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ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the second part of the thifi-first ordinary session
Paris, 2nd-5th December 1985
MONDAY,2nd DECEMBER
Morning
Meetings of political groups.
Afternoon 2.30 p.m.
l. Opening of the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the thirty-first ondinary session.
5. Action by the Presidential Committee:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the A$sembly.
6. Address by Mr. Alfred C-ahen, Secretary-General of WEU.
7. Disarmament:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Committee on Defence
Questions and Armaments.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
TUESDAY,3rd DECEMBER
Morning 930 e.m.
WEU and the strategic defence initiative:
- 
The strategic defence initiative (Defence aspects):
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on
Defence Questions and Armaments;
- 
The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Berrier on behalf of the General Affairs Committee; 
.
- Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (Proposals):
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. I*l:zer on behalf of the Committee on Scientific,
Technological and Aerospace Questions.
General debate.
Afternmn 230 p.m.
l. WEU and the strategic defence initiative.
Resumed general debate.
ll
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4 p.m.
2. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the
United Kingdom.
WEDNESDAY, 4th DECEMBER
Morning 9.30 a.m.
1. WEU and the strategic defence initiative:
Resumption and close of the general debate.
2. Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the drafi budget.
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1984 
-
The auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the motion to approve the linal accounts.
4. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial years 1984 and
1985:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van Tets on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
12.30 p.m.
5. Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister for External Relations of the French Republic.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
l. Address by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the
Council.
2. WEU and the strategic defence initiative:
Votes on the draft recommendations and draft resolution.
3. Developments in China and European security:
presentation of the report tabled by MM. Michel and van der Werff on behalf of the General
Affairs Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
THURSDAY,5th DECEMBER
Morning 9.30 a.m.
l. The European fighter aircraft for the nineties:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific,
Technological and Aerospace Questions.
Debate.
t2
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10.30 a.m.
2. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.
3. The European frghter aircraft for the nineties:
Vote on the draft recommendation.
4. Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure:
presentation of the report tabled by MM. Eysink, Spies von Brillesheim and Unland on behalf
of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
Debate.
Vote on the draft resolutions.
5. Parliaments, public opinion and defence:
presentation of the report'taUteO by Mr. Eysink on behalf of the Committee fior Parliamentary
and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the draft resolution.
CLOSE OF THE THIRTY-FIRST ORDINARY SESSION
l3
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Lcttulrom thc Prusident of the Assembly
to tlp Aaditor sabmitting the rccoants
of the Assembly for the firuncial yur 19E1
21st May 19E5
Sir,
In accordance with Article 13 of the
Financial Regulations of the WEU Assembly, I
have the honour to submit to you the accounts
for the financial year 1984 in accordance with
the statements attached hereto which refer to :
1. (a/ Summary of income and expenditure
- 
financial position as at 31st Decem-
ber 1984 (Appendix I);
fDl Statement of budget authorisations,
expenditure and unexpended credits
(Appendix II);
(c/ Contributions (Appendix III);
(d) Provident tund (Appendix IV).
2. The statement of budget authorisations,
expenditure and unexpended credits shows that
a sum of F 75 remains unexpended, whereas the
final balance of income over expenditure is
F 168,190. The difference between these two
figures, F 168,115, represents the excess of
receipts over those estimated made up as
follows:
FF
- 
Bank interest 279,386
- Sundryreceipts 13,501
- 
Sale of publica-
tions 31,051
5. Amounts in the Assetrbly's provident
fund are incorporated with tSose of the other
or3ans of WEU and the entire fund is adminis-
tered by the Secretary-General in consultation
with the Clerk of the Assembly.
On 3lst December 1984 these amounts
totalled F 2,761,413 as shown at Appendix IV.
On that date there remained two loans to two
stafrmembers amounting to F 13C,090.
The Secretary-General has continued to
receive advice from the advisory panel set up
within WEU and from outside bankers on the
investment of the funds. On 3lst December
1984 the fund was held by Montagu Investment
Management Limited in Lond(n.
I have (he honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
J.M. Cano
Presideut of the Assembly
Sir Gordon DowxrY, I(C.B.
National Audit Office
Audit House
Victoria Embankment
LONDON EC4Y ODS
Letter from thc external Auditqr to the President
of the Assembly submittinC,the rccoants
of the Assemblyfor thcfinartcialyur 19E1,
duly certified
19th taac 19Ej
Dear Sir,
I liave the honour to suSmit the accounts
of the Assembly of Western Eupopean Union for
the financial year 1984, duly oertified.
2. I also enclose my repofi as required by
Article 15 of the Financial Regglations.
Yours faithfully,
Gordon DowNev
The President of the Assembly
Western European Union
43, avenue du Pr6sident-Wilsot
75775 PARIS C-edex 16
Report of the *tental Auditor to the
Assembly of Westera EumpSn Unbn on thc
rccounts for tlu firuncW yur 1984
General
l. The following financial statements were
submitted to me by the Presidept:
- 
summary of income and expenditure
for the financial year 1984 and financial
- 
kvy on the sala-
ries of Grade A
staff 56,843
- Contributions7% 358,334
- 
Receipts for
1984 estimated
in the budget
739,115
571,000
168,1 l5
3. Excess expenditure under certain sub-
heads of the budget amounting to F 781,542 has
been met by transfers between subheads within
the same head. On the other hand, excess
expenditure under Head I 
- 
Expenditure for staff
- and Head VI - Pensions - amounting toF 153,557 and to F 45,701 have been met by
transfers from the other heads of the budget.
4. All contributions were received from the
Secretary-General WEU Iondon before 3lst
December 1984.
l5
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position as at 3lst December 1984
(Appendix I);
- 
statement of budget authorisations,
expenditure and unexpended credits for
the financial year 1984 (Appendix II) ;
- statement of sums received from the
Secretary-General of Western European
Union, London, in respect of contribu-
tions to the Western European Union
Assembly budget for 1984 (Appendix
III);
- 
account of the provident fund for the
financial year ended 31st December
1984 (Appendix IV).
2. My audit, which was carried out in accor-
dance with Article 14 of the Financial Regula-
tions of the Assembly, included an appraisal of
the Assembly's financial procedures and was
supported by such tests of the records and
transactions as appeared to me to be necessary.
Summary of income and expenditure
(Appendix I)
Financial position during 1984
3. The budget provided for expenditure of
F 15,333,200 of which F 571,000 was expected to
be covered by miscellaneous receipts and the
balance by contributions.
4. Actual expenditure in the year amountedto F 15,333,125. Income amounted to
F 15,501,315 comprising F 14,762,200 from
contributions and F 739,115 from miscellaneous
receipts. There was thus an exoess of income
over expenditure of F 168,190 arising from a
budgetary surplus of F 75 (as shown at
Appendix II) and extra miscellaneous receipts of
F 168,115.
Statement of budga afihorisations,
expenditure and unexpended credits
(Appendix II)
5. The transfers between sub'heads within the
same head of the budget were duly authorised in
accordance with Article 6 of the Financial
Regulations. These regulations ssatain no pro-
vision for the authorisation of transfers berween
heads. However, in accordance with a procedure
approved in 1973, the Secretary-General infor-
med the Council that expenditure had been
incurred in excess of budget provision on Head I(Expenditure for staff- F 153,557) and Head VI(Pensions 
- 
F 45,701), and that the total of
F 199,258 had been met from savings on other
heads.
Financial impact of extraordinary session of
Assembly
6. The financial statements include expen-
diture of F 316,512 in respect of an extra-
ordinary session of the Assembly held in Rome
in October 1984. There was no budgetary pro-
vision for this expenditure. As a result, other
expenditure totalling F 70,770, mainly in respect
of budgeted expenses connected with the
December 1984 session of the Assembly, could
not be met from the budgetary credits provided
for 1984. The expenditure has therefore been
charged to the 1985 budget. The President of
the Assembly has informed the Council of this
procedure which was adopted in order to meet
exceptional expenditure and which avoided the
need for a supplementary budget.
Providentfund
(Appendix IV)
7. The provident fund continues to operate
for those members of staff who opted to remain
affiliated to the fund when the pension scheme
was introduced. At 3lst December 1984 three
staff members were fully affiliated to the fund
and rwo others maintained balances in it. The
assets of the provident fund of the Assembly are
amalgamated with the assets of the provident
funds of the other organs of Western European
Union. At the end of the year the fund's
deposits were held in French francs, sterling
German marks and Japanese yen. Variations
in the exchange rates between the French franc
and the other currencies resulted in a net gain of
F 351 in the value of the Assembly members'
deposits during the year. This gain has been
credited to the individual accounts of the
members of the fund in proportion to their
holdings.
8. I have received a certificate from the
fund's investment managers showing the
amount of the joint deposits held at 3lst
December 1984 and confirming the share of
these deposits standing to the credit of the
Assembly's provident fund at 3lst December
1984. This share is equivalent to the balance of
F 2,761,413 on members' accounts as shown at
Appendix IV. Thus, at 3lst December 1984,
the assets of the fund were sufficient to meet its
liabilities.
9. I wish to record my appreciation of the
willing co-operation of the officers of the
Assembly during my audit.
Gordon DowNey
(Comptroller and Auditor General,
United Kingdom)
External Auditor
I9th June 1985
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APPENDIX I
Summary of incomc and *peaditurefor thefinancial year 1984
(in French francs)
Per attached statement
Assessments of member states (see Appendix III)
Miscellaneous
(A) Sundry receipts
Bankinterest....
Sundry receipts
Sale of publications
I-evy on salaries of grade A officials
(B) Pensions
Contributions (7 %)
Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.) . .. . ..
Assets
Cash atbank ...
Sundryadvances..
Accounts receivable
Expenditure under budget authorisation . . . . I 5, I 33,867
Expenditure in excess of budget authorisation on Heads I and VI . 199.258
Total expenditure (see Appendix II) ...
Excess of income over expenditure . .
Financial position os at ilst December 1984
219,386
13,501
31,051
56,843
358,334
14,762,200
739.1 1 5
15,501,315
l 5.333. l 25
E_!_6gg
4'.18,716
314,057
?4.434
F 887.207
Liabilities
Accounts payable 719,017
Excess of income over expenditure . . 168.190
F 887.207
Certified correct :
Jean-Marie Cnno Georges MouI,rls Dudley Surrn
President of the Assembly Clerk of the Assembly Chairman oflhe Committee
on Budgetary Affairs
and Administration
I certi$ that I have examined the foregoing financial statements, comprising the summary of
income and expenditure and the statement of assets and liabilities, in accordance with Article 14 of the
financial regulations of the Assembly. In my opinion the financial statements present fairly the
financial position of the Assembly of WEU at 31st December 1984, and the financipl transactions for
the year ended on that date.
Signed : Gordon Dowr.rev
Comptroller and Auditor General,
United Kingdom
External Auditor
19th June 1985
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STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDi;;
(in Fn
Total budget for
1984 I
Heao I 
- 
ExpervprruREFoRsTArr
Sub-Head I (a) Salaries of permanent establishment
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (glades A,
B, and C), including travelling expenses and insurance
Sub-Head 2 Allowances, social charges, ac.
(A) Allowances
(a) Householdallowance
(b) Children'sallowance
(c) Expatriation allowance
(d) Compensatory rent allowance
(e) Overtime(l) Guarantee against currency devaluation for non-French
staff
(g) Educationallowance
(h) Allowance for language courses
(B) Social charges
(a) Social security
(b) Supplementaryinsurance
(c) Provident fund
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and
departure of permanent fficials
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not
residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations
and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and
departure of staffand dependent persons
(c) Removal expenses
(d) Installation allowance
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials(l) Medicalexamination
(D) Provision for revising emoluments (salaries, allowances,
etc.)
5,754,000
75,000
l. Documents 954 and A/WEU/BA (E4) 4.
l8
Total of Head I
238,100
204,600
505,000
16,000
33,000
120,000
2,000
664,000
181,000
100,500
5,000
10,000
20,000
30,000
15,000
7,000
300,000
APPENDIX [I
txu
\D UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1984
ocs)
114,470
24t,355
179,908
513,772
23,978
55,066
97,lll
776
787,691
210,649
112,426
241,355
17g,90g
513,772
23,978
55,066
97,lll
776
7g7,69l
2t0,649
112,426
I r53Js? I
8,433,757
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HnIo II 
- 
EXPENDITTIRE RELATING To THE SEssIoNs oF THE ASSEMBLY
Sub-Head J l. Temporary staff
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the
Assembly
2. Linguistic staff
(A) Interpretation services
(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the
Assembly
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of com-
mrttees between sessions
(B) Translation services
Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly
3. Insurancefor temporary staf
4. Installation of equipment for sessions
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions
6. Provision for revising emoluments (salaries, per diem
allowances)
272,500
348,000
650,000
5,000
350,000
82,500
80,500
Total of Head II
HBlo III 
- 
ExppNDrruRE oN pREMrsEs AND EeUIrMENT
l. Premises
2. Work on the building
Capital equipment
433,000
30,000
73,000
Total of Head III
20
DETAITS Total budget for
1984
745,500
2,534,000
Sub-Head 4
Sub-Head 5
536,000
APPENDIX II
ll4,2l4 859,714
363,319
291,294
569,928
5,000
338, I 35
106,620
363,319
291,284
569,928
3,423
277,359
106,620
229,153 2,471,646
401,927
30,000
104,073
359,419
30,000
t04,073
42,508
31,073
2l
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Hnao tV 
- 
GBT.TERALADMIMSTRATTvE cosrs
Sub-Head 6 Postage, telephone, telex charges, transport of documents
Sub-Head 7 Office supplies and hire of machines
SubHead 8 Printing and publishing of Assembly documents
SubHead 9 Purchase of documents, reference works, etc.
Sub-Head 10 Official cars
Sub-Head 11 Bank charges
447,0W
299,000
1,333,000
40,000
40,500
s00
Total of Head IV
HBeo V 
- 
OruenExPENDrruRE
Sub-Head 12 Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the
President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and
rapporteurs
Sub-Head 13 Expenses for representation and receptions
Sub-Head 14 Committee study missions
SubHead 15 Official journeys of members of the Offrce of the Clerk
Sub-Head 16 Expenses of experts and the auditor
Sub-Head 17 Expenditure on information
Sub-Head 18 Expenses for groups of the Assembly
Sub-Head 19 Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere pro-
vided for
Sub-Head 20 Non-recoverable taxes
125,000
150,000
3,000
290,000
68,000
253,000
253,000
3,000
12,000
Total of Head V 1,157,000
Heao VI 
- 
PENSIoNS
Sub-Head 2/ Pensions, allowances, etc.
(A) Pensions
(a/ Retirement pension
(b) lnvalidity pension
(c/ Survivors'pension
(d) Orphans'pension
(B) Allowances
(a/ Household allowance
(b) Dependants' allowance
(c) Edtcation allowance
(d) Rclief allowance
(C) Severance grant
(D) Supp lementary insurance
381,600
170,300
40,800
20,300
16,500
30,500
8,000
The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 3lst December 1984, and paid for up to 3lst Ma
Jean-Marie Cnno
President of the Assembly
Geo4
Clerk of t22
APPENDIX II
Transfers
+
Total after
transfers
Total
expenditure
Unexpended
credits
11,296
11,296 435,704
288,000
1,333,000
40,000
51,796
500
421,967
258,319
1,302,716
36,513
51,796
t7
13,837
29,681
30,284
3,487
483
11,296 11,296 2,149,0@ 2,071,229 77,772
18,714
l,0l I
63,557
7,944
35,000
17,000
39,226
90,000
168,714
4,01I
353,557
51,000
213,774
253,000
3,000
19,944
89, I 33
t68,714
4,01I
353,557
50,442
200,686
253,000
814
19,944
867
t,,
13,088
2,186
91,226 91,226 1,157,000 1,140,301 16,699
42,598
262
487
9,324
3,056
32,383
8,243
9,523
5,578
349,217
212,898
41,062
12,057
16,987
20,977
2,422
9,324
12,056
349,217
212,898
41,062
12,057
16,987
20,977
2,422
55,025
12,056
55,727 55,727 677,000 722,70t
781,542 78t,542 15,333,200 15,333,125 75
i5, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.
)r.rLrAs Dudley Sr,rmr
seinbly Chairman of the Committee on23 Budsetary Allairs and Administration
45,701
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APPENDIX III
STATEMENT OF SUMS RECETVED FROM THE SECRETARY.GENERAL
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY
BI.JDGET FOR T984
Member states 600rhs
Contributions
overpaid
in 1983
Budget surplus
1983
Budget
for 1984
(Revised)
Net
contributions
required
Belgium
France
Federal Republic of
Germany
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
United Kingdom
59
120
120
120
2
59
120
(-) I11,088
(-) I I1,088
(-) 1,852
(-) 54,619
(-) I I1,088
(-)
(-)
F
54,619
1l1,088
F
172,559
350,967
(-) 350,967
(-) 350,967
(-) 5,849
c) 172,559
(-) 350,967
(-)
(-)
F
1,451,616
2,952,440
2,952,440
2,952,440
49,209
1,451,616
2,952,440
F
1,224,438
2,490,395
2,490,385
2,490,385
4t,507
1,224,438
2,490,385
600 (-) 555,442 (-) 1,754,835 14,762,200 12,451,923
Amounts paid by the Secretariat-General to the Assembly
1983 budget surplus
1984 budget
13,007,365
1,754,835
@
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APPENDIX IV
PROYIDENT F'I.'ND
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR EI\DED 31st DECEMBER 1984
in French francs
Jean-Marie cnno ceorsgg Mouu.rs 
. choir*il"#:lrtffi*ur* onPresident of the Assembly Clerk of the Assembly nuisitary iflirii, ina iaiiniitiatton
I ccrti& that I have examined the foregoiag account. In my opinion the aecount presents fairty the finaqoial Dositioo of the providont fund at 31st December 1984.
Gordon Dowxsv
Comptroller and Auditor General, United Kingdom
19th June 1985 External Auditor
B alance b r oug ht forw ar d :
Accounts of staff members as at lst January
1984
Contributions of staff members and of the
Assembly of Western European Union
Repayments of loans by staffmembers
Interest received during the year
Gain on valuation at 3lst December 1984
F
2,437,070
167,294
51,460
192,936
351
2.849.111
Withdrawals
Management fee
Accounts of existing staff members as at
3lst December 1984
F
74,800
12,898
2,76L,413
2.849.t11
EElnz
U
X
Boe
EIz
-.1
otJ\o
Document 1029, Addendum 23rd September 1985
Accounts of the odministative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1984
The Assembly,
Havi-ng examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1984, together with
the auditor's report, in accordance with Anicle l6 of the financial regulations,
Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial
responsibility.
MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1984 
'
submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Alfairs and Administation2
by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
_2,..M1mlen of the committgg. 
.li1 Dudlel Smith (Chairrnan); MM. Haase, Beix (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens, Biefnot,\o\1, 21d911, Ferrari Aggladi (Alternater .Mitterdorfer\ rosChi lelternate; Giusi), Freeson, j6".U-n, Linster, uorrii,Oehler, Pollidoro, Raulj, Schmitz, Stokes (Alternate: Sir GeoJfrey Fiisberg), van Tets,"deyies, Zierer.
N.B. ?'fte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Document 1030 24th September 1985
DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1986 '
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administratbn2
by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ExpraNnronv MeMon tNoulvl
submitted by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur
l. Political orders
2. Operating budget
2.1. General
2.2. Analysis of expenditure
2.3. Analysis of receipts
2.4. Summary of estimates
3. Pensions budget
3.1. Analysis of expenditure
3.2. Analysis of receipts
Suuu.qny oF EsrrMATEs oF ExpENDrruRE AND RECEIpTs FoR THE FINANCIAT venn 1986
Bupcer Esrnraares
Part I : Operatingbudget
Section A: Expenditure
Section B: Receipts
Part lI : Pensions budget
Section A: Expenditure
Section B : Receipts
ApprNorcrs
I. Organogram of the Oflice of the Clerk of the Assembly
II. Recapitulation of changes in the staffof the OfIice of the Clerk proposed in the 1986
budget
III. Salaries of staffrecruited for Assembly sessions
IV. Three-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment of the
OIIice of the Clerk
V. Comparison between the various budget heads and total amounts in the 1985 and
I 986 budgets (percentage)
VI. Foreseeable trend ofpensions in the period 1986-90
VII. Trend of the real increase in Assembly budgets for the financial years 1983-86
l. Adopted in committee by 6 votes to 2 with 3 abstentions and approved by the Presidential Committee.
2. Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); MM. Haase, Beix (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aldriaensens, B.iefnot,
Bohl, Enders, Ferrari Aggradi (Alternate: Mitterdorfer), Foschi (Alternale: Giust), Freeson, Jeambrun, Linsler, Morris, Oehler,
Pollidoro, Rauti, Schmitz, Stokes (Alternate: Sr Geolfrey Finsberg), van Tets, de Vries, Zierer.
N.B. Iie names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submilted by Sir Dadley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteat)
I. Political orders
1. At the May 1985 session, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, presenting a report on the activities of the Presi-
dential Committee, underlined that since the ministerial meeting in Paris on l2th June 1984 Western
European Union had entered a period of reactivation and restructuration, the guidelines for which were
laid down in the Rome declaration of 27th October 1984.
2. He also recalled that at the December 1984 session the Assembly had drawn the first conclusions
concerning the reactivation of WEU, inter alia instructing the Presidential Committee in Order 58 " to
establish permanent liaison arrangements with the Council or its presidency and to see that the
Assembly is enabled to bring to a successful conclusion its mission in working out a new and more
important r6le for WEU ".
3. At the close of its ministerial meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985, the WEU Council
underlined the important r6le of the WEU Assembly and paid tribute to its active contribution to the
revitalisation of WEU.
4. At its May 1985 session, the Assembly, whose aim is to give the Council its full support in the
fundamental task of bringing about the political conditions for asserting a European personality in the
various bodies contributing to Europe's security, said it expected the Council to give it the wherewithal
to pursue fruitful co-operation with it. To this end, it instructed the PresidentialCommittee:
- 
in Order 59 to give favourable consideration to the proposals the Assembly was soon to make
for improving its conditions of work;
- 
in Order 60 to consider and discuss with the chairmen of the permanent committees the organ-
isation of a mini-session of committee meetings to be held before the December part-session,
in suflicient time to allow reports to be circulated two weeks before the Assembly first sits.
5. Finally, at its meeting on l9th February 1985, the Presidential Committee decided to defer until
1986 the preparation of a brief on the political union of Europe, which was the subject of a motion for
an order tabled by Mr. Tummers and others on 5th December 1984.
2. Operating budget
2.1. General
6. All the orders mentioned above give a precise outline of the political context in which the
Assembly's budgetary estimates for 1986 should be placed.
7. Since its creation, the Assembly's activities have expanded although its secretariat has remained
very small (additionally affected by the loss of an hors cadre post) and in all evidence its means have
become increasingly out-of-date and ill-suited to meeting the demands of its heavier workload.
8 The Assembly's participation in the reactivation of WEU therefore necessarily means changing
its structures and equipment. In other words, like the ministerial organs, it has to revise its budget.
It would in fact be paradoxical to consider that only the Assembly's tasks are unaffected by the reaciiv-
ation of WEU when consideration is being given to increasing the number of staff of the Secretariat-
General and giving it new means by making use of sums available in the budget due, in particular, to
the change in the tasks of the Agency for the Control of Armaments.
9. As a result, the draft budget for 1986 now before you reflects the Assembly's real requirements
without taking account of the zero growth criterion. Here it should be underlined that apart from
requirements connected with the reactivation of WEU this criterion can no longer be applied in the
manner indicated by the Council (the rate of increase in the total net budget must be equal to or, even
better, lower than the inflation rate shown by the general index of consumer prices) since its application
would inevitably lead to a progressive reduction of resources in real terms and in the long run a cutback
in the Assembly's activities.
10. This is due to the fact that most budget sub-heads are not represented in the basket of consumer
prices serving as a basis for the assessment of price increases and they are liable to vary considerably in
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the light of market conditions. In fact, the rise in the cost of services and equipment under these sub-
heads has been distinctly higher than the average inflation rate.
11. Moreover, the adverse effects of applying this criterion are well known since over the years it has
led to a reduction in real terms of sums granted involving, as was the case in 1985, a cutback in activ-
ities. It would be more objective to caliulate budgetaryidjustments for each category of expenditure
in accordance with the inflation rate for each category.
12. In preparing the budget for 1986, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration took
account of the fact that in order to carry out its tasks in the new political context creatbd by the Rome
declaration the Assembly must be able to develop its relations with the Council and with other
parliamentary assembliei and enjoy a certain degree of flexibility in organising its debates. and
iommittee meetings. It must also be able to give due dimensions to the projects it con$iders politically
essential.
13. But in this it needs the assistance of a qualified, suitably-equipped secretariat and experts from
the Council's agencies. It must also have the resources it needs to organise its meetings, committee
visits and public relations.
14. The operating budget for 1986, as analysed below, indicates under the various heads the
estimates which correspond to the Assembly's requirements thus defined.
15. Compared with the budget for 1985, there are the following differences :
1986 l 985 Difference Increase
Total expenditure. .
Net total.
19,961,300
19,557,300
15,628,400
15,170,400
4,332,900
4,436,900
27.72%
28.91%
16. This is a large increase compared with the previous year, but can be reduced considerably (to
below 20%) 1f the comparison takes into account the trend of Assembly budgets in the last three years.
There was-in fact a d-ecrease in real terms in the operating budgets for 1984 and 1985 (cf. Appen-
dix VII).
17. Moreover, in view of the size of this increase the Committee on Budgetary Aflairs and Adminis-
tration considered it necessary to indicate the order of priority which should be attributed to the
various categories of expenditure.
18. This order is as follows :
- 
first priority: expenditure connected with the activities of Assembly bodies (travelling
expenses, recruitment of experts, sums allocated to the political groups, etc.);
- 
second priority: modernisation of equipment;
- 
third priority: creation of new posts in the Oflice of the Clerk.
19. In the third-priority category, the new posts whose creation is requested are also listed in order of
priority.
2.2. Analysis of expenditure
20. Since the technical criteria followed when preparing the budget are described in qhe explanations
following each head, the criteria governing the assessment of requirements will be given in this explana-
tory meirorandum, particularly requirements stemming from application of the orders referred to in
section I above.
HeadI-Permanentstalf
21. (a) The Office of the Clerk of the Assembly includes (see organogram at Appendix I):
- 
the private oflice of the President;
- 
committee services;
- 
administrative service;
- 
external relations and information service;
- 
translations and publications service.
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22. (b) Pivate offrce of the President. By adopting Amendment I to the draft budget of the
Assembly for the financial year 1985 tabled by Sir Paul Hawkins, the Assembly recognised the need to
all.ow its 
_P_resident, like his colleagues in other European assemblies, to be assisted by a head of theprivate oflige. The Council having rejected this proposal, the creation of a permanent Grade 43 post
should again be requested in the 1986 budget. The creation of this post would allow a head of the
private office to be recruited for the term of office of each President.
23. (c/ The committee services include the committees of the Assembly except for the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the documentation section.
2a. 
. _L1a_doptrng the budgets of recent financial years, the Assembly expressed the opinion that it
would be desirable to strengthen this service by the addition of a GradcA3 officiat to assiit committees
according to requirements, draft minutes and replace secretaries in the event of absence.
25. The increase in committee work makes this new post essential and urgent.
26. Moreover, two assistants should be recruited capable of operating word processors : one would be
assigned to the assistant to the committee service and the other to the Committee for Parliamentary
and Public Relations which has so far had to work in a state of permanent emergency.
27.- 
. 
(d).The reorganisation of the administrative service can no longer be deferred. The preparation
and implementation of the bydggt, accounting and bookkeeping, -organising committee meetings,
pre-paring sessions and symposia, financing journeys by the President, rapporteurs and members of tlhe
Qffice- of the Cl.erk, recruiting and paying temporary officials (approximalely 500 contracts per year),the administration of the permanent staff.and keeping their files, including-security files, tlie oigani-
sation of security services and the supervision of general services represent an incieased task ritrictr
cannot be intemrpted.
2!. To cope with tle multiplicity- and complexity of these duties, the service, led by one Grade 45
offrcial, has only one Grade 86 chief accountant and a Grade 83 assistant to the head of service.
29. The disproportion between the magnitude of this service's tasks and the staff available is
evident. One only has to compare the staff of the ministerial organs of WEU in London and in Paris
to see the precarious situation in which this service operates r.
30. It is not unimportant to note that the small number of staffassigned to the administrative service
of the Assembly- does not allow the duties of each official to be defined accurately. The chief
accountant and the assistant (Graqe 83 shorthand/typist) help each other in all areas wilhout it beingpossible to make a breakdown of duties in accordance with certain universal principles such as th6
separation between the duties ofaccountancy and ofbookkeeping.
3l. In view of the fact that the grolvt! in the Assembly's activities in all areas is tending to aggravate
this situation, it seems important to make provision at least for the creation of a Grade B3=boo[[eeping
post.
32. Furthermore, if it is considered that the assistant to the head of service has duties extending well
beyond tle attributions of a bilingual shorthand/typist, it would be only legitimate and fair to maki this
a Grade 84 post.
33_. (-e) Th9 press and external relations service and the translations and publications service have
asked for no increase in staffat the present juncture. They are able to recruif temporary staf! which is
oocuueNr 1030
1. The staffof the administrative senrices of the ministerial organs in London and in Paris and those of the Assembly are
as follows:
London Paris Assembly
Head of division. lA5
1A3
lA2
l84
l83
l84
l4,6
lA5
tA4
3B.4
l84
l83
2B.2
lA5
l86
r83
Head of finance and administrative section
Assistant head ofthe finance and administrative sect
Assistant head of division
Administrator
Chief
Accountants
Assistant to the head ofdivision
Administrative assist
Assista
6 l0 3
30
DOCUMENT IO3O
not the case for committee services and the administrative service for which only pormanent offrcials
have the required experience to perform the duties ofthese services efliciently.
34. (/) ln the revision of strengths, it is necessary to ask for the creation of a pqst of chauffeur to
drive the oflicial car.
35. The availability of a chaufleur would allow this car to be used for the President of the Assembly
too and, insofar as possible, dispense with the practice of occasionally hiring a chauffeur-driven car
which the frequent presence of the President at the seat of the Assembly makes extremely costly.
36. In the explanations relating to the estimates under Sub-Head 22 "Offtcial caps", it is specified
that the cost of hirin g a cat in this way would be not less than F 140,000 per year, which corresponds to
the annual salary of a Grade C3 chauffeur.
37. It is also important to note that whereas the Assembly at present has only one car without
chauffeur the minisierial organs in Paris have two chauffeurs and two cars and the Secretariat-General
in London also has two chauffeurs and two cars.
38. (S) To sum up, estimates of expenditure in the 1986 budget should take accoultt of the f-ollowing
variatioirs in the stringth of the Office of the Clerk, which are listed according to the order of priority
attributed to each new post:
Creation of new posts
First priority:
Second priority:
Third priority:
Fourth priority:
Fifth priority:
Sixth priority:
Regrading
I Grade 83 accountant
I Grade 83 assistant for the Committee for Parliamentary
and Public Relations
I Grade ,A3 assistant committee secretary
I Grade 83 assistant to the assistant committee secretary
I Grade ,A.3 head of the private oflice
1 Grade C3 chauffeur
F
171,000
185,000
350,000
160,000
300,000
140,000
1,200
1,307 2OO
Post of assistant to the head of administration from Grade 83 to Grade 84
Head II 
- 
Temporary stalf
39. Assembly Orders 58 and 60, referred to in section l, have serious financial ir$ptcations fo-r this
head of the budget. Meetings of the body for liaison with the Council provided fdr in Order 58 and
twice-yearly sessions of committees in the capital of one of the member countries flIean that teams of
interpieteri have to be recruited. If it is considered that a full team (two booths, four interpreters)
costJbetween F 10,000 and F 15,000 approximately per day at current rates, depending on whether the
interpreters are recruited locally or not (in the latter case, travelling expenses have to be added), it can
be seen that implementation of these two orders would require additional sums avdraging approxima-
tely F 200,000.
40. Estimates under this head also take account of the fact that the sittings and interpretation
services have to be strengthened during Assembly sessions because of the large number of meetings of
political goups and committees, which has been the case for several sessions.
41. In the 1986 budget, it is therefore proposed to increase the number of interpreters recruited
during sessions from twtlve to fourteen. The same is true of the security service ulhich is demanding
an increase of two in the team of ushers if the security measures now necessary are to be implemented.
42. In addition to this expenditure resulting from the proposed reactivation of WEU, there are the
increases in the salaries of temporary staff who, particularly in certain highly-qualified categories
(verbatim reporters, pr6cis writers and parliamentary secretaries), represent a very. high percentage(tZ to l3%). - This is due to the policy followed by the co-ordinated organisations_which seeks to bring
ihe salaries offered closer to rates on the private market: without this revaluation it would be
impossible to recruit such staff.
3l
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43.. It is expecte-4 that the cost of recruiting a documentalist to prepare the brief on European political
union would be offset by savings under Sub-Head 8 of this head, provided the creation of ihe new posts
requested in Head I is authorised.
Head III 
- 
Expenditure on premises and equipment
44. Estimates under Sub-Heads l0 to 14 of this head are merely a renewal of last year's sums, these
being moreover almost entirely under the control of the international secretariat of ihe SAC, which is
responsible for co-ordinating and managing joint expenditure programmes.
45. 
_ 
Conversely, estimates under Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17, details of which are given in the three-year
modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment of the Office bf tne Clerk given at
Appendix IV, show a considerable increase comparQd with sums granted for 1985.
46. This is due to the fact that the improvement in the Assembly's working conditions, which was
the lrbjsgl of Order 59 referred to in section l, can be achieved only by modernising the equipment of
the Oflice of the Clerk, together with the revision of its structure as set out in Head I.-
47. In this connection, the following considerations illustrate and justiff the proposals for new
equipment contained in the three-year programme :
48. (a) For its sessions the Assembly has had the benefit of equipment on loan from a few firms free
of charge, i.e. :
- 
from Gestetner: 3 type 309 offset machines;
2 stereotypers for offset;
2 type 2002 and 2006 photocopiers;
- 
from Rank Xerox: 1 type 1075 photocopier;
- 
from Canon: 1 type 305 photocopier.
49. However, these firms have informed us that at the present economic juncture it will no longer be
possible to provide this equipment free of charge. This diffrculty can but make working conditions
worse for the reproduction service which is already in difliculty because of the considerable increase in
the volume of its work. It is therefore necessary to improve this service's equipment, which at the
moment has two offset machines and one stereotyper, by purchasing a third offset machine and a
second stereotyper, the first remaining in service as long as its condition allows.
50. (b) Ithas been proved that the word-processing equipment obtained last year meets our require-
ments from the standpoint of efliciency and cost. It is not without importance to underline that the
hire of five wgrd processors has, as expected, allowed considerable savings to be made, easily covering
the cost of their hire.
51. The system must now be completed by the purchase of three more word processors, thus
allowing other types of work to be computerised and further savings to be made in the cost of printing
documents.
52. 
. 
It sh-ould be possible to save about F 100,000 and this sum has been deducted from printing costs
under the following head.
l!. 
-fnp cost of purchasing these three word processors is included in the three-year programme(F 29_0,000). Should this seem too much for a single financial year, the leasing metLod used for the
lrst five word processors might be adopted, which would involve an annual expenditure of F 85,000 forfive years.
54. (c) Th9 conversion of three electronic typewriters (for the private office of the President, the
secretariat of the Clerk and the secretariat of the Head of Administration) into an electronic screen
system would be desirable to facilitate the work of the assistants concerned when preparing the many
documents emanating from their respective secretariats.
55. 
. 
(d) The acquisition of a personal computer with wages and bookkeeping software is the only way
to adapt the accounting service (which includes only one person at the present time) to the growing
requirements of the Assembly. This computer was already requested in the 1985 budget.
56, (e) As matters now stand, the Assembly can provide the temporary services during sessions with
only seventeen electric typewriters which are very old models and ihe number of which is diminishing
since, no longer being on the market, they can no longer be repaired. The Oflice of the Clerk is therel
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fore obliged to provide temporary staffwith very old mechanical typewriters which are kept mainly to
allow secretarial work to be continued in the event of electricity cuts.
57. No longer familiar with the use of such machines, temporary staff are coristantly asking for
machines of better performance in order to ease their work and make it more eflidient. It therefore
seems essential to replace these machines progressively with effect from 1986.
58. (/) Another problem which is raised repeatedly is the installation of a telex. A telex is made
available to members of the Assembly during sessions but the Oflice of the Clerk is not equipped with
one. In spite of the unfavourable opinion given by the Budget Committee in Ldndon, the general
advantages of such an installation cannot be denied, as has been pointed out by many parliamenta-
rians. It therefore seems essential to make provision for installing a telex in the Offrce of the Clerk in
l 986.
59. (g) Finally, it has become urgent to replace certain oflice furniture. First and foremost provi-
sion should be made for purchasing furniture meeting the correct medically-agreed working conditions
for assistants using word processors.
Head IV 
- 
General administrative costs
60. Estimates under this head call for the following remarks :
61. (a) An increase of F 100,000 in the estimate for Sub-Head 18 is proposed to meet the growing
volume of all forms of communication, particularly by telex, whose installation is requested in 1986.
62. (b) In spite of the increase in the volume of work, estimates for the purchase of paper and other
office supplies have risen very little due to the trend of prices in this sector. This is possible thanks to
the use of more rational methods of work aimed at reducing paper consumption.
63. (c) The cost of printing and publishing documents is affected by the brief on the political union
of Europe to be prepared in 1986 in accordance with the decision of the President*ial Committee, as
indicated in section 1.
64. However, up to F 100,000 of the cost of printing this brief, estimated at F 150;000, can be offset
by savings which it will be possible to make in printing costs thanks to the purchase bf three new word
processors.
65. Compared with 1985, there is therefore an average increase of 9% in the e$timate under this
sub-head (paper and labour), plus F 50,000 for the publication mentioned above.
66. (d) The recruitment of a chauffeur allows the lowest possible estimate under Sub-Head 22
"Oflicial cars", including the cost of repairs, garage, petrol, etc., for the offrcial car. As indicated in
the explanations to Head IV, if the recruitment of a chauffeur is not authorised, sums under this
sub-head will have to be increased by F 140,000 to allow a chauffeur-driven car to be hired for the
President when he is present in the Paris oflices.
Head V 
- 
Other expenditure
67. As indicated in the analysis of expenditure under Head II, Assembly Orders 58 and 60 have
serious financial implications for the interpretation service and also affect estimates under Sub-Head 27
since the new programme of work of the Assembly bodies necessarily requires the availability of sums
allowing members of the Oflice of the Clerk to attend committee sessions and meetings of the
committee for relations with the Council which are not held in Paris.
68. To this end, sums requested in 1986 for oflicial travel are F 140,000 higher than those granted in
1985, which represents a strict assessment of requirements in the light of the increas0 in travelling and
per diem allowances.
69. An increase of F 50,000 in sums requested for the expenses of experts is due to the fact that the
kind of study to be conducted in the context of the reactivation of WEU is expected to require greater
recourse to experts in the various areas of defence policy, armaments control and disarmament.
70. Finally, there are considerable increases in estimates for the travelling expense$ of the President
of the Assembly, committee chairmen and rapporteurs (F 100,000), the expenses of political groups(F 100,000) and representation expenses (F 50,000).
71. Your Rapporteur considers that the activities of the Assembly bodies which are likely to increase
in the context of the reactivation of WEU - to which there have been many references in this expla-
natory memorandum 
- 
fully justiff these increases which, moreover, represent the minimum essential
for exercising such activities.
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2.3, Analysis olrecipts
7-2. 
- 
The greater interest being shown by the mass media and public towards WEU since
declaration augur wider circulation of WEU Assembly publications. Estimates underpublications " for 1986 are therefore double those of last yiar.
73. Estimates for other types of receipts are based on provisions in force and on experience.
the Rome
" Sale of
2.4. Sumrury of esrirrrult s
7.4. 4. t!rP."ty of operating budget estimates for 1986 (expenditure and receipts) is given atAppendix V.
75. In this table an indication_is given of the proportion of total expenditure and the net total (expen-diture less receipts) represente{ by each head of the budget. For comparison, data retatingio iili9g5
budget are given in the same table.
,:'::;::;y#,."
76- Estimate{l expenditure on- pensions in 198_6, taking into account the same changes in scales as forpermanent staff, is higher than for the previous financial year because of the retiremeit of tt"o Grade A
oflicials.
!7. . Mopover, foreseealle.expenditule for 1985 will exceed estimates because of the payment of aleaving allowance to an official who resigned during the year.
78. Appendix VI to this budget-shows the foreseeable trend of expenditure on pensions for the next
five-years, based on t:."g. gf {tatr It can be_ 
-seen 
that this expenditure is futly c-ovired until igAT by
-staff contributions (7%) and theoretical WEU contributions (tegO), which aie not included in thi:budget.
79. 
- 
As from 1988, expenditure will exceed receipts, but it is logical to bear in mind the sums
reimbursed to member states for validation of past service and it can 5e considered that the administra-
tion of pensions will be positive for several years to come.
3,2, Aaalysis of rcccipts
80- 
- 
Receipts in the-budget come from the serving staffs contributions to the pension scheme,
calculated at the rate of7% ofbasic salaries.
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Summary of estimatu of *penditure and receipts
lor the financial year 1986
Details Expenditure Receipts
Pnnr I Operating
Section A:
Head I:
Head II:
Head III:
Head IV:
Head V:
Section B:
budget
Expenditure
Permanent staff
Temporary staff
Expenditure on premises
equipment
General administrative costs
Other expenditure
Receipts
Nsr rorar
and
Pnnr II Pensions budget
Section A:
Head I:
Expenditure
Pensions, allowances and social
charges
Receipts
Nrr rorer,
Section B:
Nsr rorer BUDGET
10,877,000
3,036,400
1,909,100
2,420,500
1,718,300
404,000
19,961,300 404,000
19,557,300
19,961,300 19,96r,300
940,000
476,000
940,000 476,000
464,000
940,000 940,000
20,021,300
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Budget estimates
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET
Section A - Expenditure
HeodI-Permanentstaff
Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
1986
Sums
authorised
for 1985
Expected
expenditure
in 1985
Sub-Head I - Basic salaries
Sub-Head 2 - Allowances:
2.1. Expatriationallowance
2.2. Household allowance
2.3. Allowance for children and
other dependent persons
2.4. Rent allowance
2.5. Education allowance
2.6. Allowance for language
courses
2.7. Overtime
2.8. Home leave
Sub-Head 3 - Social charges:
3.1. Social security
3.2. Supplementary insurance
3.3. Provident fund
1,060,000
270,000
130,000
15,000
80,000
70,000
665,000
335,000
315,000
42,000
90,000
2,000
50,000
30,000
Sub-Head 4 - Expenses relating to the recruitment and
departure of permanent oflicials
4.1. Travelling expenses of can-
didates for vacant posts
4.2. Travelling expenses on arri-
val and departure of per-
manent officials and their
families
4.3. Removal expenses
4.4. Installation allowance
15,000
Sub-Head 5 - Medical examination
Torer or Heeo I .....
7,700,000
1,529,000
1,460,000
180,000
9,000
6,330,000
l,195,000
1,192,000
8.000
6,300,000
1,180,000
I,190,000
5,600
8,000
10,877,000 8,725,000 8,683,600
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Explanations
Sub-Heads 1 and 2
Estimates under these two sub-heads cover emoluments (basic salary and allowances) paid to
permanent staffin acordance with Chapter III of the StaffRules of the Oflice of thd Clerk of the WEU
Assembly. They are calculated on the basis of scales in force on lst January 1985 2, adjusted in
accordance with the following expected increase :
4.5% as from 1st July 1985 (this adjustment taking account of the foreseeable rate of inflation and
the eflects of the variation in economic parity between France and
Belgium),
5% as from lstJuly 1986.
No adjustment is provided for in respect of the first half of 1986 since the foreseeable increase in
the cost of-living for -that period is less than 3%. Adjustments taken into dccount amount to
F 690,000.
A list of staff of the Offrce of the Clerk, showing their grades and duties, is given at Appendix II.
This appendix also shows proposed changes compared with the financial year 1985. Justification for
these changes is given in the explanatory memorandum.
Sub-Head 3
Estimated expenditure for " Social charges " is based on commitments stemming from:
- 
application of the social security agreement signed between Western Eurodean Union and the
Government of the French Republic on 2nd June 1979 (Sub-Head 3.1) 3;
- application of the convention on complementary collective insurance (Sub-Head 3.2) a;
- 
application of Article 27 of the Staff Rules providing for the employer's contribution to the
Plovident Fund, amounting to 14% of basic salary, for staff not affiliated to the pension
scheme (Sub-Head 3.3).
Sub-Head 4
As can be seen from the sub-heads concerned, the sum requested is to cover the cost of recruiting
new staff. Under " Removal expenses ", account has been taken of the fact that one of the two Grade
A o{Iicials due to retire in 1986 will be leaving Paris.
In the column " Expected expenditure in 1985 " has been included the sum paid to a Grade B
oflicial who left the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly to take up a similar post in the Secretariat-
General in London.
Sub-Head 5
The sum requested is to cover the cost of the medical check-up which all nlembers of the staff
must undergo under Article 9 of the StaffRules. Medical check-ups for WEU staff in Paris are carried
out at the OECD medical centre.
2. These scales are worked out by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts and approved by the WEU
Council and the Councils of the othei co-ordinated organisations (NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, ESA). In accordance with
the committee's 1 59th report, salaries are adjusted with effect from I st July of each year. Furthermore, should the cost of living
between lst July and 3lst December rise by more than 3% a corresponding percentage adjustment is made. (This threshold,
initially 2%, was raised to 3% in the l9lst report).
3. Ulder this agreement, WEU staffbenefit from the French general scheme, with the exception of farhily allowances and old-
age penslons.
4. Under this convention, WEU staff benefit from complementary insurance in the event of sickness or temporary or
permanent disability. Furthermore, in the event of the death of an insured person, the insurance company pays a lump sum to
the beneficiaries he has nominated.
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Heod II - Temporary stalf
Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
1986
Sums
authorised
for 1985
Expected
expenditure
in 1985
Sub-Head 6 - Staff recruited for sessions
6.1. Sittings service
6.2. Interpretation service
6.3. Translation service
6.4. Other services
of the Assembly
1,079,000
389,000
790,000
50,000
for Assembly
, of the Clerk
Sub-Head 7 - Interpretation staff required :
work between sessions
Sub-Head 8 - Temporary staff for the Oflice
Sub-Head 9 - Social charges
9.1. Insurance for temporary
staff other than interpreters
9.2. Provident fund for interpre-
ters
9.3. Insurance for interpreters
4,200
100,000
4,200
2,3og,oo0
560,000
60,000
108,400
1,850,000
350,000
60,000
89,800
1,820,000
350,000
80,000
86,400
3,036,400 2,349,800 2,336,400
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Explanations
Sub-Head 6
Estimates under this sub-head relate to:
(a) Salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, allowances for travelling time and the
reimbursement of travelling expenses of temporary staff recruited for sessions (sittings, interpretation
and translation services). A list of such stafi, showing their respective duties and balaries, is given at
Appendix III. As specified in the explanatory memorandum, two additional interpreters and two
additional ushers will be recruited for sessions. Salaries are calculated in accordance with scales in
force on lst January 1985 in the co-ordinated organisations (on the basis of salaries paid to permanent
staffof comparable grades), adjusted in the same way as for permanent staff, i.e.:
4.5% increase as from lst July 1984;
5% increase for 1985.
These adjustments amount to F 135,000.
In application of the agreement signed between the co-ordinated organisations and the
Internationii Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI), the salaries of interproters are calculated
on the basis of the scale in force for Grade I-,$.8 stafl plus 6%.
(b) Lump-sum payments made to staff recruited for various services during sessions (doctor, post
office technician, typewriter mechanic, roneo stafi etc.).
Sub-Head 7
This sub-head shows the sums paid to interpreters recruited for simultaneous interpretation at
meetings of parliamentarians between sessions (salaries and where appropriate per diem allowances,
travelling time and travelling expenses).
Estimates are based on a total of 200 working days (of which 120 in Paris bnd 80 elsewhere).
Salaries and working conditions are the same as for interpreters recruited for sessions (cf. Sub-Head
6). Their salary adjustment for 1986 amounts to F 30,000.
Sub-Head I
Estimates under this sub-head relate to the salaries of additional staff of a[ grades which the
Office of the Clerk may have to recruit in 1986. They include an overall sum for salaries, possible
travelling expenses and insurance.
Although exceptional expenditure due to the temporary recruitment for two months of a
documentalisi to prepare the brief on * The political union of Europe " is included ynder this sub-head,
the sum requested iJthe same as in 1985 since it is expected that fewer staffwill have to be recruited
from outside due to the creation of two new posts of assistant and one new post of accountant,
requested under Head I.
Sub-Head 9
Estimates under this sub-head correspond to the following social charges:
Insurancefor temporary staJf other than interpreters
Staff recruited for the Assembly sessions are insured with the Van Breda insurance company
against the risks of death, accident or sickness, 60% of the premium being paid by the Offrce of the
Clerk and 40% by staff
P r ov i dent fund for i nt er pret er s
In accordance with the agreement between the co-ordinated organisations and the IACI, WEU
has to pay into the conference interpreters' provident fund or, where appropriate, another provident
fund, a contribution of l4%, which is added to a contribution of 7% by interpreters.
I nsur anc e fo r int er pret ers
A Lloyds insurance policy, taken out through the intermediary of Ste'ryart Wdghtson in Lon4on,
covers inte4ireters for accidenti, sickness and temporary or perrnanent disability prdventing-the4 fro-m
working. fwo-thirds of premiums are paid by the Oflice of the Clerk and one-third by the
interpreters.
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Heod III - Erpenditure on premises and equipment
Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
1986
Sums
authorised
for 1985
Expected
expenditure
in 1985
Sub-Head l0 - Share of joint expenditure
premises
I I - Hire of committee rooms
12 - Technical and other
Assembly sessions
13 - Various services for the
sessions
Sub-Head
Sub-Head installations for
Sub-Head organisation of
Sub-Head 14 - Maintenance of the premises of the Office
of the Clerk
Sub-Head 15 - Purchase or repair of offrce furniture
Sub-Head 16 - Purchase of reproduction and other oflice
equipment
Sub-Head 17 - Hire and maintenance of reproduction and
other offrce equipment
Paris
470,000
15,000
340,000
45,000
15,000
79,500
594,800
349,800
430,000
15,000
315,000
27,000
15,000
10,000
75,000
272,000
430,000
4,200
320,000
40,000
12,000
10,000
57,000
260,000
1,909,100 1,159,000 l, I 33,200
40
the
DOCUMENT IO3O
Explanations
Sub-Head 10
Sums requested under this sub-head cover the Assembly's share ofjoint expenditure on the Paris
premises. They include the fixed annual sum of F 30,000 which the Assembly has to pay until 1987 as
its share of the cost of replacing the telephone switchboard.
The international secretariat of the SAC is responsible for co-ordinating and [nanaging the pro-
gramme for such expenditure to which the Assembly contributes 30%, the ACA 45% and the SAC 25%.
Sub-Head 11
Outside Paris, Assembly committees normally meet in committee rooms with simultaneous
interpretation equipment made available to them by the national delegations concerned. However, in-
certain cases it ii to Ue expected that the Assembly will have to pay for the hire of a ioom or the cost of
installing portable interpretation equipment in rooms not so equipped. Sums requested under this
sub-head are to cover such expenditure if necessary.
Sub-Head 12
As its title indicates, this sub-head relates to expenditure for the installation of simultaneous
interpretation equipment, telephone booths, screens, etc., in the premises of the Ec0nomic and Social
Council during Assembly sessions.
Estimates take account of the foreseeable rise in the cost of services and of the hire of metal-
detecting equipment necessary for improving security measures.
Sub-Head 13
Expenditure under this sub-head relates to contracts for the provision ofvarious services {".ilg
Assembly sessions (removal of equipment, cleaning of premises loaned by the Ecqnomic and Social
Council, etc.).
Estimates are based on expenditure in the financial year 1985 and take account of the foreseeable
rise in the cost ofservices.
Sub-Head 14
The same sum is requested for 1986 as for 1985 to allow minor repairs to be carried out to the
premises of the Office of the Clerk.
Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17
Sums under these sub-heads are justified by the three-year modernisation and maintenance
programme for equipment given at Appendix IV to this budget. Criteria governing the preparation of
this progfamme are shown in the explanatory memorandum.
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Head IY - General administatiye costs
SubHeads
Estimates
for
1986
Sums
authorised
for 1985
Expected
expenditure
in 1985
Sub-Head 18 - Postage, telephone, telex and transport of
documents
Sub-Head 19 - Duplication paper, headed writing
and other ofEce supplies
Sub-Head 20 - Printing and publication of documents
Sub-Head 2l - Purchase of documents
Sub-Head 22 - Official cars
Sub-Head 23 - Bank charges
580,000
260,000
1,490,000
50,000
40,000
500
490,000
239,000
1,138,000
44,900
60,000
500
440,000
240,000
1,310,000
44,000
60,000
500
2,420,500 2,141,300 2,094,500
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Explanatioas
Sub-Head 18
The increase of F 100,000 as compared with 1984 is calculated on the basis of an average
inflation of 5%, this being the minimum foreseeable, and takes account of the fact that the increase in
the Assembly's work will involve a considerable increase in the cost of the various nieans of communi-
cation. Moreover, expenditure relating to the use of a telex in 1986 will be charged to this sub-head.
Sub-Head 19
In spite of the considerable increase in reproduction work and the purchase of a third offset
machine, the increase in the estimate as compared with 1985 is slight and is mainly due to the variation
ofprices in this sector.
Sub-Head 20
Estimates under this sub-head take into account:
- 
the cost (F 150,000) of printing the brief on " The political union of Europe;" (see explanatory
memorandum);
- 
foreseeable variations in prices for this category of expenditure (9%).
However, the purchase of three new word processors in addition to those already in service will
allow estimated savings of F 100,000 to be made in the cost of printing documents. It should be
recalled that in 1985 sums under this sub-head were already reduced by F 155,000 thdnks to the lease of
five word processors and adoption of a computerised system of printing the docufrrents of the three
political committees.
Sub-Head 21
The increase of 12% corresponds to the increase in the INSEE index for books and newspapers
for the most recent twelve-month period known at the time this budget was drawn up and to changes in
exchange rates for publications purchased outside France.
Sub-Head 22
Compared with 1985, estimates under this sub-head are much lower due to the fact that the
recruitment of a chauffeur, requested under Head I, will allow the offrcial Assem$y car to be made
available to the President in normal conditions. Should this recruitment not be authorised, estimates
under this sub-head will have to be increased by F 140,000 to allow a chauffeur-driven car to be hired
when the President is present at the Assembly (estimate: 2 days per week, i.e. F 3,500 x 40 weeks
- F 140,000).
Sums requested will be used for foreseeable repairs to the offrcial car, insuratce,gurage, petrol,
etc.
Sub-Head 23
The estimate of F 500 remains unchanged.
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Head Y - Other expenditure
Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
1986
Sums
authorised
for 1985
Expected
expenditure
in 1985
Sub-Head 24 - Travelling and subsistence allowances and
insurance for the President of the Assem-
bly, chairmen of committees and rappor-
teurs
Sub-Head 25 - Expenses for representation
Sub-Head 26 - Committee study missions
Sub-Head 27 - Offtcial journeys of members of the O{Iice
of the Clerk
Sub-Head 28 - Expenses ofexperts and the auditor
Sub-Head 29 - Expenditure on information
Sub-Head 30 - Expenses for political groups
Sub-Head 3l - Contingencies and other expenditure
elsewhere provided for
Sub-Head 32 - Non-recoverable taxes
239,000
210,000
3,300
450,000
120,000
300,000
373,000
3,000
20,000
139,000
160,000
3,300
310,000
70,000
275,000
273,000
3,000
20,000
I10,000
170,000
700
434,000
70,000
260,000
273,000
10,000
1,718,300 1,253,300 1,327,700
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Explanations
Sub-Head 24
The cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly is borne by
governments, as are those of members of the Bureau and Presidential Committee.
The Assembly bears the cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for tho President of the
Assembly on oflicial visits and of rapporteurs and, when appropriate, committee chairmen insofar as
these visits are connected with the preparation of a report or the running of the Assembly. Journeys
by committee chairmen and rapporteurs are subject to approval by the Presidential Committee.
Estimates take account of the expected increase in the Assembly's work in 1986 (see explanatory
memorandum) and of the foreseeable rise in per diem allowances and travelling expe4ses.
Sub-Head 25
The increase of F 50,000 compared with the 1985 budget is due to the rise in the cost of meals in
restaurants in the Paris area and to gleater requirements due to the increased activities of the various
Assembly organs.
Sub-Head 26
Sums under this sub-head are to cover extraordinary expenditure linked with committee study
missions.
On the basis of experience, the same amount has been requested as last year.
Sub-Head 27
The increase in sums requested for 1986 compared with last year is justified by:
- 
the increase in per diem allowances approved by the Council with effect from lst July 1985(21lth report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts) and the
increase in the cost of air travel, amounting on average to l1%;
- 
the increased activities of the Assembly which require more frequent travel bry members of the
Oflice of the Clerk to organise meetings and visits of the various Assembly committees. It
should be noted that for the same reasons the Assembly will probably have to present a supple-
mentary budget in 1985.
Sub-Head 28
It is to be expected that the type of studies to be carried out in the framework of the reactivation
of WEU will require gtreater recourse to experts in the various aspects of defence policy, armaments
control and disarmament. An increase of F 50,000 in estimates under this sub-head is therefore
requested.
Sub-Head 29
The increase of 8.75% over sums granted in 1985 is an average between the 6.5% increase in the
cost ofrepresentation and the I l% increase in travelling expenses.
Sub-Head 30
The Assembly's increased activities have repercussions on estimates for the expenditure of
political groups. An increase of F 100,000 is considered necessary, including an increase due to the
effect of the rate of inflation.
Sub-Head 31
There is no change in the estimate for this sub-head as compared with 1985.
Sub-Head 32
The same amount is requested as in 1985.
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PART I: OPERATING BUDGET
Section B - Receipts
Estimates
for
1986
Budget
for 1985
Expected
receipts
in 1985
Sale of publications
Bank interest
Social security reimbursements
Levy on basic salaries of Grade A officials
Toral Rrcrprs.
I10,000
250,000
9,000
36,000
50,000
250,000
9,000
150,000
70,000
250,000
65,000
67,000
404,000 458,000 452,000
Explanations
Estimates for the sale of publications, bank interest and social security reimbursements are
calculated on the basis ofexperience.
The amount of the levy on basic salaries of Grade A officials has been calculated at the rate of
1.5% of such salaries up to 30th June 1986 in accordance with the 203rd report of the Co-ordinating
Committee, approved by the WEU Council on 3rd July 1985.
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PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET
Section A - Expenditure
Head I - Pensions, allowances and social charges
Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
r986
Sums
authorifed
for l9p5
Expected
expenditure
in 1985
Sub-Head I - Pensions and leaving allowances
l.l. Retirement pensions
1.2. Invaliditypensions
1.3. Survivors'pensions
1.4. Orphans' or dependants
pensions
1.5. Leavingallowances
Sub-Head 2 - Family allowances
2.1. Householdallowances
2.2. Children's and other depen-
dants' allowances
2.3. Education allowances
Sub-Head 3 - Supplementary insurance
Torer or Herp I .....
630,000
192,000
46,000
27,000
24,000
5,000
868,000
56,000
16,000
626,500
45,000
12,000
680,000
45,000
l 1.500
940,000 683,500 736,500
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Explanations
Sub-Heads I and 2
In 1986, the Assembly will be paying six pensions, as follows:
- 
four old-age pensions;
- 
one invalidity pension;
- 
one survivor's pension.
Estimates for expenditure under these two sub-heads are calculated in accordance with the
provisions of the pension scheme rules and take into account the date on which two new pensions will
become payable in 1986.
In 1985, a leaving allowance was paid for which provision had not been made in the budget
estimates for 1985 and this led to excess expenditure under Sub-Head l.
Sub-Head 3
Pensioners are insured against the risk of sickness in accordance with Article 19 bis of the
collective convention in force.
Estimates for expenditure under this sub-head correspond to the proportion of the premium paid
by the Assembly.
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PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET
Section B: Receipts
Explanations
Estimated receipts have been calculated on the basis of contributions to the pension scheme paid
by permanent staffof the Offrce of the Clerk of the Assembly (7% of basic salary).
Estimates
for
l 986
Budpt
for 1985
Expected
receipts
in 1985
l. Contributions by permanent oflicials 476,000 341,q00 380,000
476,000 341,000 380,000
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APPENDIX I
Organogram of the Olfice of the Clerk of the Assembly
iE
9E
>i
cs
6r
9<
ud
€>
llI66
gEE
8 9..9.
835
; oo
a9I
,-,4iao
APPENDIX II DOCUMENT IO3O
APPENDIX II
Recapitulation of changa in the staffof the Olfice of the Clerk
proposed in the 1986 budget
Grade Duties 1986budget
1085
buHget +or-
H.C.
A6
A5
A4
A3
A2
B6
94
B3
B3
B3
C6
C4
C3
Clerk
Senior counsellor
Counsellors
First secretaries
Secretaries
Translators
Chief accountant
Personal assistants
Bilingual shorthand-typists
Accountant
Switchboard operator
Head of reproduction department
Assistants in reproduction department
Chauffeur
I
I
4
)
3
3
I
5
7
I
I
I
2
I
I
I
4
2
I
3
I
4
6
I
I
:
+2
+lr
+l
+l
+l
33 27 +6
L Regradingofa83post.
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APPENDIX III
Salaries of stalf recruited for Assembly sessions
1, Sittings service
Duties Number No. ofdays
Daily
rcmuneration
Fr
Total
F
Total
F
Counsellors to the President of Assembly
Heads of sections
Sergeant-at-arrns. . .. ,
Parliamentary secreta;;;
Precis writers
Verbatim reporters .. . ..
Assistants.
Head ushers
Ushers .....
Offset-assemblers
Adjustment
Travelling e
la
lb
la
lb
la
lb
lb
3a
2b
3a
3b
7a
l3b
l0a
la
la
la
lb
2b
28b
3b
la
la
8a
la
Lala
la
5b
l0a
l6
l8
l0
t2
l0
t4
t2
r0
t2
l0
t2
l0
t2
l0
l8
22
l0
l6
t4
t2
t2
l0
t2
l0
t2
t4
t2
24
t2
l0
l,2lll,2ll
861
l,l l3
l,l l3
l,l l3
989
723
975
737
989
989
989
329
329
329
378
581
581
581
630
3ll
3ll
282
282
282
3ll
3ll
534
282
19,376
21,798
8,610
13,356
I 1,130
I 5,582
I 1,868
21,690
23,400
22,110
35,604
69,230
154,284
32,900
5,922
7,239
3,780
9,296
16,268
195,216
22,680
3,1 l0
3,732
22,560
3,394
3,948
3,732
7,464
32,040
28,200
41,174
48,678
I1,868
45,090
57 ,714
223,514
293,300
6,842
73,128
28,200
ll4 I
for 198(
)xpenses,
pto
829,508
59,000
888,508
190.000
1,078,508
1,079,000
* In accordance with scales in force on lst January 1985.
a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside Paris.
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Duties Number No. ofdays
Total
F
Interpreters I 8 uI 6b
10
t2 347,000
t4
Adjustment for
Travelling exper
1986.....
nses......
347,000
25,000
372,000
17,000
389,000
2, Interprctation seryice
a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside Paris.
N.B. OnlstJanuaryl985,thedailyremunerationofinterpretersamountedtoF2,l2T.55. Inaddition,interpretersrecruited
outside Paris are entitled to payment for time spent in travelling (half a day each way), a daily allowance (per diem) corres-
ponding to that of a Grade L4 permanent oflicial, plus reimbursement of their travelling expenses.
i. Translation service
l. Based on 30 days for revisers and translators and 40 days for assistants.
a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside Paris.
Duties Number
Daily
remuneration
F
Estimate I TotalF
Revisers. . .
Translators
Assistants. .
3a
4b
3a
5b
6a
2a
3b
2b
86r
1,403
688
1,169
329
378
581
630
77,490
168,360
61,920
175,350
78,960
30,240
69,720
50,400
245,850
237,270
229.320
Adjusitment for 1986
712,440
50,654
Travelling expenses.
Rounded up to
763,094
26,000
789,094
790,000
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APPENDIX IV
Thra-year modernisation and mainlenance progtammefor the equipment
of the Olfice of the Clerk
(The estimates given may fluctuate with the trend of prices)
Ref.
No. Equipment Explanations
Budgets
1986 l 987 1988
)
3
I
5
6
7
8
4
9
l0
l1
A. Reproduction
equipment
I RX 1045 photocopier
I RX 3107 photocopier
3 Gestetner offset
machines
2 Gestetnerelectrostatic
stereotypers
Gestetner 100 binding
machine
Logabas-Ordina 7630
assembling machine
with stapling machine
AM International
addressograph
I Fortematic 655 paper-
cutting machine
I Orpo-Planax binding
machine
I Orpo-Thermomatic
binding machine
B. Typewriters and
calculators
(a) OIfice olthe Clerk
8 Olivetti ET l2l
electronic typewriter
Hire (blocked rate): F 1,713 per month
Maintenance (indexed rate): F 2,000 per
month in 1985.
Property of the Assembly.
Maintenance (indexed rate): F 1,614 per
quarter in 1985.
I type 3l l, purchased in 1984: maintenance
(indexed rate).
I type 329,purchased in 1985: maintenance
(indexed rate).
I type 329, purchase price
maintenance (indexed rate).
I Gestetner PM9): purchase of a new offset
machine means it will remain in use as long
as possible and the maintenance contract
will therefore be extended (indexed rate).
I Gestetner OE 3: purchase price
maintenance (indexed rate).
Purchased in 1978, this machine is still in
good condition and it will be possible to use
it for another five years, until the current
maintenance contract expires (indexed rate).
Purchased in 1977, this machine is serviced
when required. Since the cost of a mainte-
nance contract is exorbitant, the expediency
of continuing this form of maintenance is
being.examined. The estimate is based on
expenence.
This machine is on hire for a five-year
period which began on lst July 1981.
Maintenance is included in the cost of
hire. The expediency of renewing the
contract when it expires on 30th June 1986
is being examined.
This machine is serviced when required. A
single annual service is enough to keep it in
good working order.
Purchasedin 1964 I These machines are in
I good working order) and no maintenance
Purchased in 1974 \ contract seems neces-
, s8ry.
Purchased between l98l and 1983, these
typewriters are in very good condition.(Two of them will be converted into ETV
300 word processors.) (Cf.26 ter below.)
45,000
6,500
6,500
4,000
65,000
4,000
1,200
69,000
3,700
I,100
18,000
700
3,500
45,000
6,500
6,500
4,000
4,000
1,200
3,700
1,100
3,500
18,000
700
45,000
6,500
6,500
4,000
4,000
1,200
3,700
1,100
3,500
18,000
700
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Ref.
No. Equipment Explanations
Budgets
1986 1987 1988
r2
l3
t4
t5
r6
l7
l8
l8 bis
t9
20
Olivetti ET 221
electronic typewriter
4 Olympia SGE 51 elec-
tric typewriters (2 with
English keyboards and
2 with French key-
boards)
2 IBM electric typewri-
ters (1 with an English
keyboard and I with a
French keyboard)
3 Olivetti calculating
machines
4 Olympia SGE 5l elec-
tric typewriters (l with
an English keyboard
and 3 with French key-
boards)
4 IBM electric typewri-
ters (2 with English
keyboards and 2 with
French keyboards)
3 Olivetti Editor electric
typewriters (with lta-
lian keyboards)
2l Olympia mechanical
typewriters (19 with
English keyboards
and 2 with French
keyboards)
(b) For use during ses-
sions
Electronic typewriters
Purchased in 1983, this typewriter is in very
good condition. Like the two mentioned
above, it will be converted into an ETV 300
word processor. (Cf.26 ter below.)
This is a very old model which is no longer
repairable, not having been on the market
for some time. These typewriters will
remain in service as long as they are usable,
but it is to be expected that they will have to
be replaced in the very near future. (Cf.
l8 bis below.)
These are in poor condition and should
therefore be replaced. (Cf. l8 bis below.)
Two of these machines were purchased
between 1968 and 1979 and are in good
working order. To meet the growing needs
of the Administration Service, a third
should be purchased.
These typewriters are the same model as
those under 13 above. They are assigned to
national delegations and need replacing as
they can no longer be repaired. (Cf. 18 bis
below.)
These typewriters are the same model as
those under 14 above. They are assigned to
national delegations and political groups
and need replacing. (Cf. l8 bis below.)
Purchased secondhand in 1980, these type-
writers are assigned to the Italian Delegation
and the Italian summary reporters. They
need replacing. (Cf. l8 bis below.)
Replacement of l7 typewriters under 13, 14,
16, 17 and 18 above at a rate of 4 per year
for 3 years and 5 in 1989.
Purchased between 1966 and 1979, these
typewriters are used only occasionally
because they are old models and staff are no
longer used to working on such machines.
It is planned to keep the best of them in
reserve in case ofelectricity cuts.
To meet the requirements of the various
services during Assembly sessions, and sub.ject to the purchase of the 17 typewriters
mentioned in 18 bis above, the following
hire. prognmme is envisaged for each
sessron:
1986 1987 1988 1989
English keyboards 14 12 l0 7
Frenchkeyboards 13 ll 9 7
The rates indicated relate to electronic
typewriters, the electric ones hired until now
no longer being available.
1,800
24,W
14,900
13,000
24,000
12,750
I1,000
24,000
10,600
9,000
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Ref.
No. Equipment Explanations
Budgets
1986 l 987 1988
2t
22
23
24
25
25 bis
26
26 bis
26 ter
27
28
29
30
3t
32
33
(c) Maintenance and
repairs
C. Miscellaneous
equipment
UHER 5OOO
dictaphones
Grundig Stenorette
dictaphones
Grandjean stenotyping
machine
Telex
D. Word processors and
computers
5 Olivetti ETS 2010
word processors with 4
printers
3 olivetti ETS 2010
word processors with
printers
3 Olivetti ETV 300 word
processors
ll
I personal computer
with "wages" and
" bookkeeping " soft-
ware
E. Ofiicefurniture
Various offices
Various oflices
Various offices
Swivel armchairs
easy chairs
Metal cupboards
Metal frling cabinets
All typerwriters and calculators are serviced
twice a year, before each session, by a
mechanic recruited for this purpose. More-
over, a lump sum should be earmarked for
possible repairs at other times.
Purchased in l97l and 1980, these dicta-
phones are in good condition. It is not
planned to replace them in the period
l 986-88.
Purchased between 1963 and 1983, these
dictaphones are in good condition. It is not
planned to replace them in the period
l 986-88.
Purchased in 1974, this machine is in good
working order. It is planned to keep it in
use for the next five years.
Overall estimate for possible repairs to
equipment in this category.
Hire.
These have been hired on a five-year quar-
terly leasing basis.
Indexed maintenance contract.
It is planned to purchase these machines to
complete the system indicated in 26 above.
Indexed maintenance contract.
These include the conversion of 3 electronic
typewriters assigned to the secretariat of the
President, the Clerk and the Head of Admin-
istration.
Indexed maintenance contract.
Training courses.
This purchase was already proposed in 1985in order to modernise the administration
service.
Indexed maintenance contract.
Purchase, already proposed in 1985, of 5
" computer " desks for committee assistants
using word processors. It is planned to
purchase 5 others in 1987.
Replacement of furniture already proposed
in 1985.
Replacement of other furniture.
Some were reupholstered in 1985 and the
rest should be done in 1986.
Purchase of two cupboards.
Purchase of two frling cabinets for the
archives.
6,000
4,000
20,000
132,700
30,000
290,000
14,000
90,000
13,000
6,000
55,000
2,000
35,000
20,000
8,000
8,000
4,000
4,500
7,000
5,000
20,000
r32,700
30,000
I 8,500
13,000
7,000
35,000
12,000
7,000
5,000
20,000
132,700
30,000
1 8,500
13,000
7,000
8,000
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Breakdown by badget classification
Budget classification Ref. No.
in programme
Budgets
Head Sub-head 1986 l 987 r 988
III
m
III
15. Purchase
ture
of oflice furni-
16. Purchase ofreproduction and other
oflice equipment
17. Hire and maintenance of reproduc-
tion and other oflice equipment
28
29
30
31
32
33
3
4
l5
l8 bis
26 bis
26 ter
27
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
20
2l
25
25 bis
26
26 bis
26 ter
27
35,000
20,000
8,000
8,000
4,000
4,500
35,000
12,000 8,000
79,500 47,000 8,000
65,000
69,000
1,800
24,000
290,000
90,000
55,000
24,000 24,000
594,800 24,000 24,000
45,000
6,500
14,500
4,900
l,100
3,500
18,000
700
27,900
6,000
4,000
20,000
162,700
14,000
19,000
2,000
45,000
6,500
14,500
4,900
l,100
3,500
1,8,000
700
23,'150
7,000
4,000
20,000
162,700
118,500
13,000
7,000
45,000
6,500
14,500
4,900
1,100
3,500
18,000
700
19,600
7,000
4,000
20,000
162,700
I 8,500
13,000
7,000
349,800 350, I 50 346,000
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APPENDIX V
Comparison between the yarious budget heads and total amounts
ia the 1985 and 1986 budgets
(percentage)
ExpeNonunr
I. Permanent staff
II. Temporary staff
III. Premises and
equipment
IV. General administrative
costs
V. Other expenditure
Tornr A (expenditure)
Rrcurrs
Torar B (net)
r 985 l 986
Amount %of Amount %of
A B A B
8,725,000
2,349,900
1,159,000
2,141,300
1,253,300
5s.83
15.03
7.42
13.70
8.02
57.51
15.49
7.64
t4.t I
8.26
10,877,000
3,036,400
1,909,100
2,420,500
1,719,300
54.49
15.21
9.56
t2.t3
8.61
55.62
t5.52
9.',|6
12.38
8.78
15,628,400
459,000
100 r03.01
- 
3.0r
19,961,300
404,000
100 102.06
-2.06
15,170,400 100 I 9,557,300 100
s8
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APPENDIX VI
Foreseeable trend ofpensions in the period 1986-90
(calculated in accordance with 1986 scales)
Grade Basicsdary
No. of
monthly
contribu-
tions
taken intc
account
%of
salary
Pensions
1986 1987 l 988 1989 1990
A6
A3
B4
CI
A6
A4
A5
A5
Pensic
bei
452,462
359,220
423,667
423,667
)ns alrea(
ng paid
306
333
32s
402
v
6l
65.5
64.r6
'10
322,000
224,000
136,000
46,500
149,000
60,000
322,000
224,000
136,000
46,500
298,000
240,000
322,000
224,000
136,000
46,500
298,000
240,000
270,000
325,000
322,000
224,000
136,000
46,500
29E,000
2410,000
295,000
325,000
322,000
224,000
136,000
46,500
298,000
240,000
295,000
325,000
Employees'
contributions 7% - 476,000
Theoretical WEU
contribution 14%- 952,000
Difference
937,500
1,428,000
1,266,500
1,428,000
1,861,500
1,428,000
l,gg6,5oo
1,42E,000
1,886,500
1,428,000
+ 491,500 + 162,500
- 
433,500
- 
45E,500
- 
458,500
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APPENDIX VII
Trend of the real increase in Assembly budgets
for the financial years I 9E 3 -86
Financial year Total Nominal increase(%)
Inflation rate
(%) Real increase
1983
1984
1985
1986
l 983
1984
l 985
l 986
(a) Total expendii
14,095,000
14,656,200
15,628,400
19,961,300
I
(b) Net total t
13,990,000
14,426,200 
]15,170,400 
I19,557,300 |
ture (operating budget.t_I r.qsI o.otI zt.t2 Itltl
/operating budget)l_lIg.nII s.r5 |28.s1 |
7.4
6.5
5
7.4
6.5
5
- 
3.42
+ 0.13
+ 22.72
+ 19.43
- 
4.29
- 
1.35
+ 23.91
+ 18.27
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OPINION ON THE BUDGET OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL YEARS 1984 AND 1985 '
submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administrationz
by Mr. van Tets, Rapporteur
TABLE OFCONTENTS
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on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the
financial years 1984 and 1985
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submitted by Mr. van Tets, Rapporteur
I. Preliminary considerations
II. Aspects ofthe 1984 and 1985 budgets
III. Action taken on Recommendation 409
APPENDICES
I. WEU budget estimates for 1984
II. WEU budget estimates for 1985
III. Establishment of Western European Union
IV. Recommendation 409 adopted by the Assembly on 2lst June 1984 and
reply of the Council
V. Proposed mechanisms for concertation and conciliation
VI. Evolution of expenditure on pensions paid by WEU since l98l
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); MM. Haase, Beix (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens, Blefnot,
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Pollidoro, Rauti, Schmit4 Stokes (Alternate: Sir Geollrey Finsberg), van Tets, deYies, Zierer.
N.B. 7he names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
oa tho budget ol the ministerial organt of WEU
lot thefinancid yeus 19E1 and 19E5
The Assembly,
(i) Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council
has complied with the provisions of Article Ylll (c) of the Charter;
(ii) Having taken note of the contents ;(iii) Consideringthat:
(a) the new structure of the ministerial organs of Western European Union depends
essentially on the tasks devolving upon them in the framework of the institutional
reform announced in the Rome declaration of 27th October 1984;
(b) the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for 1984 and 1985 are
merely a renewal of the budget for 1983;
(c/ it would consequently be pointless to examine these budgets on a cost-effectiveness basis;
(d) inpreparing the budgets for the financial years 1984 and 1985 the criterion of zero growth
was applied;
(e) since 1984 progress has been made in consultation and conciliation within the co-ordinated
organisations,
Recouuerqos rH,c,r rHr CoLtNcIL
l. Re-examine the problem of applying the zero growth criterion with a view to specifying that this
criterion is to be applied only to operating budgets and not pension budgets;
2. In order to apply this criterion correctly, establish a rate ofincrease for each category ofexpen-
diture instead offixing a single rate ofincrease for the net total ofthe budget;
3. Pursue efforts to improve the status of staff in the framework of consultation and inform the
Assembly of the conclusions of studies on this subject;
4. In the framework of present reorganisational studies, re-examine the possibility of a single seat
for the ministerial organs of WEU in order to improve liaison between these bodies which at present
have oflices in London and in Paris, thus reducing costs by integrating supporting stalf, and reach a
decision on this matter.
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Explanatory Memorundum
(submitted by Mn vaa Tets, Rapporteur)
I. Preliminary considerations
l. Article VIII (c) of the Charter of the
Assembly states that :
" The Assembly shall express its views in
the 'form of an opinion or recommenda-
tion on the annual budget of Western
European Union as soon as it has been
communicated. "
To this end, a member of the Committee
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration is res-
ponsible for presenting a report which has to be
technical since only budgetary and adminis-
trative questions are the responsibility of this
committee.
At the present juncture, during the period
in which the ministerial organs of WEU are
being reshaped and the budgetary implications
of which will be impossible to assess before
1986, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and
Administration considered it should submit a
single report to the Assembly dealing with the
1984 and 1985 budgets.
II. Aspects ofthe 1984 and 19ES budgets
2. Further to its responsibilities, last year the
committee studied the budget of the ministerial
organs for 1983 on a cost-effectiveness basis in
order to ascertain that their tasks were fulfilled
in the most efficient and economical manner.
Conversely, the 1984 and 1985 budgets
cannot be studied from the same angle since in
application of the decisions taken at the meeting
of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence in
Rome in October 1984 and as indicated in para-
graph I the structure of the ministerial organs is
being completely revised to adapt it to their new
tasks in the framework of the reactivation of
Western European Union.
3. To obtain more specific indications about
this revision, your Rapporteur met the Secre-
tary-General of Western European Union in
London on 7th February 1985. He confirmed
that the WEU budgets for 1984 and 1985 weie
merely a renewal of the 1983 budget and did not
therefore reflect the new structure and work of
the ministerial organs. Furthermore, their tasks
have not yet been defined and relevant studies
are being continued. The WEU Council of
Ministers will probably be informed of the
conclusions of these studies in the course of
1985.
On the basis of the decisions then taken it
is possible that a revised budgqt will be drawn up
for 1985 setting out the means necessary for the
various ministerial organs of WEU in the frame-
work of their new structure.
Even that budget will inevitably be an
interim one. It will depend on the estimates of
requirements for 1986 in terrns of the organisa-
tion's new duties and reorganisational costs
themselves which will certainfy involve changes
in the structure of staff.
4. Rebus sic stantibus, the present report can
but take note of this quite exceptional situation
in which no valid opinion could be given on the
1984 and 1985 budgets of the ministerial organs.
III. Action taken on Recofitmendation 409
5. Your Rapporteur feels he should take this
opportunity however of mentioning Recommen-
dation 409 on the budget of the ministerial
organs of WEU for 1983 in ot'der to ascertain its
present validity in the light of the new trends set
out in the Rome declaration.
The WEU Council sent the Assembly its
reply to this recommendatioh on 26th Septem-
ber 1984. It was an interim reply preceding the
Rome declaration and announcing measures to
be taken but without speciffing the type and
scope of these measures.
6. The first paragraph of the recommenda-
tion referred to the possibility of uniting the
London and Paris headquarters with a view to
integrating joint services. Clearly no final
answer can be given immediately on this matter,
but the Secretary-General mentioned to your
Rapporteur the serious diffipulties standing in
the way of such a merger, be it accomplished in
London or in Paris.
Indeed, the problem of a suitable seat
would arise since neither the present seat in
London nor the one in Paris could accom-
modate all the organs of \JVEU, even taking
account of the effects of integrating joint
services.
At the present economic juncture, which
as everyone knows is havi(g severe repercus-
sions on the WEU budgets, it would be unrea-
listic to contemplate such a solution. In addi-
tion, it should also be recallgd that some mem-
bers of the staff might not Ue able to reJocate
which would give them the dight to indemnities
for loss of job and this would prove to be a
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heavy burden for the budgets of the bodies
concerned. Your Rapporteur realises that these
considerations are well founded, but in spite of
the complexity of uniting the two seats it would
seem essential to examine closely every facet so
that the governments, and in particular those of
the two host countries, will able to reach their
decision, which is fundamentally political, when
the time comes.
7. On staff policy, the principle of flexibility
recommended by the Assembly seems to have
been adopted already. Here, most of the posts
which have become vacant recently in the minis-
terial organs have not been frlled pending the
restructuration of these organs and new appoint-
ments have been made on the basis of fixed-
term contracts. This practice can but be encou-
raged. This is also in conformity with the pre-
sent trend in all the co-ordinated organisations
which, through fixed-term recruiting, are trying
to avoid staff becoming ossified. It is consi-
dered preferable to recruit national officials for a
given task for a specific and relatively short
period who then return to their national admi-
nistrations. Moreover, permanent contracts
lead to pensions which, because of the system
chosen, destabilise the budget and, consequently,
the contributions to be paid by the governments.
8. The separation of the operating budget
from the pensions budget for the application of
the zero grofih criterion has not yet been agreed
to by all the governments. When the various
budgets of WEU for 1985 (including that of the
Assembly) were being discussed, some delega-
tions wished this growth rate to be applied to all
the budgets. It is to be noted however that at
meetings held in Paris on 3lst January and lst
February 1985, the WEU Budget and Organisa-
tion Committee decided to examine this ques-
tion.
Your Rapporteur can but refer to the argu-
ments presented by Mr. de Vries in his report on
the budget of the ministerial organs for the
financial year 1983 and emphasise the need to
apply this criterion only to the operating budgets
so as to avoid, in the future, the various organs
of WEU being obliged to reduce their activities
in order to compensate for the cost of pensions,
which rises steadily as staff members retire (cf.
Appendix VI).
To apply zero growth to the whole budget,
including pensions, is not commensurate with
the system chosen for paying pensions as they
become due. The situation would have been
diflerent if a system of insurance based on
annual payments had been chosen. It would
have been normal for such payments to have
been part of the operating budget. Conversely,
since the present system has been adopted,
actual expenditure is irregular and may rise or
fall sharply due, for instance, to the unexpected
death ofan oflicial or pensioner.
Your Rapporteur therefore believes the
choice of system makes it imperative to separate
the operating budget from the pensions budget.
9. It is not unimportant to underline that the
application of zero gfowth to the total budget
inevitably leads to a progressive reduction of
resources in real terms and consequently to an
enforced reduction in the work of the WEU
bodies. In practice, this growth rate is equal to
or even lower than the increase recorded in the
general index of consumer prices calculated on
the basis of price variations of a broad spectrum
of articles which do not include certain items
and services which appear in the WEU budget.
Prices for the latter vary considerably depend-
ing on market conditions. Paper is a good
example since its cost increased in 1984 by
25% to 30%, mainly due to the rising dollar
exchange rate.
In conclusion, while respecting the princi-
ple of zero growth, it would be desirable to
change the way it is applied. Your Rapporteur
believes that if the work of WEU is to be safe-
guarded in real terms appropriate budgetary
adjustments should be adopted for different
categories of expenditure and rates of inflation
applicable to each of these categories calculated
in accordance with oflicial indices.
It is interesting to recall that this proce-
dure is already followed by the OECD which is
an authority in economic and financial matters.
10. On staff policy, in its reply to the Assem-
bly's Recommendation 409, the Council said
that " the position of the combined staff associa-
tions of the co-ordinated organisations has
improved considerably ". In 1984, machinery
for consultation and conciliation was set up byjoint agreement between the co-ordinated orga-
nisations and the representatives ofthe Standing
Committee of the Staff Associations of the Co-
ordinated Organisations (CPAPOC). This
constitutes a significant improvement in
relations between the two parties concerned. In
view of its interest, a document from the
Standing Committee of Secretaries-General sum-
marising the mechanism for consultation and
conciliation and the background to this question
is appended to the present report.
Regarding the " feasibility study on com-
parison of duties, grades and levels of remunera-
tion in the co-ordinated organisations, other
international organisations, certain civil services
and certain private sector firms ", mentioned in
paragraph 8 of the report by Mr. de Vries, a
preliminary draft report to the Councils was
drawn up in September 1984 by the Co-
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ordinating Committee of government budget
experts. In this report, it is proposed that the
study in question be entrusted to a private firm
whose terms of reference would be agreed by the
Council. This study will certainly be of great
value since it will cover all problems connected
with the status of staff and particularly career
prospects.
The committee wishes the Council's deci-
sions on these questions to be communicated to
the Assembly as soon as possible.
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APPENDIX t
WEU budget estimates for 1984
Proposqd expenditure and iacome
for the total budget
Section A Section B Section C TOTAL B + C
Expenditure
Salaries and allowances
Travel
t
1,276,880
30,305
202,730
12,030
Francs
10,417,800
190,600
720,950
31,000
25,000
Francs
22,105,300
747,900
1,068,850
61,500
45,000
Francs
32,523,100
929,500
1,789,800
92,500
70,000
Other operating costs .
Purchase of furniture and equipment
Brrildinp
Total ordinary costs
Pensionscosts....,
1,521,945
I 1 1,935
I 1,375,350
1,507, I 30
24,028,550
3,802,300
35,403,900
5,309,430
Tornrfor all costs
Income
WEI I ter
1,633,990 12,882,480 27,830,850 40,713,330
475,490
42,530
3,560,100
182,000
7,612,200
396,500
11,172,300
578,500Other receints
Total ordinary receipts
Pension receipts
Tornr for all receipts
NerTorlr (whole budget)
Budget surplus 1982 (-)
Contributions required in 1984 *
518,020
46,6?0
3,742,100
301,000
8,008,700
696,000
I 1,750,800
997,000
564,690 4,043,100 8,704,700 12,747,800
1,069,190 8,839,390 19,126, I 50 27,965,530
107,733 300,574 522,080 822,654
961,457 8,538,806 18,604,070 27,142,876
l. Difference 1984/1983 
-2.47 0lo + 4.66% + 13.07 % + t0.27 %
Contribatioas *
600ths f. Francs
Belsium 59
120
120
120
2
59
120
94,543.27
192,29t.40
192,291.40
192,291.40
3,204.96
94,543.27
192,291.40
2,669,049.47
5,428,575.20
5,428,575.20
5,428,575.20
90,476.26
2,669,049.47
5,428,575.20
France
Germanv
Italv
Luxembourg....
Netherlands ....
United Kingdom
600 961,457.00 27,142,976.00
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APPENDIX II
ll/EU budget estimates for 19E5
Proposed *pendiluru aad income
for the total budget
Section A Section B Section C TOTAL B + C
Expenditure
Salaries and allowances
Travel
t
1,296,910
39,750
212,600
2,720
Francs
I1,206,900
174,400
760,790
22,500
25,000
Francs
23,729,650
550,500
l,l 15,090
73,900
45,000
Francs
34,936,550
724,900
1,875,880
96,400
70,000
Other operating costs .
Purchase of furniture and equipment
Building
Total ordinary costs
Pensionscosts....
1,551,980
137,890
12,189,590
1,611,100
25,514,140
4,747,540
37,703,730
6,358,600
Tornr- for all costs
Income
WEI I tax
1,689,870 13,800,690 30,26L,640 44,062,330
486,840
43,620
3,922,500
234,500
8,241,740
528,900
12,164,200
763,400Other receipts
Total ordinary receipts
Pensions receipts
Tornr for all receipts
Nrr Tornr (whole budget)
Budget surplus 1983 (-)
Contributions required in 1985 *
530,460
48,200
4,157,000
329,000
8,770,600
751,600
12,927,600
1,080,600
578,660 4,486000 9,522,200 14,008,200
l,lll,2l0 9,314,690 20,739,440 30,054,130
109,983 1,193,033 698,757 1,891,790
1,001,227 8,121,657 20,040,683 28,162,340
l.Differencel985/1984 -3.93% +5.38% +8.43% +7.47%
Contibutions *
600ths f Francs Less amountsblocked Francs (net)
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy .
Luxembourg....
Netherlands ....
United Kingdom
59
t20
120
t20
2
59
120
98,453.99
200,245.40
200,245.40
200,245.40
3,337.42
98,453.99
200,245.40
2,769,296.77
5,632,468.00
5,632,468.00
5,632,468.00
93,874.46
2,769,296.77
5,632,468.00
73,750.00
150,000.00
150,000.00
150,000.00
2,500.00
73,750.00
150,000.00
2,695,546.77
5,482,468.00
5,482,468.00
5,482,468.00
91,374.46
2,695,546.77
5,482,468.00
600 1,001,227.00 28,162,340.00 750,000.00 27,412,340.00
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APPENDIX III
Establishment of Western European Union
1984 and 1985 budgets 1983 budget +or-
A B C Total A B c Total A B C Total
Secretary-General
Deputy Secretary-
General
I
1
I I
1
I
I
I
2
I
1
I I
I
I
I
I
2
Direclor
Assistant Secretary-
General . . .
Hors grade 3 I I 5 3 I I 5
A7
6
5
4
3
2
;
2
3
2
i
4
I
3
6
8
I
2
I
4
9
t2
4
4
I
2
3
2
i
4
I
3
6
8
I
2
I
4
9
t2
4
4
A grades 8 5 2t 34 8 5 2t 34
L5
4
3
2
I
I
I
I
;
I I
I
2
6
I
I
I
I
I
;
:
.,
I
2
6
I
L srades 4 4 2 r0 4 4 2 l0
B5
4
3
2
I
8
7
5
2
i
i
;
6
:
2t
20
8
2
;
7
5
2
i
!
;
6
1
2t
20
8
2
B grades 22 ll l8 5l 22 ll l8 5l
C5
4
3
2
1
i
8
?
i
:
I
9
-
I
5
20
?
i
8
?
i
:
I
9
-
I
5
20
?
C grades ll 7 l0 28 ll 7 l0 28
Total 48 28 52 128 48 28 52 128
A 
- 
Secretariat General.
B 
- 
International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.
C 
- 
Agency for the Control of Armaments.
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APPENDIX IV
Recommendation 409 adopted by the Assembly
on 21st June 1984 and reply ofthe Council
RECOMMENDATION 409 3
on the budget ol the ministerial organs ol lltEU
for the financial year 198j a
The Assembly,
(i) Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council
has complied with the provisions of Article YllI (c) of the Charter;
(iil Having taken note of the contents;
(iii) Consideringthat:
(a) the future structure of the ministerial organs of Western European Union depends
essentially on the tasks devolving upon them in the framework of political decisions to be
taken on this matter by the Council;
(D/ it would consequently be pointless at the present juncture to express an opinion on the
cost-effectiveness of these organs;
(c/ it would however be possible to make budgetary savings if the restructuration of the minis-
terial organs included unification of the Paris and London headquarters and the integration of
their services;
(d) in preparing the budget the criterion of " zero growth " was applied,
RrcouurNos rHAT THE CouNcr
l. Examine the possibility of uniting the London and Paris headquarters with a view to
integrating joint services;
2. Adopt flexible criteria in its staff recruitment policy, in view of new tasks to be accor-
ded to the ministerial organs of Western European Union;
3. Specifu that the criterion of " zero gxourth " applies only to operating expenses and that
expenditure and income relating to pensions should therefore be set out in a separate section
ofthe budget;
4. Inform the Assembly of the stage reached in the studies on improving the status of staff
announced in the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 340 and the participation of
staff associations in the consultation and conciliation structure of the co-ordinated organisa-
tions.
3. Adopted by the Assembly on 2 I st June I 984 during the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session (6th sitting).
4. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. de Vries on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration (Document 983).
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 5
to Recommendation 409
l. and 2. Discussions on the reactivation of WEU have not yet reached the stage at which the new
tasks of the organisation, the Council and its subsidiary bodies can be clearly defined. Conclusions on
these matters must first be reached before the future structure, size, location and other administrative
requirements can be foreseen. Included in this second stage of the Council's considerations would be
recruitment policy.
3. The criterion of " zero growth " is already applied to the budget of the ministerial organs. The
present budget format includes a separate statement of pensions' costs. While these have been taken
into consideration by governments in determining the total acceptable budget, the Council is aware that
with increases foreseeable in pensions' costs over the coming years, the situation will have to be kept
under review.
4. The position of the combined staff associations of the co-ordinated organisations has improved
considerably over the past few years. The previously ad hoc attendance of staff representation at
meetings and discussions in the framework of co-ordination has given way to regular and overall parti-
cipation by the associations. Negotiations on this matter still continue within the co-ordinated organi-
sations and in the Co-ordinating Committee of government budget experts, at present concentrating on
refining current procedures for consultation and on possible conciliation structures.
5. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th September 1984.
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Proposed mechanisms for concertation and conciliation6
12th December 19E4
The background to the appraisal exercise
l. At end-1982 the Standing Committee of
the Staff Associations of the Co-ordinated Orga-
nisations (hereinafter CPAPOC) formulated a
number of proposals aimed, as it put it, at fully
associating staffrepresentatives in the process of
salary determination in the co-ordinated organi-
sations. As it has evolved since 1958, operating
without any written rules of procedure, this pro-
cedure requires the Co-ordinating Committee of
government budget experts (CCG) to consider
salary adjustment proposals formulated by the
secretaries-general after consultation with their
staffs, and to make recommendations to the
various councils/committees of ministers.
Before frnalising its report the CCG hears the
viewpoints of the secretaries-general and the
staff associations.
The substance of the CPAPOC proposal
(see CSG/W(83)5) is that:
(a) A tipartite consultative committee be
established where representatives of
governments, the secretaries-general
and the staff associations would meet
together on an equal footing. On the
basis of salary review proposals refer-
red to it by the secretaries-general and,
as the case may be, by one of the other
partners, the tripartite committee
would negotiate a jointly agreed re-
commendation or, failing this, dulY
note the different Positions.
(b) A cotclliation commission composed
of independent persons be established,
which would be entrusted, on the ini-
tiative of one or other of the parties,
with responsibility for making recom-
mendations to the councils on matters
where there is serious disagleement.
The initial thinking of the seuetaries-general
2. The representatives of the secretaries-
general and CPAPOC had a number of discus-
iions on the issue, which was subsequently
raised by the secretaries-general on 12th Novem-
ber 1983.
6. Document of Standing Committee of Secretaries-
General (CSG/W(84)l).
The latter indicated that they too were dis-
satisfied with co-ordination as it applied to sala-
ries and pensions, chiefly because it eliminated
contacts in this area at political level between the
secretaries-general and governments.
They did not however feel that it was
appropriate at this juncture to go back to the
suggestions, Iirst mooted in 1977, that a " group
of wise men " be mandated to review co-
ordination procedures.
They stated that they fuund the proposal
for a tripartite structure unrealistic since the
views of the government experts could be
obstructed by the other two P4rties.
They nonetheless instructed the heads of
administration to look into ways of improving
consultations with staff reprqsentatives and the
possibility of introducing some kind of concilia-
tion procedure in the co-ordination mechanism.
At the same time, they were concerned that
the broad lines of salary policy be discussed at
the appropriate political levdl and that the Co-
ordinating Committee remain the technical
organ with its responsibility confined to formu-
lating recommendations.
CPAPOC tall<s wilh heads of administration
3. In pursuance of this mandate, the heads of
administration prepared a first exchange of
views with CPAPOC which took place on 8th
March 1984 in Strasbourg. After informing the
secretaries-general on 23rd lvfarch in Paris ofthe
broad lines of their joint reflection and obtaining
agreement in principle to further talks along the
same lines, the heads of administration held two
more joint meetings with CPAPOC, the first on
lgth June in Strasbourg and fhe second on l5th
September in Paris.
Although falling short bf what was sought
by CPAPOC, which indicatdd that it wished to
return to the issue of tripartilte representation at
a later stage, the following proposals do consti-
tute an acceptable response to the concerns
expressed on both sides ofthe table.
Bilateral consultations between the representa-
tives of the secretaries-general and CPAPOC
4.1. It has become evident that consultations
between heads of administration and CPAPOC
could and should be more frank and substantive.
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In recent months there has been a move in
this direction, resulting in a climate of greater
mutual confidence.
Such consultations might be along the fol-
lowing lines:
4.2. Representatives of the secretaries-general
and CPAPOC would hold consultations prior to
any salary adjustment or review proposals being
made and on any proposed amendment to the
adjustment and review procedure.
They would also consult, at the initiative
of th-e representatives of the secretaries-general
or of CPAPOC delegates, on any question relat-
ing to salaries, allowances and pensions that,
while not on the Co-ordinating Committee's
agenda, one or other party wished to have dis-
cussed or to have action taken.
4.3. Unless the parties decided otherwise,
consultations would be in two stages :
(a) A preparatory meeting at which all the
aspects participants felt should be
taken into account would be freely dis-
cussed.
Regarding salaries, there would be a first
Iepction to the proposals the secretaries-generalfelt able to make pending the discussioni to be
held with CPAPOC. CpApOC delegates would
be briefed on the main elements underpinning
these preliminary proposals.
(b) ln view of the constraints imposed by
the timetable for decisions on each
question, another meeting would then
be scheduled within a reasonable time-
limit.
At that meeting participants would seek to
align their positions, as far as they were able, in
order to reach a formulation of the proposal or
recommendation that reflected common posi-
tions.
4.4. What would happen if bilateral consulta-
tions did not fully harmonise the different stand-
points ?
(a) When a question required, in the view
of both parties, to be submitted to the
councils/committees and/or the Co-
ordinating Committee but there were
dilferences of opinion on the precise
proposal to be made, due note would
be taken of the divergent view of
CPAPOC and this would be set out in
annex to the proposals of the secreta-
ries-general.
(b) When disagreement concerned the
very principle of referral to the coun-
cils/committees and/or Co-ordinating
Committee, with the representatives of
the secretaries-general deeming such
referral to be inopportune, the secreta-
ries-general would nonetheless set outin a document the standpoint of the
staff associations, appending the note
{raftgd by the latter, while reserving
the right to indicate that they did noi
support it and even that they did not
wish to see it discussed.
Communication of the proposals of the secreta-
ries-general
5. Both the heads of administration and
CPAPOC delegates share the concern of the
secretaries-general that the Co-ordinating Com-
mittee should operate at its proper technical
level, without obscuring the politlcal dialogue
that should exist between the secretaries-gendral
and governments.
It is therefore suggested that, when cir-
cumstances warrant, the proposals of the secreta_
ries-general be communicated directly to the
councils/committees in order to driw their
attextion to aspects of particular importance and
invite them to give the Co-ordinating Commit-
tee some broad policy guidelines.
In other cases, in particular when it is a
matter of routine application of a current adjust-
ment procedure, proposals would continue to be
communicated directly to the Co-ordinating
Committee.
But whether communicated directly or via
the councils/committees, the salary proposals of
the secretaries-general, supplemented if need be
by additional or independent CPAPOC propo-
sals, will in any case come before the Co-
ordinating Committee.
Procedure at Co-ordinating Committee level
6.1. It is on this phase of the procedure invol-
ving the Co-ordinating Committee that, as has
been said, the views of CPAPOC and of the
representatives of the secretaries-general have
been the farthest apart from the start.
While a genuinely tripartite approach
would seem to be ruled out, the budget experts
retaining in the last analysis responsibility for
making recommendations to councils/commit-
tees, the process of framing such recommenda-
tions could and should involve a greater
exchange of views with the two other parties.
6.2. There is thus a need to develop methods
of seeking a consensus between the parties. To
this end the r6le of the Co-ordinating Committee
Chairman in actively seeking such a consensus
should be formally recognised.
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Furthermore, when it is a question of
applying an existing procedure without seeking
to amend it, use might be made of tripartite
working parties 
- 
an approach that has already
been adopted on occasion 
- 
and also the prepara-
tion, under the leadership of the Co-ordinating
Committee Chairman, of a joint report setting
out any conflicting positions.
6.3. In its report the Co-ordinating Committee
should not only note the arguments invoked by
the two other parties but also set out these argu-
ments in such a way that the councils/commit-
tees are fully briefed, for each of the points in the
report, on what they actually involve.
Here, simply appending the views expres-
sed by the secretaries-general and the stalf,
without further action, may be deemed insuffi-
cient.
Recourse to independent expert opinion
7.1. Assuming that the recommendation to be
forwarded to the councils/committees remained
a matter for the experts, it would seem that in
case of serious conflict between this recommen-
dation and the views of the other parties, the Co-
ordinating Committee report could no longer
automatically be the sole draft decision to be
submitted to the political organs.
7.2. Should the Co-ordinating Committee's
recommendations be such as to be prejudicial to
the proper functioning of the organisations
and/or to the basic rights ofstaff, the secretaries-
general and the staff should be able to supple-
ment the dossier with an independent expert
opinion which is accepted as authoritative.
Here we are not speaking of recourse to
any of the traditional methods of settling labour
disputes and, in particular, of establishing an
arbitration mechanism between the Co-ordina-
ting Committee on the one hand and the
secretaries-general and staff on the other. The
object of the exercise would be to demonstrate,
should the need arise, that the Co-ordinating
Committee's proposals run counter to the proper
functioning of the organisations or to the basic
rights of their staff.
7.3. In practical terms this could imply the
following:
- 
that one person, or better still, a
three-man group be appointed for a
two-three year period by the councils/
committees on a revolving basis. They
would be selected on the basis of their
recognised competence and total inde-
pendence. In the case of a three-man
group, the persons should be ofdifferent
nationalities. They would be appoin-
ted on the basis of a list put forward by
the secretaries-gener4l after consulta-
tions with CPAPOC. Since the matter
is of concern to all the organisations,
the decision of the council called upon
to appoint the persons would become
effective only after an appropriate lapse
of time, during which the other coun-
cils, duly informed, could make known
their own decision to approve or reject
the choices made. Should one of the
councils object, the secretaries-general
would make fresh proposals after appro-
priate informal contacts with govern-
ments;
- 
that, as soon as the secretaries-general
had noted the existence of serious disa-
greement with the Co-ordinating Com-
mittee, they would forward the latter's
report to this entity, the councils being
duly advised that recourse was being
had to the procedure they had insti-
tuted. The person (or group of per-
sons) would forward the conclusions
within a reasonable time-limit to the
secretaries-general with copies to CPA-
POC and the Co-ordinating Committee.
The secretaries-general would then
transmit the Co-ordinating Committee's
report and the conclusions to their res-
pective councils;
- 
before resorting to such a procedure, the
representatives of the secretaries-general
would naturally consult with CPAPOC.
Their statement to the effect that the
matter was being referred back to the
three-man group of experts, with the
point(s) of serious disagreement high-
lighted therein, would set out the staff
position.
7.4. In order to initiate the same procedure in
CPAPOC 
- 
on the assumption that, after
consultation, the secretaries-general would feel it
unnecessary to have such recourse - the follow-
ing changes might be envisaged in order to gain
the support of the councils/cornmittees :
- 
the three-man group, formally asked by
CPAPOC to formulate an opinion,
would give a provisional ruling on the
existence of serious disagreement.
Should it deem that the situation is not
one in which its opinion can be vali-
dly sought, it would return the dossier
to the secretaries-general for direct
consideration by the Councils;
- 
the introduction of such a procedure
could be decided for an initial two-year
period and then considered afresh at a
subsequent stage.
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Evolation of *penditure on pensions paid by WEU since 1981
(a) Appropriations for pensioru for the various organs of l4tEI) (1951-1985)
(b) Number of peasions paid out by WEU (1981-1985)
SG - Secretariat-General.
ACA 
- Agency for the Control of Armaments.
SAC = Standing Armaments Committee.
O of C - Office of the Clerk.
l. Paid in conjunction with a survivor's pension.
2. Excluding hors cadre officials.
l98l 1982 1983 1984 l 985
Budget
total
Appro-
priations
for
pensions
Pension/
budget
ratio
(%)
Budget
total
Appro-
priations
for
pensions
Pension/
budget
ratio
(%)
Budget
total
Appro-
priations
for
pensions
Pension/
budget
ratio
(%)
Budget
total
Appro-
priations
for
pensions
Pension/
budget
ratio
(%)
Budget
total
Appro-
priations
for
pensions
Pension/
budget
ratio
(%)
Secretariat-
General .. .
Standing
Armaments
Committee ..
Agency for
the Control of
Armaments
Office of
theClerk....
t
1,02 1,160
E
104,160 10.20
E
1. I l 3.95i
t
104,880 9.41
E
1,028,515
E
67,830 6.59
E
1,069,19C
f.
65,265 6.10
f.
l,lll,2l0
t
89,960 8.07
F
7',034,670
14,907,470
r0,866,000
F
861,800
2,217,100
106,000
12.25
14.87
0.97
F
7,969,63C
16,461,94C
12,282,M
F
1,199,500
2,803,100
126,000
I 5.58
17.02
1.03
F
7,3 I 3,890
14,910,050
r 3,893,000
F
I,131,450
2,004,500
240,000
t5.47
13.44
1.73
8,839, 380
19,126,r50
14,762,2W
F F
t,206,130
3,106,300
677,@0
13.65
16.24
4.58
9,31 4,690
20,739,440
I 5,470,900
F F
1,282, I 00
3,995,900
683,500
13.76
t9.27
4.42
Pensions
l98r t982 l 983 r 984 1985
SG ACA sAc ) ofC Total SG ACA SAC ) of( Total SG ACA sAc ) of( Total SG ACA SAC C ofC Total SG ACA SAC C of( Total
Retirement
Survivors' .
Orphans' ..
Invalidity .
7
I
I
t7
10
ll
9
3
I
I
I
34
l5
2
I
7
I
I
l8
9
ll
l3
3
2
I
I
40
t4
2
I
7
I
I
20
9
I
t4
3
3
I
I
44
t4
2
I
7
2
3
I
23
9
I
13
4
2
I
I
45
l6
4
2
9
3
3
I
23
9
I
r3
4
2
I
1
47
l7
4
2
Totals 9 28 t2 3 52 9 28 t6 4 57 9 30 l7 5 6l 13 33 t7 4 67 l6 33 t7 4 70
Total
establishment2 45 5l 27 26 149 45 5l 27 26 t49 45 5l 27 27 150 45 5l 27 26 149 45 5l 27 26 t49
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Document 1032 24th September 1985
RECOMMENDATION 424 
'
on the disaster in Mexico
The Assembly,
Deeply moved by the disaster which has struck Mexico;
Anxious to demonstrate the active sympathy of Europeans towards the Mexican people,
RrcouveNos rHAT THE CouNctI-
Urge member governments to express their solidarity through action to help vitctims byaffording
them humanitarian, material and financial assistance, using the most appropriate fhamework for this
purpose.
l. Adopted on behalf of the Assembly by the Presidential Committee at its meeting on Tuesday, 24th September 1985'
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Document 1033 4th November 1985
WEU and the strategic defence initiative
The stategic defence initiative
(Defence aspects)
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments2
by Mn van den Bergh, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INrnooucrony Nore
Dnq,Fr REcoul.tgNoauoN
on the strategic defence initiative
Dnerr Rrsorurrou
on the strategic defence initiative
Expl,c.Nnrony MEMoRANDUM
submitted by Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. History of ballistic missile defence
(a) Soviet anti-ballistic missile systems
(D/ President Reagan's initiative
(c/ Public presentation of SDI
III. SDI and arms control
IV. European opinion
V. United States offer of European participation
- 
WEU position
VI. Conclusions
VII. Opinion of the minority
l. Adopted in committee by 1I votes to 4 with 5 abstentions.
2. ![eryber1 of the committee: Yr. Pignion (Chairman); MM. Blaauw, Kittelmann (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alberini, Amadei,
van.den Bergh, Bonnel, Bourges, Brown- (Alternqte: Qr. AiUei1, Cox, Dejardin, Ertl, Galley (Alternate: Jung), Gerctl, biust, S-itA_nthony Grant (Alternate: Lord Ngwglt), MM. Huyghues_des Etages (Alternate: Baumel),'Konen, de xwaiditeniet, Lei.iriii,
Natiez, Pecchioli (Alternate: Antoni), Sarlr, Scheer, Sii Dudley Smiih, MM.. Steverlynck, Stokes (Alternate: Sir Freieiiieinriuj.''
N.B. Tfte names of those taking pan in the vote are printed in italics.
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Introductory Note
In preparing this report and another on emerging technology and military strategy the Rapporteur
had interviews as follows:
10th January 1985 
- 
Ministry of Defence, The Hague
General G.L.J. Huijser, Chief of Defence Staff;
Lt. General G.W. Boerman, National Armaments Director;
Major General tr. C.M. van den Bergh, Director of Materiel, Army;
Commodore Ir. W.J.A. van Raay, Deputy Director Mat6riel, Navy;
Major General Ir. H. Boekenoogen, Director of Mat6riel, Air Force;
Brigadier General Ir. E.B. van Erp Taalmankip, Materiel Department, Air Force;
Dr. Bert Klaamers, Policy Planning Staft
Colonel H.A. Konzy, Chief, Planning Division, Army StafI;
Colonel de Jong, Information Department, Air Force;
Lt. Colonel Vollema.
25th January 1985 
- 
Ministry of Defence, Bonn
Major General Htittel, Assistant Chief-of-Staff, Politico-Military Affairs;
Colonel Wiesmann, Politico-Military Affairs;
Colonel Rode, NATO Affairs;
Colonel Dingler, Armaments Co-operation;
Colonel Bromeis, Operations;
Lt. Colonel Dr. Schilling, Military-Strategic Affairs;
Lt. Colonel Lehr, Defence Planning;
Lt. Colonel Wenger, Defence Intelligence;
Dr. Schloenbach, Armaments;
Mr. Wenthe, Armaments Research.
8th February 1985 - London
Chatham House RIIA
Mr. John Roper, Research Fellow, former Chairman of the committee.
Ministry of Defence
Mr. Nigel Nicholls, Assistant Under-Secretary, Defence Staff;
Mr. John Roberts, Assistant Under-Secretary, lnternational Procurement;
Mr. Nigel Hughes, Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser;
Mr. Brian Hawtin, Head of NATO/UK Policy Division;
Mr. T.M. Bossom, Head Resources and Programmes Division;
Wing Commander R. MacKendrick, Defence Policy StaE
Dr. Waters, Scientific Staff;
Colonel G.J. Barnett, Defence Concepts StafI;
Miss Hilary Thompson, NATO Policy Division.
Plessey Electronics
Mr. Peter Bates, Deputy Chairman, United Kingdom Representative to NATO Industrial
Advisory Group (NIAG).
l4th February 1985 
- 
NATO Headquarters, Brussels
Mr. Robin Beard, Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Suppor[
Mr. M. Weiss, Director of Armaments and Defence Research;
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Mr. N. Spridgen, Armaments and Defence Research;
Mr. J.M. Stewart, Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Planning and Policy.
25th February-Lst March 1985 
- 
Washington
25th February 
- 
Department of Defence
Mr. George Bader, Principal Director, European and NATO Policy, ISp;
Dr. Harlan Straus, Director, Northern Europe Region, ISP;
Mr. Louis Michael, Assistant Under-Secretary, Plans and Development, DRE;
Dr. James Tegnelia, Assistant Under-Secretary, Conventional Initiatives, DRE;
Ms. Mary Ann Gilleece, Deputy Under-Secretary, Acquisition Management;
Mr. Walter Henderson, Senior Negotiator, lnternational Acquisition;
Mr. Frank Cevasco, Director, NATO and European A{fairs, DRE.
26th February 
- 
Department of Defence
Mr. Ronald S. Lauder, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and NATO Policy, ISP;
Dr. Steven D. Bryen, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Trade and Security Policy (East-
West Trade);
Mr. Randy Bell and Mr. Robert Fiss, Office of Regional policy Issues, ISp;
Mr. Talbot Lindstrom, Deputy Under-Secretary, International Programmes and Technology,
DRE.
State Department
Mr. John Hawes, Deputy Director, Politico-Military Bureau.
Consultant
Dr. Steven Canby.
27th February 
- 
State Department
Mr. James Huff, Director, Benelux Department;
Mr. Martin Wenick, Director, Northern European Affairs;
Mr. James Dobbins, Deputy Assistant Secretary, European Affairs.
Department of Defence
Major General Klein, Vice-Director, J5, Plans and policy, JCS;
Colonel Robbins;Major Emerson; Major Dials;
Lt. Colonel Sandrock;
Commander Sheflield.
House of Representatives
Mr. Warren Nelson, StaffMember, House Armed Services Committee.
28th February 1985
The Raytheon Corporation Boston, Mass.
lst March 1985 
- 
National Security Industrial Association, Washington
Yr. George News_ome, Chairman of the International Committee and representative of Seyfarth,
Shaw, Fairweather and Geraldson;
Colonel Bruce E. Green, USA (Ret), International Committee Executive.
Representatives of United States industry
Mr. M. Edward Carlson, Director, International Programmes Honeywell, Inc.
Mr. Harley A. Cloud, Director of Technology, Federal Systems Division IBM Corporation;
Mr. Walter R. Edgington, Vice-President Marketing, GTE Business Systems Corporation;
Mr. Harold V. Larson, Manager International Representation, Rockwell International Overseas
Corp.;
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Mr. George H. Perlman, Vice-President International Martin Marietta Corporation;
Mr. Arthur J. Stanziano, Vice-President Government Affairs, Hazeltine Corporation;
Mr. John C. Stockett Jr., Consultant, Sanders Associates, Inc.;
Mr. H.C. Witthaus, Industry-Government Relations, General Motors Corporation;
Mr. Richard G. Woodbury, Vice-President, Contraves Goerz Corporation.
Representatives of Department of Defence
Mr. Frank Cevasco;
Dr. Harlan Straus.
8th March 1985 
- 
Paris 
- 
Ministry of Defence
Mr. Henri Conze, Deputy Director, International Relations, D6legation Gen6ral pour
l'Armement;
Mr. Mazens, DGA;
G6neral Juin, Deputy Director, GPES;
Colonel Baer, Defence Staff, IBEG;
Colonel Brunet, Defence Staff- Plans and Policy;
Colonel de Linage, Defence Staff- General Studies;
Professor J. Lestel, Research and Study Directorate, DGA.
The committee 4s a whole met at the Palais d'Egmont, Brussels, on 15th February 1985, when Lt.
General Huitfeldt, Director of the NATO International Military Staff, addressed it on emelgin8
technology and military strategy. It then held a joint meeting with the Military Committee of the
North Atlantic Assembly.
The committee then met in Strasbourg on l2th March 1985 where it was briefed by General
Charles de Llamby, Commander First French Army, and members of his stalf, and at Headquarters
French Forces in Germany Baden-Oos, where it was briefed by Lt. General Houdet, Commander-in-
Chiei and Commander 2nd French Army Corps, and his staff.
The committee met at the seat of the Assembly the following day and was received by
Mr. Charles Hernu, Minister of Defence, and then visited the French Defence Staff command post
where it was briefed by Vice-Admiral Louzeau, Major General of the Joint Defence Staff, and by
General Guichard, Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Operations.
The committee met subsequently at the seat of the Assembly on 16th April, 7th May and 20th
May when it discussed earlier drafts of a combined report on emerying technology and military
strategy, which also dealt with sDI.
At a further meeting in Geneva on 24th July 1985, the committee was addressed by the following
representatives to the Conference on Disarmament:
- 
H.E. Mr. Mario Alessi, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Italy;
- 
H.E. Mr. Alfonso Garcia Robles, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Mexico and
Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament;
- 
H.E. Mr. Stanislaw Turbanski, Ambassador, Head of the Polish Delegation and Chairman of
the ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons;
- 
H.E. Mr. Saad Alfararyi, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Egypt and Chairman of
the ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space;
- 
H.E. Mr. Richard Butler, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of Australia and Chairman of
the ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons;
- 
H.E. Mr. Donald Lowitz, Ambassador, Representative of the United States;
- 
H.E. Mr. Victor Issraelyan, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the Soviet Union.
At that meeting, the committee asked the Rapporteur to separate the parts of his draft report
which dealt with the sirategic defence initiative, and with emerying technology and military strategy.
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Following its meeting in Turkey and Greece from 23rd to 30th October when the committee took
evidence for a forthcoming report on European security and the Mediterranean, the committee then
discus-se_4and adopted the present report on the strategic defence initiative at a further meeting at the
seat of WEU in London on 4th November 1985.
The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the ministers, members of parliament,
officials, senior oflicers and experts who met the committee and replied to questions.
The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.
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Draft Recommendation
on the sfiategic delence initiative
The Assembly,
(il Considering the strategic defence initiative announced by President Reagan in March 1983 and
the invitation from the United States Secretary of Defence of March 1985 for allied cquntries to explore
possible co-operative efforts " on data and technology short of ABM component level f';
(iil Believing that Europe collectively must give priority to developing independent space technology
both for civilian applications and for military applications which will enhance the slability of defence
and assist in verification of arms control agreements and confidence-building measures;
(ii, Welcoming any defence technology collaboration with the United States trhat will enhance
security and stability, will not undermine existing arms control agreements, or compromise the
negotiation of future agreements;
(iv) Noting that the strategic defence initiative has raised some questions both from European
governments and within the United States administration, and that Article IX of the ABM treaty
prohibits the transfer to other states of ABM systems or components limited by the treaty;
(v) Expressing the hope that the SDI programme will not cast doubt on the policy of nuclear
deterrence which can only strengthen the defence ofEurope;
(vi) Welcoming the better prospect of progress in the bilateral negotiations on " gpace and nuclear
arms both strategic and intermediate range ", and welcoming the Council's attitude to SDI expressed in
reply to Recommendation 413, according to which " relevant tests or deployments will have to be a
matter for negotiation, under the terms of the ABM treaty. In view of the contribution of this treaty to
stability, the Council stresses the importance of preventing its erosion ",
RrcoutrteNos rH,c.r rHr CouNcrL
l. Agree a common response to the United States' strategic defence initiative which should:
(a) stress the importance of avoiding an arms race in space;
(b) accept research compatible with existing arms control agreements and of a nature and scale
which will enhance stability and security;
(c) permit European industry to participate on mutually advantageous terrns in appropriate
areas of SDI research;
2. Give priority and special emphasis to a joint European programme for defence and arms control
purposes, including observation and communications satellites, and to promoting civil technological
research of Eureka type within ESA and the European Communities;
3. Urge the Soviet Union and the United States to ensure that space defensive measures of
themselves do not become an obstacle to balanced and verifiable agreements limiting strategic and
intermediate-range nuclear weapons;
4. Emphasise the need, when the results become available, for the United States and its European
partners to discuss the possible military and strategic implications of research on SDI;
5. Instruct the new agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions to report
annually on the arms control impact of the SDI.
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Draft Resolution
on the strategic deleace initiative
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming any defence technology collaboption with the United States that will enhance
security and stability, will not undermine existing arms control agreements or hamper the negotiation
of future agreements;
(it) Noting that the strategic defence initiative has raised some questions both from European
governments and within the United States administration;
(iii) Stressing the fundamental importance of the ABM treaty as a cornerstone of all attempts at East-
West agreement on arms control, and drawing attention to the important statement on SDI by the
WEU Council in its reply to Recommendation 413: " relevant tests or deployments will have to be a
matter for negotiation, under the terms of the ABM treaty. In view of the contribution of this treaty to
stability, the Council stresses the importance of preventing its erosion ",
Cnus upon the Congress of the United States, pending the outcome of current arms control
negotiations, to ensure that the SDI in itself does not become an obstacle to balanced and verifiable
agreements limiting strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr, van den Bergh, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l.l. The committee reported on President
Reagan's strategic defence initiative, more popu-
larly known as star wars, and allied reactions toit as recently as last Decemberr and on that
report the Assembly recommended that the
Council: " 2. Agree common instructions to the
representatives of those WEU countries partici-
pating in the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva with a view to securing ... a ban on
space weapons, including anti-satellite systems
or new ABM systems; ... " 2. The committee
returns to the subject in this report in implemen-
tation of the decision of the Presidential Com-
mittee of 24th September 1985 on the strategic
defence initiative:
" (i) The Presidential Committee agreed
on the need to ensure that the WEU
Assembly could debate this matter.
(ii) The Presidential Committee consi-
dered that the Assembly should be
enabled to debate the SDI, in accor-
dance with the following procedure,
on the basis of a single draft recom-
mendation to be submitted by the
Committee on Defence Questions
and Armaments, while giving the
General Affairs Committee and the
Committee on Scientific, Technologi-
cal and Aerospace Questions the task
of reporting on those aspects of the
SDI within their area of responsibil-
itv.
(iii) The chairmen of the three commit-
tees would ensure close consultation
between their committees so as to
help the Rapporteur of the Commit-
tee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments to concert his views with those
of the Rapporteurs of the other two
committees prior to the adoption of
the preliminary draft recommenda-
tion, so that a draft recommendation
could be prepared which was likely to
obtain the agreement of the three
committees.
(iv) The Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments was requested
to communicate its draft recommen-
l. Report on the control of armaments and disarmament,
Document 998, explanatory memorandum, Chaprer III,
3rd December 1984, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw.
2. Recommendation 415 adopted by the Assembly on
4th December 1984.
dation to the other two committees
concerned in suflicient time, i.e.
before the London meetings, and the
Rapporteurs would express the views
of their respective pommittees there-
on.
(v) In any event, it would be for the
General Affairs Committee and the
Committee on Scientific, Technologi-
cal and Aerospace Questions to table
amendments expre$sing their points
of view on the SDI if they were unable
to endorse the text proposed by the
Committee on Defence Questions
and Armaments... "
1.2. In accordance with paragraph (iii) above,
the preliminary draft recommQndation and reso-
lution were communicated to the Rapporteurs of
the other two committees concerned for their
opinion before the report was discussed by the
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments.
1.3. The subject is of particular importance to
WEU in that, fortuitously pephaps, " collective
consideration " by the Courlcil " in order to
achieve as far as possible a co-prdinated reaction
of their governments to the invitation of the
United States to participate in the research pro-
gramme " 3, became the first substantial defence
item for decision on the Council's agenda since
the reactivation of WEU announced in the
Rome communique in October 1984. The fact
that at the time this report wds drafted no final
agreement had been reached in the WEU
Council reflects the diverse attitudes to the
initiative among European governments.
II. History of ballistic mlssile defence
2.1. In the 1960s the United States developed
a series of anti-ballistic missile systems based on
high-speed missiles with nuclear warheads.
The Nike Zeus in 1964 and Nike X of 1968 were
cancelled as ineflective by President Johnson;
the successor Sentinel was sim[larly cancelled by
President Nixon in 1969, to be followed by the
Safeguard system based on the Sprint and
Spartan missiles actually deployed in the 1970s
but dismantled after a vote in Congress in
1975. The Soviet Union for its part deployed
the Galosh ballistic missile defence system
which at one time had one hundred missile sites
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Council ministerial meeting,23rd Apdl 1985.
DOCUMENT IO33
around Moscow, now reduced to thirty-two.
Successive United States Secretaries of Defence
did not perceive these systems as potentially
eflective against the growing numbers of Soviet
ballistic missiles, but they were occasionally
described as possibly effective against a smaller
third nuclear power such as China. Certainly
the proliferation of oflensive nuclear warheads
was always seen as a means of penetrating an
adversary's ABM system, at less cost than that
of the system. The then Secretary of Defence,
Mr. McNamara, said in March 1967: " I do not
think there is a senior civilian or military oflicial
in the Defence Department that does not believe
that we should react to the (Soviet) ABM
deployment by expanding our oflensive force
2.2. The negotiations of some eighteen months
which led to the signature of the interim SALT
agreement and the treaty on the limitation of
anti-ballistic missile systems on 26th May 1972
were devoted in part to persuading the Soviet
Union to the United States view that a more
stable strategic balance could be achieved by
limiting ABM systems and accepting the concept
of mutual assured destruction than by attempt-
ing to construct missile defences which could in
any case be penetrated at relatively less cost by
swamping them with more offensive warheads
or decoys.
2.3. As permitted under the 1972 ABM treaty,
the United States under previous administra-
tions continued basic research at relatively low
intensity on both directed energy (laser) and
particle beam technology. In the words of the
last statement to Congress of the Carter adminis-
tration's outgoing Under-Secretary of Defence
Research and Engineering in January l98l:
" The major effort is the high-energy laser space
defence research ... in FY 1982 construction of
the advanced test accelerator for the particle
beam technology programme will be completed
and additional low-energy beam propagation
experiments will be conducted with the experi-
mental test accelerator. " Reports of the Secreta-
ries of Defence of previous administrations also
noted the existence of a Soviet programme on
lasers and particle beams, but expressed the
opinion that the latter had failed to solve the
problems of basic physics, and implied that the
Soviet Union had embarked too early on a deve-
lopment programme.
(a) Soviet anti-ballistic missile systems
2.4. The Soviet Union has had an anti-ballistic
missile defence system based on 32 Galosh
missiles with nuclear warheads deployed round
4. Quoted from United States Congressional Research
Service Report No. 85-48F: The strategic defence initiarive
and United States alliance strategy, February 1985.
Moscow since the ABM treaty was signed in
1972. According to the IISS: " reports suggest
that new missiles are being deployed. A little
more information on radar deployments has
become available; it is not clear whether this
represents new deployments or merely new data
two new anti-ballistic missile systems 
- 
the
SH-04 (exoatmospheric) and SH-08 (endoatmos-
pheric) have been reported. " 5
2.5. The April 1984 edition of the United
States publication " Soviet military power "
devotes more space than earlier editions to
Soviet ABM defence, claiming " 64 reloadable
above-ground launchers " for Galosh ... " The
Soviets are upgrading this system to the 100
launches permitted under the ABM treaty
the new Moscow defences are likely to reach
fully operational status in the late 1980s ". The
report claims that the Soviet Union has " an
improving potential for large-scale deployment
of modernised ABM defences well beyond the
100-launch ABM treaty limits " which " could be
accomplished within the next ten years ". The
study continues:
" Soviet directed energy development pro-
grammes involve future ABM as well as
anti-satellite and air defence weapons
concepts. By the late 1980s, the Soviets
could have prototypes for ground-based
lasers for ballistic missile defence. The
many difliculties in fielding an operation
system will require much development
time, and initial operational deployment
is not likely in this century. Ground- and
space-based particle beam weapons for
ballistic missile defence will be more diffr-
cult to develop than lasers. Nevertheless,
the Soviets have a vigorous programme
under way for particle beam development
and could have a prototype space-based
system ready for testing in the late
1990s. "
2.6. In the week of 7th October, there was
controversy in Washington over the size of the
Soviet ABM programme, when Mr. Robert
McFarlane, the White House national security
adviser, asserted that the Soviet Union had " the
most advanced " space defence programme " on
the face ofthe earth ", an assertion that did not
tally with more measured administration brief-
ings to Congress committees in the course of the
year when, for example, the House appro-
priations sub-committee had been told that in
lasers and particle beams the Soviet Union had
" no identifiable lead in the applications of
these technologies to a space-based strategic
defence " 6.
5. International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Balance 1984-85.
6. International Herald Tribune, lst October 1985.
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(b) President Reagan's initiative
2.7. The genesis of President Reagan's strategic
defence initiative announced in his speech of
23rd March 1983, has become clearer to your
Rapporteur following his discussions in
Washington. The proposals did not originate in
the Pentagon, either with the joint chiefs-of-staff
or in the office of the Secretary of Defence, but
in the White House itself. They are attributed
partly to the President's Science Adviser,
Mr. George Keyworth, and partly as a response
to public opinion revealed in polls and in mail
reaching the White House which showed grow-
ing public anxiety over nuclear weapons. The
language of the announcement reflected this
preoccupation: " I call upon the scientific
community in our country, those who gave us
nuclear weapons, to turn their talents now to the
cause of mankind and world peace, to give us
the means of rendering these nuclear weapons
impotent and obsolete. " The aim was " to
eliminate the threat posed by strategic nuclear
missiles " 
- 
there was no reference to tactical and
theatre nuclear missiles, cruise missiles or
bombers. The Secretary of Defence, Mr. Wein-
berger, had seen only an early draft ofthe state-
ment, and was in Europe attending a Nuclear
Planning Group meeting when it was delivered,
taking the Pentagon by surprise and leaving
most of the experts sceptical.
2.8. In the ensuing two years however, under
pressure from the White House, the initiative
has been developed into a full-scale programme
with a new organisation within the Department
of Defence 
- 
the Strategic Defence Organisation
under Lt. General James A. Abrahamson 
- 
and
various scattered research projects have been
grouped under the direction of this organis-
ation. Budgetary requests for FY 1986 now
before Congress are $3.7 billion for this project
which, the committee understands, would com-
pare with the $1.25 billion for the continuation
of the pre-existing research programmes, had the
SD initiative not been taken. Evidence given to
Congress in 1984 by the then Under-Secretary of
Defence Research and Engineering, Mr. Delauer,
was: " We plan an aggressive adequately funded
programme to pursue the relevant technologies
at the maximum reasonable rate. For fiscal
year 1985 we are requesting approximately$Z billion (total for DoD and DoE). We
anticipate that during the fiscal year 1986-89
period, approximately $24 billion will be
required. " 7
2.9. No longer however is it claimed that SDI
would be " the means of rendering nuclear
weapons impotent and obsolete ". In the terms
7. Hearings of the Research and Development Sub-
Committee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, I st March 1984, page 477.
of the January 1985 White House hand-out on
the SDI: " The strategic defence initiative, by
itself, cannot fully realise this vision ... for this
we will need to seek many solutions ... the SDI
takes a crucial first step ... The SDI research
programme will provide to a future President
and a future Congress the technical knowledge
necessary to support a decision in the early
1990s on whether to develop and deploy such
advanced defensive systems. " The possibility
will be investigated of destroyipg oflensive stra-
tegic missiles either shortly after launch (the
boost phase); during the post-boost phase both
before and after multiple warheads are released
from their carrier; and finally during the termi-
nal phase when the separate warheads are re-
entering the atmosphere. Defensive systems
might be ground-based or spacerbased, or a com-
bination of both. The weapqn system might
use directed energy (lasers) or particle beams or
more conventional projectiles. The main thrust
of the programme is towards non-nuclear
devices, although the possible use of nuclear
devices for generating high-enepgy X-ray pulses
is also understood to be under investigation.
2.10. Congressional support for SDI will have
been affected by two reports from the Congress
OfIice of Technology Assessment published on
24th September 1985 on SDI and on anti-
satellite systems (ASAT). The former con-
cluded lhal a perfect SDI was not feasible, and
that an unstable one could be destabilising.
Mr. Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee, commented that " after
spending billions and billions of dollars we could
find that we have bought ourselves greater insta-
bility than the world has ever confronted in the
atomic age ".
2.11. The House of Represerltatives Defence
Appropriations Committee in October 1985
recommended $2.5 billion for SDI for FY 1986(beginning lst October 1985) compared with the
administration request for $3.7 billion. During
FY 1985 the Pentagon is reported to have
awarded about 1,000 SDI contracts worth more
than $l billion E.
(c) Public presentation of SDI
2.12. The difference in emphasis in public state-
ments by members of the present United States
administration makes clear the internal divi-
sions concerning the realities and priorities of
SDI, which reflect some of the questions raised
by European leaders.
2.13 On the one hand Mr. Paul Nitze, the
special adviser on arms control to the United
States President and Secretary ofState, speaking
in Philadelphia on 20th February, described the
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stringent criteria by which SDI technology would
be judged before any decision might be taken to
deploy a system:
" The criteria by which we will judge the
feasibility of such technologies will be
demanding. The technologies must pro-
duce defensive systems that are sur-
vivable; if not the defences would 1hem-
selves be tempting targets for a first
strike. This would decrease rather than
enhance stability.
New defensive systems must also be cost-
effective at the maryin, that is it must be
cheap enough to add additional defensive
capability so that the other side has no
incentive to add additional oflensive
capability to overcome the defence. If
this criterion is not me! the defensive sys-
tems could encourage a proliferation of
countermeasures and additional offensive
weapons to overcome deployed defences,
instead of a redirection of effort from
offence to defence...
If the new technologies cannot meet these
standards, we are not about to deploy
them. "
2.14. Mr. Nitze described the three phases envi-
saged for the SDI programme: the near term of
" at least the next ten years " during which deter-
rence would continue to be based on the ulti-
mate threat of nuclear retaliation while the
United States pressed " for radical reductions in
the number and power of strategic and inter-
mediate-range nuclear arms We will be
pursuing the SDI research programme 
- 
in full
compliance with the ABM treaty which permits
such research ... We have offered to begin
discussions in the upcoming Geneva talks with
the Soviets as to how we might together make a
transition for a more stable and reliable relation-
ship based on an increasing mix of defensive
systems. " Defining the transition, Mr. Nitze
enumerated the criteria for deploying defensive
systems, quoted in the previous paragraph,
saying: " the transition would continue for some
time, perhaps for decades. As the United States
and Soviet strategic and intermediate-range
nuclear arsenals decline significantly, we would
need to negotiate reductions in other types of
nuclear weapons and involve, in some manner
the other nuclear powers. " Finally, in the ulti-
mate period " given the right technical and poli-
tical conditions, we would hope to be able to
continue the reductions of nuclear weapons
down to zero. The global elimination of
nuclear weapons would be accompanied by
widespread deployments of effective non-nuclear
defensives. "
2.15. In contrast to Mr. Nitze, Mr. Richard
Perle, the United States Assistant Under-
Secretary of Defence for international security
policy, has consistently cast doubt on the value
of the existing arms control treaties including the
1972 ABINI treaty:
"... The irrelevance of the treaties,
designed to regulate the competition in
strategic weapons, has become increas-
ingly clear as the Soviet build-up has
continued Every strategic weapon
added to both United States and Russian
arsenals since 1972 has been added under
the terms (sometimes interpreted gene-
rously by the Soviets) of one treaty in
force, one expired but still observed and
one never ratified but adhered to never-
theless. " e
III. SDI and arms control
3.1. Article V of the 1972 ABM treaty provides
that: " Each party undertakes not to develop, test
or deploy ABM systems or components which
are sea-based or mobile land-based. " Agreed
statement D appended to the treaty provides
that:
" In order to insure fulfilment of the obli-
gation not to deploy ABM systems and
their components except as provided in
Article III of the treaty, the parties agree
that in the event ABM systems based on
other physical principles and including
components capable of substituting for
ABM interceptor missiles, ABM laun-
chers, or ABM radars are created in the
future, specific limitations on such sys-
tems and their components would be
subject to discussion in accordance with
Article XIII and agreement in accordance
with Article XIV of the treaty. "
3.2. The prohibitions are reiterated in the
January 1985 White House hand-out on SDI
which adds however:
" That agreement does permit research
short of field testing of a prototype ABM
system or component. This is the type of
research that will be conducted under the
SDI programme. Any future national
decision to deploy defensive systems
would of course lead to an important
change in the. structure of United States
and Soviet forces. We are examining
ways in which the offensive/defensive
relationship can be managed to achieve a
more stable balance through strategic arms
control. "
9. " Arms: Too serious to fudge ", article contributed to
The Times, 2lst March 1985.
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However the White House security adviser, Mr.
McFarlane, suddenly claimed in the week of 7th
October that statement D would permit testing
and development of advanced anti-missile
technologies 
- 
a claim at variance for example
with Mrs. Thatcher's understanding following
her talks with President Reagan in December
1984 (paragraph 4.1). It is understood that
President Reagan then gave a ruling on adminis-
tration policy on llth October, which was
announced by Mr. Shultz in his address to the
North Atlantic Assembly on l4th October when
he said the SDI " research progmmme is and will
continue to be consistent with the ABM
treaty. The treaty can be variously interpreted
as to what kinds of development and testing are
permitted, particularly with respect to future sys-
tems and components based on new physical
principles. " He said: " It is our view, based on a
careful analysis of the treaty text and the
negotiating record, that a broader interpretation
of our authority is fully justified. This is how-
ever a moot point; our SDI programme ... will
continue to be conducted in accordance with a
restrictive interpretation of the treaty's obliga-
tions. Furthermore, any SDI deployment
would be the subject of consultations with our
allies, and to discussion and negotiations, as
appropriate, with the Soviets in accordance with
the terms of the ABM treaty. Our policy thus
reflects: the defences to peace and stability, and
his vision of a 'balance of safety' replacing the
'balance of terror'; our commitment to pursue
the programme as currently structured, which is
consistent with a restrictive interpretation of our
obligations under the ABM treaty; our judgment
that the SDI programme ... will be adequate to
answer the question of whether a cost-effective
and survivable defence against ballistic missiles
is feasible. "
3.3. As amended by a 1975 protocol, the ABM
treaty prohibits the deployment of more than
one ABM site by each party. Article IX
provides that:
" To assure the viability and effectiveness
ofthis treaty, each party undertakes not to
transfer to other states, and not to deploy
outside its national territory, ABM sys-
tems or their components limited by this
treaty. "
which would limit co-operation with other states
if a new ABM system were to be deployed.
3.4. Under the ABM treaty the parties also
undertake in Article VI: " B. not to deploy in the
future radars for early warning of strategic
ballistic missile attack except at locations along
the periphery of its national territory and
oriented outward. "
3.5. The joint United States-Soviet statement
issued on 8th January following the meeting in
Geneva between the Secretary of State, Mr.
Shultz, and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr.
Gromyko, stated that: " The sides a$ee that the
subject of the negotiations will be a complex of
questions concerning space and nuclear arms
both strategic and intermediate-range with all
the questions considered and resolved in their
inter-relationship. The objective of the nego-
tiations will be to work out effoctive agreements
aimed at preventing an arns race in space and
terminating it on earth ... " It is agreed that the
current Geneva negotiations cah be divided into
three groups to deal respectively with space
weapons, strategic nuclear weapons and interme-
diate nuclear weapons.
3.6. The Soviet Union has recognised that
basic research is permitted under the ABM
treaty, and that it is condubting " scientific
research on space problems ", " We do not
deny the right or possibility to proceed with
fundamental research. But laboratory study
and research is one thing, developing prototypes
and testing space weapons is an bntirely different
thing ", said Marshal Akhromeov, Soviet Chief-
of-Staffr0. The Soviet Union has however
called for SDI to be abandoned hs a condition of
agreement in the bilateral negotiations. Pro-
gress will therefore depend on careful definition
of permitted research.
3.7. In a BBC interview on 30th October 1985,
President Reagan, asked whelher the United
States would share SDI technology with the
Soviet Union, replied " Why not ? "
IY. European opinion
4.1. In expressing public support for United
States research under SDI, while recalling that
the Soviet Union is also uqdertaking such
research, European leaders haVe stressed that
their support is limited to researph. The British
Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, in her December
1984 meeting with President Reagan at Camp
David agreed four points which the British
authorities have since reiterated more frequently
than those of the United States:
" 
- 
the United States and western aim
not to achieve superiority but
maintain balance, taklng account
Soviet developments;
- 
the SDl-related deployment would, in
view of treaty obligations, have to be a
matter for negotiation;
- 
the overall aim is to enhance, not
undercut, deterrence; and
10. Interview published in New Yorl( Times, l3th Octo-
ber 
- 
quoted here from Le Monde, I 5th October 1985.
is
to
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- 
East-West negotiation should aim to
achieve security with reduced levels of
offensive systems on both sides. "
Speaking about these four points in the House of
Commons on l9th March, Mrs. Thatcher said
" research is permitted and constraints on
deployment are those contained in the anti-
ballistic missile treaty signed in 1972 both by the
Soviet Union and the United States, which
permitted research but required negotiation
before testing and deployment in accordance
with the terms of the treaty. "
4.2 The British Foreign Secretary, Sir
Geoffrey Howe, addressing the Royal United
Services Institute in London on l5th March,
first stressed the historical importance of the
ABM treaty whereby " The United States and
the Soviet Union committed themselves for an
unlimited period to restrict active defences
against the nuclear threat from ballistic missiles
to a very low level ... The net eflect was to
eliminate the option of full-scale deployment of
defensive systems, perceived in 1972 to be
destabilising, costly and in any case ineffective,
and to enhance the strategy ofnuclear deterrence
through the clear recognition of mutual vulnera-
bilities. " He went on to raise fundamental
questions about SDI, pointing out that space was
currently used by both sides for communications
and surveillance satellites and that the West
faced the problem of anti-satellite systems,
exacerbated by Soviet deployment of a limited
capability which it was logical and prudent for
the United States to balance. He continued:
" On the other hand we must recognise the
heavy western dependence upon the exist-
ing utilisation of space technology and
particularly upon satellites for intelligence
purposes. We must also recognise that
the prospect at a time of crisis of either
side being faced with a loss of irs strategic
eyes and ears would be gravely destabilis-ing. It could provoke a new and even
more threatening stage in any East-West
confrontation ... There may be equally
good grounds for negotiating some cons-
traints upon elements of anti-satellite
activity. I welcome the readiness expres-
sed by President Reagan ... to consider
such mutual restraint while the negotia-
tions ... explore possibilities for concrete
agreements ... The government takes the
view that if negotiations were to succeedin imposing mutual constraints on anti-
satellite systems these could have a helpful
impact over a period of years. -We
should take that opportunity now if it is in
the western interest. "
Turning to SDI, Sir Geoffrey continued:
" As the United States administration
themselves recognise the programme is
geared to a concept which may in the end
prove elusive ... Treaty obligations speci-
fically allow for research to continue into
defensive systems. Evidently it is point-
less to try to impose constraints which
cannot be verified. Most activities in
laboratories or research institutes comeinto that category. The ABM treaty
recognised this when it drew a distinction
between research on the one hand and
development, testing and deployment on
the other...
But what should happen if and when deci-
sions are required on moving from the
research to the development stage ? ... at
that stage the judgments to be made will
only partly depend upon technical assess-
ments about the feasibility of defences.
Even if the research shows promise, the
case for proceeding will have to be
weighed in the light of the wider strategic
implications of moving down the defen-
sive road...
The history of weapons development and
the strategic balance shows only too
clearly that research into new weapons
and study of their strategic implications
must go hand in hand. Otherwise
research may acquire an unstoppable
momentum of its own, even though the
case for stopping may strengthen with the
passage of years ... in his 1983 address
President Reagan himself acknowledged
that a mix of o{fensive and defensive
systems could be 'viewed as fostering an
aggressive policy'. Uncertainty apafi,
would the establishment of limited defen-
ces increase the threat to civilian popul-
ations by stimulating a return to the targe-
ting policies of the 1950s? Most funda-
mental of all would the supposed techno-
logy actually work ? And would it ... pro-
vide defences that not only worked but
were survivable and cost effective ? These
are the key questions to be answered by
the research that is being undertaken on
both sides...
There would be no advantage in creating a
new Maginot line of the twenty-first
century, liable to be outflanked by relati-
vely simpler and demonstrably cheaper
countermeasures. If the technology does
work, what will be its psychological
impact on the other side ? President
Reagan has repeatedly made it clear that
he does not seek superiority. But we
would have to ensure that the perceptions
of others were not different ...
If it initially proved feasible to consrruct
only limited defensives, these would be
bound to be more vulnerable than com-
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prehensive systems to countermeasures.
Would these holes in the dyke produce
and even encourage a nuclear flood ?
Leaving aside the threat to civilian popul-
ations, would active defences provide the
only feasible way of protecting key mili-
tary installations ? Might we be better
advised to employ other methods of
protection, such as more mobile and
undersea forces ?
Finally on the technology side could we be
certain that the new systems would permit
adequate political control over both
nuclear weapons and defensive systems,
or might we find ourselves in a situation
where the peace of the world rested solely
upon computers and automatic decision-
making ?
Then there is the question of cost. The
financial burden of developing and
deploying defences goes far beyond the
additional cost of providing defences
against the non-ballistic missile threat.
No one at present can provide eYen a
guestimate of the total sums involved.
But it is fair to assume that these will run
many hundreds of billions of dollars...
We shall have to ask ourselves not only
whether the West can afford active defen-
ces against nuclear missiles. We must
also ask whether the enormous funds to be
devoted to such systems might be better
employed ... might it be better to use the
available funds to improve our capability
to oppose a potential aggressor at a time of
crisis with a credible, sustainable and
controllable mix of conventional and
nuclear forces ?
President Reagan spoke of the need to
reverse the erosion of the ABM treaty. It
represents a political and military key-
stone in the still shaky arch of security we
have constructed with the East over the
past decade and a half. But to go beyond
research into defensive systems would.be
inconsistent with the t'erms of the ABM
treaty as it stands. It was agreed at Camp
David last December that any deployment
beyond those limits would have to be a
matter for negotiation. We would have
to be confident that that formidable task
could actually be managed on a mutually
acceptable basis ... I do attach impor-
tance to convincing the Soviet leadership
that we in the West are indeed serious in
our aim of maintaining strategic stability
at significantly lower levels of nuclear
weapons. We do not want to give them
the impression that we have something
else in mind. We are serious about arms
control and we must be seen and heard to
be so.
Finally ... we must be sure that the
United States nuclear guarantee to Europe
would indeed be enhar[ced as a result of
defensive developmen(s. Not only en-
hanced at the end ofthb process but from
its very inception.
But we also have to consider what might
be the offsetting developments on the
Soviet side, if unconstrained competition
in ballistic missile defences beyond the
ABM treaty limits were to be provoked.
In terms of NATO's policy of forward
defence and flexible response, would we
lose on the swings whatever might be
gained on the roundabouts ?
Deterrence has worked and it will conti-
nue to work. It may be enhanced by
active defences. Or their development
may set us on a road which diminishes
security. We do not lqtow the answer to
that question. Meanwhile four clear
points emerge. First, .". in the words of
Sir Winston Churchill'be careful above all
things not to let go of the atomic weapon
until you are sure and ryore than sure that
other means of presertving peace are in
your hands'. Secondly, ... we must be
especially on our guard against raising
hopes that it may be impossible to fulfil.
We would all like to think of nuclear
deterrence as a distasteful but temporary
expedient. Unfortunately we have to
face the harsh realities of a world in which
nuclear weapons exist and cannot be
disinvented. Words and dreams cannot
by themselves justifu what the Prime
Minister described to the United Nations
as the 'perilous pretence' that a better
system than nuclear delterrence is in reach
at the present time. Thirdly, any deploy-
ment of space-based or other defences
must be a matter for negotiation ... In
the words of the White House statement
of 3rd January ' deployments of defensive
systems would most usefully be done in
the context of a co-operative equitable and
verifiable arms control environment. A
unilateral Soviet delloyment of such
defences ... would dbstroy the found-
ation on which deterrence has rested for
twenty years.' I warmly welcome the
clear statements of the United States
administration's view that deployments
would need to be a co-operative ende-
avour to be embarked upon in an arms
control context. "
The fourth factor was the linkage between
offensive and defensive systems. If offensive
forces were lowered dramatioally " then the case
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for active defences may be correspondingly
strengthened. Conversely radical cuts in offen-
sive missiles might make the need for active
defences superfluous. "
4.3. As already reported by the committeerr,
France, in a major statement to the forty-nation
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on l2th
June 1984, called on the countries concerned,
but in the first place the United States and the
Soviet Union, to engage in multilateral negotia-
tions on the properly verified limitation of new
anti-ballistic missile technologies, which would
prohibit both new anti-ballistic missile systems
as well as anti-satellite systems, directed energy
systems and particle beam systems. France
called in particular for:
(i) the strict limitation of anti-satellite
systems, including the prohibition of
any that could reach satellites in high
orbit;
(ii) the prohibition for a renewable
period of five years, of the deploy-
ment or testing anywhere of directed
energy systems capable of destroying
ballistic missiles or satellites; ...
(iii) an undertaking by the United States
and the Soviet Union to extend to the
satellites of third countries the provi-
sions concerning immunity of certain
space objects on which they have
already agreed bilaterally.
4.4. In August 1985 in a further statement in
the conference the French representative made
less far-reaching proposals, but noting the close
relationship between ASAT systems and ABM
systems, proposed there should be multilateral
negotiations to ban high-altitude ASATs and to
protect satellites of third parties, while ABMs
were left to the bilateral negotiations.
4.5. A recent press report has summarised the
French position as recognising three drawbacks
to the SDI:
" (i) by developing space defence the
United States will incite the Soviet
Union to do the same which could
have unfortunate consequences for
the credibility of the French striking
force, whose delivery vehicles would
encounter new obstacles;
(iy' through his Messianic references to
star wars, Mr. Reagan may demobi-
lise public opinion, naturally sus-
picious of nuclear weapons, by mak-
ing it believe that there was an alter-
native to deterrence. For the United
ll. Report on the control of armaments and disarma-
ment, Document 998, explanatory memorandum, paragraph
3.14, 3rd December 1984, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw.
States to devote colossal sums to
strengthening their nuclear weaponry
would in no way reduce this risk;
(iii) the SDI in any case faces Europe with
a technological challenge. Paris does
not believe in the sincerity of the
offers ofco-operation 
- 
very vague in
any case 
- 
made by Washington.
These offers are intended above all
to ' tetanise critical reaction to SDI'
and to undermine European initiatives
in this field. It is recalled that the
United States has never viewed with
favour the establishment of European
co-operation in high technology fields,
examples cited being Airbus and
Ariane. "12
4.6. In Germany, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, the Chancellor and the President of the
Republic all referred to SDI in the course of one
week. In Bonn on l8th March, Mr. Genscher
issued a five-page article on " A new chapter in
East-West relations " welcoming the opening of
the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet
Union and the United States in Geneva:
"... The aim, ag;reed on 8th January
between the United States and the Soviet
Union which is to seek to prevent an
arms race in space, represents an attempt
at' preventive arrns control'...
The aim of the Geneva negotiations
affects the basic security interest of the
Europeans and fundamental questions
affecting the common security of the
western alliance. We are satisfied therefore
that the United States are ready for overall
consultations which will accompany the
process of negotiation in Geneva and will
give us the possibility to participate in
them. What is important is to fully safe-
guard the strategic unity of the alliance,
avoid instability, and ensure that the
United States allies in Western Europe
participate in the development through
close and confident consultations, and are
not decoupled from technological innov-
ation. Until there is a better strategy to
prevent war, the strategy of flexible
response must remain valid. It is a
strategy adapted to preventing war.
Nothing, absolutely nothing, must com-
promise this overriding moral aim.
Therefore any new development must be
assessed to see whether or not it brings us
nearer to the aim of preventing war.
Nothing must be done which would
make a war in Europe possible, because
even a war waged only with conventional
90
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weapons would be, for the people of
Europe, in view ofthe state oftechnology,
a far worse catastrophe than the second
world war.
It is of great importance that the Euro-
peans should not limit themselves to a
r6le of spectator in the negotiations
between the great powers. After having
maintained the network of East-West
relations during a period when contacts
between the great powers were disturbed
they must ensure from now on that the
new phase is not limited to relations
between the main powers and to questions
of security, but embraces the whole of
East-West relations, and fully benefits
Europe. "
4.7. Addressing the annual conference of his
CDU party in Essen on 20th March, Chancellor
Kohl said " we are leaving our decision open one
way or the other on the implementation of the
SDI ". SDI had the advantage of having
brought the Soviet Union back to the negotiating
table, and he concluded that " the more success-
ful the Geneva negotiations are in drastically
reducing the numbers of defensive nuclear
weapons in both the East and the West, the more
the stationing of weapon systems in space may
become superfluous ... we will continue to
advocate that the Europeans develop a joint
position and convince our American allies ".
4.8. Finally the Secretary-General of NATO,
Lord Carrington, in a lecture in Cambridge on
3lst January is reported to have said that the
theory ofa strategic defence that could enhance
United States and allied security needed to be
tested, but that the case remained to be
proved. He welcomed the four points agreed
between Mrs. Thatcher and President Reagan in
December 1984 and added that " it will at the
very least be extremely diffrcult to devise a
system of strategic defence which meets these
objectives ofbalance, no superiority and enhan-
ced deterrence " 13. Addressing the North
Atlantic Assembly on I lth October he said:
" ... we need a convincing answer to the
point which the Soviet Union keeps
making about the SDI: in brief, that they
can't be expected to accept deep reduc-
tions in strategic weapons if they risk
waking up one morning to find that what
they have left has been degraded by the
successful United States deployment of a
system of ballistic missile defence.
The fact, surely, is that they run no such
risk. First of all because any question of
deployment is a long way down the line,
and the Soviet leaders know it: just as they
know that the open nature of American
society gives them many more opportun-
ities ofkeeping an eye orr things than is the
case the other way round. Secondly,
because if deployment were thought desir-
able once the results of the SDI research
programme had been thoroughly eva-
luated, it would be very much in the
interests of the United States to do what
they have made clear that they would do -
which is to seek to negotiate the transition
to a strategic balance more dependent on
defensive and less on dflensive weapons.
And finally, because whatever problems
may be left can surely be dealt with by
negotiating appropriate safeguards to
accompany or form parf ofany new agree-
ment on offensive arms. "
4.9. With the reservations quoted in the fore-
going paragraphs, the Europoan countries have
generally supported in public the United States
decision to conduct research into the possibil-
ities of ballistic missile defence, within the terms
of the ABM treaty, but on the understanding
that that treaty does not perrnit testing or deve-
lopment of such weapon systefns.
Y, United States offer of Eurbpean participation
5.1. In the course of discussions with Euro-
pean leaders early in 1985, representatives ofthe
United States administration; in explaining the
SDI initiative, suggested thdt European coun-
tries might wish to share in SDI research. Mrs.
Thatcher and Chancellor Kqhl are reported to
have said that their countries might be interestedin participating in researchl. This possibility
was mentioned to your Rapporteur during his
discussions in Washington, but European parti-
cipation in SDI research appeared not to have
been worked out in any detall with the Defence
Research and Engineering Department in the
Pentagon.
5.2. Shortly before the meeting of the NATO
Nuclear Planning Group i{r Luxembourg on
26th and 27th March 1985 Mr. Weinberger took
the unusual step of writing to the Ministers of
Defence in all NATO countries and Japan,
Australia and lsrael, asking for a reply to the
United States SDI proposals " within sixty
days ", and then releasing the text to the press:
" Dear Colleague,
In the period since President Reagan
introduced his vision for the strategic
defence initiative (SDI), many of our allies
have informally expressed an interest in
participating in this rqsearch programme.
At the same time, some of our friends
have sought clarification of our policy and13. TheGuardian, lstFebruary 1985.
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attitude toward such co-operation. I am
writing to you today both to make clear
my government's views on this important
subject and to begin a direct dialogue with
you thereon.
As you know, the purpose of the SDI
is to determine whether there are cost-
eflective defensive technologies that could
enhance deterrence and increase stability.
Because our security is inextricably linked
to that of our friends and allies, we
will work closely over the next several
years with our allies to ensure that, in the
event of any future decision to deploy
defensive systems (a decision in which
consultation with our allies would play an
important part), allied, as well as United
States, security against aggression would
be enhanced. Moreover, the SDI pro-
gramme will not confine itself only to an
exploitation of technologies with potential
against ICBMs and SLBMs, but will also
carefully examine technologies with
potential against shorter-range ballistic
missiles.
The United States will, consistent with
our existing international obligations
including the ABM treaty, proceed with
co-operative research with the allies in
areas of technology that could contribute
to the SDI research programme. Pur-
suant to this policy, the united States is
permitted and is prepared to undertake
such co-operative programmes on data
and technology short of ABM component
level as may be mutually agreed with
allied countries.
If your nation is interested in exploring
possible co-operative efforts or contribu-
tions, I would ask, as a lirst step, that you
send me, within sixty days, an indication
of your interest in participating in the SDI
research programme and of the areas ofyour country's research excellence that
you deem most promising for this pro-
gramme. In order to provide a more
comprehensive basis for our assessment of
pertinent capabilities and to help expedite
the process, the United States is prepared
to arrange meetings in Washington so thatyour government's scientific/technical
representatives may receive detailed brief-
ings on the SDI programme during this
period.
We would expect to give your responseprompt consideration with a view to
initiating as appropriate bilateral discus-
sions on specific areas and arrangements
for co-operation ... " la
5.3. The communique of the Nuclear Planning
Group ministerial meeting on 27th March
mentioned support for SDI research in these
terms:
" We have continued the comprehensive
consultations on the political and strategic
implications of the United States strategic
defence initiative (SDI). This is designed
to establish whether recent advances in
technologies could o{fer the prospect of
significantly more effective defence
against ballistic missiles. We support the
United States research programme into
these technologies, the aim of which is
to enhance stability and deterrence at
reduced levels of offensive nuclear forces.
This research, conducted within the terms
of the ABM treaty, is in NATO's security
interest and should continue. In this
context, we welcome the United States
invitation for allies to consider participa-
tion in the research programme. "
5.4. Negotiations are now taking place with the
United States to explore the possibility of
concrete participation in the SDI either directly
by European firms with appropriate expertise or
possibly, in the case of Germany and the United
Kingdom, through governmental agreement.
5.5. After the meeting of the Nuclear Planning
Group on 30th October 1985, it was announced
that Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Heseltine had
reached agreement in principle on provisions for
British participation in SDI research, but the
agreement was understood to be in general terms
and did not offer Britain a specific share in
excess of $ I billion which Mr. Heseltine had
been seeking.
WEU position
5.6. The Ministerial Council of WEU duly
examined SDI at its Bonn meeting on 23rd April
1985, but without agreeing on a joint position, as
the communiqu6 shows:
" The Ministers also examined questions
associated with research efforts concerning
strategic defence. They agreed to conti-
nue their collective consideration in order
to achieve as far as possible a co-ordinated
reaction of their governments to the invi-
tation of the United States to participate
in the research programme and instructed
the Permanent Council accordingly. In
this context they underlined the impor-
tance of the continuing bilateral consulr
ations with their partners in the Atlantic
Alliance as an essential element of allied
cohesion. "
5.7. The Council, in its reply to Recommend-
ation 413 on I lth April, adopted a clear position14. Quoted from Atlantic News, 29th March 1985.
92
DOCUMENT 1033
concerning the restrictions imposed on SDI by
the ABM treaty and stressed the importance of
not eroding the latter:
" The Council notes that the strategic
defence initiative (SDI) announced by the
United States is no more than a scientific
research programme and hence does not
contravene the provisions of the 1972
ABM treaty. The Council also takes the
view that laboratory research does not
lend itself to arms control measures. On
the other hand, relevant tests or deploy-
ments will have to be a matter for negotia-
tion, under the terms of the ABM
treaty. In view of the contribution of this
treaty to stability, the Council stresses the
importance of preventing its erosion. "
5.8. The committee hopes that a co-ordinated
reply from WEU can be agreed, but notes that
actual replies to the United States invitation to
participate in SDI will be given individually by
governments.
YI. Conclusions
6.1. The committee notes the reservations on
SDI expressed by European circles quoted
above. It finds the procedure of the Weinberger
letter to allied Defence Ministers, asking for a
reply within sixty days and then released to the
press, a quite inappropriate way to handle
relations between allied governments, especially
on an issue of fundamental importance on which
views are known to be divided.
6.2. The committee's chief conclusions are set
forth in the draft recommendation and draft
resolution, but the committee also endorses the
French proposal that a treaty to ban highJevel
anti-satellite weapons and to protect satellites of
third parties should be negotiated in the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (para-
graphs 4.3 and 4.4 above).
YII. Opinion of the minority
7.1. The report as a whole was adopted by the
committee by 1l votes to 4 with 5 abstentions.
The minority voting against the report felt the
reference to an arms race in paragraph l(a) of
the draft recommendation to be super{luous,
claiming that the SDI was a defensive initiative
which could not contribute to an arms race.
That minority would have replaced paragraph
l(b) of the draft recommendation with the
words: " l(b) accept research oompatible with the
ABM treaty ".
7.2. Among members abstaining one would
have added at the end ofparagraph 2 ofthe draft
recommendation the words: " before considering
direct European participation in SDI ". The
same member would have included in paragraph
3 of the draft recommendation the words of
Recommendation 415 adopted by the Assembly
in December 1984, which called for " ... a ban
on space weapons, including anti-satellite sys-
tems or new ABM system ".
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Amendments I to 12 29th November 1985
ll/EU and the strategic defence initiative
The strategic defence initiative
(Defence aspects)
AMENDMENTS I to 12 |
tabled by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur,
on behalf of the General Affairs Committee
1. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following newparagraph:
"_(iy' Consid_eri$ l$t the- development of space defence technology means that the European
allies of the United States have to make e-very effort to master the niw technologies which 
"iigiitone day take their place in an effective defence system; ',.
2. Leave out paragxaph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
" (ii) \elieving th-at Eulope collectively must pursue the development of independent spacetechnology both for civilian applications and for defence applicalions which will enhanci its
security and assist in verification of arms control agrbements and confidence-building
measures; ".
3. 
- ^In 
paragraph (iii) of.the preamble to the draft recommendation, Ieave out from " stability " to the
end ofthe paragraph and insert:
" and foster research on new defence systems without jeopardising existing arms control agree-
ments or compromising the negotiation of future agreements; ".
4. Leave out paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.
5. kave out paragraph 1v,) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
" (v/ Believing that a strategic defence system might play a complementary rdle in the policy of
nuclear deterrence; ".
6. In paragraph (vil of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert after the words
" Recommendation 413" a footnote reference to refer to a footnote setting out the text of paragraph 3
of the Council's reply to Recommendation 413, which reads:
" 3. The Council welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have begun
global negotiations, i.e. dealing with strategic weapons, INF missiles and defence and space
weapons. It hopes that these negotiations will achieve security at the lowest possible level of
forces through substantial, balanced and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons. The Council
notes that the strategic defence initiative (SDI) announced by the United States is no more than a
scientific research programme and hence does not contravene the provisions of the 1972 ABM
treaty. The Council also takes the view that laboratory research does not lend itself to arms
control measures. On the other hand, relevant tests or deployment will have to be a matter for
negotiation, under the terms of the ABM treaty. In view of the contribution of this treaty to
stability, the Council stresses the importance of preventing its erosion. "
7. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from " Recommenda-
tion 413 " to the end of the paragaph and insert:
" considering that the American a\rthorities have not yet explained in suflicient detail the propo-
sals for the United States' European allies to take part in the SDI programme, ".
1. Seellthsitting,4thDecemberl9S5(amendments1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9, 10, lland12agreedto; amendment5negatived).
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8. In paragraph I of the draft recommendation proper, after " defence initiative " insert:
" or, if that seems impossible, speciff Europe's own interests in this area by harmonising as far as
possible the answers of the seven WEU member countries ".
9. In paragraphl(c) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "participate" to the end
ofthe paragraph and insert:
" in all areas of SDI research on terms providing a genuine exchange of technology ".
10. At the end of paragraph I of the draft recommendation proper, add:
" (d) ensve that the answers of members of WEU to the American invitation do not jeopardise
the development of Europe's technological capability and encourage the dgvelopment of this
capability, in particular through the early implementation of the Eureka progralmme; ".
11. Leave out paragxaph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
" Request all countries concerned to ensure that no obstacles will be placed irp the way of balan-
ced and verifiable agreements limiting strategic and intermediate-range nutlear weapons and
encourage the pursuit and success of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva on the limita-
tion of armaments in the three areas covered; ".
12. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add:
" 6. Ensure maintenance of the nuclear deterrent capability of the Atlantic Alliance as long as
Europe's security is not effectively guaranteed by other means and consider the question of the
case for adequacy in conventional defence capacity, both in the present situation and in regard to
the development of the strategic defence initiative. "
Signed:Hill
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Amendments 13 and 14
2nd December 1985
WEU and the strategic defence initiative
The strategic defence initiative
(Defence aspects)
AMENDMENTS 13 and 14 I
tabled by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt
13. Amend paragraph l(c) of the draft recommendation proper to read:
" ensure that European industry is associated only with due respect for national interests and on
mutually advantageous terms in appropriate areas of SDI research;".
14. In the French text of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " De prier
I'Union Sovi€tique et les Etats-Unis de faire en sorte que " and insert " D'insister aupris de I'Union
Sovi4tique et des Etats-Unis pour que ".
Si gned : Dreyfus- Schmidt
l. see 11th sitting, 4th December 1985 (amendment l3 not moved; amendment l4 withdrawn)
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Amendments 15 to 24
3pd December 1985
WEU and the strategic defence initiative
The strategic defence initiative
(Defence aspects)
AMENDMENTS 15 to 24 |
tabled by Mn Gansel and others
on behalf of the Socialist Group
15. Before paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new
paragraph:
" Believing that an extension of the arrns race into space as raised by the stratogic defence initia-
tive must be prevented since it will bring only the illusion of more security and in fact will
endanger strategic stability and create within the alliance zones of unequal security; ".
16. Leave out paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and inseft:
" Believing that Europe collectively must give priority to developing indepen{ent space techno-
logy for civilian applications which among other things will also assist in surveillance, veri-
fication of arms control agreements and confidence-building measures; ".
17. kave out paragraph (v/ of the preamble to the draft recommendation.
18. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from "strategic and
intermediate-range " to the end of the paragraph and insert:
" noting the Council's attitude to SDI expressed in reply to Recommendation 413 according to
which 'relevant tests or deployment will have to be a matter for negotiation under the terms of
the ABM treaty', and welcoming their further statement in that reply that 'in view of the contri-
bution of this treaty to stability the Council stresses the importance of preventing its erosion', ".
19. l,eave out paragraph l(b) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
" (b) not accept research incompatible with existing arms control agreements and of a nature and
scale which will endanger stability and security;".
20. Leave out paragraph 1(c/ of the draft recommendation proper.
21. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insen the following new paragraph:
" 3. IJrge all states to refrain from testing and developing anti-missile and antfsatellite weapons
and from preparing for an afins race in outer space; ".
22. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " space defensive measures of
themselves do " and insert " research in space defensive measures in itself does ".
23. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " when the results become
available ".
24. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, Ieave out " possible " and insert " political as
well as the ".
Signed: Gansel, Millan, Miller, Stoffelen
1. See llth sitting, 4th December 1985 (amendments 15, 17,19,20,21 artd23 negatived; amendments 16 and22 not moved;
amendment l8 withdrawn; amendment 24 agreed to).
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IVEU and the strategic defence initiative -
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committeez
by Mr. Berrier, Rappor-leur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DnlFr RecouurNonuoN
on WEU and the strategic defence initiative 
- 
the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance
ExprnNntony Menaon c,Noul\4
submitted by Mr. Berrier, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. The Atlantic Alliance and the defence of Europe
III. Europe and President Reagan's strategic defence initiative
IV. The reactivation of WEU
V. Tightening institutional links between the Assembly and the other WEU
organs
VI. Conclusions
l. Adopted in committee by 13 votes to 0 with I abstention.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Michel (Chairman); MM. Hardy (Alternate: Lord Hughes), van der Werlf (Vice-Chairmen);
Mr. Ahrens, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berrier, Bianco, Bogaerts, Burger, Hill, Sir Russell Johnston, Mrs. Kelly, MM. Koehl(Alternate: Dreyfus-Schmidt), l-agneat (Alternate: Phcriaux), Lagorce, Martino, Masciadri (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Muller,
Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Ruet (Alternate: Baumet), Rumpf, van der Sanden, Spitella, Vecchietti (Alternate:
Gianotti), de Vries.
N.B. i'fte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
"i^Yi,';;l!;;i;:i:f ;;!xtili;txifi;t;:;
The Assembly,
O Considering that Europe's security requires the European members of the Atlantic Alliance to
make their views carry greater weight on matters relating to the strategy of the allidnce, disarmament
and allied countries'policies outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty;
(it) Considering that close, continuing co-ordination of their views is essential to achieve this end;
(ii, Noting that the modified Brussels Treaty at present provides an ideal framework to achieve this
end;
(iv) Welcoming the intentions asserted by the Council in its Rome declaration, Eonn communique
and reply to Recommendation 420 with a view to giving new life to WEU, but regretting the slowness
with which these intentions are transformed into decisions;
(v) Considering that it is urgent to adapt the WEU agencies to the Council's new vocation;
(vil Considering that keeping public opinion informed about the activities of the Council and of
the Assembly is an essential part of a policy of deterrence whose real basis is the will of the people;
(viil Noting the very marked improvement in the information the Council gives the Assembly, but
hoping that, in accordance with the intentions expressed in the Bonn communiqu6, the Council will
increasingly inform the press ofits activities;
(viii) Having carefully studied the legal implications of Order 63,
RrcouueNos rHAT rne CouNcIr-
l. Ensure that the Ministers of Defence participate fully in its work and in it$ dialogue with the
Assembly;
2. Have the appropriate agency conduct a continuing study of the strategic consequences of the
development of new weapons, whatever the results of its efforts to co-ordinate the answers of member
countries to the American proposal that they take part in the strategic defence initiatlve;
3. Proceed to organise the new agencies, namely the agency for the study of disa[mament questions,
the agency for the study of defence questions and the agency for co-operation in the field of armaments,
by giving them, insofar as possible, all the necessary means to be able to co-operate in carrying out their
respective tasks;
4. Specify without delay the new aims of its discussions and the scope of its aption regarding dis-
armament and the nature of the tasks given to the agency concerned;
5. Play an active part in informing Europeans about matters relating to their secqrity:
(a) by keeping the press systematically and oflicially informed of its own activities by all
appropriate means;
(b) bV instructing the new agency handling defence questions to promote the organisation of
training courses in the defence institutes of each of the member countries for nationals of the
seven countries with responsibility in defence matters or likely to have an influence on public
opinion so as to allow them to have a better understanding of the Eurgpean dimension of
security problems;
6. Guarantee the Assembly full independence in all areas, in particular by allowing it to divide its
overall budget between the various heads while respecting the regulations governing the staff of the
co-ordinated organisations;
7. Pursue its effort to keep the Assembly better informed of its work by ensuring in particular the
continuation ofjoint meetings between the Council at ministerial level and the perl'manent committees
of the Assembly;
8. Expedite positively the examination of applications for membership from European member
countries of the Atlantic Alliance with the aim of one day associating all the member countries of the
European Community in a joint security policy.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mn Berrier, Rapporteur)
L Introdaction
l. The report now prepared by the General
Affairs Committee has a twofold title. The
committee had proposed " The European pillar
of the Atlantic Alliance " at the time your
Rapporteur was appointed. Subsequently, the
Presidential Committee decided to group the
three reports of the General Affairs Committee,
the Committee on Defence Questions and
Armaments and the Committee on Scientific,
Technological and Aerospace Questions under
the overall title " WEU and the strategic defence
initiative " so as to allow a wide-ranging debate
on President Reagan's strategic defence initiative
at the December 1985 session.
2. This modification of the General Affairs
Committee's original intentions is in many
respects justified, particularly in view of the fact
that in November 1985 the WEU Council,
meeting in Rome at ministerial level, is to try to
achieve agreement between all member coun-
tries on their answer to the United States
Government',s proposal that they participate in
the SDI. There is therefore a close link between
WEU's activities in 1985 and Europe's reactions
to the American proposal and this link has
become official since the communiqu6 issued at
the close of the ministerial meeting in Bonn on
23rd April 1985.
3. Moreover, for many years the goyern-
ments of the European member countries of the
Atlantic Alliance have avoided using the term
" European pillar " of the Atlantic Alliance,
perhaps lest this indicated a widening gap
between the two shores of the Atlantic. Yet the
idea of an Atlantic community based on two
pillars came from the American side, being
referred to for the first time in President
Kennedy's speech in Philadelphia in April
1962. This being so, in the Rome declaration
of 27th October 1984 the Council gave an
accurate definition of what this European pillar
of the alliance might be, recalling inter alia that:
- 
" a better utilisation of WEU would not
only contribute to the security of
Western Europe but also to an improve-
ment in the common defence of all the
countries of the Atlantic Alliance and to
greater solidarity among its members ";
- 
there are " specifically Western Euro-
pean geographical, political, psychologi-
cal and military dimensions ";
- 
" increased co-operation within WEU
will also contribute to the maintenance
of adequate military strength and poli-
tical solidarity and, on that basis, to the
pursuit of a more stable relationship
between the countries of East and Westby fostering dialogue and co-opera-
tion ";
- 
there is a " need to make the best use of
existing resources through increased
co-operation, and through WEU to
provide a political impetus to institu-
tions of co-operation in the field of
armaments ".
4. Your Rapporteur considers this to be a
definition of the reasons why the seven govern-
ments decided to reactivate WEU and of how
Europe's participation in the defence of Europe
might be organised at the present juncture,
i.e. insofar as this expression has any meaning,
the constitution of the " European pillar " of the
alliance.
5. Finally, on 24th September 1985 the Presi-
dential Committee of the Assembly decided to
refer to the General Aflairs Committee the
implementation of Order 63 on the institutional
connection of the Assembly with other organs of
WEU. This order, adopted at the May 1985
session, instructed the Presidential Committee:
" To ask the competent committee for the
preparation of a report on the possibilities,
conditions and consequences of a closer
institutional connection of the Assembly
with other organs of WEU. The report
should consider also the following possibi-
lities:
(a) responsibility of the Secretary-General
of WEU also with respect to the Assem-
blv;
(b) responsibility of the different expert
secretariats for both the Assembly and the
other organs of WEU;
(c) one single budget for all WEU organs
including the Assembly;
(d) centralisation of all WEU organs in
one place;
(e/ consideration of all other possibilities
suitable further to promote the cause of
WEU.
This report should restrict itself to a pre-
sentation of the factual conditions and
legal possibilities as a basis for the neces-
sary political follow-up and an eventual
100
DOCUMENT IO34
decision by the competent bodies accord-
ing to the Brussels Treaty. "
6. The same day, the General Affairs
Committee, meeting in Paris, made your Rap-
porteur responsible for implementing this deci-
sion, which seemed logical since the Assembly's
institutional links with other organs of WEU
forms part of the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance. The study requested will be the
subject ofa separate chapter.
II. The Atlantic Alliance and the defence
of Earope
7. Without wishing to go back to the origins
of the Atlantic Alliance, it must be noted that at
present it is not well adapted to certain facets of
the world today. Set up at a time when only the
United States had nuclear means, the alliance
was intended first and foremost to allow
Western Europe to benefit from the umbrella of
nuclear deterrence and thus ensure its security,
which was threatened by the Soviet Union's
overwhelming preponderance on the European
continent, and international peace. Since then,
the development of Soviet nuclear armaments
and then its naval force and the lead it has taken
in space have completely changed the nature of
the worldwide military balance and of the
threats to Western Europe and the rest of the
free world. Furthermore, the period of prosper-
ity'enjoyed by Europe until 1973 and the growth
of the European Community brought about a
new division of economic forces and, to a
certain extent, a new sharing of political
influence and military strength within the
western alliance.
8. In these conditions, it was inevitable that
differences would emerge among the allies on all
security matters and that the European allies
would call for a new sharing of influence and
responsibilities between them and their Ameri-
can allies. It was of course General de Gaulle
who most vigorously put forward plans to
change the relationship between Europe and
the United States in the Atlantic Alliance and
who consequently took the most extreme steps
with France's withdrawal from NATO and the
build-up of a French national nuclear force.
But although the other European members of the
alliance did not wish to go so far, the Harmel
plan, whose conclusions were adopted by the
North Atlantic Council in December 1967, was
an attempt to respond to what Henry Kissinger
called transatlantic misunderstandings and, on
the American side, President Kennedy's refer-
ence to the two pillars of the Atlantic commu-
nity showed that he too was alive to the need to
rebalance the alliance.
9. The trends that started with that first
crisis have continued and the question of the
respective shares of Europq and the United
States in joint defence respon$ibilities still exists,
perhaps not as a global problem but rather as a
series of questions to whioh no satisfactory
answer has yet been found.
10. (i) The limitation of armaments and rela-
tions between members of the Atlantic Alliance
and of the Warsaw Pact have also been internal
matters for the alliance since the United States
and the Soviet Union started negotiations on the
subject during President Kennedy's term of
oflice.
11. Naturally, the European members of the
alliance could but welcome unreservedly the fact
that the two great powers were trying, through
disarmament agreements, to terminate what was
known as the cold war, to limit the numbers of
nuclear weapons each side deployed, to take
useful precautions to avoid ryar breaking out by
surprise or by accident and to ban the deploy-
ment of barriers of anti-ballstic missiles which
would have considerably reduced the effects of
mutual deterrence. If in 1979 they subscribed
to the two-track NATO decipion on the deploy-
ment of Euromissiles, it wab in the firm hope
that this decision would allow serious negotia-
tions to be held between the two great powers to
avoid such deployment. The opening of wide-
ranging Soviet-American negptiations in Geneva
at the beginning of 1985 on strategic nuclear
weapons, Euromissiles and the development of
space weapons met with whOlehearted approval
in Europe.
12. However, a secondary effect ofthese nego-
tiations was to strengthen the position of the two
great powers within- their respective sy-stems of
ittiance. Their allies were in fact left out of
these negotiations which nevertheless concerned
them in more than one respect, first because
American nuclear weapons are the cornerstone
of the western deterrent system on which
Europe's security is based, second because the
Soviet Union has always insiisted that account be
taken of United Kingdom and French nuclear
weapons when calculating the number of means
of dtlivery authorised for each side and finally
because the intended systeill of balance leads -
and this is obviously one of the Soviet Union's
aims 
- 
to the European countries becoming
more dependent on the tvuo great powers, i.e.
Soviet domination in Ea$tern Europe. The
terms of the problem are obviously different in
the West but the dominating position of the
United States in the Atlantic Alliance has never-
theless been reinforced.
13. It is evident that lt is in everyone's
interest to pursue and succeed with these nego-
tiations and that the presence of the partners of
the United States and thp Soviet Union in
Geneva would not make $uccess easier. The
solution proposed by the Americans and endor-
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sed by their allies is to hold appropriate consul-
tations in NATO. This is effectively done, but
the fact that the United States meets a diversity
of European countries gives it a privileged posi-
tion which generally allows it to ensure ratifi-
cation of decisions already taken in Washington
and which have often already been applied.
There is no doubt that intra-European consulta-
tions on the limitation of armaments would give
Europe gtreater weight in the alliance.
14. The declaration adopted by the seven
WEU countries in Rome in October 1984
showed that the seven governments were well
aware of this need and it was not by chance that
they decided to start studying disarmament
matters in WEU as from February 1985. When
the General Affairs Committee visited Washing-
ton in June 1985, in their answers to questions
put by a member of the committee, American
leaders did not hide the fact that these consul-
tations were not to the liking of the American
authorities and that approaches had been made,
as announced by the press but never confirmed
by the European governments and repofted by
Mr. van der Sanden in his report on the new
outlook for WEU 
- 
reply to the thirtieth
annual report of the Council, presented to the
Assembly at its session in May 1985 (Documentl0l2). It is moreover easy to believe that the
American negotiators in Geneva have no wish to
have their own positions weakened by European
polnts of view being divulged which might be
different from their own. In such cilcum-
stances, it is diflicult to see a solution to the
diffrculty arising from the American monopoly
in nuclear weapon negotiations.
15. One means has perhaps been found since
the Helsinki conference on security and co-
operation in Europe whereby all the European
countries join the two great powers in negotia-
tions on certain aspects of disarmament and on
the freedom of states and individuals in Europe.
This is the purpose of the current Stockholm
meeting. But it is common knowledge that
only the secondary aspects of disarmament are
being tackled there, whereas the most important
matter for Europe's security is still the nuclear
aspect of deterrence and will perhaps become the
development of defence technology in space,
neither of which is on the agenda of the
CSCE. At least the disarmament questions and
confidence-building measures on the agenda
could be studied among Europeans in WEU.
16, Finally, on 2nd October 1985, during his
offrcial visit to Paris, Mr. Gorbachev, First
Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, made
new proposals on the limitation of armaments.It is not the aim of this report to consider the
proposals concerning the Soviet-American nego-
tiations in Geneva, but one about holding direct
negotiations between the Soviet Union and the
Western European nuclear powers. At the time
of writing, it is too early to know the answers of
the countries concerned or even to assess the
possible consequences of such negotiations
should Mr. Gorbachev's proposal be accepted.It is nevertheless clear that such a matter
concerns the security of Western Europe as a
whole and also that it cannot be dealt with
without taking account of the Soviet-American
negotiations. A new area is thus being opened
up for consultations between European members
of the Atlantic Alliance before concerting their
approach, as is necessary, with that of their
American allies.
l7_. (ji) The question of western strategy arose
when Soviet nuclear power became operational
and United States territory was no longer out of
reach_ofenemy missiles. Quite understandably,
the United States then sought doctrines whoie
main aim was to avoid all-out nuclear war. It
concentrated its efforts on acquiring second-
strike capability and consequently on developing
its possibilities of defending Europe by conven-
tional means and then by increasingly sophisti-
cated nuclear means: tactical missiles, Euro-
missiles, cruise missiles and enhanced radiation
weapons.
18. Thus the United States quickly turned to
burden-sharing within the alliance. The Euro-
pean members were invited to develop their
conventional weapons, while the Americans
would make an effort to diversify their nuclear
weapons. In fact, little heed was paid to them,
two European countries acquiring their own
nuclear weapons and the others allowing their
defence b_udgets to become progressivelylower,
in spite of the principles proclaimed in NATO. '
19. In fact, the United States'European allies
have always been afraid that the evblution of
strategy and of American weapons might lead to
an " uncoupling ", i.e. a radical distinction being
drawn between United States and European
defence. They have used all means at iheir
disposal, and in particular meetings of the North
Atlantic Council, to obtain certain guarantees
from the United States:
(a) the permanent stationing, since 1949,
of strong American land and air forces
in Europe to demonstrate the Amer-
ican commitment to defend Europe;
(b) the adoption of strategic doctrines to
carry hostilities into potential enemy
territory. One might wonder how-
ever whether the balance of conven-
tional forces really allows this;
(c) the development of consultations in
NATO between allies on political and
military matters;
(d) making American nuclear weapons
available to certain European armies
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in accordance with a two-key system,
allowing the United States, if neces-
sary, to ban the use of these weaPons
by those holding them (December
I 956).
20. Other attempts were made to meet Euro-
pean wishes, for instance the creation of a multi-
lateral nuclear force, transported by surface
vessels, but it soon became clear that such
attempts failed to meet Europe's security requi-
rements. They in no way offset the increasingly
wide gap between American and European
strength and did nothing to reduce Europe's
dependence on the United States which alone
was able to decide the level of retaliation to an
attack. Nor did they respond to Europe's fear
that the deterrent effect of American nuclear
weapons might lessen because a retaliatory capa-
bility existed outside American territory, i.e. the
possibility of pursuing a war, even nuclear, with
the hope that the territory of the two great
powers would be safeguarded.
21. However, two measures partially over-
came these disadvantages. First, in December
1966 the Defence Planning Committee organised
in NATO a Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee
and a Nuclear Planning Group and at the minis-
terial meeting in Athens in May 1962 the cir-
cumstances in which NATO might be forced to
resort to nuclear weapons were examined. In
principle, these measures ensured Europe's parti-
cipation in alliance strategy in the North
Atlantic Treaty area. But the inevitably world-
wide, and not only North Atlantic, nature of a
war between the United States and the Soviet
Union considerably reduced their scope since it
was quite obvious that there could be no ques-
tion of influencing the United States' freedom of
decision in the use of its nuclear weapons.
22. Furthermore, the existence of nuclear
weapons in the United Kingdom and France
allows these two countries, each in its own
specific conditions, to play an independent roleif their security is threatened. The present
cordial relations between France and its Euro-
pean partners, particularly the Federal Republic,
has allowed the French Government to
announce that it considers France's security
would be threatened long before enemy forces
crossed the Rhine and, without of course
renouncing its freedom ofdecision as to the use
of its nuclear weapons, France has shown its
willingness to strengthen co-operation with its
partners on defence matters, so as to allow them
to benefit from the deterrent eflect ofits nuclear
weapons. At its Ottawa meeting in 1974, the
North Atlantic Council had recognised the
advantages of the British and French nuclear
weapons, and the subsequent improvement in
military co-operation between France and its
allies gives these advantages a firmer found-
ation, a fact which is sometimes forgotten.
23. There can obvioustv Ue lro global solution
to the problem of Europe's share in alliance
strategy and disarmament which is perfectly
satisfactory to everyone. However, the situa-
tion would be improved if Europeans could
agree among themselves and gonsult each other
in order to carry greater weilht. Here too the
Rome declaration provides a number of favour-
able factors since it provides that henceforth the
Ministers of Defence of the seven countries
will attend meetings of the WEU Council of
Ministers and that matters relating to alliance
strategy will be one of the aips of the organis-
ation's work. This seems partricularly necessary
in view of the fact that the strategic defence
initiative agreed upon by ihe United States
Government in 1983 will, as and when its effects
are felt, raise problems to ulhich its European
allies will have to find appropriate answers.
Your Rapporteur will refer to this problem
later. In any event, he considers it hardly
desirable for Western Europe not to follow the
present trend of American space research and
not to provide itself with the means of
conducting a continuing jdint study of the
consequences this may have fpr its security.
24. (iii) Security matters arising outside the
North Atlantic Treaty area cqnrlot remain alien
to Western Europe which is the part of the world
most concerned by international trade for its
energy and raw material supplies and for outlets
for its various activities. While Western Eur-
ope's military capability limils its possibilities of
action over very long distances, several of its
countries have nevertheless in recent decades
had to resort to force to attain various aims.
Furthermore, Europe cannot rely on the United
States alone to support its own concept of
western interests on the five continents. Since
the Vietnam war, the United States has been
extremely cautious in its commitments outside
the American continent and it has sometimes
seemed useful, for internatio{ral order and peace,
for European countries to t{ke direct action in
the Middle East, Africa or the South Atlantic.
Conversely, it has happened that action by the
United States, particularly on the American
continent, has fallen well short of securing the
unanimous agreement of its European partners.
25. Certainly, not all the European countries
have the same means of acting outside the
NATO area. Some, such aq the Federal Repub-
lic, preclude such action. Not all have the same
relationship with African gr Asian countries,
although developments resulting from the Lome
Agreements between the European Community
and a large number of developing countries is
tending to extend to the Community as a whole
the privileged trade relation$ which several of its
members had with their former colonies, from
an economic point of view at least. Any
compulsory form of consultation or action is
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therefore unthinkable here, since any initiative,
which can only be taken by states, would thus beparalysed. Better all-round mutual information
and understanding regarding the action some
might have to take should at least prevent such
actien leading to disagreement liable to jeopard-
ise European solidarity and harm the credibility
of the western defence system both inside and
outside the alliance.
26. The political consultations which have
been developed over the years between the
member countries of the European Community
help to bring points of view closer together and
certain countries have proposed setting up apermanent international secretariat for these
consultations. However, it is still diflicult to
tackle defence questions in such a context
because of the presence of countries which do
not wish to do so, such as Ireland, or whose
defence policy differs significantly from that of
their partners, as is at present the case of
Greece. In all probability therefore the WEU
Council will be retained to tackle such questions,
at least in cases where this proves impossible in
a wider framework. The principle of unanimityfor all decisions will allow each country thi)
freedom it needs vis-i-vis its partners for taking
action whenever it seems necessary. This is no
doubt the case the Ministers had in mind when
stating in the Rome declaration that they " may
also consider the implications for Europe of
crises in other regions of the world ".
27. (iv) The production of armaments is also a
permanent difliculty for the Atlantic Alliance to
which it has not yet been able to find a satis-
fagtgry solution. It arises in terms of military
efliciency because the existence of diflereni
equipment and armaments among the armies
which would have to fight together on the same
territory creates logistic problems that are
diflicult to solve an'd in economic terms because
the growing sophistication of modern weapons
makes research and the development of proto-
types increasingly expensive and limits the
procurement possibilities of national armies.
Joint organisation of production therefore seems
logical, but in spite of many declarations in this
sense it has never been possible to carry it out
satisfactorily.
28. Any attempt to effect this organisation
within the Atlantic Alliance would encounter
difficulties which seem insuperable because of
the difference in the size of American and Euro-
pean industries on the one hand and of the
requirements of the American armed forces and
of individual European countries on the other.
This precludes equitable transatlantic burden-
sharing. The two-way street in trade which
NATO has often proclaimed as its aim has never
worked satisfactorily because the arms trade in
the alliance has always been tipped strongly in
favour of the United States, and this can hardlybe otherwise. However, a steady eflort ti,
ensure interoperability of armaments may allow
a solution to be found to certain iogistic
problems, but even this means certain countries
adopting standards diflerent to their usual
practice which would involve additional expend-
iture which is not always accepted lightly.
29. It should also be recalled that in certain
European countries arrns production is an
important sector of the economy, it makes a
substantial contribution to employment and the
trade balance and it stimulates scientific and
technological research. This is particularly soin France. Such countries cannot coniider
giving up the production of certain equipment or
weapons for the sake of rationalised production
in the Atlantic community, because the conse-
quences might seriously jeopardise their future
activities.
30. For all these reasons, it may be thought
that co-operation in arms production should be
sought in a European rather than an Atlantic
context in order to protect everyone's interests.
Recent examples in civil production such as
Airbus indicate that Western Europe has suffi-
cient industrial power and markets to altow its
products to face up to the international market
alolgside- American firms, which is increasingly
diflicult for the national industries of European
countries in many sectors.
31. There have been many attempts to
achieve European armaments co-operation and
some joint projects between several European
countries have been technical and economic
successes. These include combat aircraft and
helicopters, anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons
systems and ships of small tonnage and the
attempts which have failed must not eclipse the
successes. Nor should it be forgotten that such
co-o-peration has generally been between only a
small number of countries on the basis - of
agreements specific to each programme.
32. This should lead to a considered assess-
ment of actual possibilities in this connection.
Today it still seems utopian to hope that all the
European members of the alliance will need the
same equipment at the same time. The busi-
ness of the European combat aircraft which hasjust led to a- clash between those advocating a
t gul.y aircraft, such as the Federal Republic, iheUnited Kingdom and Italy, and those in favour
of a lighter multir6le aircraft, such as France,
shows that behind industrial rivalry there are
also military requirements which do not always
correspond at the same time.
33. The choice of one aircraft by part of
Western Europe and of another by other coun-
tries is probably not of such great importance as
some have portrayed. Well-planned co-opera-
tion should allow Europe to produce several
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types of aircraft from among which military
headquarters could procure the type they need
when they need it. This might involve certain
countries in the production of aircraft which
they did not need in the immediate future, but it
would also mean all countries having to conform
to a principle of European preference which has
never really been applied.
34. The question of joint production has
existed ever since the recovery of the European
armaments industry and in 1955 WEU set up a
Standing Armaments Committee to preparejoint production agreements. Neither this com-
mittee nor other more recent attempts to over-
come the obstacles of all kinds in the way ofjoint production have ever resulted in any conti-
nuity in European co-operation. The task
which the Seven apparently wish to attribute to
the SAC, if the Rome declaration is to be
believed, would be considerably different from
its initial one and from those of other European
bodies responsible for arms production since it
would be mainly to give political impetus to
such production, which probably means trying
to remove obstacles. This would conform fully
to the decisions taken a long time ago by the
Seven in the SAC which has been concentrating
increasingly on economic and legal studies of a
general nature.
35. (v) The question of the reactions of the
population of Europe to defence matters came
into the limelight with the large-scale demonstra-
tions organised by pacifist movements following
NATO's twofold decision on Euromissiles in
December 1979. Your Rapporteur does not
wish to reopen the discussion on the influence
which the Soviet Union may have had on paci-
fist movements in this connection, but he has to
recognise that the spread of these demonstra-
tions was one of the reasons why the seven
governments considered, proposed or accepted
the reactivation of WEU. They therefore felt
that the activities of a European organisation
with security and defence responsibilities would
be useful for restoring flagging confidence among
the people of Europe in the defence of Europe.
Similar reasons probably induced the Amer-
icans to approve the reactivation of WEU at a
time when they themselves were becoming more
confident in the will and ability of their own
government to defend the United States and its
allies.
36. Another sign of the diminishing determi-
nation of the European members of the alliance
to take part in an active security policy is to be
seen in the diffrculty many of them are having in
acting on the decision of principle taken by the
members of the Atlantic Alliance to increase
their defence budgets by 3% per year in constant
terms so as to meet their requirements in
modern conventional weapons. This percent-
age was raised to 4(h after the North Atlantic
Council adopted the Rogers plan which called
for more sophisticated weapons in order to
implement the alliance's new strategic concept.
These diffrculties have revealbd that the Euro-
pean governments' agrcement to the Rogers
doctrine did not obtain the backing of the
people, and parliaments do not seem convinced
of the need to give priority to a major financial
effort to allow alliance strategy to be guided in
the direction proposed by SACEUR. It is clear
that such a divergence between collective deci-
sions and what can in fact be {one in each coun-
try is liable to jeopardise the cohesion of the
alliance and it is logical that the democratic
countries should respond to this challenge not
only on a national level but also by strength-
ening parliamentary activity at Western Euro-
pean level to allow Europeans to play a real part
in the adoption of doctrines on which their
security is based.
37. There are thus many 
- 
and in most cases
long-standing 
- 
reasons for irnproving the cohe-
rence of the European element in a defence
system of which the Atlautic Alliance will
obviously remain the keystone. However, the
trend of United States defence policy in the last
two years, with the announcement of President
Reagan's strategic defence initiative in 1983,
provided new reasons and added urgency for
organising the European pillan of the alliance.
III. Europe and President Reagan's strategic
defence initiatlve
38. President Reagan's announcement on
23rd March 1983 that the United States was to
embark upon a vast research programme for new
weaponry to use space, at llast as a relay, for
protection against enemy fnissiles caused a
considerable stir in Europe. His invitation to
the European members of the Atlantic Alliance
to take part in this prograrrtme compelled the
governments to think how they might answer
this proposal.
39. Your Rapporteur does not wish to go into
the technical aspects of the matter, for which
other Assembly committee$ are responsible.
He merely wishes to set out some of the conclu-
sions he was able to draw from the General
Aflairs Committee's meetings in Washington in
June 1985.
40. (y' President Reagan's initiative is not an
innovation, introducing a space dimension to
United States defence policyr The most know-
ledgeable American authorities are in fact
convinced that the Soviet Union started to
develop the means necessary for using space for
its own defence a long time ago by perfecting
its anti-missile missile systpms. In fact, the
Soviet Union is at present the only country in
the world to have deployed both an anti-ballistic
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and an anti-satellite system. It is now well
ahead. But the Americans, for their part, did
not wait for President Reagan's speech before
examining the advantages of using space for
their security and using new technology, particu-
larly laser technology. Under the 1983 initia-
tive, large sums 
- $26,000 million over a period
of five years 
- 
are to be earmarked for the
pursuit and extension of this research pro-
gramme. But study of the United States
budgets for 1984-85 and 1985-86 raises the ques-
tion whether this figure will in fact be reached by
the end of this five-year period.
41. (ir,) Although results have already been
achieved, it is impossible at the present stage of
knowledge to specify what the end result will be
and when. It seems out of the question that the
means considered will make it 100% certain that
all enemy missiles will be destroyed, at least in a
given time, even if it is assumed that the enemy
will not develop more or less effective counter-
measures. In other words, it is to be assumed
that towards the end of the century it will be
possible for the United States 
- 
and probably
also the Soviet Union 
- 
to have anti-missile
defence systems of limited and perhaps dubious
effectiveness.
42. (iii) ln any event, the American decision
has been taken. Thousands of millions of
dollars have been earmarked and it is not for
Europe to wonder whether it is a good or bad
thing to conduct such research which depends
only to a very small extent on European partici-
pation.
43. (iv/ Participation does not necessarily
mean that European states should take part in
the entire programme. The idea is that the
American authorities should procure certain
equipment from European firms which have
reached a higher technological level than their
American rivals in specific areas. A number of
such contracts have already been signed.
44. (v) The question of the deployment of a
new anti-missile defence system has not yet
arisen and will not do so until considerable
progress has been made thanks to current
research. The conditions may vary depending
on progress at the Geneva negotiations between
the Soviet Union and the United States to limit
war in space and also on knowledge of Soviet
measures and American reactions following the
1988 elections.
45. (vy' Consequently, the question of a
radical revision of western strategy which would
arise if defensive weapons were to play a new
role, deterrence having hitherto been ensured
only by olfensive weapons, is not a topical
one. In the United States itself, the government
is encountering active and effective opposition
in Congress to its policy of deploying new under-
ground MX strategic ballistic missiles on Amer-
ican territory. In other words, it in no way
believes that deterrence by strategic nuclear
weapons is a thing of the past nor is it at all sure
that Congress will agree to pass from the
research to the deployment stage in view of still
open questions about the cost and eflectiveness
of the proposed defence system.
46. Your Rapporteur considers these few
comments point to a number of measures for
Europe which in any event will become neces-
sary in the next few years:
47. (a/ Progress achieved by the United States
and the Soviet Union in the use of space must be
followed closely.
48. (b) It must be ensured that the partici-
pation of European firms in the American pro-
gramme does not lead to a brain drain of techni-
cians and scientists towards the United States
but provides work for firms in Europe itself and
allows them to improve their knowledge of the
technology they use and not merely sell licences
to American firms. In June 1985, the commit-
tee met several people in the United States who
made no secret of their fears that indiscretions
by their European partners might put a brake on
Europe's participation in the SDI programme.
Even if this were only a pretext to explain in
advance American reluctance to divulge techno-
logy developed under the SDI, it is clear that
events in Europe during summer 1985 can but
strengthen American reservations.
49. (c/ Considering that American firms are
in any event the main beneficiaries of the SDI in
terms of finance, technological progress and its
spin-off, it is essential for Europe to make a
research and development effort which will
allow its own firms to remain competitive.
Such an effort does not have to be linked with
defence policy and the French Government has
proposed a programme to its partners known as
Eureka which aims at developing nine non-
military aspects of European technology. At its
meeting in Bonn in April 1985, the WEU
Council of Ministers agreed to refer consider-
ation of these proposals to the European
Community. These proposals were in principle
welcomed by France's partners. On 4th Sep-
tember 1985, it was learned that the Govern-
ment of the Federal Republic of Germany had
decided to allocate DM 3,000 million for this
programme over a period of five years.
50. Often the people the General Affairs
Committee met in the United States said they
had no objection in principle to the SDI and
Eureka programmes being developed at the same
time, but they also said they knew little about
the Eureka programme and did not wish to
commit their country on this matter. European
observers, for their part, while underlining the
technical compatibility between the two pro-
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grammes, have raised the question of financial
compatibility, and it is clear that the French
Government is afraid that some of its major
partners may keep their participation in the
Eureka programme unduly small in order to be
able to invest more in research connected with
the SDI programme. For instance, at the
meeting between President Mitterrand and
Chancellor Kohl at Bregancon on 26th August
1985 it was announced that the Federal Republic
would not take part in the production of a
Franco-German infrared observation satellite,
the only type with an all-weather capability.
51. (d) ln the military field proper, Europe
must take full account of the fact that:
(i) the SDI will not lead to deployment
for an as yet undetermined number of
years and that it is not sure it ever
will;
(iil it is not yet possible to assess the
degee of security it will offer;
(iii) it is not at all sure that systems
deployed as a result of the SDI will
effectively be able to destroy
medium- or short-range missiles, i.e.
ensure as much security for Europe as
possibly for the United States.
52. In such conditions, Europe cannot give up
a system of deterrence which still places the
accent on offensive weapons, particularly
nuclear weapons. But if the idea spreads that
the future depends on defensive weapons and
that in the long run offensive weapons are
destined to be relegated to the arsenal of
obsolescent weapons, it is liable to become
increasingly diflicult to make an already hesitant
public opinion accept the financial and other
efforts necessary for the maintenance and
development of nuclear weapons which will
nevertheless remain for many more years the
principal instruments of a policy of peace-
keeping through deterrence.
53. (e) The fact that the United States and its
second nuclear strike force are one day to be
better protected against a first Soviet strike is
obviously advantageous for the alliance as a
whole, since such security will make a first
Soviet strike more improbable. However, if the
protection of the United States and Western
Europe is to be ensured by diflerent means, in
increasingly different conditions and in accord-
ance with even more diflerent strategic hypo-
theses, there will be a greater risk of Europe's
territory being uncoupled from that of the
United States, with all the drawbacks this entails
for Europe's security.
54. Although your Rapporteur in no way
suggests that Western Europe should reject Presi-
dent Reagan's proposal that it take part in the
SDI programme, for all the dbove reasons he
wishes to emphasise that it nlust proceed with
caution, ensuring at one and the same time the
pursuit and speedier development of its techno-
logy and the maintenance and constant improve-
ment of the whole of its pre$ent conventional
and nuclear defence system.
55. The fact that the SDI stdms from a purely
American decision, in which the United States'
allies were asked to take no paft, can but remind
the European members of the Atlantic Alliance
of the need for better constltations and for
making their voice better heald to defend their
own security interests. It mdkes it even more
urgent to develop the varioup elements which
your Rapporteur analysed in the previous
chapter for allowing a European pillar to be
formed in the alliance. First and foremost, a
continuing study of Europe'q security require-
ments is needed in this hour of uncertainty
about the views of our American allies and the
Soviet Union regarding the probable trend of
their own defence systems, first in the context of
requirements for the Geneva negotiations and
then, in a more or less distant future, in order
to take account of the deployment of new
weapons. Europe must obvirously not cling to
concepts which would be rendered obsolete by
these trends, but it is essential for it to rely only
on tangible achievements and to avoid abandon-
ing prematurely the strategy of deterrence which
has ensured its security for forty years in favour
of the more " moral " defefisive as opposed
to offensive weapons. A defence policy is
more or less " moral " depending on whether it
is offensive or defensive and not on the type of
strategy on which it is based.
56. It is evident that it wopld be disastrous if
a deep rift formed between the European mem-
bers of the alliance over the pnswer to be given
to the American proposal bebause once again it
would leave the United Sta(es alone to decide
what the strategy of all the allies should
be. Meeting in Bonn on llth April 1985, the
seven WEtiministers showed they understood
this fully when they decided to devote the next
WEU ministerial meeting to the search for a
co-ordinated answer to the American proposal.It is not yet possible to foresee the deci-
sions they will take on thlt occasion. Your
Rapporteur has no intentipn of anticipating
theii results, but it seems td him as diflicult to
imagine Europe giving a negative answer as to
foreiee the full consequerlces of a positive
one. In any event, he considers the conditions
he has just mentioned are necessary for true
understanding between Eulopeans and Ame-
ricans. While in Washin[ton he had the
impression that the Ameriqan authorilies were
prepared to give them favourable consideration,
but no formal promise was given.
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57. Press reports after General Abrahamson's
visit to Rome at the end of August 1985 indi-
cate that the Italian Government for its part has
decided to participate actively in the SDI
research programme. It is diflicult to know
what this participation will in fact be and
whether it implies anything other than industrial
agreements. Moreover, press reports claim that
it proved impossible, at two or three meetings of
experts in WEU in the spring and early summer
of 1985, to work out a joint seven-power posi-
tion towards the American proposals. How-
ever, the Seven do not seem to have given up
trying. But in the circumstances one may
wonder whether the ltalian decision might not
make it more diflicult to reach agreement at the
ministerial meeting in November. This more-
over has been so for positive or negative
remarks made on the subject by leaders of other
countries.
58. For the time being, Europe must take
account of existing developments in the use of
space for defence purposes, which, moreover,
has advantages for the maintenance of balance
and peace and veriffing that countries respect
the treaties they have signed. This is in parti-
cular the case for communications and obser-
vation satellites. Again, it is certain that the
Soviet Union already has means of destroying
satellites in low orbit and in August 1985 the
United States showed that it also had this
capability. There can obviously be no question
of reverting to the previous situation but if the
increased militarisation of space is to be avoided
the agreements concluded between the two great
powers in 1972 in the ABM treaty must be
extended. France has made firm proposals at
the Geneva disarmament conference including,
in particular, a limit on anti-satellite systems, a
ban on those capable of reaching satellites in
high orbit, a ban on the deployment of and
experiments with directed-energy weapons for aperiod of five years, which would allow the
pursuit of research under the SDI programme
but not the deployment of arms thus developed,
strengthening the existing system ofdeclaring all
space objects and the extension to third coun-
tries of the American-Soviet convention ensur-
ing the immunity of some of them. It would be
well worth while for such proposals to be studied
by the United States' European allies with a viewto preparing a European position not only
towards participation in SDI but also towards
measures for avoiding the balance of forces in
the world being disturbed too quickly.
IY. The reactiyation of WEU
59. The Rome declaration and subsequent
decisions taken by the WEU Council show
clearly that the seven governments agree that
WEU is not and should not become a military
organisation. The only possibility at present
is to integrate European forces in NATO orto maintain forces under national command.
Neither the countries which have opted for thefirst solution nor those which preferred the
second are thinking ofconverting to a European
defence system and it is still impossible to envi-
sage a European defence union, in the context
of the European Communities, for instance.
Conversely, WEU can play a major role in
allowing the European members of the alliance
to compare their views on the principal aspects
of their defence policy. This is allowed by its
statute, based on a treaty of alliance but
involving no limitation of national sovereigntyin planning and implementing their securitypolicy. But WEU is destined to remain a poli-
tical organisation and any ambiguity which may
remain in this respect was removed by the Rome
declaration. It is therefore by political means
that WEU can help to build the European pillar
of the alliance, or even form a pillar of the
alliance itself, without in any way claiming to
replace either the integrated NATO commands
or national military authorities. The letter the
Secretary-General sent to your Rapporteur on
this subject, given in paragraphs 75 to 97 of
this report, examines the other aspect of the
problem, i.e. the place WEU can take in a Euro-
pean union, in terms which your Rapporteur
readily endorses.
60. These are the limits within which thought
should be given to what the European pillar
should be and the role WEU can play in formingit. From this angle, WEU after the Rome
declaration will be very different from what it
was before 1985. Until then it had been para-
lysed by the military commitments imposed by
the control of armaments. These commitments
have been abolished and the rigid structure
which prevented WEU from being an eflective
political forum thereby disappeared.
61. The governmental side seems to have
managed to break free from the heritage of the
first thirty years of WEU history and think about
what the organisation's new activities mightbe. Thus, the Council of Ministers has talien
several initiatives with a view to guiding WEU
in new directions. However, the implementa-
tion of these initiatives seems to be encountering
certain difficulties. For example, a meeting of
disarmament experts was in fact held in Bonn in
February 1985, as the American authorities
confirmed to the General Affairs Committee,
but produced no serious results following an
approach from Mr. Burt, then United States
Under-Secretary of State. Why did the Euro-
pean governments make a mystery of a fact
which was reported in the internaiional press
and confirmed by Mr. Burt himself? This raises
a serious weakness in WEU to which your
Rapporteur will revert later, i.e. keeping the
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public, press and Assembly informed about the
Council's work.
62. Similarly, according to the press, meetings
of experts have been held in London, most
recently in July, to endeavour to harmonise
member governments' answers to President
Reagan's proposal. The press also reported that
this meeting was a failure. As far as your
Rapporteur knows, no information was given to
the Assembly about these meetings. No com-
muniquds seem to have been issued, which
means he does not know how reliable this press
information may be. But if these meetings
really failed, there are strong grounds for
concern, if not about the will of the governments
to revive and reactivate the WEU Council, at
least about how they will effectively be able to
follow up the Rome declaration and the Bonn
communique. After relinquishing disarmament
matters and in view of diffrculties in the joint
production of armaments, if the Council gives
up the aims it set itself in the principal question
facing the alliance now and for some time to
come, i.e. participation in American research
designed to allow a complete revision of alliance
strategy, little substance will be left for the
European pillar which WEU might form.
63. Furthermore, the slow progress being
made with the reorganisation of WEU appears
to contradict the will proclaimed by the minis-
ters in Rome and Bonn to give new impetus to
the organisation's activities. Your Rapporteur
wishei to resume here a number of questions
which the Assembly has already put to the
Council but to which it has never received
satisfactory answers.
64. (i) What results have been achieved at the
meetings of experts held in WEU to consider
reforming the organisation or specific matters
such as - disarmament or member countries'
answers to President Reagan's proposal? Will
they be followed up? How will the Assembly be
informed of their activities?
65. (ii) What tasks are to be given to the
Secretariat-General and to the three agencies
which the Bonn communiqu6 announced would
be set up?
(a) What exactly is meant by the " poli-
tical impetus " which WEU should
give to the joint production of arma-
ments? The initial task of the Standing
Armaments Committee was mainlY to
prepare the technical aspect of agree-
ments between governments. How-
ever, since this activity remained fairly
limited and other bodies such as the
IEPG undertook Parallel work, the
international secretariat of the SAC
was asked to conduct more general
studies on the conditions for devel-
oping European armaments co-opera-
tion. Has this trend been confirmed.
What consequences would such a
decision have for the SAC itself?
(b) Thenature of trre woit to be done by a
disarmament agency is still very
vague, particularly following rumours
about the Council's activities in this
area. Would it keep the Council
permanently informed of the state of
disarmament questions? If so, what
sources of informatiOn would the new
agency have? How indePendent would
itbe of member countries and of infor-
mation transmitted to it by them?
Would its conclusions be published? It
is clear that only an effective increase
in the Council's worlt on disarmament
and the limitation of armaments
would be able to give the agencY a
meaningful programme of work justi-
fring the attribution of means, inclu-
ding computers, needed for processing
the vast volume of detailed data
without which it is hard to see how the
agency could play a useful r6le.
(c) The role of a third agency for studying
defence policies is even more vague.
In this connection, your Rapporteur
wishes to recall a ProPosal made bYMr. Genscher, then Chairman-in-
Offrce of the Council, to the Assembly
at its session in Novdmber 1984, that a
European institute be set uP to
conduct research into defence ques-
tions. Presumably this ProPosal,
about which the AssemblY has since
received no inform4tion, encountered
obstacles as may be expected in view
of the development of so manY such
establishments in ITIVEU countries in
the last ten years. Nevertheless, the
question has been raised, particularly
in military circles, a$ to whether such a
proposal would not be useful for the
cause which the Council intends to
uphold, provided a slightly different
definition is given of the institute's
aims. Indeed, what EuroPe needs is
not so much a new research centre as a
body able to give public opinion and
those who shape and inform it a better
grasp of the European dimensions of
security problems.
Consideration might therefore be
given to setting up not a research insti-
iute but a study institute to organise
information and training courses for
young leaders from member countries
such as army offrers, civil servants,
European oflicials or persons exer-
cising various civilian activities such
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as journalists, engineers, university
staff, etc. Such institutes exist in
certain countries and their experience
might be used and adapted to a Euro-
pean scale. They might also be asked
to take part in the work of a European
institute which would use these bodies
for conducting courses which should
be ofshort duration.
A European defence institute might
therefore have only a lightweight struc-
ture with the task of planning and
organising courses conducted by insti-
tutes in member countries. It might
be worked out by the WEU agency res-
ponsible for defence questions becauseit would correspond to one of the
essential aims which the Council set
itself, i.e. to make public opinion
understand the requirements of Euro-
pean security.
69. (iii) According to the Rome declaration,
the Council intended to give the Assembly a
somewhat similar task. As a parliamentary
body the Assembly can do this only in a parlia-
mentary manner, i.e. through debates and votes,
and the Council can in no wise expect to impose
either its agenda or a fortiori the conclusions
which must be drawn from its debates. In any
other case, the Council would certainly en-
counter firm opposition from the whole Assem-
bly, which would thus defend the Council's
intention as expressed in the Rome declaration,
i.e. to make European public opinion aware of
the requirements of Europe's security by parlia-
mentary means. Any parliamentary assembly
that was docile towards the governmental organs
of the organisation would be immediately diicre-
dited.
70. This implies that:
(a) the reorganisation of WEU must leave
the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly
completely independent of the minis-
terial organs, even in administrative
matters;
(b) the budget granted to the Assembly
must be suflicient to allow it to carry
out its activities in satisfactory condi-
tions and, within the limits of its
annual budget, it will have greater
independence than in the past in the
breakdown of appropriations between
the various budget heads, with due
respect of course for existing regula-
tions, particularly where the staff are
concerned;
(c) the Assembly must be kept satisfact-
orily informed about the activities of
the Council and all its dependent
organs, which has not been the case to
date, particularly in regard to the
meetings which have been held in
1985 on matters relating to the re-
organisation of WEU, disarmament
and the SDI. It is, to say the least,
strange that information published in
the press on these activities should
have been confirmed by a government
which is not a member of WEU, when
the Council and the authorities of
member countries have constantly
evaded the issue when asked about
this matter. However satisfactory it
may be, the Council's annual report
will be issued too late to be able to
serve as a basis for a useful exchange
of views between the Council and the
Assembly.
71. Several times the Council has proposed
holding confidential meetings with certain mem-
bers of the Assembly and the Assembly set
up a special committee for these contacts, which
was an important concession to the Council's
views. Nevertheless, being parliamentary, 8rr
assembly like ours cannot easily delegate respon-
sibilities other than to properly constituted
committees in view of the necessary represen-
tation of political groups and national delega-
tions whose own responsibilities stem solely
from Assembly decisions and which can do
nothing other than prepare Assembly sessions.
An increase in the number of informal meetings,
ad hoc committees and privileged contacts
might well distort the parliamentary character
which our Assembly must retain. There is no
question here of opposing the procedure for
dialogue proposed by the Council and accepted
by the Assembly, but the danger of taking such
procedure too far must be stressed. The Assem-
bly as a whole is the Council's partner in a
relationship which must be kept public. Only
its permanent committees are composed so as to
ensure the correct representation of national
delegations and political groups. Informal
contacts must not be allowed to encroach upon
this obligation imposed by the parliamentary
system.
72. Conversely, initiatives by the Council are
to be welcomed. First, it has replied unusually
quickly to Recommendation 420 adopted in
May 1985 on a report by Mr. van der Sanden.
This reply reached the Oflice of the Clerk on
23rd September, allowing your Rapporteur to
mention it here and consequently start a dia-
logue between the two WEU organs. Second,
on 8th May, the Permanent Council sent
members of the Assembly a report on the re-
organisation of the WEU agencies which, un-
fortunately, is confidential and cannot therefore
be examined in this report. Finally, there is a
letter from the Secretary-General in answer to
your Rapporteur's letter asking for his opinion
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on the reorganisation of WEU. Just as un-
fortunately, the Secretary-General, although
agreeing to most of his letter being quoted in the
present report, would not agree to the infor-
mation he gave about the reorganisation of the
agencies being quoted. Your Rapporteur
wishes to thank him for his confidence and
congratulate him on the new style he has thus
given to relations between the Council and the
Assembly. However, he can but note that since
he is obliged to respect the confidential nature of
information given to him in confidence, he
cannot refer, in this report, to the essential
question of the reorganisation of the WEU tech-
nical agencies.
73. In regard to the reply to Recommendation
420, the Assembly, while noting that the Council
confirms its intention to intensify its work and
exchanges with the Assembly, also notes with
interest:
(a) the Council's definition of the nature
and r6le of the presidency, since it
clears up certain ambiguities arising
from new practices in relations bet-
ween the Council and the AssemblY
during the period of reactivation;
(b) the will expressed by the Council to
improve WEU's public relations and
information activities;
(c) the decision to set up three new
agencies without delay;
(d) the intention to continue its consider-
ation of the possible enlargement of
WEU parallel with current work on
reactivating WEU;
(e) the confirmation of its search for a
co-ordinated answer by member coun-
tries to the SDI proposal.
74. The Secretary-General's letter to your
Rapporteur had the g,reat merit of providing
realistic answers to questions the Assembly has
been raising for some time, and your Rapporteur
can do no better than quote the main parts:
75. " ... The establishment of a European
union is the aim set by the Twelve, and also by
the Seven of WEU who are among the Twelve.
This union is to comprise a whole series of
dimensions: economic, foreign policy, technolo-
gical, security among others.
76. The Ten - or future Twelve - have so far
succeeded in developing their economic dimen-
sion through the Communities and their foreign-
policy dimension through political co-opera-
iion. It is noteworthy, moreover, that because
of the difliculties inherent in the construction of
Europe these two dimensions are within differ-
ent hameworks: a supranational framework
for the Communities and an intergovernment
framework for political co-operation. It is a
fact that this task of building Europe has
encountered several types of obstacles which
forced it to grow in different directions depend-
ing on circumstances rather fhan logic, some-
what like a plant forced by stonework to grow in
directions that nature did not intend.
77. So far, the Ten have not succeeded in
providing their security dimen$ion.
78. However 
- 
without referring to the
European Defence Community which was, in
this connection, the closest s0 far to success -
efforts have not been lacking. Since 1970 they
have even increased. The most recent attempts
have come up against the fact that three govern-
ments have found it impossible to go beyond a
consultation among the Ten otr the political and
the economic aspects of seclrrity. Statements
by these governments give the impression that
this situation will continue, a[ least in the near
future, in the case of Ireland aild Greece.
79. I believe that it is the accumulation of
failures or half-failures in the attempts by the
Ten to work truly in conceft in the realm of
security - as well as an increpsing interest bothby public opinion and governments in the
pioblems relating to the defence of Europe - that
essentially prompted the initiatives for reviving
the union. What could not he done among the
Ten the Seven decided, at this point, to do
together, especially as they had the instrument
available which up to that time they had scarcely
used. During the organisation's ' dormant'
years, the Assembly was morpover an exception
and its activities were particularly worthy and
remarkable.
80. Against this backgrouild, the reactivated
WEU stands as a clear beginning to a European
security dimension, as one of the elements in the
process of the construction of Europe - admit-
tedly at another level, since there are only seven
and not twelve members + but nevertheless
alongside the Communities and political co-
operation.
81. The fact that Western European Union is
thus one of the elements in the construction of
Europe implies a series of coprsequences for that
organisation.
82. Consider the following:
83. (a) There must be sustained co-ordination
and co-operation between WEU and the other
two European dimensions + the Communities
and political co-operation.
84. This means that the vprious bodies of the
Ten and the Seven must define and implement
the most suitable procedureq for achieving such
relations. The Council trust realise this.
WEU's Secretariat-General and agencies must
act accordingly. The matter is no less impor-
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tant, on the contrary, for the WEU Assembly
which is directly exposed to public opinion
where active support is vital to the pursuit and
deepening of the construction of Europe and
particularly the successful development of a
European security dimension. Its relations
with the European Parliament are therefore of
particular significance.
85. (D/ Secondly, the imminent accession of
Spain and Portugal to the Communities and, as
a consequence, their participation in European
political co-operation raises the problem ofthese
two countries' relations with Western European
Union. Lisbon moreover has already made a
formal approach.
86. (c) Lastly, the most recent developments
on the European integration scene which affect
the Communities and political co-operation
inevitably have consequences for WEU also.
Both the report of the ad hoc committee for
institutional questions (Dooge Committee) and
the United Kingdom's proposed agreement on
political co-operation and the Franco-German
proposal for a treaty on European union, which
were all put before the European Council in Milan
last June, and also the Netherlands and Italian
proposals subsequently put forward, bring up the
question of the European security dimension.Nor will the intergovernmental conference
ignore this matter. If its work was to prove that
today the Twelve as a whole were prepared,
without any misgivings, to introduce this secur-ity dimension into the work of constructing
Europe this would be a new development that
would immediately change the destiny of the
union. Either it would be enlarged to include
all the members of the Community and become,
at the level of the Communities and political
co-operation, a third element in the Europe of
the Twelve, or it would be dissolved within the
Twelve and its essential responsibilities would
be taken over, for example, by political co-
operation.
87. However, the information available does
not suggest that this assumption is correct.
This being the case, the revitalised Western
European Union remains the only European
forum for reflection and consultation on security
problems and must fully assume this responsibi-lity in close co-operation with the two other
elements in the work of constructing Europe,
while being prepared to adapt itself to future
developments and ensuring close collaboration
with the Atlantic Alliance.
88. For, on the other hand, this part of the
work of constructing Europe which is the re-
activated WEU is also placed in the framework
of the Atlantic Alliance.
89. Are not all its member states also mem-
bers of the alliance and do not all their
governments agree in considering and pro-
claiming that there can be no credible defence of
the West, and hence of Western Europe, without
the alliance?
90. Through a better balance, the reactivation
of WEU cannot fail moreover to strengthen the
alliance significantly.
91. The new Western European Union, the
beginning of a European pillar of the alliance,
must therefore have close contacts and most
effective co-ordinated relations with the alliance
as such and with each of the allies which are not
included among the Seven.
92. It is in such a context that I see the
reorganisation of WEU whose Council should,
in my opinion, be able to handle all matters
relating to the security of Europe within its
Atlantic context.
93. The agencies should therefore be in a
position to provide the Council with studies
allowing it to exercise these essential responsibi-
lities.
94. For specific matters, the Council
might have recourse to expert working groups
from the capitals, as is now the case wittr ttre
SDI working group, and the agencies might,
where appropriate, for certain questions, call
upon consultants.
95. The Secretariat-General would have at
one and the same time a rdle of serving the
Council, co-ordinating various work and, with
the agreement of the Council, providing
impetus.
96. The closest possible contact should be
maintained with the Assembly at the level of
both the Council and the Secretariat-General.
97. These are the considerations I wished to
convey to you. At this stage, they are mainly of
a personal nature, but of course at the same time
they guide the action which, under the authority
and with the approval of member states,
,_.ig;.nrr, started as Secretary-General of WEU
98. Your Rapporteur felt it important for the
Assembly to be given this information on the
views of the Secretary-General of WEU because
he believes they will further the deliberations of
the Assembly, its dialogue with the Council and,
eventually, the reactivation of WEU.
99. The prospects opened up by the Secretary-
General obviously raise the question of the
possible consequences of the trend in the Inde-
pendent European Programme Group indicated
in the communiqu6 adopted at the close of its
London meeting on l8th June 1985. Among
other things, it says that " a key objective of the
IEPG is the development of a ... European
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defence industry " and that " the establishment
of a permanent IEPG secretariat will be studied
and the results will be discussed at the next
meeting ". This signifies that the Ministers of
Defence are in the process of reactivating the
IEPG just when the Ministers for Foreign Aflairs
claim to be reactivating WEU, with the same
methods and topics.
100. The Council repeatedly claims that it
wishes to avoid duplication. Is it not in the
process of creating duplication? Perhaps the
Ministers of Defence are not left enough room in
the WEU framework and the way the Ministers
for Foreign Affairs seem to be monopolising the
WEU Council may be a reason for this transfor-
mation of the IEPG into a European defence
organisation parallel with WEU but escaping
parliamentary control. However this may be, it
should be noted that the Secretary-General's
arguments would lose much of their weight if a
European defence policy were to be worked out
in a body such as the IEPG, which was originally
set up to organise exchanges of views on
armaments questions between European and
American members of the Atlantic Alliance, and
if the Ministers of Defence failed to make
effective use of WEU to give the necessary
political impetus to European co-operation in
these matters and, in general, to tackle defence
and disarmament questions among Europeans.
l0l. Your Rapporteur reserves the right to add
to this analysis later in the light of any further
information he may obtain about decisions
prepared or taken by the Council in October and
November 1985.
Y. Tightening institutional links between
the Assembly and the other IAEU organs
102. The Assembly has always been intent on
establishing closer relations with the Council.
It cannot be said that the Council, in spite of its
statements, has always been of the same mind.
It must be noted, however, that since it under-
took to give new life to wEU it has adopted a far
more positive approach. In particular, mention
may be made of the frequent meetings between
the President of the Assembly and the Chair-
men-in-Oflice of the Council since June 1984,
meetings between the Council and the commit-
tee set up for that purpose by the Assembly in
December 1984, the fact that the Council has
twice received memoranda from the Presidential
Committee prior to its ministerial meetings and
has taken them into account, at least when
preparing its Rome meeting in 1984, the Secre-
tary-General's presence at the meeting of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions on 4th November 1985 to speak about the
Council's relations with the press and his
agreement to address the Assembly at the
session in December 1985. All these facts
underline an obvious eflort by the Council to
make a significant improvement in its relations
with the Assembly.
103. It therefore appears that a number of insti-
tutional barriers to satisfactory exchanges bet-
ween the Council and the Assembly have
been removed. It is clear that the place
occupied by armaments controls in WEU's work
until 1985 helped to prevent a closer relationship
between the two organs of WEU. The require-
ment of government control over the Council
was firm and the margin of initiative or even
freedom of speech allowed to the Secretary-
General were very limited. It is now evident
that the removal of most of these controls, the
attribution of new tasks to the Council and the
appointment of a Secretary-General determined
to make the most of this situation for the benefit
of the organisation as a whole and the develop-
ment of relations between the Council and the
Assembly in particular have brought about a
deep-rooted change in the Council's attitude
towards the Assembly. If this change is
confirmed, many of the reasons which led to the
adoption of Order 63 will no longer apply.
104. Conversely, as drafted, paragraph (a) of
that order contains a number of ambiguities and
opens the door to certain dangers for the
Assembly's independence. The paragraph
refers to the " responsibility of the Secretary-
General of WEU also with respect to the
Assembly ". But Article IX of the modified
Brussels Treaty specifies that:
" The Council of Western European
Union shall make an annual report on its
actiyities and in particqlar concerning the
control of armaments to an assembly
composed of representatives of the
Brussels Treaty power$ to the Consulta-
tive Assembly of the Council of Europe. "
Hence it is the Council, i.e. the governments,
that is responsible for keeping the Assembly
informed. Its Chairman-in-Oflice has to pre-
sent the annual report to the Assembly, whereas
the Secretary-General, who exercises the chair-
manship of the Permanent Council, the Coun-
cil's subsidiary organ, and is the Council's
head of administration, is rnade responsible by
the Council for gathering the information neces-
sary for preparing the annual report and drafting
the text ofthe report for adoption by the govern-
ment representatives. He can therefore have no
direct responsibility towards the Assembly.
105. This interpretation is in every way
confirmed by paragraph 3 of ihe reply to Recom-
mendation 420, which reads:
" In view of the intensification of the
Council's activities, the Rome declaration
stipulated that the presidency should be
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given a leading role in preparing replies to
Assembly recommendations and written
questions.
However, the presidency as such is not an
autonomous institution, and its actions
and declarations cannot be separated from
those of the Council as a whole. Under
these circumstances, there is no need for
the presidency to present an activity
report separate from the one regularly
submitted by the Council to the Assem-
bly."
106. The Secretary-General is appointed by the
Council and responsible to it and can hardly also
be responsible to the Assembly. It is diflicult to
imagine the Assembly electing the Secretary-
General of the organisation since, in view of his
duties, his task is to serve the Council. Unlike,
for instance, the Commission of the Commun-
ity, which has certain powers under the Rome
Treaty, the treaty grants him no independence.
Moreover, in view of the nature of the
Council's responsibilities towards the govern-
ments, the case of WEU cannot be assimilated to
that of the Council of Europe, where the Parlia-
mentary Assembly has wider powers in areas
which the governments consider less essential
than that ofsecurity.
107. The very nature of WEU made it neces-
sary to have a dual administration, i.e. the
Secretariat-General, responsible only to the
Council, and the Oflice of the Clerk of the
Assembly led by a Clerk elected by the Assembly
and whose responsibilities are defined in the
Charter of the Assembly. In budgetary matters
in particular, he is placed under the auihority of
the President in accordance with Article ylII (b)
of the Charter. The fact that the Offrce of ttre
Clerk is independent of the Council and Secre-
tariat-General is an essential guarantee of the
Assembly's freedom of information and expres-
sion and your Rappofteur believes it would be
most dangerous to relinquish this. Should
differences again arise in the future between the
two WEU organs it would be deplorable if the
offrcials working for the parliamentarians did
not have the required degree ofindependence of
the executive.
108. In this connection, it is necessary to recall
the care with which the national parliaments of
all the WEU member countries have kept their
staff independent of the executive. It should
also be pointed out that when certain member
countries have had diflicult relationships with
their partners, as in the case of France in 1969,
the Assembly managed, thanks to the independ-
ence of the Oflice of the Clerk, to avoid the
paralysis which then gripped the Council: the
WEU crisis did not harm the Assembly.
109. Finally, the modified Brussels Treaty
defines the Assembly's duties as being super-
visory rather than those of a legislative assem-bly. The impact of the texrs it adopts is
therefore limited and the governments are not
bound by its recommendations. Conversely,
supervisory duties imply total independence and
any decision limiting that independence would
be a violation of the treaty.
I10. For all these reasons, your Rapporteur,
while welcoming the new Secretary-General's
concept of his responsibilities towards the
Assembly and the way he makes maximum use
of the possibilities of initiative the governments
allow him, proposes not examining the establish-
ment of organic links between the Secretariat-
General and the Assembly because this would
necessarily lead to a change in the institutional
links between the Assembly and the Council as
defined by the Charter of the Assembly which
itself stems from the modified Brussels Treaty.
lll. [n regard to paragraph (b) of the order,
" different expert secretariats " should probably
be taken to mean the three agencies which the
Council is setting up in place of the Agency for
the Control of Armaments and the international
secretariat of the Standing Armaments Commit-
tee. The prospects of these agencies were
referred to in the previous chapter. For several
years, co-operation has been developing between
the Assembly committees and the ACA on the
one hand and the international secretariat ofthe
SAC on the other at the request of the Commit-
tee on Defence Questions and Armaments and
the Committee on Scientific, Technological and
Aerospace Questions. The Council in fact
authorised the two agencies to co-operate with
the Oflice of the Clerk of the Assembly for the
preparation of certain reports. But it imposed
certain conditions:
(i) that each Assembly request be sub-
mitted to the Council which alone
decides on the appropriate steps to be
taken;
(ii) that all expenditure involved in such
co-operation be borne by the Assem-
bly budget, including the travelling
expenses of members of the secre-
tariat.
ll2. The Council thus provides the Assembly
with technical assistance which, in the opinion
of the Council, should be subordinate to the
other tasks of the agencies. The removal of
most controls and the creation of new agencies
with tasks more concerned with information
than implementation obviously makes it easier
for them to contribute to the information of the
Assembly and to co-operate with the Oflice of
the Clerk. But the Council has not modified
the conditions it laid down for their assisting the
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Assembly with its work. It has thus respected
the separation of powers within WEU and the
Assembly has no complaint about this. It is
indeed difficult to imagine the Council's sub-
sidiary organs taking part in the Assembly's
supervisory work. This separation of powers
therefore means the WEU technical organs can
take part only in the preparation of documents
which may be of assistance to rapporteurs or be
used as appendices to reports under the respon-
sibility of the agencies. It must not lead to the
agencies, which depend on the Council, taking
over from the Offrce of the Clerk, which must
remain an exclusive service of the Assembly.
ll3. Within this framework imposed by the
treaty, outlined by the Council and accepted by
the Assembly, the closest possible co-operation
should be planned between the WEU technical
organs and the Assembly.
ll4. Paragraph (c) of the order proposes a
single budget for all the WEU organs. This is
now the case since the governments have to give
their opinion on all the budgets relating to the
whole organisation. However, it is inevitable to
maintain the separation between the budgets of
the ministerial organs which constitute a unit
composed of three sections 
- 
perhaps four or
two after the WEU structures have been reorgan-
ised 
- 
and the budget of the Assembly. More-
over, for a long time and with sound reasons the
Assembly has been asking for greater indepen-
dence in the exercise of the right to break down
its own budget between the various heads and
sub-heads within the limits of the overall budget
granted by the Council. In present circum-
stances, it cannot insist on the Council sub-
mitting to it for prior authorisation the break-
down of the budget within the heads which
concern it. It merely informs the Assembly and
asks it for an a posteriori opinion on these
heads. This practice conforms well to the
nature of the Assembly as defined in the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty by ensuring that the Assem-
bly has its due supervisory powers. Your Rap-
porteur finds it hard to imagine that a very diffe-
rent practice is possible and does not wish Order
63 to lead to the Council having an even greater
right to oversee the Assembly than in the past.
ll5. This right already has serious disadvan-
tages for the Assembly's independence, particu-
larly as it leads with increasing frequency to
untoward, petty and irksome interventions by
government oflicials, which make it diflicult to
apply certain decisions taken by the Presidential
Committee, disrupt the work of the Office of the
Clerk and detract from the normal progress of
the careers of the Assembly offrcials.
116. Paragraph (d) refers to the centralisation
of all WEU organs in one place. This is a very
logical proposal which has already been the
subject of several Assembly recommendations.
Hence it can but endorse this proposal once
again, although fully aware that transferring a
seat requires slow and diflicult negotiations and
transactions.
ll7. Among the " other possibilities suitable
further to promote the cause of WEU ", referred
to in paragraph (e), your Rapporteur wishes to
underline the importance of keeping the press
and public opinion properly informed about the
Council's work. It would appear that informa-
tion published in the press following the meeting
of experts held in July 1985 to prepare a co-
ordinated answer by the seven governments to
the American proposal to take part in the SDI
was inaccurate and unduly pessimistic. Such
vexations would probably have been avoided if
the Council had issued a comnrunique after that
meeting setting out the conclusions.
118. Your Rapporteur well roalises the dangers
of giving the public information about ongoing
negotiations. However, he considers that offi-
cial information issued jointly by all the parties
concerned is preferable to tendentious informa-
tion resulting from a leak. Moreover, he
considers that the developrnent of relations
between member countries of the European
Community in the last thirty years or more has
completely changed the nature of these relations
and that traditional diplomatic practice based
largely on secrecy has given way to more open
methods. The question is whether WEU is
prepared to take account ofthis trend.
l19. While keeping, as urged by Order 63, " to
a presentation of the factual conditions and legal
possibilities ", with due respect for the modified
Brussels Treaty, your Rapporteur has to be
rather restrictive in his answers to the questions
raised in this order. He feels that any other
form of answer would be liable to call the treaty
in question. He does at leaslt consider that all
the proposals in his draft recommendation
correspond to paragraph (e) of the order since
they endeavour to take as a basis what is
known about the present position of WEU when
defining the possibilities available for " promo-
ting the cause of WEU ". He does not wish
present circumstances to endanger the funda-
mental principles to which both the Assembly
and the Council have always expressed their
attachment.
YI. Conclusions
120. More than a year after the Rome declara-
tion, it is still quite diflicult to assess the posi-
tion with regard to the reactivation of WEU and
to know whether it is actually on the way to
becoming the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance. The question is not one of the institu-
tions themselves which, in the present fluc-
tuating situation of the WEU bodies, can be
ll5
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reorganised as the governments wish. The
question is whether it is possible to form such a
pillar and whether the governments really wish
to do so. No other body, now or in the near
future, will be able to achieve this result if the
Seven fail to do so within the fairly flexible
framework now offered by the WEU bodies
which have been freed from their former com-
mitments.
l2l. The governments must therefore agree
upon far more fundamental questions if they
wish, in one way or another, to shape a Euro-
pean entity within the Atlantic Alliance and, in
spite of progress in this sense, it is not at all
certain that they agree on this goal. If it is true
that an American objection made them stop
examining disarmament matters, that they can-
not agree on a definition of the role of the WEU
agencies, on a joint armaments policy, on the
co-ordination of their answers to President
Reagan's proposal that Europe participate in the
SDI or on giving the Assembly the means to
exercise, in a parliamentary context, the task
which they themselves assigned to it, there is
every reason to have doubts about the reactiv-
ation of WEU and even about the possibility of
giving substance to Europe's effective partici-
pation in western defence.
122. The Seven probably have little time left to
pull themselves together and follow up the inten-
tions set out in the Rome declaration. There
are already many signs that these intentions may
not be followed up. Yet the Soviet Union and
the United States now seem to be considering
very new developments in their defence policies
and the technology required to back up these
policies. If in the near future, the European
menrbers of the Atlantic Alliance do not manage
to co-ordinate their views on defence matters
and if they fail to develop the new technology
being applied in Japan, the Soviet Union and the
United States by appropriating the necessary
sums for large-scale investment in the develop-
ment of European technology they may fall so
far behind that they will be unable to catch up
and may seriously jeopardise their security in
the very near future.
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Amendment I
3rd December 1985
WEU and the strategic defence initiative
The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance
AMENDMENT 1 
'
tabled by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt
l. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " whatever the results of its efforts
to co-ordinate the answers of member countries to the American proposal that they take part in the
strategic defence initiative; ".
S igned : D r eyfus- S c hmidt
l. See I lth sitting, 4th December 1985 (amendment negatived).
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Amendment 2
2nd December 1985
)VEU and the strategic defence initiative
The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance
AMENDMENT 2 
'
tabled by Mr. Spies von Biillesheim
2. kave out paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
" Referring to the fact that the report on the possibilities, conditions and consequences of a closer
institutional connection of the Assembly with other organs of WEU, which is asked for in Order
63, will be prepared separately; ".
Signed: Spies von Bullesheim
l. See I lth sitting, 4th December 1985 (amendment agreed to).
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Developments in China and European security
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 2
by MM. Michel and van der Werfli, Rapporteurs
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dner.r RrcouurNonrtoN
on developments in China and European security
E*pr-nNlronv MruoReNouu
submitted by MM. Michel and van der Werff, Rapporteurs
I. Introduction
II. Economic development
III. Political developments
IV. Chinese power
V. External policy
VI. Conclusions
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Michel (Chairman); MM. Hardy (Alternate: Lord Hughel,_van der_Werlf (Vice-Chairmen);
Mi Ahrens, Si Frederic Bennelt, MM. Beriier, Bianco, Bogaerts, Burger, Hill, Sir Russell Johnsto+, Mrs. Kelly, MM. Koehl(Alternate: 'Dtreyfuyschmidt), lagneau (Alternate: P1uiaux), LagoJce, Martino, M-asciadri.(Alternate: Mezzapesa), 
-Muller,
i;ior"oit, Lori"Reay, VttU.'ned-demann, Ruet (Alternate: Bauiet), Rumpf, van der Sanden (Alternate: de Kwaadsteruet),
Spitella, Vecchietti (Alternate: Gianotti), de Vries (Alternate: Tummers).
N.B. Tlre names of those taking part in the vote are printed in ilalics.
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Draft Recommendation
oa developments in Chiaa and European security
The Assembly,
/y' 
_ . 
Considering the major part played by China in the world balance and the maintenance of peace
and the erren more important r6le it will have to play in the near future;
(iil 
- 
Considering that the interests of China and of Western Europe converge in many areas and may
develop independently of ideological and institutional differences;
(iii) 
. 
Considering that the major aim of the Chinese Government is the country's economic and social
development;
(iv) Considering that a condition of this development is the maintenance of peace in Asia and
throughout the world and welcoming the fact that the Chinese Government evidently shares this
conviction;
O Welcoming the development of the Chinese economy and of exchanges of all kinds betweenChina and Western Europe;
(vil Deploring developments in Cambodia and the loss of its independence,
Recouueuos rHAT rne CouNcrr
l. Encourage all possible initiatives to ensure that current negotiations on the reduction of nuclear
weapons also take the Far East into consideration so as to avoid weapons deployed in Europe being
moved towards that region;
2; 
_ 
Study and assess the extent to which Cocom restrictions hinder the continued development of
the People's Republic of China;
3. Urge- membgr goyernments to develop their countries' political, technological and scientific,
commercial and cultural relations with the People's Republic of China, in particular by:
(y' increasing trade between China and Western European countries;
(ii) developing knowledge of the Chinese language and culture in Western Europe;
(iii) facilitating cultural exchanges, particularly by establishing European cultural institutes
in China.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by MM, Michel and van der Werlf, RapporTeurs)
L Introduction
l. This text is the third report by the General
Affairs Committee on China and European
security. The first, presented by Sir Frederic
Bennett in 1978, drew attention to China's
reappearance on the international stage after a
long absence due to the cultural revolution and
emphasised that this re-emergence of China as a
power, far from being a further threat to Europe
and its interests in the world as many people
then feared, was on the contrary a factor which
would stabilise the balance, serve the cause
of international peace and eventually meet
Europe's known interests. This report inte-
rested the Chinese authorities suffrciently for
them to contact the committee, invite an official
of the Office of the Clerk to visit China and then
invite the committee to visit the People's Repu-
blic of China in April 1983.
2. This allowed the committee to instruct
Mr. Caro to present a further report which,
based on a vast amount of information obtained
during the committee's visit to China, was able
to go more deeply into the ideas expressed by Sir
Frederic. The report helped to inform the West
about China's steps to develop its economy in
order to improve forthwith the standard of
living of its people, to abandon an oppressive
system in favour of a renewal of freedoms of all
kinds and to foster the resumption of foreign
trade, essential for the Chinese economy.
Thanks in particular to an address given to it by
Zhao Ziyang, the Prime Minister, the commit-
tee's visit to China helped the development of
relations between China and Western Europe.
3. It is clear that the report, presented by the
committee and adopted by the Assembly in June
1983, gave a picture of developments in the
People's Republic of China which the latter
coniidered fair since in 1984 the Institute of
Foreign Affairs in Beijing invited the former
Rapporteur, who had in the meantime become
President of the Assembly, to pay a further visit
to China, accompanied by about fifteen parlia-
mentarians. Mr. Caro proposed that the Presi-
dential Committee be invited to make this visit
but, since that body does not present political
reports, the General A{fairs Committee has been
asked to draw the conclusions from the visit the
dates of which were fixed, by agreement between
the Presidential Committee and the Chinese
authorities, for the period 7th to 20th October
1985.
4. During its visit, the Presidential Commit-
tee was able to visit six provinces: Guanxi,
Sichuan, Shaanxi, Sinkiang, Gansu and Hebei.
In each case, it was received by the most
senior provincial authorities, givgn first-hand
information about their economic situation and,
in Sinkiang, was briefed in detail about the
frontiers between that immense province and
neighbouring countries. In Beijing, the Presi-
dential Committee was received by Li Xiannian,
President of the People's Republic of China, who
granted it a one and three-quarter hour audience
during which the President described his coun-
try's defence policy and answered questions put
by the European parliamentarians. The com-
mittee was also received by Zhou Nan, Vice-
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Xu Xin, Vice-
President of the Institute of Strategic Studies and
Assistant Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces,
Professor Huan Xiang, Director General of the
International Study Centre, and many other
senior authorities. It also inspected an
armoured division in the Beijingurea.
5. Each of your Rapporteurs was able to be
present for only part of this vislt, but between
them covered the whole programme. Their
report can therefore draw inforniation from the
visit to China. They have nevertheless been
able to draw on other sources of information
from the West or from China which have contri-
buted significantly to shaping their opinions.
This has been made easier by the steady impro-
vement in information about Ctrina which can
be obtained through oflicial Chinese publica-
tions, the presence of a growing number of
western journalists in China and the increasing
prominence given to their articles in our news-
papers. In particular, they wefe able to make
use of a major study entitled Dw Reich der Mitte
in Reformstimmung published in Nos. 85, 90,
93, 104, 120, l3l, 159 and 225 of the Neue
Zircher Zeitung in 1985 and of many articles in
Beijing Information. They were also able to
take direct or indirect advantage of the increa-
sing number of exchanges of offfcial or unoflicial
delegations between Western European countries
and China, more business or tourist travel in
China and western scientific publications on the
People's Republic of China. This spectacular
development fully confirms what the committee
observed in 1983 and which was set out in
Mr. Caro's report. It now remains to follow
up and complete what was then written.
6. The present document has therefore
drawn much from the Presidential Committee's
visit to China but is not merely a report of the
visit. It has sought information from a variety
of sources and, in the main, expresses the opi-
nion of the Rapporteurs alone.
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II. Economic development
7. There is no doubt that China's remarkable
economic development, noted by the committee
in 1983, is continuing. On the thirty-fifth anni-
versary of the Chinese revolution on lst October
1984, Deng Xiaoping announced that the target
of quadrupling 1984 agricultural and industrial
production by 2000 was realistic. Growth in
the period 1979-83 points in this direction but it
is doubtful whether it will be possible to main-
tain this gowth rate and bottlenecks which it is
possible to remoye only by long-term invest-
ment might slow down this new great leap
forward in the next few years. Admiitedly, th-e
seventh five-year plan which is to start in 1986
attempts to solve these problems, particularly in
transport and communications. but it is not
certain that fifteen years will be enough. There
are signs that the development of China has run
up against a number of difficulties, some of
which can already be listed and to some extent
analysed.
8. (a) Application of the policy of the " four
modernisations " campaigns defined by Zhou
Enlai in 1964 but taken up again systematically
by Deng Xiaoping and imposed as from 1978
was a spectacular success. In 1984, China
produced 407 million tons of grain as compared
with 304 million in 1978, thus allowing it, in
spite of a steadily-growing population, not to
lmport any grain for the second year running.
Results are believed to be even better for cotton
and oilseed.
9. However, agriculture seems to have been
developed with little investment and without
any noticeable increase in the area cultivated,
mainly due to a rise in manpower productivity
encouraged by the liberalisation oftrade in agri-
cultural products and the release of peasant
energy. Thus, agricultural productivity is
reported to have increased by 4.80h per year in
recent years, which is considerable. However,
such a rise cannot be expected to continue for
long with these methods alone. Increasingly,
higher productivity will require investment ind
China's means are too limited for it to be able to
invest enough in agriculture. The only possibi-
lity might be to ask the peasants whose income
increased considerably when prices were freed to
finance this technological revolution, and this
places the Chinese authorities before a delicate
choice: either allow a rural aristocracy to re-
emgrqe which can reintroduce a system. of
exploiting men by invested capital, oi resume,
thlough state intervention, at least part of theinitiative it had left to the peasants. It is
understandable that the Chinese Government is
leaving this option open as long as circum-
stances do not force it to make a difficult choice
between official ideology and economic require-
ments.
10. (b) The third plenum of the twelfth cen-
tral committee, meeting in Beijing in December
1984, decided that China would not confine
itself to improving the way the system worked
but would start transforming essential structures
by reintroducing the law of the market, extend-
ing to towns and the industrial sector measures
taken in country areas in 1978;in this way prices
would progressively recover their r6le as econo-
mic indicators as they were freed and firms
would recover their independence at the expense
of centralised planning. It is evident that this
trend has hardly started, except in certain
regions with special economic status.
11. One may wonder whether measures which
were a success in the country can be applied in
towns without jeopardising certain elements of
social a!_d political stability. It is obviously
more diffrcult for rural society than for indus-
trial and urban society to organise itself to
defend corporate interests and to translate their
economic independence into social and political
claims. Already in 1984 there was unrest in
cerlain towns as a protest at the rapid and prob-
ably excessive rise in agricultural prices. What
would happen if freeing industrial prices and
wages were to jeopardise the social discipline
and moral order on which the government had
so far counted? The western press has reported
three violent demonstrations of discontent in the
first half of 1985, in Ji'an, Beijing and Tianjin.
In the latter case, peasants were demanding a
bonus of 7.5 yuan, granted only to town-
dwellers, probably because of the rise in agri-
cultural prices.
12. For some time now, even in oflicial publi-
cations including, apparently, the People's Dailyin December 1984 there have been leports oT
questioning the relevance of marxism in the eco-
nomic sector. Admittedly, capitalist pollution
is still rejected with horror but one may wonder
how much of that pollution can the r6gime
survive and at what point would ideology be
called in question. It is clear that it has per-
ceived this danger and, since 1983, a numbei of
repressrve measures have been imposed on
sectors where the search for a profit had led to
disputable results. Thus, the entire administra-
tion of the island of Hainan Dao has recently
been the subject of inquiries and sanctions for
having taken advantage of its position as China,s
maritime gateway to bring a large number ofluxury goods into the markets of mainland
China, which was not without serious repercus-
sions on the country's currency reserves-, since
the equivalent of $1,600 million is believed to
have been diverted in this way by the provincial
administration.
13. (c/ China's economic development has run
up_ against the weakness of its energy resources.
After having stagnated for a long time at about
100 million tons per year, its oil production rose
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to 114 million tons in 1984 and its coal produc-
tion to 770 million tons, placing China in the
first rank in the world, but this is not enough for
a country of 1,000 million inhabitants in the
process of equipping itself. China is therefore
considering building up a nuclear energy indus-
try and has been seeking western partners
capable of building nuclear plants on its terri-
tory. On 10th June 1985, it signed a memoran-
dum with the Kraftwerk Union, a subsidiary of
the German group Siemens, providing for the
supply of four pressurised-water reactors, the
first of a planned series of ten reactors. The
importance of this programme in the eyes of the
Chinese leaders can be seen from the fact that
they did not hesitate to infringe the principle to
which they were nevertheless attached that
China should avoid dependence on foreign
countries by not asking for credit. The cost
price of each plant being almost $1,000 million,
it was able to avoid this drawback, but it
seems to have been most exacting in obtaining
transfers of technology corresponding to its
purchase. Nuclear co-operation agreements
have been concluded with a number of other
countries, including Japan, the United King-
dom, France, Italy and the Netherlands in 1984
and 1985. However, the drop in oil prices in
1984-85 seems to have slowed down the rate at
which nuclear plants are being built.
14. Here too one may wonder how far China
is prepared to go towards the progressive
adoption of international trade standards. It
would appear that a sharp drop in its currency
reserves, which are believed to have fallen from
$16,000 to $8,000 million in a year, particularly
due to the development of trade evading state
supervision, is placing it before a diflicult choice
between strengthening exchange controls and
related police operations or accepting the risk of
a large external debt in order to speed up the rate
of industrialisation. So far, the government
seems to have taken the limited risks involved
in moderate indebtedness, and this is perfectlyjustified for a country in the process of equip-
ping itself.
15. (d) The policy of decentralisation to the
benefit of the provinces, which are henceforth
authorised to negotiate directly with foreign
firms for the purchase of durable goods, also
involves certain risks, particularly evolution at
different rates leading to differences in employ-
ment, wealth and even food resources. This
would strengthen the centrifugal elements which
necessarily exist among such a large population
spread over such a Yast territory. The counter-
bilance of these risks is obviously the power of a
single centralised party, but it seems inevitable
thai this party will either have to revise its policy
of decentralisation or, in turn, submit to its
eflects.
16. (e) The fundamental question raised by
the economic evolution of China today, now
that its government has to cho0se between
continuing a policy of liberalisation whose social
and political consequences it wotrld have to
accept, or reverting to orthodox marxism which
wouid probably comfort the politic{l system left
over from the 1949 revolution but which mightjeopardise the economic develop4nents which
have been launched since 1975, is to know what
is the real aim of the Chinese leadgrs. Do they
wish to make China a great power as quickly as
possible, capable of playing a leadipg role in the
twenty-first century, mastering and applying all
modern technology and firmly raising the
standard of living of the populatiop, or do they
wish to keep in power a pafty and ideology
which would have to resort to authoritarian and
repressive methods in order, like the Soviet
Union, to maintain a dictatorship which could
but grow harsher with the growth in the econo-
mic, social, cultural and political consequences
of opening up the country? On I lth August
1985, Hu-Yaobang, General Secnetary of the
Chinese Communist Party, answefed this ques-
tion by defining the aim of the party as being to
make 
-China 
one of the most prosperous and
most powerful countries of the twenty-first
century. But there are many sigps that if this
really is the Chinese Government's aim, some
secti-ons of the people and party share it in only
small part. On this point, there $eems to have
been a political struggle within the party since
the fall of the gang of four.
17. (J) As your Rapporteurs have pointed out,
a number of bottlenecks stand in the way of very
fast economic growth. Instances noted are the
following:
18. (i) The inadequate commqnications net-
work makes it difficult to transpdrt people and
goods from one province to anotleJ. The
ehi.rese Government is well awalp of this situa-
tion and in October 1985 decided to encourage
investment, particularly foreign investment, in
harbour and rail installations and for several
years it has been improving the road and air
infrastructure. These are long-term program-
mes which will inevitably be very expensive.
Their effects will not be felt for Serferal years.
19. (if Similarly, the weakneqs of the hotel
infrastructure is an obstacle to the development
of tourism in China, which was gonsiderable in
1985, and increases the difficulty of establishing
economic relations between the Chinese pro-
vinces and western firms whose participation is
sought in China's economic development.
20. (iii) The non-convertibility of the yuan is
also an obstacle to trade. It i$ certainly still
diflicult to imagine full convertiUitity as matters
now stand in China but a move towards conver-
tibility of the national currency step by step is
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essential if China is to accede to the world
market.
2.1. 
_(iv) The most serious bottleneck facingthe Chinese economy is probably due to in-
adequate training at executive level. A far
younger generation is now taking over from the
older generation, the generation in between
having been the principal victim of the cultural
revolution which occurred at the time they
should have been at university. But the in-
adequacy of teaching establishments and the
decline in traditional culture which has been
only partially replaced by a modern culture
mean that the generation which will have to
assume heavy responsibilities in firms at a very
early age is not well prepared to deal with
present-day management problems because it
does not have a full grasp of the technical means
available. It is not enough to have well-
equipped firms; someone must be ready to keep
them going, to manage them, to adapt them. It
is not certain that the new Chinese managerial
staff are ready to meet this challenge, although a
few individuals seem to manage-. The same
remark probably applies to workers at all
levels. In any event, this is the impression your
Rapporteurs gained from their only too brief
contacts with Chinese industrial firms during
their visit in 1985.
22. (v) To equip China obviously means
resorting to technology, investment and co-
operation from countries with more advanced
economies. But the Chinese Government's
legitimate and praiseworthy concern not to incur
too many debts forces it to find immediate large-
scale outlets for the country's production. But
China's western partners, although prepared to
sell, are poor customers for China's industry.
They are prepared to import from China oniy
raw materials or lowJevel agricultural and
industrial products or handicrafts. China is notyet close to the position in which it will be
able to provide the international market with
finished products equal to its equipment require-
ments in every sector. The same is true for
services and even tourism, which is attracted by
China's natural and artistic riches but which
cannot be received on a large scale because ofits
underequipment.
23.. (vi) Finally, firms seem to be having
senous management problems. Your Rappor-
teurs can do no better in this connection than to
quote from the speech by Zhao Ziyang, prime
Minister, on l8th September 1985, eiplaining
the proposal for the seventh five-year plan to the
national conference of the Chinese Communist
Party:
" ... Our enterprises are backward in
technology and even more so in manage-
ment. Therefore, technological transfor-
mation should be conducted during the
period of the seventh five-year plan.
However, it is even more urgent and of
more practical significance to raise opera-
tional and management skills. During
this period, we must try, through reform,to tighten overall quality control and
labour discipline, train workers and staff
members so as to increase their profes-
sional competence and upgrade the opera-
tions of enterprises in every respect. All
this must be done if we are to shift the
focus of work of enterprises to the impro-
Yement of economic efficiency. We
should impress on all workers and cadresthat improving product quality and
reducing the consumption of raw mate-
rials are the most practical ways to fulfil
the seventh five-year plan... "
24. Furthermore, the West does not like
compensated contracts which oblige its export-
ing industries to become the sales agenta for
imported goods which they are not equipped to
handle. But the West will be able to expand its
exports to China only if it makes a determined
effort to take Chinese products whether under
compensated contracts or not. It is also natural
for China to try to develop its trade relations not
only with the third world but also with the
Soviet Union and the Eastern European coun-
tries which are better able to handle compen-
sated contracts because of the way their econo-
mies are organised. By about 1980, Sino-Soviet
trade had fallen to an extremely low level for
political reasons. It increased considerably in
1984 and 1985 although it does not yet represent
a large proportion of China's trade, but it is to be
expected that this increase will continue, particu-
larly if the more serious causes of lension
between the two countries can be overcome.
Europe should not be over-concerned about this
because it must realise that the Chinese leaders
have no intention of reverting to the position
where China depended on the Soviet Union in
the years after the 1949 revolution. China is
trying to diversify its economic and trade
partners, which at present means increasing its
trade with planned-economy countries. Europe,
which would benefit from any development of
China's trade, has nothing to fear; it must merely
ensure that it too offers China conditions which
are favourable to the development of its own
trade with China.
25. However, some mystery remains about
the organisation of production in China: firms
receive raw materials and supply finishedproducts and prices are fixed without direct
reference to costs. For instance, in the rest of
the worl4, the petrochemical industry is in the
hands of a small number of persons 
- 
managers,
technical staff and workers 
- 
whereas in China
the industry employs more than 50% more staff
than would be normal, the aim being to provide
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additional, or superfluous, posts to reduce
unemployment. Admittedly, labour costs are
not very high.
26. The management of the Chinese economy
is naturally not the business of Europeans, yet
considerations about China's domestic regime
must not prevent them from developing their
economic or even political and cultural relations
with the People's Republic of China. Never-
theless, insofar as the choices made in the next
few years will lead to long-term trends, Europe
must take these matters into account. Many
European firms have already gambled on the
pursuit of the liberal trend which began ten years
ago and have used the investment possibilities
offered by China to secure a place in a market
which they expect to expand quickly. But the
European countries too need to foresee what
kind of economic and political partner they can
expect to find in China. In this connection,
recent political developments in the People's
Republic of China can provide them with useful
pointers.
III. Political developments
27. There have been no spectacular changes
in China since 1983, but signs have been
noted of a desire to break progressively with the
past and to improve the Chinese people's share
in running the country. In this connection,
there can be no doubt that the national confer-
ence of the Chinese Communist Party held in
Beijing in September 1985 was of very great
interest.
28. There have been reports in the western
press of the fact that younger oflicials are being
appointed to positions in the party, state and
provincial administrations. For instance, in
June 1985 eight ministers, six of whom had
reached the age of 65, were replaced by persons
whose average age was under 55. Similarly, the
Party's Political Bureau has been reduced to
twenty full members and two alternates instead
of twenty-five and four, and six of its members
are newcomers who are much younger than the
others. Many other leaders have been asked to
retire and, in the civil service, retiring age has
been lowered to sixty. It has been announced
that the present leaders will withdraw in the next
few years and many of those moving into posi-
tions of responsibility have had modern training,
including in some cases women such as Mrs.
Wan Shaopen who has just been appointed
Governor of the Province of Jiangxi at the age of
54. Many of them are engineers and techni-
cians.
29. In 1984, the party completely reviewed its
lists of members and excluded those whose
behaviour might be detrimental to its reputation
and also many persons responsible for the
excesses of the cultural revolution and probably
opponents of the more open policy. This purge
appears to have affected several hundred
thousand party members. In Decomber 1984,
the People's Daily published two editorials ques-
tioning the universal truth of the thoughts and
writings of Marx, Lenin and Mao Zedong,
emphasising that marxism was not E dogma but
a guide to action and that Deng {iaoping had
moved away from orthodoxy with his economic
policy to ensure China's prosperily thanks to
foreign investment, recourse to market forces
and limited freedom for firms. One of these
editorials moreover took as an authority the
words of Mao Zedong underlining the need for
realism.
30. But there are other areas in which the
Presidential Committee's visit to China allowed
useful information to be obtained, although this
was not neceqsarily the aim of its enquiries.
Your Rapporteurs will therefore merely make a
few comments without claiming to reach firm
conclusions. It is clear, for instance, that there
is still dissension among the Chi,nese leaders
about the principal courses which the country
should follow, but no official information was
given in this connection.
31. It was very apparent that decentralisation
has become a fact and that the provincial
authorities now have a wider margin of
independence than before, particul{rly in regard
to economic initiatives, including those invol-
ving relations with countries, regions and firms
outside China. The initiatives taken by some
of these provincial authorities show a desire at
least as great as that of the central government to
activate regional economic development and to
open the door to the outside world. But
integrating these local or provincial wishes into
national planning obviously raises certain
problems, and your Rapporteurs were unable to
determine to what extent they had been solved.
32. Nor is there any doubt that discussion of
major economic and social options is more open
than in the past. Various opiniorrs are to be
heard about government policy and the.forces
which exist within the party itself, although the
Chinese press is still very conformi$t in its refer-
ences to the policy pursued by the goYernment.
This at least provides an abundapce of infor-
mation and your Rapporteurs could not fail to
be struck by the good will shown by all the poli-
tical and industrial leaders they mQt, not only in
their briefings but also in their detailed, object-
ive and sincere answers to the questions put.
The fact that military staff of various ranks
spoke without restraint and likewise answered
the questions put to them by foreign parliamen-
tarians should be strongly emphasised.
33. Procedure for appointing the representa-
tives of the people in legislative bodies is
125
DOCUMENT IO35
obviously a test of progress towards a represent-
ative system and of the people's endorsement of
government policy. Your Rapporteurs were
unable to go deeply into this matter, but noted
that some of those elected did not represent theparty and that even among party candidates
some were removed by the electorate at the last
elections because of their attitudes towards
major questions now being discussed in connec-
tion with the guidelines to be adopted for the
country. Similarly, it appeared that it was
possible to reach fairly senior posts in firms
without belonging to the party.
34. It is evident that there is a political discus-
sion in China about the fundamental question of
the shape of the " four modernisations ", i.e.
about the kind of power which the state and
party should exercise, first in economic matters
and subsequently in the overall life of the
country. This discussion is no longer held, asin the past, in secret among a small group of
Ieaders, but nor is it an open discussion, as it
would be in western countries. It is a hushed
discussion in which the uniformity of words and
principles expressed may conceal very diflerent
attitudes and in which it is diflicult for the out-
side observer to determine the ins and outs.
35. It immediately became apparent that there
was a very wide consensus in the country on
three essential points: maintaining the national
unity restored by the Chinese Communist party
in 1949, priority for economic development and
rejection of the cultural revolution whose
adverse effects are still being felt. Within this
consensus, there are signs of divergences bet-
ween advocates of early, radical liberalisation
and supporters of the predominance of marxist-
leninist ideology. It is clear that the leaders
around Deng Xiaoping have to ensure that this
consensus is maintained on important matters,
avoiding a rupture with the two main tenden-
cies, thus forcing them to fight on two fronts:
against those abusing their new-found freedom
and thus providing arguments for the conserva-
tives 
- 
and everything indicates that such people
are sometimes repressed severely 
- 
and against
those who toe the ideological line too strictly and
who would thus paralyse liberal development;
this seems to be the course followed -by the
recent purges within the party.
36. Is it possible to say which elements of
society are to be found on each side? The
western press has sometimes given indications,
for instance placing army leaders on the side of
the orthodox marxist-leninists, but your Rappor-
teurs saw no proofofthis, except perhaps in the
importance attached to political instruction, i.e.
the teaching of marxismJeninism, among the
qrgops and in military academies. They also
felt it was the younger elements, at least in the
circles to which they had access, who were the
most in favour of early, radical liberalisation,
while older people were at least more cautious.
37. In spite of the existence of such diver-
gences, the breadth of the basic consensus
should not be underestimated. But it is to be
feared that the obstacles which continued econo-
mic development will inevitably encounter may
bring grist to internal quarrels whose conse-
quences are difficult to foresee. Hence there is
no doubt that if Europe wishes China to become
a strong economic partner and, above all, an
important factor of political stability and
balance in Asia and throughout the world, it is in
Europe's interest to encourage China's economic
development and to steer well away from any-
thing that might appear to be intervention in the
country's internal affairs.
IY. Chinese power
38. When it visited China in 1983, the com-
mittee obtained very little information about
Chinese military strength. The President of the
Assembly asked the Chinese authorities to
ensure that the visit planned for 1985 enabled
participants to obtain a better idea of the policy
of the People's Republic of China in this area.The Presidential Committee's conversations
with the President of the Republic were concern-
ed- mainly with China's defence policy and the
information thus obtained was further elabor-
ated in m€etings with several civil and military
leaders. Moreover, it has now become easier to
know more about Chinese military power since
the publication of an important study in France
in 1984 r. There is no question of your Rappor-
teurs trying to summarise this book, but it was agreat help to them in their perception of the
defence problems of the People's Republic of
China.
39. Information obtained in 1983 showed
Chinese defence to be based on a policy ofdeter-
rence whose three main components were
number, space and time, thus indicating that the
Chinese leaders were making no secret of the
obsolescence of their weapons nor the in-
adequacy oftheir doctrine in face ofthe require-
ments of modern warfare. However, at that
time China had conducted nuclear tests and it
was known to have long-range ballistic missiles.
Furthermore, the Chinese arrny had been
deployed along the Ussuri and in Mongolia, in
India and on the Vietnamese frontier in condi-
tions which did not allow implementation of thepeople's war doctrine as defined by Mao
Zedong. More recent information only
confirms that China's defence policy is far more
elaborate and much better adapted to changing
l. Georges Tan Eng bok: La modern$at rcn de la difense chtno$e et
s.es principales limiles 
- 
i,977-1983, published by the-Fondatrcn pour
les audes de difense nationale, paris; I 984 (3gO 6ct"ro pag".y.
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circumstances than the Chinese leaders allowed
it to be thought in 1983.
40. Moreover, the Chinese Government has
taken a number of new measures which suggest
that its doctrine has changed considerably. In
1983, China's army of about 4 million men was
the largest in the world. However, this means
only 4 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants compared
with 4 soldiers per 300 inhabitants in the Soviet
Union, 4 per 200 inhabitants in Vietnam and
4 per 400 to 500 inhabitants in Western Europe
and the United States. In other words, the ratio
between the army and the population is one of
the lowest among the great powers. Yet in 1984
the Chinese Government decided to reduce
troop levels by a quarter, bringing them down to
3 million, i.e. about 4 soldiers per 1,300 in-
habitants and an overall level similar to that of
the Soviet Union. In addition to this army,
however, there is a people's militia, obviously
ill-equipped to wage modern warfare, often not
even armed and composed of young men about
to start their military service or who have just
completed it. It receives some training, but
serves only as a reserve, an instrument of deter-
rence against invasion and a peace-keeping
force.
41. This probably indicates that without
renouncing the deterrent value ofthe huge popu-
lation in the event of an invasion, the Chinese
authorities tried to economise by reducing the
numbers in service. Conversely, they seem to
have made considerable efforts to improve the
equipment of their forces. Some observers
have deduced that priority was now being given
to the development and deployment of nuclear
weapons, thanks inter alia to the development of
missiles with multiple warheads. Officers have
also had further training and younger oflicers
have been recruited, there is specialisation in
each branch of military training, there has been
a general improvement in weapons, logistic
support and engineering. The people's militia
has been reorganised and new deployment doc-
trines have been drawn up, particularly in rela-
tion to the search for local superiority and
counter-offensive. During maneuvres in
Ningxia in 1982, consideration was given for the
first time to tactical nuclear weapons being used
by the Chinese army. In fact, victories in India,
setbacks in Vietnam and on the Ussuri and
defeats in Mongolia point to a significant moder-
nisation of the Chinese forces which are having
difliculty in adapting themselves to parameters
which are not those of revolutionary warfare.
42. In 1983, China was undoubtedly busy
working out a new strategy and new tactics com-
mensurate with its technical capability with a
view to pursuing, with various degrees of
success, a defence policy rather different to what
it was then claimed to be.
43. In addition to the People's Liberation
Army, Chinese sources admittedly urtderline the
existence of a large people's militia which closely
resembles the picture the West may conjure up
of the people under arms. In August 1981, Fu
Zhong, Assistant Director of the Ggneral Poli-
tical Department, published an artidle stressing
the fact that the People's Liberation Army and
the militia were merely two separatd aspects of
the people under arms, in the corrfiext of the
unified armed force system, a legpcy of the
doctrines of the revolutionary mobilisation of
the people formerly worked out by Mao. But
once there are well-trained, well-equipped forces,
their tasks will most probably divetge increas-
ingly from those of the people's militia.
44. It would perhaps be simplistic to claim
that one is responsible for defending frontiers
and the other for keeping internal public order,
but in the long run a system of this kind tends to
lead to such a difference in tasks. Furthermore,
the 1982 constitution, unlike those of 1975 and
1978, no longer underlines the omnipotent,
omnipresent nature of the Chinese Communist
Party but makes the army subjept to state
authority. The party admittedly continues to
dominate and control the state, but the distinc-
tion drawn between their respective areas of
responsibility is certainly not withlout signifi-
cance. It should be added that ryhen Deng
Xiaoping gave up most of his partf and state
duties between 1981 and 1983 he {etained the
chairmanship of the party's Mililary Affairs
Committee, thus ensuring that military authority
remained subject to that of the state.
45. An examination of known data about the
formation and deployment of the Chinese armed
forces confirms the impression that in the past
ten years they have been moving quickly
towards the modernisation of armaments and
logistics at the expense of troop levels. To a
growing extent, known maneuvres and the
equipment used indicate that the usq of Chinese
forces is planned in terms resembling those for
western armed forces. This does not mean that
there are not still a number of weak points, parti-
cularly armaments, but it seems that priority is
now being given to means which would allow
modern warfare to be waged, i.e. which would
allow China to use force not only for a defensive
strategy but also to back offensive a(tion in East
Asia. While it is clear that the Peogle's Repub-
lic of China is far from being equiflped to face
up to the. very great powers, it m4y in a few
years' time have the wherewithal t! act against
Taiwan or Vietnam, if it manages td isolate one
or other of these potential opponents, which it
has not yet managed to do.
46. Finally, China has developed nuclear
weapons which it is steadily perfecting. How-
ever, these weapons are not a threat to the
United States or the Soviet Union and are not
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close to being so. The Chinese Government
seems to attribute only a limited deterrent rOIe
to them, there being no question of relying on
them to ward off a conventional attack, but
merely to discourage a potential enemy from
using his own nuclear weapons, which, politi-
cally, means the will to withstand nuclear
blackmail. This gives the measure of the true
value of conventional weapons. President Li
Xiannian told members of the Presidential
Committee that China considered all nuclear
weapons to be strategic from the moment they
could reach the territory of another country.
However, there are diflerences between informa-
tion given in the western press about the recent
development of China's nuclear capability and
ballistic arsenal and the very modest place
accorded to them in the speeches by Chinese
leaders.
47. However, at the march past on lst Octo-
ber 1984 marking the thirty-fifth anniversary of
the People's Republic of China, and again at the
one on 10th October 1985, foreign observers
were struck by the presentation of many sophis-
ticated weapons produced in China itself: new
tanks, jeeps, armoured troop carriers, self-
propelled guns up to a calibre of 150 mm,
medium-range missiles and CSS-NX4 sub-
marineJaunched intercontinental ballistic
missiles. According to the Military Balance
1984-85, China has a Xia-class submarine
capable of launching twelve missiles with a range
of 2,800 km, but four are believed to be under
construction out of a total programme of eleven
submarines. The first missile firing from a
submarine dates back to October 1982. The
very rapid progress made by China in regard to
launchers should also be underlined, although it
produces only light-weight satellites not exceed-
ing 50 kg. But it has just proposed two
launchers on the world market which would be
rivals of the European Ariane rocket and NASA
means of delivery. Moreover, it is the world's
fourth power for satellites, after the Soviet
Union, the United States and Japan, since it has
launched fourteen and there is little doubt that
the Chinese space progamme also has military
aspects as was shown at the last Le Bourget air
show.
48. However, certain observers consider that
China's capability is still limited, particularly
when moving from the prototype stage to mass
production. They point out that most new
conventional weapons produced by-China are
still developments of Soviet models from about
thirty years ago and that progress in the arma-
ments industries has been far slower than in
other industries since 1972. However, progress
has been noted recently in the production of
military aircraft and helicopters. Furthermore,
everything indicates that major efforts have been
made to modernise the training of oflicers, to
initiate them in inter-service co-operation, and
of the troops, thanks to an increase in the
number of regular forces, the recruitment of
younger offrcers and the use of new equipment
such as laser simulators which the Presidential
Committee saw being used in the armoured unitit visited. The Chinese authorities did not
conceal the fact that the recent decision to
reduce troop levels from four to three million
men was intended to allow military expenditure
to be diverted to the modernisation of conven-
tional weapons.
49. However, it is clear that the Chinese army
still has weaknesses compared with more
modern armies which, according to Tan Eng
bok, are to be found mainly in all aspects of
electronic warfare, air defence, particularly for
low altitude penetration or in cloudy weather,
and both tactical and strategic mobility. How-
ever, while your Rapporteurs share the author's
view that experience of low-intensity fighting
which the Soviet army acquired from its opera-
tions in Afghanistan may diminish the effective-
ness of Chinese action along its communication
and logistic support lines in the event of inva-
sion, they do not agree with his view that the
rusticity of the theatre of operations makes the
Soviet forces' material superiority over the
People's Liberation Army more relative. They
wonder, in fact, whether experience from the war
in Mongolia in 1969 did not prove precisely the
reverse : in the wide open spaces of the steppes,
Soviet technological superiority seems to have
had the maximum effect.
50. Another subject of controversy is the
amount of China's military expenditure. Ac-
cording to Chinese sources consulted by your
Rapporteurs, expenditure amounts to about
1.7% of GNP, which would be a very small
proportion. However, the Military Balance
points out that comparisons with other countries
are extremely diflicult because, on the one hand,
Chinese GNP is not calculated in the same way
as that of western countries and, on the other
hand, the Chinese military budget, published in
1983 and 1984, does not show all the expend-
iture which would be included in the corres-
ponding heads of western budgets. However
this may be, even if it is more than the 1.7% of
GNP quoted by the Chinese authorities, the
Chinese defence budget is still a small one. The
25% reduction in troop levels decided in 1984
should allow some saving in pay and mainte-
nance so as to be able to modernise conventional
weapons which in many sectors seem extremely
decrepit.
51. President Li Xiannian drew the President-
ial Committee's attention to the fact that defence
was last on the list of the " four modernisa-
tions ", after agriculture, basic industry and
science and technology. He stressed that it was
above all economic progress that would provide
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the basis for China's security and- productive
investment had " priority in time " over military
expenditure. Nothing the Presidential Com-
mittee noted, moreover, allows this policy to be
doubted.
52. This situation explains the positions
adopted by China in disarmament matters, as
the President of the Republic also explained to
the Presidential Committee. Indeed, China is
mainly concerned about ending the qualitative
arms race throughout the world because it does
not wish the gap separating it from the great
powers to grow even wider. Thus, it advocates
a very large reduction in the nuclear arsenals of
both great powers and is against President
Reagan's strategic defence initiative and any
other military use of space which, according to
President Li Xiannian, must remain " the com-
mon property of mankind ". Conversely, the
Chinese authorities seem to welcome the efforts
made by Western Europe to organise its defence
and improve its armaments.
53. Hence, it is through the progressive
modernisation of its conventional weapons and
the development of its air force and navy that
China intends to support its more active diplo-
matic efforts, the enormous potential levels of its
militia and its nuclear armaments remaining
complementary factors designed essentially to
safeguard national territory through deterrence
and, in the case of tactical nuclear weapons, to
guarantee that the potential adversary cannot
remain sole master of a possible escalation.
Y. External policy
54. It is quite clear that China's external
policy today corresponds to a number of princi-
ples stemming from the means at its disposal, its
situation in the world, problems inherited from
the past and its hopes for the future. They may
be defined as follows:
(i) to avoid major clashes, particularly
with the two great powers;
(ii) to keep external threats away from its
frontiers;
(iii) lo assert itself as a great power, since
otherwise it cannot expect to have a
say in world affairs, or above all in
Asian affairs, relying mainly on the
third-world countries;
(iv) to abide by the principle of the
integrity of Chinese territory as it
existed before the unequal treaties of
the nineteenth-century;
(v/ to maintain economic and other rela-
tions with countries which can help
its development, without any of them
gaining a place in the Chinese eco-
nomy that might threalen China's
independence;
(vi) to develop exchanges o[ all kinds,
including cultural exchanges, with
Western Europe in view of the high
degree of convergence between the
Chinese and European perception of
conditions for maintainlng peace in
the world.
55. The consequences of this programme are
many and the first of them concernt Sino-Soviet
relations which, after a period gf close co-
operation lasting about ten yeap after the
Chinese revolution, deteriorated tp a point at
which there were several armed confrontations.
It is clear that the programme of " four moder-
nisations " requires a period of calm free of the
threat of conflict and allowing military expend-
iture to be reduced in the wake of the firm steps
already taken in 1980 and 1985. According to
recent Chinese sources, such expenditure has
fallen from 16.3% to ll.9% of the country's
budget, a relatively low proportion, but it is
known that indications of figupes must be
accepted with circumspection. However, they
show a tendency which cannot fail to have
serious implications for China's external policy
and in particular for its relations with its Soviet
neighbour. They explain why bilateral talks
have been held for the last five yedrs for normal-
ising Sino-Soviet relations.
56. The Chinese authorities have obviously
no intention of reverting to the situation as it
was before 1960, i.e. one of almost exclusive
dependence in economic, foreign policy and
ideological matters, in other words the internal
management of the country. That period of
close co-operation left bitter mentrories, and the
only reason for seeking closer contact with the
Soviet Union seems to be the prospect of diver-
si$ing external relations, particularly economic
and trade, and consolidating peace which China
needs for a long time to come, although the
Chinese authorities are not altogether convinced
of the peaceful intentions proclaimed by the
Kremlin.
57. Your Rapporteurs were in fact able to see
that Sino-soviet relations were leEs tense than in
1983 and leaders from the two countries meet
periodically to try to improve them. The
seventh round of meetings was held in October
1985. The Soviet Union and China had already
signed an agreement in July for the moderni-
sation of seventeen Chinese firrqs by the Soviets
and the creation of seven new f'rrms. There is
expected to be a spectacular development in
trade between the two countries in the next five
years. But political diffrculties remain. China
is certainly soft-pedalling on its claim to have
the nineteenth-century unequatl treaties abro-
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gated, but the Soviet Union is prepared to make
no concessions on this point, any more than on
the three major Chinese claims: Soviet with-
drawal from Afghanistan, withdrawal of Viet-
namese forces from Cambodia and withdrawal
of Soviet forces and missiles from CentralAsia. Although there has been a sharp increase,
Sino-Soviet trade is still not very significant and
while some detente between the two govern-
ments was noted at Mr. Chernenko's funeral, it
is developing only very slowly, which points to
diffrculties ahead.
58. It is the question of Cambodia that has the
most serious effect on relations between China
and its neighbours. However, there has been
some evolution. Whereas the Khmer Rouge
had hitherto dominated the opposition and had
China's support, the latter has become far more
favourably inclined towards other groups in that
opposition, and in particular the coalition
leader, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Moreover,
the announcement in September 1985 that the
leader of the Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot, was retiring
will probably encourage reconciliation between
the coalition factions and should facilitate sup-
port from a number of other countries.
59. Admittedly, the Vietnamese army's mili-
tary successes in Eastern Cambodia and its
pressure on Thailand have allowed the area
under the control of the Pnom Penh regime to be
extended but they also consolidated the hostility
of the ASEAN countries to Vietnam which has
still not managed to have this r6gime recognised
by the United Nations. This is one of the many
points on which the positions of the Western
European countries are very close to those of
China, since they all consider the withdrawal of
Vietnamese forces to be the condition for the
restoration of peace in Cambodia.
60. A consequence of this matter has been to
force China to keep a large force along the Viet-
namese frontier, where there are continual
skirmishes, although past incidents at the time
of the offensive in Eastern Cambodia encour-
aged Beijing to be cautious in bringing pressure
to bear on Vietnam. Furthermore, disputes
about control over the P'eng-hu Lieh-tao Islands
compel China to keep naval forces in the South
China Sea and reduces its means of action
vis-d-vis Taiwan. But Beijing's only condition
for restoring normal relations with Vietnam is
the evacuation of Cambodia.
61. Recent information indicates that the
Cambodian resistance movement had some
success during the summer of 1985. Further-
more, the government in Hanoi has undertaken
to evacuate Cambodia before 1990. Although
the Chinese authorities seem to have only very
limited confidence in these promises, there have
been clear signs of d6tente in Sino-Vietnamese
relations in recent months. There is little doubt
that the Soviet Union for its part is encouraging
d6tente between the two countries.
62. China seems to have few illusions about
the concessions it can expect from the Soviet
Union in regard to its other two conditions for
the re-establishment of normal relations. It is
even afraid that the development of Soviet-
American'talks on Euromissiles may lead to a
greater concentration of soviet nuclear arna-
ments along its western frontier as Mr. Gromyko
proposed in his speech in Bonn on lTth January
l 983.
63. It gives the Afghan question only third
place in its list of claims on the Soviet Union,
although the Chinese leaders consider the Soviet
operation to be an imperialist one and that its
true aim is to allow the Soviet Union to have
access to the southern oceans. China aflirms its
support for the Afghan resistance movement,
lrt bearing in mind that the Sino-Afghanfrontier is in a very inaccessible region, thai the
roads leading from Afghanistan to China are
controlled by the Soviet Union, that China
affords the Afghan resistance movement very
little support and that there are very few Afghan
refugees in China, it can be seen that China does
not consider Afghanistan to be an area vital for
its security.
64. The frontiers between China and the
Soviet Union have raised serious problems and
caused several armed conflicts in recent
decades. During the second half of the nine-
teenth century, tsarist Russia extended its terri-
tory in Central Asia and the Far East at the
expense of the Chinese empire, prevented by its
weakness from defending its territory effect-ively. The 1860 Beijing treaty ratified a Ae
facto situation which was favourable to Russia
but the latter continued its expansionist policy
and in 1884 a second treaty recognised thl
annexation of 440,000 sq.km. of territory which
had hitherto been Chinese. In all, these twotreaties deprived China of 540,000
sq.km. They did not put an end to Russian and
subsequently Soviet encroachment which in
1949 took in a further 30,000 sq.km. More-
over, the state of Mongolia was set up at the
expense of the Chinese empire. These annexa-
tions were often obtained when frontiers were
fixed unilaterally on the spot by the Russians
under the treaties which the Chinese called
unequal. Their government was unable to exer-
cise its right to take part in fixing frontiers or to
defend lines which had already been fixed and
which were moved unilaterally by the Russians.
Only after the end of the Korean war did
China start to take serious defensive action
against this steady encroachment, but it did not
always have the upper hand.
65. Nevertheless, China and the Soviet Union
have achieved a relatively stable frontier. Its
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length and the fact that it crosses desert and
often mountainous regions inhabited by nomad
shepherds of the same ethnic origins on both
sides cause frequent incidents but, on the
Chinese side at least, there seems to be no wish
to allow them to degenerate into hostilities.
Members of the Presidential Committee had the
impression that China was not applying its birth
control legislation to Sin Kiang but that its
policy was, on the contrary, aimed at strength-
ening national minorities.
66. China now seems to be showing great
moderation in this matter. It is anxious to
restore normal relations 
- 
which of course does
not mean privileged - with the Soviet Union
and is trying to reach an agreement which might
be based on the 1860 and 1884 treaties, i.e. to fix
frontiers accurately by recovering territories
acquired by the Soviet Union without this being
confirmed by treaty. Should there be restitu-
tion, China would agree to negotiations based on
the principle of reciprocal compensation. It
would be prepared to give up its right to terri-
tories acquired by the Soviet Union on the basis
of treaties only on condition that the Soviet
Union recognises that these were unequal
treaties because of the failings of the Chinese
empire at the time they were concluded and
implemented. This is a very ambiguous requir-
ement since the notion of unequal treaty has no
legal meaning and there is little doubt that by
using it China is looking to the future. It is not
therefore surprising that so far the Soviet Union
has not been very receptive towards these propo-
sals, but there are signs that Mr. Gorbachev's
government might be more flexible than its
predecessors.
67. It is evident that Europe has no reason to
take umbrage at a reconciliation between China
and the Soviet Union which would not jeopard-
ise the independence of China's policy whether
at home or abroad. It would be absurd to place
China before a choice between East and West
which it does not want and cannot make for
reasons both of internal stability and external
policy, not the least aspect of which is continued
American support for Taiwan. For all these
reasons, your Rapporteurs wish to warn against
a too hasty and unduly negative western reaction
in the event of China developing its relations
with the Soviet Union in the coming years, as
seems likely.
68. Relations between China and the western
countries have in fact continued to develop since
1983. Similarly, Sino-American relations have
improved although, in spite of the visit by Zhao
Ziyang, Chinese Prime Minister, to the United
States in 1984, they have not taken a decisive
turn. The dispute between the two countries
relates first to the Taiwan relations acr which the
Chinese Government thought jeopardised the
advantages it expected to derive from the
resumption of diplomatic relations with the
United States on its renunciation of the
two-China doctrine. American slowness in
applying the decision to reduce arms deliveries
to Taiwan and stubborn opposition to the
delivery of high-technology products to China,
particularly large-capacity computers because
they might be used for military purposes, still
cause sharp discontent in Beijing.
69. The Taiwan question is far rnore delicate
because the government in T'ai-pei is not
prepared to recognise China's sovereignty over
the island and continues to claim to be the only
legitimate government of the whole of China.
It has refused to negotiate with Beijing on
Taiwan's possible return to China. The
Chinese Government has to face the fact that if
the future of Taiwan is not settled in the next ten
years its return to China will bscome increa-
singly problematical owing to diflbrences in the
evolution of mainland China and of the
island. It has moreover never excluded the
possibility of using military moans to bring
Taiwan back under Chinese sovereignty
although, since 1979, it has stopped bombing
Taiwan's dependent islands which are close to
the Chinese coast and now speaks of reunifying
the two parts of China rather than liberating the
island. In fact, it is now using peaceful means
to defend its cause but it does not want renun-
ciation of the use of force to make the authori-
ties in Formosa even more unyielding.
70. Since 1979, there have been repeated
offers, particularly after the agreement on Hong
Kong, to hold negotiations between Guo Min
Dang and the Chinese Communirst Party. The
purpose would be to make Taiwan an adminis-
tratiye region with a special statute allowing the
inhabitants of Taiwan to take part in running the
central state and allowing them [o retain inde-
pendent jurisdiction, armed forces, administra-
tion and even their own intellitence network.
They would retain their freedom in budgetary,
fiscal and foreign trade matters. They would be
free to travel, even in mainlatrd China, and
their property and economic syptem would be
respected.
71. So far, the Taiwan authorities have prefer-
red to consider offers from Beijing as mere pro-
paganda, arguing that uncertainty about the
future of the Chinese regime meant that the
word of its present leaders might not hold in the
future and that they could not recognise its
liberalisation because of the inadequacy of the
reforms introduced. Their re4sons are of a
domestic nature: the per capita gross national
product is ten times higher in Taiwan than on
the mainland, making reunificati,on unattractive,
and the Formosans are showing some reaction
against Chinese immigrants. In spite of the
growing part played by the original inhabitants
of Taiwan in Guo Min Dang's government, an
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independence movement is emerying in the
island. Finally, they know that although the
military balance is not in their favour, China
cannot, with impunity, remove troops from its
frontiers, particularly in the south and west, for
an operation against Taiwan, and the United
States Taiwan relations act of 10th April 1979
guarantees American support for the island's
authorities. As emphatically recalled by Zhao
Ziyang during his visit to the United States in
January 1984, Beijing considers this act contrary
to international law and is insisting that it be
repealed.
72. Beijing's policy towards Taiwan is there-
fore still marking time. The most it can do is
firmly reject the two-China doctrine, endeavour
to have Taiwan expelled from the last inter-
national organisations where it still occupies its
place and forbid all its partners to maintain
diplomatic relations with Taiwan and supply it
with weapons. Even the United States Govern-
ment has undertaken to reduce progressively its
supplies of arms to Taiwan and since the
incident provoked by the sale of two Nether-
Iands submarines in 1980, relations between the
Netherlands and China have returned to normal,
the other Western European countries refraining
from supplying arms to Taiwan.
73. In the eyes of the Chinese Government
the Taiwan question is therefore far from solved
and is a fairly heavy drag on its foreign and
defence policies. It is quite obvioui that
remaining on good terms with China means
pursuing a cautions policy towards Taiwan
although Europe has active trade with the
island. When questioned by members of the
Presidential Committee, moreover, the Chinese
authorities did not deny that the People's
Republic of China too was trading with Taiwan,
although, it was affrrmed, on a small scale.
74. Even easier are China's relations with
Japan on the one hand and with the Western
European countries on the other. Japan is
naturally still the leading supplier of equipment
to China, but China's concern not to become
unduly dependent on a supplier, customer or
possibly creditor who plays too large a part in
Chinese affairs is in fact making the Beijing
Government try to develop its trade with the
West and also with its Far Eastern neighbour,
which is obviously very well-placed for penetra-
ting the Chinese market, but it is a[ a dis-
adv_antage because of certain disputes dating
back to the Sino-Japanese war and fear of ii
occupying, by peaceful means, the positions it
occupied prior to 1945. In 1983, prime
Minister Zhao Ziyang impressed upon the
General Affairs Committee the importance he
attached to co-operation between China and
Europe and indeed he and the Chinese Govern-
ment have made repeated visits to Western
Europe and North America and received a
number of leaders from Western European
countries in 1984, such as Chancellor Kohl,
Mrs. Thatcher, Juan Carlos, King of Spain, and
Mr. Eanes, President of Portugal, not to speak
of many third-world leaders, whereas the bnly
ranking leader ofthe Soviet bloc received durin!
that year was Mr. Arkhipov, Deputy prime
Minister of the Soviet Union.
7_5. Developments in the Hong Kong and
Cambodian questions have facilitated relations
with Western Europe, whose only dilliculties
perhaps stem from the application of Cocom
rules banning the delivery of certain equipmentto the eastern countries. The European
members of the Atlantic Alliance must seek to
rgmov-e as quickly as possible the remaining
obstacles to trade with a country which there ii
no reason to assimilate with the Soviet Union's
allies, whatever its economic, social and political
options may be.
76. The Chinese Government had a major
success when it signed a joint declaration with
the United Kingdom on the future status of
Hong Kong. This was of no mean impofiance
since, although the territory in question is small,
its economic activity is considerable. The main
question was what kind of regime would be
applied after its return to China. To a certain
extent, the attitude adopted by China's partners
in a far more serious matter, that of Taiwan, will
depend on the establishment of a regime actop-
table to the population of Hong Kong and to
international society as a whole.
77. While the United Kingdom was prepared
to accept the return of the entire territory of
Hong Kong to the sovereignty of the People's
Republic of China, it was anxious to ensure
that it retained economic freedom and a certain
degree of political independence, and China
agreed to negotiate on that basis, as summed up
in the slogan " one country, two regimes " which
allowed an agreement to be signed on lgth
December 1984 to the satisfaction of bothpafties. In this matter, China was most uncom-
promising about the question of sovereignty but
extremely moderate in the pressure it exercised
to this end, since it tried neither to cause trouble
nor to isolate the British colony in order to reach
a solution more in conformity with its views on
economic management. Finally, the status of
Hong Kong should leave it a broad degree of
independence and allow it to remain a ltading
commercial centre and China's gateway to the
rest of the world.
78. Naturally, when this agreement was an-
nounced there were reactions, albeit limited,
from individuals and firms which had investedin Hong Kong. The territory has remained
active and there are signs, including widespread
building in housing, ports and industry, that
business has resumed and that confidence in the
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future is still strong. The Shenzhen economic
area on the People's Republic of China side of
the Hong Kong frontier has developed consider-
ably. Ittrades with Hong Kong on a large scale'
and the Hong Kong dollar is used there on the
same basis as the Chinese yuan.
79. This steady progress in relations between
China and Western Europe was demonstrated by
the signature in Brussels on 21st May 1985 of a
trade - cooperation agreement between the
People's Republic of China and the European
Community, represented by the Chairman-in-
Oflice of iis Council, Mr. Andreotti. The ofli-
cial communiqu6, issued by both parties,
summed up the agreement as follows:
" Of the main provisions of the agree-
ment, the following should be noted:
(a) as regards trade, the agreement adopts
the provisions of the non-preferential
trade agreement concluded in 1978 for a
period of five years and renewed since
then from year to Year;
(b) as regards economic co'operation
(i) the agreement stiPulates that
wittrin the limits of their respective
competence, the two Parties will
develop economic co-operation in all
the spheres subject to common
accord. In this connection, it cites:
- 
industry and mining;
- 
agriculture, including agro-industry;
- 
science and technologY;
- energy;
. 
- transport and communications;
- 
environmental Protection;
- 
co-operation in third countries;
(ii) the agreement provides for the
encouragement of various forms of
industrial and technical co-operation,
such as joint Production and joint
ventures, the transfer of technology,
visits and the organisation of semi-
nars, technical assistance, including
the training of stalf, a continuous
exchange of information, etc.;
(iii) the agreement also contains pro-
vrslons armed at promoting invest-
ment and improving the favourable
investment climate;
(iv) the Community states, for its part,
that it is prepared, within the context
of its development aid actiYities,
within the means at its disposal and in
accordance with its rules, to continue
its development activities in China'
Thus, the Community intends to
continue its efforts, for example, in the
spheres of agriculture and energy in
the form, in particular, of technical
assistance, transfers of technology and
training activities.
(c) As in the 1978 agreement, a joint
committee is required to m4nage the new
agreement. Its tasks will be, in particular,
to examine means and new opportunities
of developing trade and economic co-
operation and to make recornmendations.
(d) The agreement is corlcluded for a
period of five years and may be tacitly
renewed from year to Year. "
80. If this ag.reement is compared with Zhao
Ziyang's statement to the General Aflairs Com-
mittee in 1983, it can be seen how far trade has
increased between Western Europe and the
People's Republic of China in dirbctions desired
by both the Chinese authorities ahd members of
the committee.
81. However, there still seem to be obstacles
to the development of relations between Europe
and the People's Republic of China. First is the
lack of balance in their trade relations. Wishing
to ensure a relative balance in its trade and
payments, China's partners in Europe are
prepared to sell it European products even
on most favourable terms. They are more
hesitant, however, about conclpding contracts
involving their firms with Chihbse firms which
are generally nationalised. !inal!v, relations
with -the People's Republic of China are very
unbalanced because Chinese pfoducts do not
easily find buyers on European rnarkets.
82. But the picture of China'g external policy-
would not be iomplete if limited to this list of
problems and relations. What seems far more
important is that China is really rin the process of
beComing a world power, which was 
-not so
appareniin 1983. Its diplomapy is active and
inireasing its representatives throughout the
world, particularly in third-worltd countries, and
it seems to be taking an active interest in the
problems of the Pacilic Ocean, not to speak of
Africa. It is making itself heand more than ever
before in the United Nations and other inter-
national organisations.
83. Its press is very active ahd shows a keen
interest in European questions jnrst as, moreover,
the European press gives an ever-growing place
to Chinese questions. Contaqts with Chinese
leaders of all ages, but in particular with the
younger ones, and at all levels of respo-nsibility,
even in the most remote provinces of western
China, convinced the members of the President-
ial Committee that everywhero there was a very
strong desire for an opening towards Europe.
ntthougtr Western Europe's interest in China
really exists, it has not yet bepn translated into
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an adequate economic effort, nor has enough
been done to become acquainted with the
country, its language and its civilisation.
YL Conclusions
84. The Presidential Committee's recent visit
to China allowed your Rapporteurs to obtain
much valuable information. It can first be seen
that relations between the People's Republic of
China and Western Europe have nevei been so
good or promising, particularly from an econo-
mic standpoint. Far from harming Europe's
interests or international peace, the growing
power of the Chinese state seems on the contrary
to be improving the balance of forces in the
world. Western Europe might use this fact as
basis for extending its dialogue with China topolitical and military matters relating to the
security of both parties and world peace.
85. But this is possible only on the condition
that Europe makes no mistake about what it
might expect from the People's Republic of
China, which has neither the means nor the
intention of forming part of an alliance to bring
threats or pressure to bear on the Soviet Unionfrom the other side. In spite of efforts to
modernise its weaponry its military power is
limited and will remain so for a long time to
come, its main purpose being to defend Chinese
territory. This course seems to guarantee that
the r6le China can play will be above all for
d6tente and the promotion of peace. It is
abundantly clear that the Chinese authorities
have absolutely no intention of taking joint mili-
tary action with the West nor do they wish to
upset the balance of trade further by the large-
scale procurement of weapons in the West.
86.. Again, it is evident that the convergences
which the Chinese Government likes to stress
between European views and its own are a fact,
particularly in regard to Asian affairs which are
still foremost among Chinese concerns. They
may be turned to advantage in the common
interest and for the promotion of international
peace if Europe supports the legitimate but
limited claims of the Chinese Government in
that area. For instance, however the situation
in Taiwan may develop, the Chinese in no way
expect Europe to break away from the United
States, being well aware of the r6le the latter
plays in the world balance and for the security of
Europe and China. But they seem to be hoping
that Europe will take steps to convince-th6
United States and the Taiwan authorities that
direct negotiations between the latter and the
government in Beijing are essential if a reason-
able political solution is to be found to this
matter.
87. The other remark your Rapporteurs wish
to make is that Europe has not made enough
effort to face a world in which China occupied aplace commensurate with its size, population
and brilliant culture. Chinese studies aie still a
matter for a small number of experts and the
Chinese language does not receive the attention
it deserves in education in Europe. At present,
the wish to establish contacts is urging the
Chinese to make a considerable effort to attowits 6lite to accede to western languages and
culture- But this opening will be satiifactory for
all only if European societies show greater
interest and make a more sustained effort.- Thisis not an area in which the WEU Council
exercises its responsibilities under the modified
Brus-sels Treaty, but it may be the responsibility
of the Assembly to remind the governments
represented there of this necessity.
134
Document 1035
Amendments I and 2
2nd Debember 1985
Developments in China and Eutopean security
AMENDMENTS I and 2r
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere
l. After paragtaph 0A of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph:
.. Concerned by the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan where civilians are still being
massacred, ".
2. In paragraph 3(i, of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " the Chinese language and
culture " and insert " Chinese culture ".
Signed: Cavaliere
l. See lfth sitting, 4th December 1985 (amendment I agreed to; amendment 2 negatived).
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WEU and the strategic defence initiative 
-guidelines drawnfrom the colloquy on the
space challenge for Europe(Proposals)
REPORT 1
submitted on behalf of the
committee oy s_c1enyific, Technologicir altd Aerospace euestions 2by Mr. Lenzer, Chairman and Rappoieur -
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Draft Recommendation
n WEU and the strategic delence initiative -
guidelines druwnfrom the colloquy on the
space challenge for Europe
The Assembly,
(i) Considering that it is now time to give new emphasis to a balanced, jointly-agreed European
space policy and welcoming the decisions reached by the Ministerial Council of the European Space
Agency in Rome on 30th and 31st January 1985;
(iil Aware of the need to develop markets, within Europe and worldwide, which will pnsure econo-
mic returns from the large sums expended on space programmes;
(iii) Noting that applications of space operations, for instance in telecommunications and meteoro-
logy, are hampered by over-nationalistic-minded governmental administrations and institutional
monopolies;
(iv) Considering the recognised benefits for mankind of the utilisation of space;
(v) Considering the need to promote the manufacture in space of new products in the sectors of
pharmacy, biotechnology, electronics and new materials;
(vi) Considering that Arianespace is an example of successful marketing of space services;
(viil Considering also that European space industry is far more scattered and less ra(ionalised than
American industry, resulting in over-equipment and excess capacity, which will raise seflous problems
if the prospect of market stagnation is confirmed;
(viii) Considering that Europe cannot remain in the van of space development if it fails to tackle the
problems of a permanently-manned space station;
I
' (ix) Considering that the civil and military space budgets of the United States and the Soviet Union
are almost seven times larger than the space budgets of the Western European countries;
(x) Considering that Europe cannot therefore remain outside joint space defence progmmmes;
(xi) Welcoming the establishment of the new space agency in Italy and the new sptde centre in the
United Kingdom which are to promote joint European civil and military space activities,
RecouurNos rnar tre Cor.lNcrI-
Urge member governments:
I . To consider the adoption of a coherent space programme, composed of two main elements: parti-
cipation in the American space station and further development of the European laqncher system -
Ariane-5 with the HM-60 engine 
- 
leading to an independent European manned transpqrtation system;
2. To help the European aerospace industry to start a necessary period ofreorgani$ation to ensure
its independence and competitivity in the international market;
3. To define the co-operative framework in which the defence aspects of European space activities
can be discussed and determined;
4. To accept non-aggressive applications of military space technology such as communications,
surveillance, navigation and the use of satellites for crisis management and treaty verification to
strengthen strategic stability in relations between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries as indicated in the
NATO statement of 8th January 1985;
5. To pursue jointly research on a European anti-missile system independently or a$ part of SDI.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mn Lcaler, Chairman and Rapporteur)
I.Infioduction
1. In its original programme of work the
committee had decided that it would follow the
traditional pattern and call its report on the
colloquy held in Munich from lSth to 20th Sep-
tember 1985 * guidelines drawn from the collo-
quy on the space challenge for Europe ". How-
ever, the Presidential Committee decided that a
wide-ranging debate on the strategic defence ini-
tiative (SDI) should be held at the 1985 Decem-
ber session. The committee has therefore
decided to accept the Presidential Committee's
decision to link its report on the colloquy with
the WEU position on SDI.
2. In the Rome declaration of 27th October
1984, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and
Defence of the WEU member countries under-
lined the need for Western Europe to make the
optimum use of existing industrial military
resources through increased co-operation; WEU
should provide the framework for organising co-
operation in armaments.
3. The reactivation of WEU meant that it
would play a major political role in allowing the
European members of the alliance to compare
their views on the principal aspects of their
security and defence policies. WEU is a mili-
tary-political organisation, and it should help to
further European unity by political means.
4. Following this line of thinking and action,
the committee has stressed time and again that
Europe must preserve an independent European
capability in space affairs.
5. In his welcoming address to the colloquy
in Munich, the Minister President of the Free
State of Bavaria, Dr. Franz-Josef Strauss, stres-
sed that Europe was able to hold its own in all
sectors of technology such as engine manufac-
turing, aircraft construction, missiles, electronics
and many other areas as long as Europeans
worked together and avoided divergencies.
6. In the European aerospace industry,
research and development on all future techno-
logies is being conducted at a very high level for
the benefit of all industry. This is one reason
why it is so important for Europe not to leave
aerospace to other countries but to play its own
part in full. It should not be unduly influenced
by others and should try to compete with the
Iarge American aerospace industry sectors and
not accept a position ofsubcontractor.
7. Ever since the committee organised its
first colloquy in 1973, it has emphasised that
European security depends inter alia on the
development of its own aerospace technology
and that it should face up to the technological
challenge of the United States.
8. At its second colloquy in 1976, it conclud-
ed that Europe should conquer its own place in
the world market of aerospace products. Three
years later, at its colloquy in Brussels, the
conclusion it reached was that the cost and time-
span of modern aerospace programmes were so
great that Europe should harmonise its require-
ments and efforts and, in 1982, that internatio-
nal aeronautical consortia should be established
by governments and industries, to assure effec-
tive co-operation.
9. Although earlier colloquies placed strong
emphasis on the industrial and civil aspects of
aerospace programmes, the committee never lost
sight of the military use of space which was also
one of its main interests from the very outset.
10. In 1984, it adopted two reports on the
military use of space, both submitted by
Mr. Wilkinson and both commented upon by
the Ministerial Council of WEU, which was of
the opinion that the problem of the military use
of space was a particularly appropriate and topi-
cal subject for discussion and analysis. Of
course because of the unanimity rule the Council
did not go into geat detail and, in its replies
communicated to the Assembly on27th Novem-
ber 1984 to the recommendations on the mili-
tary use ofspace, it stated that the existence and
potential development of anti-satellite systems
would pose a problem of immediate concern and
development in the field of anti-ballistic missiles
and raise new questions about the future rela-
tionship between offensive systems and anti-
ballistic missile technology. Furthermore, it
pointed to the implications of the 1967 outer
space treaty.
I l. The Council acknowledged that the Euro-
pean space industry is a reality, that its achieve-
ments are considerable and that its potential is
significant. Furthermore, Europe's internatio-
nal influence, and to some extent its security,
will in the long term depend on the position it
will occupy in space activities.
12. Our committee therefore established a
programme for this colloquy inviting the poli-
tical leaders ofour countries to indicate the pro-
blems and policies from a national and Euro-
pean point of view. It invited the industrial
representatiyes to give their views on Europe's
attitude towards space iqdustrial policy and
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asked the representatives of international organi-
sations to indicate the needs and activities of
their organisations for the promotion of the
European position inside and outside Europe.
The purpose of the colloquy was to analyse the
space challenge for Europe and therefore allow it
to obtain a better knowledge of the facts and pro-
blems which were to be discussed in the Assem-
bly. The aerospace policies of the member
countries, their international aspects, the exploi-
tation and commercialisation of space know-
how and, finally, the strategic defence initiative
and European technical co-operation with regard
to this United States initiative are all of great
interest to the Assembly.
II. The aerospace policies
of the member countries
13. In conveying details about the policies of
the member countries, your Rapporteur is able
to make use of the addresses of ministers and
secretaries of state who were kind enough to
attend the colloquy in Munich and give their
views on national and European space policies.
14. In this report your Rapporteur will follow
closely the progpamme of the colloquy as estab-
lished by its preparatory committee. He there-
fore can but start with a short description of his
own country's contribution r.
Federal Republic of Germany
15. The space policy of the Federal Republic
is based on three principles. First, intensive
participation in joint European programmes in
the framework of ESA; second, international co-
operation beyond Europe and especially trans-
atlantic co-operation with the United States;
third, supplementary national scientific and
technological activities.
16. To underline the importance of space
research and technology, it should be noted that
since 1962 the Federal Government has spent
more than DM 1l billion on this discipline. In
1985 DM 800 million is available to the Federal
Ministry for Research and Technology of which
DM 400 million is earmarked as the Federal
contribution to ESA, which is approximately
25% ofthe ESA budget.
17. In the national framework more than
300 multiannual projects are being implement-
ed; their cost is estimated at DM 1.2 billion of
which only 20% for national projects and 80%
for international co-operative programmes.
18. By 1990, government appropriations for
space will rise to more than DM 1.5 billion.
These sums cover about 2% of total research
and development expenditure in the Federal
Republic; in the next decade this ilill probably
reach 3%.
19. The most important projects with German
participation are Spacelab, Ariane, communica-
tion and data-transmission satellites, observa-
tion and meteorological satellites and finally
scientific satellites.
20. The large-scale financial effort to develop
space technology for the future will be worth
while only if success is also achieved in deve-
loping markets which assure an economic return
on the expensive space prog.ramme in terms of
increased employment and income.
21. The applications of space operations in
telecommunications and earth observation by
weather satellites for example would not have
come about without action by governments and
parliaments, or perhaps not at such an eaily
stage. It will be possible to finance their further
development however when large pnough mar-
kets develop to generate funds for these services.
22. New markets for space application are
coming into view. It has been proved that the
space environment, in particular microgravity,
facilitates the development and, to a certain
extent, even the manufacturing of new products
in the areas ofphannacy, biotechnology, electro-
nics and new materials.
23. The {irst Spacelab mission cqmmanded by
the Federal Republic will include sgventy further
experiments. Europe will therefole be able to
improve its know-how for the industrial exploi-
tation of space in the field of microgravity.
24. American and Japanese cdmpanies are
already investing in this market. Europe is still
hesitant about using the new technologies and.
further initiatives by user industries are neces-
sary for Europe not to fall behind the United
States and Japan in applying spaqe technology.
The establishment of Arianespace is an exam-
ple of successful marketing of spacp services on ajoint European initiative based oh market eco-
nomic principles. The order bopk of Ariane-
space now includes almost thirty lnunches repre-
senting some DM 3 billion.
France
25. From the very start of space activities, the
French Government has been most active in
promoting European space collaboration. After
the Diamond series of launchers it advocated
space Europe, understanding full well that to
gain a strong position in this area Europe had to
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make a unified effort in order to be independent
of the two superpowers.
26. It recognises that the space sector is domi-
nated by the United States and the Soviet
Union, the only nations with a full and ambi
tious military space programme. For instance,
the Soviet Union conducts about a hundred
launchings ayear and the Europeans only a few
each year.
27. In the United States, total civil and mili-
tary space budgets are almost seven times gireater
than space expenditure by the European coun-
tries. Europe has nevertheless gained a strong
position in several essential areas.
28. Apart from its launching capabilities, it
occupies a prominent position in application
satellites, which it can both build and operate;
Meteosat exists. Europe has a communications
satellite system operated by Eutelsat, the Franco-
German Symphonie communications satellite
and Franco-German television satellites. The
French Spot programme, in which Belgium and
Sweden are taking part, looks very promising for
civil earth observation.
29. Europe is well placed in space sciences.
30. In the near future however this rosy pic-
ture might change if Europe fails to come to
grips with the problems of a pennanently-
manned space station.
31. Europe will have to face up to this funda-
mental change, which implies a coherent man-
ned space programme composed of two main
elements: participation in the American space
station and a transportation system which will
include the Hermes spacecraft.
32. None of this however will be enough as
long as Europe keeps away from military space
activities. It therefore has to take up the civil
and economic space challenge, match the pro-
gress of new competitors such as Japan and
broach the second challenge, a military, political
and security one, which also requires an answer
from the European countries as a matter of
particular urgency since, with a few rare excep-
tions such as the military communications satel-
lites of the United Kingdom and France, Europeis totally absent from space defence pro-
grammes.
33. France is determined to play a leading
international role in Europe's technological revi-
val, particularly in the launching of major new
space activities.
Italy
34. With several other countries Italy is in
favour of a feasibility study of the French
Hermes project and hopes that in the future this
will become a European programme. Italy
believes it is now time to revitalise and give new
emphasis to the European space policy. For
that reason the Italian Government has accepted
a draft law on the establishment of an Italian
space agency. The real purpose of this agency
would be to provide Italy with a powerful agency
to bring the Italian space programme as well as
the international programme to a successful
conclusion.
35. Italy is planning to increase considerably
its participation in the European Space Agency.
At the same time, it hopes that Italian influence
in the agency will increase in step with
its financial contribution. The agency will be
the instrument enabling the Minister for
Research and Technology to implement govern-
ment decisions on space and it will have to
verify the results achieved.
36. The Italian programme calls for long-term
negotiation with the United States based on the
principle of equal partnership. The first pro-
gramme to which this should apply is the pro-
duction and management of the first space sta-
tion. This is considered to be extremely impor-
tant because if Europe fails to agree with the
United States in this first programme it mlght
well miss future opportunities.
United Kingdom
37. Like Italy, the United Kingdom too has
recently established a single focal point to which
the government can turn for advice and techni-
cal support for its space policy. The British
national space centre should promote the deve-
lopment of space technology in the United King-
dom and improve the use of public resources.
For this reason industry was invited to play a
major r6le in the new national space centre.
This centre emphasises the government's com-
mitment to the development of space technology
for industrial, scientific and defence purposes.
38. ESA will remain the cornerstone of British
civil space activities and the United Kingdom
will continue to play a major r6le in ESA's
future activities.
39. The aim of the government is to ensure
the best use of available technology and avoid
waste through unnecessary duplication of effort.
It will also seek to pursue several space efforts
concurrently. The centre should enable the
easy transfer of the results of publicly-funded
research into the civilian economy.
40. The government recognises that there are
hazards, for example in the competition that
may arise for resources and technical talents bet-
ween very different kinds of activity, but it still
thinks the effort well worth making.
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41. The centre should provide a single focus
for space research and development in support
of government and the private sector.
42. In the applications field, communications
satellites have been of great importance and now
broadcast satellites are being launched. The
United Kingdom is the largest user of satellite
capacity in Europe with half a dozen United
Kingdom television channels beaming into cable
heads and hotels throughout Europe.
43. In 1986 the first British astronaut will be
flying in space and that year will also see the
launching of the Hubble space telescope.
44. On the future space station, important
questions of technology transfer and terms of
access will have to be discussed with the Ameri-
can authorities.
45. The United Kingdom wants a balanced
space programme which could be explained as
an equilibrium between activities such as the
development of launchers, manned space vehi-
cles and space station activities, which are the
means of conducting space research leading to
the achievement of more effective space
services.
I I I. International aspects
46. Space is inherently open and without
boundaries. The committee has often empha-
sised this in discussions with the WEU Council.
Co-operation across national borders in Europe
is a necessity but not the only reason why the
Western European nations should collaborate in
space. Space is also expensive and requires a
high level of technical effort and well-trained
manpower. This was also recognised during the
meeting of the ESA Council of Ministers in
Rome on 30th and 3lst January 1985. They
agreed to a long-tern progrcmme which may be
summarised as follows:
- 
science: this is a mandatory program-
me. The Council decided to increase it
9v Sm per annum until 1989 - the first
rncrease ln more than a decade;
- 
earth resources: in addition to the ERS-I
satellite due for launch in 1989, an earth
observation preparatory Programme
(EOPP) was approved, the aim of which
is to develop the subsequent mission in
this field;
- 
microgravity: to prepare for the future
utilisation of microgravity in space and,
in a first phase, to promote fundamental
life science and material science
research;
- 
telecommunications: the nelw program-
me provides, after the launch of the
Olympus satellite (large experimental
direct-broadcast satellite) for in-orbit
demonstration missions for new techni-
ques, a direct-relay satellite (similar to
NASA's TDRS), and possibly a naviga-
tion satellite;
- 
launchers: it was decided to develop
Ariane-S (see below), uslng a high-
power cryogenic engine, HM-60;
- 
in-orbit structure: the programme will
consist mainly of the development and
flight of the recoverable platform (laun-
ched with the United StCtes shuttle),
known as Eureca (not to be confused
with Eureka) and space station;
- 
there is also a technologyl programme
covering all general space technology,
platforms, in-orbit com,munications,
power supplies, etc;
- 
budget the total budget for 1985 is 970
MAU (million accounting units: one
AU is about $0.81). The 1990 budget is
planned to reach 1,650 MAU;
- 
by 1989, 52% of the budget will be
oriented towards infrastructure, and
48% will be mission-related expendi-
ture;
- 
personnel: the agency has an authorised
complement of 1,400 stafffor 1985.
47. The ministers thus voted fbr a balanced
programme to expand Europe's independent
capabilities and competitiveness in all sectors of
space activities. Your Rapporteur can point to
this even amidst those who doubt Europe's
potential for integration.
48. The development of Ariane and of a num-
ber of satellite projects with a myriad of applica-
tions for telecommunications and earth observa-
tion has served to establish the Europeans'
worldwide space reputation w[ich has been
reinforced by the successful Spagelab missions.
With the completion of development actiYities
on Spacelab and Ariane-4, the European aero-
space industry has attained a levol which allows
the committee to say that every technologically
feasible space project can now be carried out in
Europe. Europe's offering in space technology
is now part and parcel of the international
market.
Space station
49. It was therefore only logic4l for the Euro-
pean ministers to consider Preqident Reagan's
offer to participate in manned space travel.
The resolutions adopted in Rome by the ESA
t4l
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Council of Ministers on 3lst January 1985 were
the first response by Western Europe to the great
new challenges which the colloquy addressed.
By deciding to build the Columbus space station
and further develop Ariane into a heavy-payload
launch vehicle, Europe opened the door to
taking its place on the leading edge of space
development in the coming twenty years. This
not only presents a challenge to Europe's integra-
tion potential, it also challenges its capability in
terms of the much conjured technology transfer.
50. Europe's integration capability must prove
itself, for example, in the case of Columbus, in
the individual decisions to commission systems
management and system elements in the indus-
tries of ESA member states. As a rule, the dis-
tribution of ESA contracts is guided by the level
of the financial shares of the member countries.
This system should also be applied for large-
scale projects such as Columbus.
51. The capability for technology transfer
between the United States and Europe is also at
test.
52. Many Europeans still react with disbelief
and incomprehension when they receive reports
that individual United States agencies allegedly
attempt, out of lack of trust, to cut off European
engineers from the flow of information. These
agencies overlook the fact that the decisions to
co-operate in building a space station are based
on the political determination stemming from
the common interests of the western alliance.
But in working towards the objectives sought in
the Columbus programme an agreement bet-
ween all the participating governments should
be signed to reinforce that political determina-
tion and safeguard its implementation.
53. The space station is a logical extension of
the lessons and experiences of the last twenty-
five years. The move towards more widespread
and personalised services, the need for even
greater reliability and the finite capacity of the
orbital resource, all point to the need for larger,
more closely-integrated space systems such as
can be achieved oniy by man's intervention in
orbit, and the space station is to be the first step
on the road towards this objective.
54. But it is not only what the space station
will technically enable that will be important.
Equally important will be the effect the space
station will have in capturing the imagination of
the young and encouraging them to pursue high
technology careers upon which the continued
gxowth of the world as a whole depends. Suc-
cess in this area too will be an important mani-
festation of the bonds between the western
democracies. But co-operation implies genuine
partnership within Europe and between Europe
and the United States, for, although technically
successful, Spacelab as Europe's contribution to
the space shuttle programme has fallen some-
what short ofreal operational success, with ope-
rating costs and access arrangements making it
relatively unattractive to the customers for
whom it was intended. Europe does not want
to make this kind of mistake again.
55. ESA now has eighteen months of intensive
work in the definition stage of the space station
project which will determine mission, design and
cost details. In parallel, there will be detailed
governmental discussions to clarify the impor-
tant questions of technology transfer and terms
of access which will tre crucial to Europe joining
the building and operational phases. This
might be a mutually-beneficial co-operative pro-
gramme with an impact extending well into the
twenty-first century.
56. Following the January 1985 European
ministerial decision to proceed with the Colum-
bus programme, ESA and NASA concluded an
agreement which defines respective responsibi-
lities during the phase B definition and prelimi-
nary design period and which establishes a pro-
cess for making a number of key hardware deci-
sions involving the contributions of our partners
midway through phase B.
57. This agreement also sets the stage for a
long-term United States-European partnership
covering the development, construction, opera-
tion and utilisation phases of the space station
programme (that is phases C, D and E). While
formal negotiations on United States-European
co-operation during these phases have not yet
begun, a considerable number of efforts are
under way on both sides of the Atlantic to pre-
pare technically and politically for this process.
58. When the space station becomes operatio-
nal, people will be living and working in space
around the clock, 365 days a year, well into the
next century. The space station is also different
because it is evolutionary in character. The ini-
tial space station will have the built-in potential
for phased evolutionary development to meet
future requirements.
59. The space station will consist of a manned
base with accompanying unmanned platforms,
one of which will probably be in polar orbit for
earth observation purposes.
60. The space station will be a versatile and
effective facility, serving a diverse range of
functions. It will be:
- 
a laboratory in space for the conduct of
science as well as the development of
new technologies and related commer-
cial products;
- 
a permanent observatory, to look down
upon the earth and out into the
universe;
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- 
a servicing facility where payloads and
spacecraft are resupplied, maintained,
upgraded and, if necessary, repaired;
- 
a transportation centre where payloads
and vehicles are stationed, processed,
and propelled to their destinations;
- 
an assembly facility where, due to
ample time on orbit and the presence of
appropriate equipment, large structures
are put together and checked out;
- 
a manufacturing facility where human
resourcefulness and the servicing capa-
bility of the space station combine to
enhance commercial opportunities in
space;
- 
a storage depot where payloads and
parts are kept on orbit for subsequent
deployment; and
- 
a staging base for future endeavours in
space.
IY. Exploitation and commercialisation of
space know-how
61. There is no doubt that space will play an
increasing role in the economic and political
future of the entire planet. It will start becom-
ing preponderant with the installation of perma-
nently-manned platforms, i.e. in the last decade
of this century. Consequently, in view of the
potentialities of this new world which is to be
conquered and exploited, it can be said with
little risk of error that the fate of mankind will
soon be determined in space.
62. All investment in space, whether military
or civil, will thus be decisive and its economic
and political profitability guaranteed. But for
the time being only the United States and the
Soviet Union are in a position to exploit space
with all the military and civil consequences this
involves. Can Western Europe, the world's
third space power but whose space budget
cannot at present be compared with those of the
two superpowers, take up the most serious
challenge it has ever faced throughout its
history?
63. Bearing in mind, however, that Western
Europe's economic wealth amounts to 75% of
that of the United States and is greater than that
of the Soviet Union, and knowing Europe's
industrial and especially aeronautical traditions,
its space underdevelopment is surprising. It is
easier to explain when the market structure is
considered: half United States space expenditure
is of military origin and the same is certainly
true in the Soviet Union. In the rest of the
world, the proportion is a small one. Hence it
is clear that military competition between the
two great powers fostered their space develop-
ment. However, civil commercial applications
are far from negligible: a large-scale communica-
tions satellite market has developed in the
world; the meteorological and earth resources
observation satellite market is smaller; the direct
television satellite market is making a faltering
start. Apart from these military and commer-
cial markets, there is another one which might
be called one of prestige or sovereignty which
includes the American moon c.otrquest pro-
gramme, scientific satellites and thO space plat-
form programmes.
64. One of the main features of this market is
that it is largely captive, i.e. not subject to open
international competition. This is the case in
particular of military or civil programmes
financed by states, either directly or through the
intermediary of international agencies, to which
the law of fair return applies when these states
have an industrial space potential. This univer-
sally recognised and accepted principle has
logical but rather strange eflects in terms of
industrial coherence: in order to respond to a
call for bids, industrialists have to join in a
configuration similar to that of the customer. If
the call for bids is a national one, firms from the
same country keep together; an ad hoc industrial
consortium is set up if the customer is an inter-
national agency. The only notable exception to
this rule concerns space transport for which the
present shortage of means has lod to greater
market transparency. In its praotical applica-
tion to the western world, this mbans that the
American market is almost reservod for Ameri-
can firms, the European market i$ reserved for
European firms and for a joint international
agency such as Intelsat or Inmarsat a joint
consortium has to be set up. Within Europe
itself, the rules are identical: national associa-
tions if the programme is national, bilateral if
the programme is bilateral and iriternational if
the programme is international, like those
managed by the European Spaqe Agency or
Eutelsat. Open to general competition are the
markets of countries equipping themselves with
satellites and which have no space industry of
their own. Even in this case, industrial associa-
tions may be set up, either to bring in additional
know-how or to obtain a better political impact.
65. As for market trends, one thing now seems
certain, i.e. that military escalation between the
United States and the Soviet Un[on will speed
up, oflering American industry major possibili-
ties of technological and econgmic develop-
ment. The communications satellite market
seems finally to be growing less quickly than
expected for lack of solvent customers, whether
for communications proper or for television,
and should come into balance with that of cables
and in particular optical fibres; there is now an
overcapacity of satellites in orbit, Demand for
other commercial satellites will probably remain
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slight. There remain the major innovatory pro-
grammes for space stations and associated vehi-
cles which will give considerable impetus to
industrial development and lead to commercial
applications of microgravity.
66. It must be recognised that, thanks to the
political will of governments, the spirit of co-
operation which has prevailed and also the
competence and dynamism of the agencies and
industry, the results obtained have been quite
remarkable and the degree of independence
attained by Europe in space matters is already
considerable. Using Ariane, it is capable, for
itself and also for its customers, of launching
communications, meteorological, direct televi-
sion and earth resources observation satellites.
67. The standard of European products is no
lower than that of American products; on both
sides of the Atlantic there are sometimes diffi-
culties, or even setbacks, and the ability to over-
come them is equal.
68. However, precisely because of the law of
fair return, European industry is relatively far
more scattered than American industry and its
installation corresponds more to the political
will of the host countries than to industrial ratio-
nalisation. [t also leads to considerable over-
equipment. It would appear that at the presentjuncture and under present programmes there is
an excess capacity in the European space indus-
try which would raise serious problems if the
prospects of market stagnation were confirmed.
69. Our industry is therefore trying to export
its products; it has managed to do so for satellite
launching services by Ariane and also a commu-
nications system, but here it is encountering
direct American competition.
70. Progress in satellite telecommunications
has been remarkable and certainly was not fore-
seen on such a scale twenty-five years ago in
terms of numbers of spaceborne transponders,
i.e. radio transmission channels through satelli-
tes in geostationary orbit. In 1984, the total
annual amount spent on space activities in the
western hemisphere has been assessed as
approximately $20 billion, a considerable
gfowth from the zero point some twenty-five
years ago.
71. In 1965, the first Intelsat satellite carriedtwo transponders providing a capacity of
480 voice channels. This year's Intelsat satellite
can operate 45 transponders with more than
50,000 voice channels.
72. In Europe a family of telecommunications
satellites is now established totalling sixteen
satellites; the technology allowing television and
sound broadcast to be distributed directly to the
domestic user will require an extension of the
satellite network, which the Commission of the
EEC calls " television without frontiers ".
73. There appears to be a potential market for
satellite broadcast receivers of some 3 million
units for each of the larger member countries.
74. Exploitation of telecommunication satel-
lites in Europe will probably depend on the
approach adopted by institutional bodies, the
national PTTs. Much may depend on the
possible proliferation of independent operators.
75. Next to communications satellites should
be mentioned those operated by the internatio-
nal maritime satellite organisation, Inmarsat,
which was established to provide ship-to-shore
communications by satellite. Its member coun-
tries are Japan, Norway, the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom and the United States. A new
series of these satellites will come into service
from 1988 onwards.
76. Eutelsat operates the European communi-
cation satellite system, which your Rapporteur
will mention again further on.
77. Other application satellite programmes
are: a possible satellite navigation programme
with eighteen ship-to-shore and aircraft satel-
lites. However the present system in use seems
to be suflicient for the civilian user but no doubt
once the military have developed a more accu-
rate system this will also be used for civilian
purposes.
78. A system of application satellites already
established consists of meteorological and earth
observation satellites. ESA will develop and
launch the ERS-I. The technology involved
also has a very obvious military application.
79. Future potential for commercial space
activities lies in the possibility of manufacturing
products and substances in zero gravity condi-
tions. They include alloys, new types of glass,
magnetic materials, enzymes and pharmaceuti-
cals, to name but a few.
80. Commercial exploitation can however
only start with the advent of the space station.In this context the Eureca programme has
special relevance. t
Eureca
81. At the same time, ESA looks forward
increasingly to the first flight of the European
retrievable carrier (Eureca). Europe is provid-
ing the world with a " first " in the shape of
Eureca, because it seeks to combine the econo-
mic retrieval ability of the shuttle with the
demands of scientists for flights beyond the eight
or so days which the shuttle can give. Trans-
ported in the shuttle orbiter into low earth orbit,
the Eureca platform with its cargo of experi-
ments is launched and then boosted by its own
built-in propulsion unit to an altitude of about
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500 kilometres. At the end of each mission(typically six months) it will descend under its
own propulsion system and be recovered by the
shuttle and returned to earth. From 1988
onwards Eureca will be available, and ESA
believes that when its potential is realised it will
afford scientists a unique vehicle combining the
more desirable features of shuttle and satellite
flisht'
Eutelsat
82. The European telecommunication satellite
organisation has some twenty-six member coun-
tries and its convention entered into force on lst
September 1985. The organisation was set upjointly by the Western European countries on
the initiative of the PTTs. Two Eutelsat satel-
lites are now in operation; the second generation
of satellites is scheduled for 1989. The tele-
phony on Eutelsat satellites will become opera-
tional by early 1986. Two channels are in use
for television programmes within the framework
of Eurovision. Eutelsat is now studying addi-
tional uses and markets for existing services and
resources. A viable satellite system can offer
direct television broadcasting to millions of
households throughout Europe.
83. The political question to be answered is
whether the deregulation of telecommunication
services in Europe will be a sound economic
prospect for the development of telecommunica-
tion services throughout Europe.
Y, The sffategic defence initiative and
European co-operation
84. During the colloquy, many speakers refer-
red to the SDI in a political, military, industrial
or economic context. Some were for, others
against, but, most important, the ministers out-
lined the political positions of their respective
countries.
85. Your Rapporteur will revert to this after
first trying to define what SDI is really all about
at this particular juncture.
86. SDI is nominally a five-year research pro-
gramme on which the United States Department
of Defence plans to spend $26 billion by 1990.
However, the chances of obtaining this sum
within the expected period are slight. In the
current financial year, only $1.4 billion was
appropriated and, for the fiscal year starting in
OCtoU-er 1985, it seems likely that only $2.4 bil-
lion will be obtained instead of the $3.7 billion
requested. In spite of this reduced rate, it is a
large programme by anyone's standards. General
Abrahamson has been described as the only man
who has ever exceeded a limitless budget.
87. Not surprisingly, there is cqnsiderable
industrial interest in the programme, and
amongst the university institutes uoo. Apart
from the most important industriall contracts
seven main consortia have so far been formed to
address the principal areas of researoh to deve-
lop specific technologies.
88. Some small contracts have been, or are in
the process of being awarded to European
companies. Although welcome as a flow of
cash eastwards acrosi the Atlantic, it has aroused
the fear that the contracts would only be in spe-
cific areas where the United Stat$s felt that
Europe could usefully supplement the United
States'capacity and that it would not lead to any
worthwhile transfer of technology. General
Abrahamson was recently advocating the award
of contracts from his budget to allow European
contractors to address the strategic problems of
SDI from a European angle and to say what
additional areas of research might be appro-
priate. Before replies could be given, the
Eureka initiative occurred and the present posi-
tion seems to be that most Europeaq firms have
the green light to accept SDI contracts provided
that they keep their defence departments inform-
ed. The United States is almost certain to
want some more formal commitme4t from all or
some European states before there can be any
real participation. The United States probably
needs political support for the concept of the
programme more than its industry needs Euro-
pean aid. On the other hand, many European
firms have a real contribution to rqake in many
of the principal areas. Most people in European
industry are very cautious at the moment in the
hope and expectation of clearer governmental
guidance.
89. Mr. Curien, French Minister of Research
and Technology, thought space adtivities were
necessary in Europe in a defence cdntext, first in
national frameworks and then in co-operative
frameworks which still had to be defined.
90. These activities should relate to non-
aggressive applications of space technology:
communications, gathering informltion, naviga-
tion, etc., which allow the defensiye potential of
present means to be maintained without becom-
ing involved in a new arms race.
91. Moreover, the value of using space for
security purposes goes far beyond d mere $owthin the potential of the armed forces: a good
knowledge of the world situation would allow
Europe to play a greater r6le on thd international
stage in times of crisis. The idea of using satel-
lites on an international basis for prisis manage-
ment and treaty verification might be followed
up, so that the European countries would be able
to form their own opinion on whether interna-
tional agreements were being respected, involv-
ing or not the superpowers. They could also act
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in full knowledge of the facts with a view to estab-
lishing stable relations between third-world
countries.
92. Over and above these traditional applica-
tions of,space technology for political and-mili-
tary purposes, which would certainly be of bene-fit to Europe, the American SDI and similar
efforts by the Soviet Union clearly raise the
question of Europe's attitude towards an anti-
ballistic progmmme with a strong space element.
France for its part considers that such a pro-
gramme can but revive the arms race and that itis therefore undesirable. The concept of an
absolutely impenetrable barrier is admittedly
attractive, but it is not certain that it is feasible
and the erection of a partial barrier could but
lead to a strengthening of offensive means.
93. While seeking to limit the extent and stra-
tegic consequences of the militarisation of space,
Europe cannot with impunity keep its distancefrom traditional military space activities.
Moreover, the necessary efforts to meet the mili-
tary space challenge and those corresponding to
the civil challenge will help each other. Strong
civil space technology, particularly in launchers,
is an essential basis for the early development of
defence applications. Sending men into space
moreover can but assist the security aim which
corresponds to the political and military chal-
lenge by making Europe appear as a great tech-
nological power. Implementation of space pro-
grammes needed in both the civil and the mili-
tary fields would moreover increase the pro-
gramme of work of the European space industry
and thereby increase its competitivity. It would
also be accompanied by advanced research and
development work whose results would improve
the qualitative performance of application satel-
lites and keep European industry in a competi-
tive position internationally.
94. By embarking upon a major space pro-
gramme, with both civil and defence compo-
nents, Europe is not only meeting the twofold
space challenge just mentioned. It is under-
taking activities which still stimulate the ener-
gies and abilities ofresearch centres, laboratories
and industry and it will give further impetus to
one of its main economic sectors, the aerospace
industry, generator of employment and exports.It is proposing an exaltir_rg theme to its techni-
cians, engineers, research workers and young
people as a whole. It is promoting research in
line with the technological renewal that is now
central to the concerns of the governments of
most European countries.
95. Mr. Timmermann, Seuetary of State for
Defence of the Federal Republic, underlined that
it should be borne in mind that considerable suc-
cess has been achieved by the European coun-
tries in using aerospace technology for civilian
purposes, also in competition with the United
States.
96. If these European activities were extended
to military applications, this would substantially
improve the cost-effectiveness of civilian Euro-
pean aerospace programmes.
97. Therefore, from an economic perspective
as well, it will be of vital importance for Europe
not to miss the train that will lead it to the tech-
nology of the twenty-first century if Europe does
not \Mish to fall back into an inferior position
vis-i-vis the United States and Japan.
98. The Secretary of State disagreed however
with the French Minister on European participa-
tion in the SDI. He was of the opinion that a
government-to-government accord should be
reached at the end ofthis year or early 1986.
99. It was of vital interest for the Federal
Republic to take part in the United States
research effort.
100. The main object of this American pro-
gramme is to explore space technologies and to
find ways and means of implementing a new
security concept 
- 
a concept which is no longer
exclusively aimed at deterring Soviet aggression
by the threat of nuclear retaliation but whose
aim it is to intercept and destroy strategic missi-
les and their warheads before they are able to
reach the territory of the United States and its
allies. One should not accept the easy slogan of
a " militarisation of outer space ".
l0l. On the one hand, space has already been
used for military purposes for many decades, for
instance by operating reconnaissance, early
warning and communications satellites, and by
testing anti-satellite weapons, ballistic missiles,
and anti-ballistic missile systems. Moreover, all
intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic
missiles and their warheads are nowadays cros-
sing space close to the earth.
102. On the other hand, it must be borne in
mind that many of the abovementioned weapon
systems contribute towards making peace safer
in the present political and strategic situation.
In particular, reconnaissance, early warning and
communications satellites are of vital impor-
tance for armaments control and crisis
management.
103. From this it follows that the use of spacefor defence purposes offers a wide range of
advantages, but President Reagan's strategic
defence initiative has opened up a new
dimension.
104. This, however, confronts the European
NATO partners with the challenge of entering
into a selective participation in the research and
development of new technologies that may
emerge in the future with a view to remaining
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able to pursue a constructive dialogue, at least
with the United States.
105. To what extent, and in which technolo-
gical fields German participation in SDI is feasi-
ble and necessary is the subject ofdetailed talks.
106. Europe cannot stand aside if the world
powers intensi$ their systematic efforts for a
military utilisation of space.
107. Therefore, we should jointly pursue consi-
derations on a European anti-missile system
which, either independently or as an element of
SDI, would open up space as a dimension of
defence.
108. This is all the more true if, as generally
expected, the use ofspace for defence purposes is
going to improve the chances of reducing the
danger ofwar.
109. Greater stability in the relations between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact may, for instance,
be achieved by improving early warning, track-
ing and surveillance capabilities with the aid of
satellite-based systems, and possibly also by
developing effective strategic systems reducing
the danger of successful enemy attack.
ll0. The NATO countries support the objec-
tives of the negotiations between the two world
powers as described in their joint statement of
8th January 1985, that is, " to preYent an anns
race in space and terminate it on earth, to limit
and reduce nuclear arms, and to strengthen stra-
tegic stability ".
111. AII of us have a vital interest in the
success of the Geneva negotiations because
research for the purposes of strategic defence
based on systems operating in outer space opens
up a new dimension of armament efforts -
efforts in which the Soviet Union is already acti-
vely involved.
ll2. As long as the military challenges posed
by the Soviets are still on the increase, we have
no alternative to keeping pace with them.
113. Viewed against this background, the Uni-
ted States research programme on SDI is one of
the efforts which are justified, politically neces-
sary and relevant to the security interests of the
Atlantic Alliance.
114. Mr. Pattie, United Kingdom Minister of
State for Industry and Information Technology,
was in agreement with the German Secretary of
State. The United Kingdom Government had
also accepted the invitation to participate in the
research phase ofthis technology.
I15. A programme with the size and complexi-
ty that SDI appears to have will bring a great
deal of civil spin-off from the research which
will have to be done.
I16. The United Kingdom will be looking for a
genuine co-operative r6le and a sfiraring of the
necessary technology rather than, as has happe-
ned sometimes in the past, providihg intellectual
capacity in the shape of scientists and engineers
from our universities and institutions - the
" brain drain ". Before any decisions are made
the government will need to know what is beirlg
proposed, who will be paying the bill, what will
be produced and where the work will be carried
out.
ll7. The ltalian Minister for Research and
Technology, Mr. Granelli, underlined the need
for a joint position on participation in the SDI
to be adopted by ttre member couhtries of West-
ern European Union.
118. Italian participation in the stage of
research into the possibility of implementing the
SDI project should not be interpfeted as antici-
pating the general political and strategic eflects
of operational decisions which all countries
consider premature and which the European
countries in particular will hhve to assess
carefully.
ll9. In Italy, the government is in the process
of defining itie tirnetaUle and cdnditions for a
commitment limited to reseafch which, at
government level, will have to determine ve_ry
ipecifrcally the various sectors, conditions for
cb-operation, rules for technological transfers
and relations with other nationpl or European
scientific and technological progtrammes such as
Eureka.
120. The positions of the various European
governmenti towards all these problems should
be guided by caution and flexibility. Where co-
operation with the Americans ls concerned, it
will be at least eight years befone we reach the
stage at which the SDI might be implemented
and all defensive systems reorganised at world
level.
l2l. It is therefore unacceptable to exclude as a
matter of principle participatiop in a common
research stage for space defence. But at the
same time we must reject any claim to move
automatically onto the implemdntation of a sys-
tem when we do not even kdow how it will
really work. It is moreover well known that
Italy, in this connection, considqrs the limits laid
down in the ABM treaty cannot be transgressed.
Industrial points of view
122. The basic point of 't ie* of the aerospace
industry may be summed up as follows:
123. Space technology cannot guarantee the
industrial future (no technology can do this), but
it is an important condition for the continuation
of the technically advanced Er:nopean industrial
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nations which lack natural resources. Further-
more, it may be concluded that any decoupling
of an industrial nation from space technology 
-
however motivated 
- 
involves serious national
risks, which logically stem from the need for
industrial nations to pursue seriously any possi-bility of technical progress such as space
technology.
124. The efforts and the resources that the
European industries have devoted to ESA space
technology developments have brought impor-
tant achievements and the generalised growth of
industrial capabilities.
125. The European industry has now to face
the new space challenge for the next fifteen years
and will be deeply involved in preparing and
carrying on the multifaced and most advanced
programme of the new space era in order to keep
in line with the technological boom of the future.
126. The result of the recent Rome conference
has shown an unexpected consensus ofEuropean
countries to participate in many challenging
projects.
127. In parallel with the major items of the
future such as Columbus, Ariane-5, Hermes,
ERS-I and so on, two new initiatives have been
triggered, one in the United States and the other
in Europe: SDI and Eureka.
128. The main development themes of the SDI
for space industries are: radar technologies and
space image radars; optical technologies and
space imaging lasers; boost and space surveil-
lance systems; new weapons;battle management
and communications; space power and logistics;
and robotics, while the five priority themes of
Eureka are: informatics (large and fast compu-
ter); robotics and artificial intelligence; commu-
nications (wide-band communications and com-
ponents); biology and new materials.
129. Your Rapporteur has listed the major
themes of the two initiatives to stress that the
projects are not opposed or to be seen as alterna-
tives. The Eureka project, designed according
to the financial resources Europe can mobilise,
consents important advanced technologies in
areas where a strong recovery is necessary. The
SDI project, through its size and lixed goals, can
be developed with the economic resources that
only the United States can offer.
130. Apart from political considerations, scien-
tific and technological collaboration between the
two shores of the Atlantic will become more and
more necessary for the common interest of the
western world and humanity.
131. For many of these themes European
industry has a good starting basis of exiitingjoint ventures and complementary experience,
but it should avoid a narrow, egoistic approach
and parochialism. Fruitful co-operation bet-
ween industries in a European and in an Atlantic
framework could help to create a common west-
ern space culture.
132. However, your Rapporteur will also indi-
cate some negative industrial aspects and first
with regard to the SDL Of course European
industry welcomes the proposal to take part in
the American SDI programme for the space
defence of the United States. The proposal has
raised high hopes because of the scope of the
programme announced. But Europeans must
not forget that there are constraints to a signifi-
cant movement of credit across the Atlantic,
i.e. on the one hand problems relating to mili-
tary secrecy will become increasingly strict as the
programme approaches the application stage
and, on the other hand, economic and social
requirements. Probably therefore the partici-
pation of European firms in the SDI programme
may not be a factor of substantial development.
133. At the same time, European space indus-
trialists, having obtained scientific and technical
results which are surprising if compared with the
resources at their disposal, should be aware that
the market they can reach is tending to shrink,
even if prestigious programmes are being
launched. Industrial overcapacity already
exists and will have to be absorbed. There is no
doubt that European firms will soon have to
embark upon a stage of necessary reorganisation
to ensure their survival.
Points ofview of scientists
134. The 23rd March 1983 proposal by Presi-
dent Reagan to build up a laser-weapon defen-
sive system by the end ofthe century spurred the
debate on the possible destabilising e{fects of
anti-satellite weapons. It did not, however,
introduce new concepts of anti-satellite systems,
which have already been under consideration for
a number of years. A conventional anti-ballis-
tic missile system (ABM) has been under deve-
lopment since the 1960s, both in the United
States and the Soviet Union. More sophisticat-
ed and innovative anti-satellite weapons (ASAT)
are now being designed and prototypes are about
to be tested.
135. Several diflerent issues are involved.
One concerns the feasibility of such systems.
Another is whether such systems, if and when
deployed, would provide suffrcient protection.A third concerns the human and financial
costs involved in research and development and
implementation. The fourth relates to the
question, already mentioned, whether such deve-
lopment would promote peace or on the
contrary provoke a further destabilisation. The
fifth and last concerns the consequences with
regard to the uses of space for socio-economic
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development in general and in developing coun-
tries in particular.
136. The Presidential speech supported the
over-optimistic views of some authorities that
engineers and scientists would be able to pro-
duce a technological fix to liberate the world
from the spectre of nuclear holocaust. Other
experts on the contrary provide ample evidence
that the feasibility of such systems on purely
theoretical grounds is rather doubtful at the
least.
137. Viewed against this background, one
could argue logically that funding research and
development for anti-satellite weaponry would
constitute sheer waste, not to speak of the costs
of their eventual deployment. This reasoning
carries etren more weight if one considers the
huge demand for highly qualified research staff,
technical personnel and funds needed for the
research and development alone. The costs for
deployment of such weaponry at the required
massive level to ensure some degree of protec-
tion would be really staggering. Even the vast
human and financial resources of the most
powerful industrialised nations would be heavily
taxed by such a development to the extent of
diverting much-needed resources from civilian
uses and improvement of human services.
138. A final argument against the deployment
of anti-satellite defensive systems, or in more
general terms against the militarisation of space,
is that it would curtail peaceful uses of space.
This would not only be a case of draining resour-
ces away from operational uses ofspace techno-
logy for socio-economic development and the
related research and development. It would
also claim a disproportionate part of the dimen-
sion " space " itself, which is not unlimited.
Furthermore it would hamper international co-
operation in space, without which peaceful uses
of space simply would not be viable, one of the
reasons being the increased distrust among the
" non-space " nations with regard to the inten-
tions of the space powers.
139. Finally your Rapporteur wants to mention
an opposite view by stating that three points
should be emphasised which seem essential.
First, WEU, but also Europe, must grasp the fact
that at present there is no longer any real major
technological obstacle to the development and
deployment of first-generation SDI systems.
They are within the reach of both the United
States and the Soviet Union. The decision is
therefore purely a political one. But it might
fundamentally upset the present balance, parti-
cularly for Europe. Second, no European coun-
try alone can carry out such an undertaking.
But Western Europe can. However, it has a
choice between doing nothing, co-operating with
the United States at the risk of becoming irrever-
sibly dependent and, finally, providing itself
with the means of acceding to independence. It
has the technological capability. Provided its
people are made aware of the real problems, the
financial means can be obtained. That too is a
political question. Third, whatever decision is
iaken, the technological and econlomic spin-off
will be considerable: more than t[rree thousand
patents exploited as a result of the $nollo moon-
conquest programme have repaild investment
more than ten times over, and th$re are several
thousand others still to be expldited. Europe
will or will not be present in this implacable
competition whose real stake is its place, and
perhips even its survival, in tile twenty-first
Century. This too is a political qqestion.
140. Perhaps for the first time in history, the
long-term repercussions are liable to be irreversi-
ble for Europe. Apart from the oonstraints and
pressure brought to bear on political leaders by
their o*n people and the various [nterest groups
of which they are composed, partt of their joint
task as Europeans should at least be to make the
community aware of the true pfoblems which
exist and above all ofthe fundam.qntal stakes.
YI. Conclasions
l4l. In its reply of 27th November 1984 to
Recommendation 410 on the rhilitary use of
space in the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson, the
Council pointed out that, with regard to the
implications of developments in space, opportu-
nities already existed in this field for European
industry. However, during the colloquy in
Munich which was a space forurtr to solicit opi-
nions from governments, industry, scientists and
parliamentarians on the long-range goals of
European space activities, it became quite clear
that there had been many successful develop-
ments in civil applications of space but the pre-
sent situation was giving rise to discontent and
anxiety.
142. This resulted mainly frorrr the following
factors: (i) F-uropean investment in space was
less than one-tenth that of the United States;(iil the European aerospace industry was too
scattered and had excess capacity; (iiy' the space
market could be widened only [f national mar-
kets became less protectionist; (iu/ a European
market required European standards; (v/ Euro-
pean industry was too slow in developing new
products to be manufactured in space; (vi) the
absence of a military space programme hampe-
red the European aerospace industry.
143. Governments of member countries should
realise that space is becoming more and more
important not only for scientists and industria-
lists but also for the general Public. European
institutional bodies tend to defend their mono-
polies and are very reluctant to develop new
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means in communications, television, etc., to
serve the general public.
144. Transport systems which were started
during the last century are subsidised with vast
sums of money which increase every year in all
member countries, whereas science and techno-
logy, and especially space budgets, are the first to
suffer from economic stagnation.
145. Space is inherently an international matter
and, for Western Europe, only joint action
makes sense, whereas separate national state
activities will not be able to give an adequate
response to the space challenge for Europe.
146. Turning to the military aspect, it should
be realised that the challenge of the Soviet
Union is still increasing and there is no alterna-
tive for Europe but to keep pace.
147. Military space programmes would of
course increase the programme of work of the
European space industries and thereby increase
their competitivity in the world market.
148. It is emphasised that in this context mili-
tary does not mean weapons. It means finan-
cial appropriations from defence budgets.
Many military uses of space such as communica-
tions, early warning and observation systems are
obtaining United Nations endorsement under
the heading ofactivities for peaceful purposes.
149. The committee has often proposed that in
the absence of a European military space stra-
tegy and of co-ordination for establishing Euro-
pean military space progxammes, the WEU
Ministerial Council should handle these matters.
150. The reactivation of WEU should induce
member governments to give a major political
r6le to the WEU Council and Assembly in defr-
ning the principal aspects ofsecurity and defence
policy with regard to European space questions.
l5l. SDI is not a space programme but a first
step in developing a new dimension in military
strategy. The use of space, satellites and mili-
tary hardware in space can be considered in the
same way as the introduction of military aircraft
in the early decade of this century. This intro-
duction completely revolutionised the science
and technology of warfare. Whether one
accepts this fourth dimension or not is of relati-
vely little importance as it will be impossible to
return to the status quo ante. One should not
forget that in the end it is man who decides
whether this research project will be used to
,improve or destroy life. This is true for space
developments and for technological develop-
ments in general.
152. The WEU Assembly could play a r6le in
promoting, if not a common point of view bet-
ween all partner countries, at least an under-
standing of the different political attitudes which
exist in governmental, industrial and scientific
circles. It should be realised that the conse-
quences of SDI research and development might
result in future developments of major impor-
tance for our economic and industrial well-being
with widespread civil applications.
153. Even ifEurope participates in the research
and development, it need not take subsequent
steps involving the stationing of hardware. It
might be another ten years before any decision
has to be taken on this aspect.
154. In the draft recommendation, the commit-
tee has urged member governments to adopt a
coherent space programme including a manned
space programme since Europe cannot remain in
the van of space developments if it fails to come
to grips with the problems of a permanently-
manned space station. This is also true if
Europe remains outside a joint space defence
progmmme.
155. To develop such a programme, however,
an adequate framework has to be agreed upon,
in which European space activities in a defence
context could be discussed, decided and
promoted.
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Programme of the colloquy, Munich, 18th-20th September 1985
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Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questibns
Mr. Martin GnUNen, MdB
Parliamentary Secreiary of State, Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, Co-prdinator for
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(The aerospace policy in Europe from the economic point of view)
Dr.-Ing. Othmar Husr
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Mr. Hubert CunlnN
French Minister for Research and Technology
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Mr. Luigi GnrNeLrt
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(Italy's space policy in the European framework)
Mr. Geoffrey PnrrIr
United Kingdom Minister of State for Industry and Information Technology
(The United Kingdom's space policy in the national and European framework)
Dr. Albert Pnossr, MdB
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Thursday, 19th SePtember 1985
9 a.m. Third sitting
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President of A6rosPatiale
(Europe's independence in space matters)
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11.30 a.m. Press conference
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Document 1036
Amendment I
WEU and the strategic defence initiative
Guidelines drawn from the collaquy on the
spoce challenge lor Europe(Proposals)
2nd December 1985
S i g ned : D r eyfus - S c h m i dt
AMENDMENT I 
'
tabled by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt
1. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.
l. See I lth sitting, 4th December l9E5 (amendment negatived).
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Amendments 2,31 41 5 and 6
3rd December 1985
IAEU and the strategic defence initiative
Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the
space challenge for EuroPe(Proposals)
AMENDMENTS 2,3,4,5 and 6t
tabled by Mn Gansel and others
on behalf of the Socialist Group
2. Leave out paragraph (x/ of the preamble to the draft recommendation.
3. In paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, lerave out " which are to promotejoint fur-opea-n iiuii a'"4 mihtary spac€ activities, " and insert " in so far as they are designed to pro-
mote joint European civil space activities ".
4. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.
5. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper,leave out " military ".
6. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph 6 as follows:
.,6. To give full support to development of a Eureka programme of which space technology
should be a part. "
Signed: Gansel, Millan, Miller, Stolfelen
1. See l lth sitting, 4th December 1985 (amendments negatived).
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Amendment 7
3rd December 1985
IVEU and the strategic defence initiative
Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the
space challenge for Europe(Proposals)
AMENDMENT 7 
'
tablcd by Mr. Bloauw
7. 
. 
In paragraph I of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " To consider the adoption of a
coherent space programme, composed of two main elements " and insert " To consider the adoption of
a coherent space progamme addressing all civil and military space activities and including space and
ground segments, with emphasis on two main elements: ".
Signed: Blaauw
l. See l lth sitting, 4th December 1985 (amendment nor moved).
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Document 1037 6th November 19E5
The European fighter aircraft for the nineties
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aetospace Questions2
by Mr. Wilkinson, RaPPorteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Norr or ACKNowLEDGMENT
DRAFI RECOMMENDATION
on the European hghter aircraft for the nineties
ExpmNntonv MEMoRANDUM
submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur
L lntroduction
II. The requirements
III. The individual national situations
- 
French air force
- 
French fleet air arm
- 
Italian air force
- 
German air force
- 
Royal Air Force
- 
Spanish air force
- 
The northern four - Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norwad
- 
Implications of the national requirements
- 
Industrial implications of a four-nation EFA without France
IV. Patterns of collaboration
V. Conclusions
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Meibers of the commiuee: Ml Lenzer (Chairmal),1 M.M. Wilkinson, l3ssinet (Vice-Chairmen);)'tlMl. Aarts:19."3::tf:t:
aoii, Ciliii",i,, fi.naroiii, -ionia, Ganeu,'Sir Paul Hiwkins (Alternate: Pgtrry), MM. Hengel, M-cGuir( (Alternate: sir John
tiiiiiO,-rti;r;;;Rirri;-S"diit,-5o"r,jt, sp,ri von Bullesieim, Mrs. Stails-Dompas, MM. vallei$ worrell (Alternate:
Tummers).
N.B. Tie names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics'
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Draft Recommendation
ol the Ewopean fightet aircralt for the aineties
The Assembly,
fi) Welcomine the decision of the Governments of the Federal Republic 
-of Germany, Italy, Spain
Liiro tt. u.itia {iriao1n to initiate the project definition of a common Eurofighter aircraft to meet the
operational requirerients of their air forces from the mid-1990s;
(ii) Understanding the reasons which led the Government of France to seek to 
-p-rocure an aircraft
UJsea on tfre Rafale lxperimental aircraft for the French air force and navy in the 1990s;
(iii) Mindful of the necessity for the members of the western alliance to utilise their resources for
defence as effectively as Possible;
(iv) Conscious of the calls for impr_oved ir,rteroperability and standardisation of equipment on the
iiulrt of-wiii.* Erropean Union mehber nations iepeatedly made by this Assembly;
h) Recalling the political impetus given to increased rationalisation and collaboration by- the-Euro-
ft" ;.ii,.;ffi ffi,[6l;t ih;'WEu-.olloqry on international aeronautical consortia in London in
l98l;
hi) Aware that such aircraft currently in service as the Jaguar, Alpha-Jet,Atlantic,Transall, and Tor-
Lilo" t i".'irril;-dilffitratio the iirdustrial, logistic and m.ilitary benefits.of collaborative !-t"j.Y
;i". 
"rd 
joint pr6cui.-.nt albeit with differing modes of collaboration and project management ln
each case;
(vit) Eager to reform governmental and industrial structures so as to harmonise 
"p:1ti"3t^f^1T::i".1"t.,-i5-o.din"t. 1s-eauipment timescales and choices and utilise industrial capacity oil a collabora-
tive basis within the WEU member countries;
hiii) Convinced that such reforms are increasingly urgent in order to meet Western Eurppels require-#;;r;;i;iili#'"'ii.ot uiriasonabte.osiund-'fo cimpete on more equal terms with United states
-an,rf"ctu.ers boih within the NATO market and worldwide;(ix) Believing that wEU and this Assembly in particular have a vital r6le in helping to overcome
national self-interesb 
""A1n. 
puro.hi"t potitiial impediments which stand in the way of western Euro-
;;;;ffi;t;tio, ofit. pioiute..nt and production of high technologv defence equipmenlt,
RecorrrrarNps rnar rne CouNcIL
Urge the member states to:
l. Ensure that the Independent European Programme Gloup issues regular repoits of its. pro-
iiedings to the ns"rnuiv oi-wEu in oroe? that melmbers of the Assembly may monitot more closely
the prdgress of Western European arrns co-operation;
2. Accede to requests to join wEU which have been or may be made by such. non-rflember coun-
tri., ur Fortug"r or Spuin i.ri,Liii"erv ro 
"i io encourage 
political as well as industrial intogration in the
defence freld in Western EuroPe;
3. Utilise to the full the experience gained in the management of pr-evio_us international collabora-
ii". 
".iorp".. 
p-:.ct., 
"nAlo 
patticulir of the Panavia fornado, in deciding the govornmental and
industrial management-structures to be adopted for the Eurofighter;
4. Invite the governments of France on the one hand and of the four Eurofighter co-nsortium
nations on the othe.';;;;;;;i tt" p"ttitipation of Belgium' Denmark' tfre Netherlands 4nd-Norway in
fiiJ pi"o".t6; ild pio*i.-inior'ttreir rispective figliter aircraft to replace the F-16 in tlhe late 1990s;
5. Work vigorously towards the adoption of a similar collaborative approach torvards the definition,
ol"erop,,,iot, -proouciion and progurehent of otler military aircraft for the air foroes of westernil;&;;;Aihfirrill". oi a niultirole aeroplane for such missions as transport, maritime reconnais-
sance and in-flight refuelling;
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6- Persuade the member nations of the Eurofighter consortium to standardise to the maximum
extent possible weapon.systems and equipment to be incorporated into the Euronghier so as to enhance
the aircraft's interoperability and facilitate its logistic support;
7. Initiate discussions both.in the IndepeSdent European Programme Group and among the indus-trial interests concerned o1 P-aking_ the Eurofighter consortium a -clurable industrial arrarrgeitent on thelines of Airbus Industrie which could producei famity of military aircraft.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mh Wilkinson, Rapporteur)
L Introduction
1. There are today a large number of diffe-
rent types of interceptor and olfensive support
aircraft in service with the air forces of Western
Europe in spite of such successful collaborative
programmes as the Tornado between the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy and the United
Kingdom, the F-16 between Belgium, Denmark,
the Netherlands, Nonway and the United States,
and the Jaguar between France and the United
Kingdom.
2. The fulfilment of essentially national ope-
rational requirements, differing tactical doctrines
between the air staffs of the various Western
European air forces, varied geographical and
military criteria, together with disparate indus-
trial and budgetary considerations have all mili-
tated against a coherent and internationally
rationalised policy for the production and procu-
rement of fighter aircraft in Western Europe.
3. In addition the United States air force has
operated some aircraft in Western Europe such
as the A-10 Thunderbolt and the F-15 Eagle
which are not in the inventory of any Western
European air force. Such astonishing disparity
of equipment must seriously degrade the effecti-
veness of NATO air forces. The inherent mobi-
lity and appetite foi consumables of air power
put a premium upon interoperability standardi-
sation. The flexibility and availability of
NATO air forces are seriously impaired if the
capacity to refuel, rearn and preferably to carry
out at least first-line servicing does not transcend
national boundaries in Europe.
4. The procurement of the F-16 by four air
forces in Northern Europe while unwelcome to
the Western European aerospace industries was
undoubtedly in operational terms substantial
progress. Even more so the procurement of
Tornado by the Italian air force, West German
air force and navy, and the Royal Air Force was
logistically a great step forward, even if the full
operational benefit of such commonality could
not be fully derived owing to differing arma-
ments and weapon carriage requirements.
5. The Assembly of Western European
Union and especially the Committee on Scienti-
fic, Technological and Aerospace Questions have
placed great emphasis on the importance, for the
rationalisation of air force inventories within the
member nations, of a collaborative programme
for the production and procurement of the next
generation of fighter aircraft. In particular
Document 874 on the European combat aircraft
and other aeronautical developments (Mr. Bras-
seur 
- 
l98l) and Document 916, on internatio-
nal aeronautical consortia 
- 
guidelines drawn
from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February
1982 (Mr. Wilkinson 
- 
1982) gavd strong politi-
cal support to this collaborative process.
6. Indeed the encouragemen( of practical
industrial collaboration and joint procurement is
part of this organisation's very raison d'Otre.
They bring tangible economic and military bene-
fit in their own right as well as being a practical
means towards closer Western European unity
within the alliance in the security policy field.
Without a concertation of operational require-
ments and re-equipment timescales within the
member countries it is clear that whatMr. Thomas Callaghan Junior has called the
" structural disarmament " of the alliance would
take place in view of the relative price eflect
whereby the cost of high techrlology defence
equipment escalates above the rate of inflation
and in view of the fact that fewer and fewer
member countries are for political reasons
willing to augment their defence $pending by at
least the NATO target of a 3% annual increase
in real terms.
7. In other words rationalisation, standardi-
sation and interoperability are imperative neces-
sities. Without collaboration in the armament
field NATO nations will be buying less and less
for more and more unless they are prepared to
accept performance degradation in their new
equipment which would be unthinkable in the
face of the growing sophistication of Warsaw
Pact armaments. To politicianq industrialists
and military men alike the rlew European
combat aircraft has represented the touchstone
of the collaborative spirit within the member
countries of Western European Union.
8. For most Western European air forces the
mid to late 1990s are a period whgn a large num-
ber ofexisting frontline aircraft nded to be repla-
ced. These old aircraft are in technical terms
the third generation ofjet combat aircraft. The
new fourth-generation combat aefoplanes which
will replace them will all have as standard featu-
res new technology which charactorise only some
of today's fighters.
9. Above all the next or fourth generation of
air combat vehicles will be control configured,
that is to say, inherently unstable with active
computer-commanded flying cOntrol systems
which ensure maximum perforrnance at any
point in the aircraft's flight dnvelope. Fire
control will be highly automated, much naviga-
tional, target-acquisition and traoking data colli-
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mated to permit head-up operation of the air-
craft by the pilot in most flight modes. The
cockpit environment will be highly ergonomic
with the key aircraft and weapon systems for
combat operated directly from the control
column and throttle. More exotic metals like
lithium will replace much conventional duralu-
min alloy and a great deal of composite cons-
truction will ensure an exceptionally strong,
durable yet hght structure. Even with the
active air-to-air guided weapons of the future
like AMRAAM there will still be a premium
upon agility in air combat. The chief limitation
upon mancuwability is likely to be pilot tole-
rance which will require new developments such
antiJg' suits actuated off the computerised flight
control system to ensure inflation before the
sudden onset ofhigh acceleration forces.
II. The requirements
10. There was sufficient commonality of ope-
rational requirements and re-equipment time-
scales for the chiefs-of-staff of the French, Ger-
man, Italian, Spanish and United Kingdom air
forces to sign in late summer 1984 a joint staff
target outlining agreed parameters of perfor-
mance and specification to which offrcials and
industrial representatives of the five nations
should work in seeking to agree a common air-
craft. Of course there were differences of pre-
cise operational requirement between the respec-
tive chiefs of air staffbut they believed sufficient
commonality existed to make a single aircraft
solution practical.
11. From the industrial point of view pre-
vious partnerships in European combat aircraft
production had always been either bilateral, like
the Franco-British Jaguar, or at best trilateral, as
in the case of the British-German-Italian Tor-
nado. As a consequence full economies of scale
had never been realised and European fighter
aircraft production runs were far shorter than
those of United States competitors such as the
F-18 and F-16 which consequently proved extre-
mely successful in export markets. Indeed the
F-16 obtained the celebrated march6 du sidcle in
being selected by the Governments of Belgium,
Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway for their
air forces and co-produced in a massive offset
deal in those countries which also participated in
the production of F-16s purchased by third
countries. Rightly or wrongly, Franco-British
rivalry was in retrospect often alleged as the
cause of the decision by the four northern tier
NATO nations not to procure a European
fighter. However, it must also be admitted that
they are operationally well satisfied with the
F-16 and although appreciation of the United
States dollar led to a major escalation in cost,
industrially there was considerable benefit for
the four European partners in the programme.
12. Even so, a lesson was learned by the Euro-
peans that if possible a wider collaboration
should be achieved than for previous projects.
Above all, the perfect combination was envi-
saged as being British engine expertise allied to
France's traditional success in exporting fighter
aircraft together with German productive relia-
bility and resources plus Italian engineering
innovation and flair. Such an analysis is sim-
plistic of course but the Europeans were determi-
ned that never again would the Arnericans be
allowed to divide and rule their market. The
solution could only lie in a wider international
collaboration open even to other potential part-
ners such as the Spanish and the northern four
but essentially founded on the four principal
aerospace nations ofEurope 
- 
Britain, the Fede-
ral Republic of Germany, Italy and France.
Above all there should not be competing Euro-
pean progrcmmes such as the doglight in days
gone by between the Jaguar and Mirage.
Such a scenario was necessarily over-optimis-
tic in view of differing industrial traditions and
precise operational requirements between the
potential partner nations.
III. The individual national situations
French air force
13. The French air force requires some 250
new combat aircraft to replace the Jaguar and
Mirage III primarily in the offensive support and
reconnaissance r6les from the mid-1990s. An
air defence capability, while useful, is secondary
since the Mirage 2000 is only now beginning to
enter squadron service and will have a useful
operational life well into the next century.
Frenchfleet air arm
14. The French fleet air arm will require 86
new aircraft from the mid-1990s to replace the
Crusader in the air defence r6le and the Eten-
dard IVP in the reconnaissance r6le operating
from the nuclear-powered successors of the
carriers Foch and Clemenceau.
Italian air force
15. The Italian air force requirement is for
150 new aircraft to replace the Lockheed F-104S
in the air superiority r6le in the mid-1990s.
Offensive support will be fulfilled by the AM-X
aircraft currently being jointly developed by
Aeritalia and Embraer of Brazil.
German air force
16. The German air force will require 250 new
aircraft in the mid-1990s to replace the Phantom
F-4 for air defence. The interdiction, recon-
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naissance and electronic countermeasures r6les
will be carried out by the Tornado and close air
support by the Alpha-Jet.
Royal Air Force
17. The British air force will require some 250
new aircraft in the air superiority rdle in the
early to mid-1990s. The Tornado GR-l will
perform the interdiction, strike/attack and
reconnaissance r6les and the Harrier GR-5 the
close air support r6le. Since th0 demise of air
stafftarget 403, the Royal Air Force has not been
looking for a Jaguar replacement as such since
the offensive support Jaguar squadrons in the
Second Allied Tactical Air Force in Germany are
being re-equipped with the Tornado. Jaguar
squadrons in the United Kingdom are being
retained for the time being, although they too
will ultimately need to be re-equipped. The
Tornado F-2 and F-3 are being introduced into
service to replace most of the Phantom F-4 squa-
drons in the United Kingdom in the air defence
r6le although the two F-4 squadrons are being
run on as are the two Phantom F-4 interceptor
squadrons in Royal Air Force Germany. The
prime deficiency of the RAFs current order of
battle lies in a genuine air combat vehicle.
Experience with the Jaguar has clearly demons-
trated that it is preferable to have an aircraft
optimised for air combat with a secondary air-
to-ground capability rather than the other way
round.
Spanish air force
18. The Spaniards' requirement for a new
aeroplane is probably the least immediate of the
four EFA partners. They are beginning to take
delivery of the F-l8A primarily for the offensive
support role, but with an impressive secondary
interceptor capability. For air defence the Spa-
nish air force has the Mirage F-1. It also has
some 22 Phantom F-4s. The Spaniards would
like to procure between 100 and 150 new aircraft
to replace their Mirages and Phantoms towards
theendofthe 1990s.
The northern four - Belgium, Denmark, the
Netherlands and Norway
19. The F-16 consortium nations will proba-
bly be able to operate the aeroplane satisfactorily
with system enhancements until at least the late
1990s. Thereafter their operational require-
ments would seem very similar to those of the
four EFA partners 
- 
an air superiority aircraft
with a secondary air-to-ground r6le.
Implications of the national requirements
20. The above brief summary dots demons-
trate that the French air force and navy are
seeking a somewhat different aeroplane from
that required by the other European lations who
seem likely to need to procure new fighter air-
craft during the decade of the 1990s. It is cer-
tainly very distinct from the requirerhents of the
four EFA partners. Certainly indu$trial consi-
derations reinforced the decision of the French
Government on lst August 1985 to part compa-
ny with the other four nations and to pursue the
procurement of an aeroplane more closely mat-
ched to French operational requirements than
any compromise five-nation aircraft .
21. As the French Prime Minister Mr. Fabius
explained to the Institut des Hautet Etudes de
D4fense Nationale on l3th December 1984:
" France has decided to continue to deve-
lop an aircraft which meets its operational
requirements and is based on its industrial
and commercial know-how. It will there-
fore be different from the interceptor on
which the four countries with which we
were holding discussions are going to co-
operate. But the way still reflnains openfor co-ordinated aeronautical produc-
tion. "
In other words the door was kept open to an
eventual decision to launch either auother colla-
borative programme to meet the French combat
aircraft requirement or, even aftert a reassess-
ment of the situation, to rejoin the EFA pro-
gramme. Spokesmen of the four EFA nations
have also sought not publicly to $iscount the
chance of a French change of heart. However
in practical terms as work-sharing packages are
decided and the project becomes increasingly
defined, such a prospect necessarlly becomes
more and more diflicult. Clearly there has been
a commendable effort at a political level not to
allow hard feelings or recriminatioris to develop
over the failure of a five-nation collraboration to
materialise. At an industrial level there were
mixed feelings.
22. Certainly the French air foroe and naval
requirements did seem to predispoge the choice
by France ofan aircraft ofrather different speci-
fication from that sought by the other four
nations. Above all, not being optimised for air
combat engine performance was not quite such a
critical criterion for France. The latest techno-
logy and high power for the engine were however
definitely necessary if the air supedority r6le of
the other nations could be met. For France,
therefore, the SNECMA M-88 powerplant cur-
rently under development was i$eal for the
rather lighter and less agile Frdnch aircraft
whereas the four other nations needed an ultra-
modern high-technology engine of even higher
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performance than the GE-404 which powers the
F-18 or than the Turbo-Union 199 which powers
the Tornado. Rolls-Royce is working on just
such a new military engine, the XG-40, so in
both cases the respective powerplant considera-
tions meant that there were additional reasons
for a different project to be pursued by France
from that adopted by the four EFA nations.
Nevertheless the crucial factor was that carrier
compatibility for the French navy and lesser
requirement for high specific excess engine
power of the French air force meant that, while
French officials were prepared to compromise
on their ideal weight of 8.5 tons for the aircraft
by accepting perhaps a maximum of 9.5 tons,
this was done reluctantly. Furthermore France
always had the export potential of the project
very much in mind and in the French view the
heavier the aircraft the higher the cost and this
could fatally degrade the saleability of the air-
craft in export markets.
Industrial implications of a four-nation EFA
without France
23. Both the United Kingdom and France
have been building technology demonstrator
fighter aircraft which are due to fly in the late
spring of 1986. In the case of France it is the
ACX or Rafale. In the case of Britain it is the
EAP or experimental aircraft progxamme. The
ACX is a purely national project, whereas the
EAP has had participation from the Panavia
partners, although it is noteworthy that the
German Government withdrew support from its
predecessor design the ECA (European combat
aircraft).
24. British Aerospace and six British partner
companies have invested about $120 million in
the EAP and the British Government has inves-
ted another $85 million. It remains to be seen
how much credit they receive for the work when
the shares of the development costs of EFA are
worked out. The EAP at about I I tons is consi-
derably heavier than Marcel Dassault's Rafale
and heavier too than EFA.
25. Aviation Week quotes the EFA as having
an operational empty weight of about 21,500lbs,
that is, halfivay between that of the General
Dynamics F-l6C and the McDonnell Douglas
F-18A. Its two engines will develop about
2l,750lbs of thrust and its wing area will be 540
square feet. Although French oflicial sources
stress that Rafale is purely a demonstrator it is
expected that even ifnot an exact pre-prototype
of the adopted French design it will form the
basis ofit. Indeed throughout rhe long negotia-
tions about thrust and engine power it was
always felt by the four EFA nations that Rafale
was the French blueprint of the ideal collabora-
tive aircraft.
26. French industrial spokesmen claim that
the outcome of the talks was satisfactory 
- 
first
for the British since they would obtain the lion's
share of the contract, secondly for Marcel Das-
sault, because it was not locked into a collabora-
tive programme with the Panavia partners in
which it would have been in a minority position,
and thirdly for Europe, since the Americans
would now have to compete against two Euro-
pean aircraft, not one.
27. Certainly there is a potential niche in the
market for the new European combat aircraft
since the United States air force's advanced tac-
tical fighter will be a much heavier and more
costly aircraft to replace the F-I5. By the
mid-1990s even derivatives of the F-16, F-18
and F-20 will be outclassed by EFA. However,
the unit cost of EFA could have been still lower
with an initial production run some 336 units
greaterwith French participation. Nevertheless
the Panavia partners always put ability to meet
the threat 
- 
such as the MIG-31 
- 
before expor-
tability and the Spanish interest has been a tech-
nological as well as an operational benefit, espe-
cially for engine capability since Spain has
limited current capability in the powerplant area
now.
IY, Patterns of collaboration
28. Although the four EFA partners deny it,
EFA will be produced on essentially the Panavia
and Turbo-Union models, plus Spain. Doubt-
less the management structure will be tailored to
suit the requirements of the new programme and
the exact governmental agency to supervise the
programme has yet to be defined. The indus-
trial headquarters will be in Munich and talks on
work-sharing are already in progress there. The
United Kingdom and Germany will each manu-
facture 33% of the aircraft, Italy 2l% and
Spain l3%.
29. Probably there will be individual assembly
lines in the four countries with separate produc-
tion flight tests, but a single development flight
test centre. There will be differences of in-
service dates between the partners and varia-
tions in national weapon systems and equip-
ments. It is hoped that the maximum commo-
nality can be achieved.
30. Marcel Dassault of France has always had
a different philosophy about collaboration, belie-
ving strongly in the merits of clear design
leadership rather than equal partnership in thisfield. If they attract Fokker of the Netherlands
or SABCA of Belgium into their new fighter the
relationship would be subcontractual as with the
F-16.
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Y, Conclusions
31. The whole EFA saga has probably turned
out for the best. The Panavia partners and
Spain are happy. The French do not have to
reconcile operational requirements which they
always felt were irreconcilable and the respective
industrial interests are satisfied. Even the ele-
ment of competition between EFA and the
French aircraft may be healthy in the short term.
However for the next generation after EFA
when the costs will be even higher it will be
imperative to harmonise operational require-
ments and to produce a single European
aeroplane.
32. After the committee had adopted this
report in London on 6th November 1985, it was
learned that President Mitterrand had made a
proposal to Chancellor Kohl in Berlin on l0th
October 1985, which was restated at the meeting
between the two leaders on 8th November
1985. There were two sides to this proposal:
first, France would take a 5 or l07o share in the
EFA consortium and, second, a new consortium
should be established to build a lighter fighter
aircraft. Together with the other European
countries, France wished to establish a joint
military aircraft construction prograinme to
build fighters, transport and trainer aircraft and
also weapon systems. This probably means two
or more European aerospace consorfi&.
33. Your Rapporteur believes this new deve-
lopment may well require a follow-up report in
the near future, particularly since the French
plan is expected to be discussed at the next mee-
ting of the WEU Council of Ministers on l4th
November 1985.
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Amendments l, 2 and 3
4th December 1985
The European fighter aircraft for the nineties
AMENDMENTS 1,2 and 3r
tabled by MM. Pignion and Bassinet
l. After paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add the following new
paragraph:
" Welcoming the French proposals made in Bonn to the four countries which have agreed to
develop the European fighter aircraft that they take part in both fighter aircraft programmes and
the proposa! made 
_to the Independent European Programme Group partners to start reflecting
on the possibility of co-ordinating all military aircraft programmes; ".
2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " so as to encourage political as
well as industrial integration in the defence field in Western Europe " and insert " to allow a larger
number of European countries to take part in joint reflection on security matters ".
3. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add the following new paragraph:
" Take into consideration French proposals for France to have a 5 to l0% participation in the
consortium responsible for developing the European fighter aircraft and for Europe io participate
in the programme derived from the experimental Rafale aircraft; ".
Signed: Pignion, Bassinet
l. See l2th sitting 5th December l9E5 (amendments I and 3 amended and agreed to; amendment 2 negatived).
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Parliaments, public opinion and defence
REPORT 
'
sabmitted on behalf of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 2
by Mr. Eysinlq Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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(iy' Public opinion and defence
(iii) Parliaments and public opinion
III. The responsibilities of WEU parliamentarians in security and defence rnatters
vis-d-vis the public
IV. The means of reaching public opinion in security and defence matters
(y' Governmental action
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II. Summary record of the information meeting with members of the two
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l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Dame Jill Knight (Chairman); MM. Frasca,_fnders (Vice-Chairmen)iMIr'f..,Bonnel (Alternate:
Dijardin), Cavaiiere, Goerens, Hackel (Alternatei-_Antretter), Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Mr. Mercier, Dr. Miller, MM. Noerens,
Sairas, St6fieten (Alternate: Eysink), Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra.
N.B. Ile names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Resolution
on parliaments, public opinion and delence
The Assembly,
(t) Having studied the rep-ort of its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on parlia-
ments, public opinion and defence;
(ii) 
. 
Convinced that- th9 neiessary improvement in public awareness of western security and defence
que-stions and particularly of-the functions and activities of the Assembly of Western Euiopean Union
in this respect calls for new efforts at both national and international levei,
CRLrs oN NATIoNAL DELEGATToNS
l. To 
_intensifr their efforts to follow up the activities of the WEU Assembly in national parlia-
ments, political groups, committees and vis-d-vis the public;
2. To invite governments to take specific steps to provide the public with substantial information
about WEU in general and the Council's activities in particular;
3. To keep a continuing watch over the relevant governmental activities.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Eysiak, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. This is the first report to be presented by
this committee to the Assembly of Western
European Union since 23rd May 1985 when the
Assembly adopted Resolution 70 on the amend-
ment of Rule 42 brs extending the responsibi-
lities of the committee whose title was changed
to " Committee for Parliamentary and Public
Relations ". A new task was attributed to the
committee in that a new paragraph was added to
Rule 42 Drs stipulating that the committee shall:
" (c) make all necessary proposals with a
view to bringing the work of the Assembly
to the attention of the public and the press
in member countries ".
2. The new scope of the committee cannot
be without consequences for its future activities,
but effective action is extremely diflicult in view
of the strict limitations imposed by the Assem-
bly's diflicult budgetary situation.
3. At this stage already a fundamental ques-
tion arises which concerns both governments
and parliaments: Is the pursuit of an effective
public relations policy really possible within the
limits of the rigorous principle of zero growth?
4. This problem does not concern Western
European Union alone. It was Lord Carrington,
the Secretary-General of NATO, who, at the
opening session of the thirty-first annual assem-
bly of the Atlantic Treaty Association in Oporto,
Portugal, made the following remarks:
" I sometimes think that our paymasters
have a rather exaggerated view ofthe vir-
tues of the shoe-string in the information
business. A business which the western
democracies cannot afford to neglect,
because it is the essence ofour system that
policies 
- 
and especially policies for the
longer haul 
- 
will only succeed if they are
understood and seen to make sense. "
5. Probably an effective information policy
cannot be pursued without financial support.
But this is of course only one aspect. There is
also the question of the role parliamentarians
should play vis-i-vis the public in security and
defence matters at national and international
level. All activities in this new field need very
careful consideration before making concrete
proposals or reaching conclusions. The pur-
pose of this report is therefore merely to collect
data likely to highlight interrelations between
parliaments, public opinion and defence ques-
tions in order to establish a basis for working out
a public relations policy for the Assembly.
6. This analysis will not therefore be theore-
tical but will seek to spell out the duties of WEU
parliamentarians towards the publiQ and public
opinion and to provide guidelines for fulfilling
these duties. In a further report firp proposals
for the Assembly's public relations policy should
be elaborated.
II. The dffirent interrelatifins
(i) Pailiameats and deleace
7. The r6le of parliaments in defbnce matters
has many facets, most of which have already
been examined by diflerent committees of the
Assembly of Western European Union. In May
1977 the Assembly took note of an information
report entitled " Members of parliament and
defence " presented by Mr. Delorme on behalf of
the then Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments.
8. His study covered the r6le of members in
national parliaments and was based on a ques-
tionnaire sent to the parliaments of all member
countries. A major part of the report dealt with
the relationship between parliaments and
governments in defence matters.
9. One of the Rapporteur's conclusions was
that " in spite of differences between countries,
parliaments have important legislative and
supervisory powers " in defence rnatters. But
on the other hand he stated that apart from
some exceptions, " it would appear that the
planning of defence policy is the prerogative of
the executive and even of the government
assisted by committees of experts ".
10. Referring to the Netherlands, where a
defence council attached to the government
includes representatives of both chambers, the
Rapporteur concluded that this example was
worthy of consideration in order to allow the
legislature to be associated with defence plan-
ning from the outset. Otherwise the fundamen-
tal question had to be raised as to whether the
nature of modern warfare did not make parlia-
mentary powers illusory.
I l. It is worth repeating these oonsiderations
because they also have repercus$ions on the
question of whether governments and parlia-
ments have a joint or separate funotion vis-d-vis
public opinion.
12. Turning to the European levol, the Assem-
bly of Western European Union has only.limited
supervisory powers vis-i-vis the Council. For
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that very reason, the Assembly has always been
concerned that national governments and the
Council should keep parliamentarians informed
about security and defence planning.
13. In this context, the Assembly adopted spe-
cific recommendations such as:
- 
Recommendation 197 on military secu-
rity and parliamentary information
adopted on l2th May 1970;and
- 
Recommendation 333 on parliaments
and defence procurement adopted on
22nd May 1979 on reports from the
Committee on Defence Questions and
Armaments.
14. In their Rome declaration ministers sup
ported the idea of more contact between the
Council and the Assembly and in the Council's
reply to Recommendation 4ll on deterrence
and the will of the people, communicated to the
Assembly on 2fth May 1985, it was aflirmed
that " the enhanced dialogue between the Assem-
bly and the Council should enable public opi-
nion to be even better informed of the basis of
the defence policy of WEU member states ".
15. But for the moment these intentions are
still waiting to be carried into effect and the posi-
tion of WEU parliamentarians, caught between
the Council and the public, remains di{Iicult.
. 
(ii) Pablic opinion aad delence
16. In the abovementioned report by Mr.
Delorme, one result of the questionnaire was
summarised as follows:
" All the answers show the interest of the
population in defence matters. Parliamen-
tarians are frequently questioned on the
subject and the political parties have to
give them prominence in their electoral
undertakings. "
17. But such a result does not say anything
about the main preoccupation of the public in
security and defence, nor does it give any idea of
the level of knowledge among the population.
" Interest in defence matters " may also mean:
conscientious objection, noise from military
flights, damage caused by maneuvres, equip-
ment supply problems, stationing of troops,
military installations, pollution control, etc.
18. One major and at the same time particular
aspect was handled in a very comprehensive way
in the report Mr. Lagorce presented on behalf of
the General Affairs Committee on deterrence
and the will of the people on which Recommen-
dation 4l I was adopted by the Assembly on 3rd
December 1984.
19. It is worth quoting the following assess-
ment from the explanatory memorandum as an
example:
" Your Rapporteur considers it important,
and it corroborates the various poll results
that he has been able to consult, that inter-
national peace, defence, nuclear weapons
and the balance of forces, although real
and serious, are not the main preoccupa-
tion of the majority of Europeans... The
inadequacy of the West's means of
defence, a fact stressed by all govern-
ments, does not seem very serious to a
large majority of Europeans. "
20. As a consequence, the Assembly in
Recommendation 4l I recommended that the
Council " continue to keep European public opi-
nion informed of the dangers to which the world
is exposed, of the measures available to the
European members of the Atlantic Alliance for
countering them and of the type and level of
weapons deployed in Europe ".
21. The Council in its reply " shares the
Assembly's concern to ensure that European opi-
nion is informed as completely as possible about
the threats to our continent and about the secu-
rity and defence policy adopted by the member
countries of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance to
counter these threats... this is essentially the res-
ponsibility of each member state which provides
regular information using the methods that it
considers the most appropriate ". There is
therefore agreement between the Assembly and
the Council on the general need for an improved
information policy.
22. All parliamentarians should use this replyin asking their respective governments about
how they are really implementing this informa-
tion effort towards the public. But the break-
down of tasks between parliamentarians and
ministerial organs in this respect needs further
clarification.
23. It is interesting that the Council further
referred to the document * WEU and public
awareness " which had been prepared by the Per-
manent Council and had been approved at the
meeting at ministerial level in Bonn on 22nd.
and 23rd April 1985. The document was
annexed to the reply and contains some ideas
concerning the Assembly's r6le in public rela-
tions which will be examined below.
24. In fact it cannot be denied that parliamen-
tarians too have an important responsibility
towards the public and public opinion in secu-
rity and defence matters.
(iii) Pailiaments and public opiaion
25. The responsibility of parliamentarians
towards the public is mainly based on the fact
that they are elected by the population and
represent the interests of the people. wEU par-
liamentarians have a twofold responsibility
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towards their national electorate and at Euro-
pean level.
26. The population has the right to be kept
regularly informed by its representatives about
their activities. Conversely, parliamentarians
should listen to their electors in order to take
account of their views on all relevant questions.
Consequently, as already stated in the report
by Mr. Delorme, parliamentarians have mainly
an information role towards the public.
27. This information r6le is a duty which
should not be limited to parliamentary activities
but should include opinions on political deci-
sions and action taken by governments. Parlia-
mentarians should seize every opportunity of
improving public knowledge and awareness of
defence and security matters where they are
better informed than the average citizen. In
providing their assessments of the situation and
of governmental activities, parliamentarians
must also to some extent provide information
on government actions.
28. As a first result, it may be said that parlia-
mentarians are something of a link between
governments and the people. It is important to
realise that parliaments and parliamentarians are
responsible towards the people and not towards
government. But governments are responsible
both towards parliaments and towards the
people. Parliaments have to represent and
interpret the will of the people vis-i-vis the
governments. The question is whether they
have also to interpret governmental action vis-d-
vis the people. This question will be examined
in the following section with particular regard to
the responsibilities of WEU parliamentarians.
III. The responsibilities of WEU
parliamentarians in security
and defence questions vis-,i-vis the public
29. When the Assembly decided to enlarge the
competence of this committee in order to
improve public awareness of its work, it became
the committee's duty to examine the improve-
ment of technical means for reaching the wider
public within the given financial limits and also
the substance of the message to be conveyed to
the public.
30. To determine the substance of the Assem-
bly's activities, the point of departure is the fact
that the Assembly of Western European Union
is the only international parliamentary institu-
tion with responsibility in defence and security
matters backed by an international treaty.
31. The former Chairman-in-Oflice of the
Council, Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany,
therefore raised a crucial point, ulhen he stated
in his speech to the WEU Assembly in Paris on
22nd May 1985:
" The Assembly bears great responsibility
with regard to the democratic legitimation
of our endeavours. It represents at an
international level democrdcy in practice
on matters of security PolicY. "
32. It is interesting to note that in addressing
the North Atlantic Assembly in Stuttgart on 20th
May 1985, the Federal Chancellor, Mr. Kohl,
underlined, with regard to that assembly too,
that it was of importance in representing the
democratic element of the Atlantic Alliance.
But on the same occasion the Pfesident of the
Bundesrat deplored that the North Atlantic
Treaty did not, in fact, make provision for true
participation at parliamentary level and stated
that it had been overlooked that the legislative
organs too were able to take nlost important
decisions for the alliance.
33. Bearing in mind the stronger position of
WEU parliamentarians, who havQ the backing of
the modified Brussels Treaty and the Assembly's
Charter, and reiterating the Ministers' wish
expressed in the Rome declaratibn " to see the
Assembly playing an increasing rdle " also with
regard to public opinion, it seems urgent for the
Assembly to define its responsibilities and posi-
tion in this respect on the basis of its legal and
political independence.
34. A central aspect of the Assembly's public
relations policy should therefore be to strengthen
public awareness of the fact that the existence
and activities of the WEU Assembly mean first
and foremost that European defence and secu-
rity policy is democratically supervised at both
European and national level.
35. This democratic structure of WEU based
on an international treaty is unique in the whole
world and should be brought more often to the
attention of the public by comppring it, for ins-
tance, with the totally different situation in the
Warsaw Pact organisation which was created as
a reaction to the accession of the Federal Repu-
blic of Germany to the Brussels Treaty and to
the Atlantic Alliance, but does not provide any
specific parliamentary supervision.
36. In the Assembly's public relations policy,
parliamentarians could always advocate an
improvement of the democratic structure of
WEU, bearing in mind that the powers of parlia-
mentarians are still incomplete at European
level. On the other hand, there are good
reasons for explaining in public the advantages
of having parliamentary supervision in WEU
both at international and national level'
37. In working out a public relations policy, in
substance it should be borne in mind, of course,
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that the Council and its subsidiary bodies form,
together with the Assembly, one and the same
organisation, Western European Union. There
are certainly matters of common interest which
concern the organisation as a whole, for instance
to make WEU better known to public opinion.
The publication of an information booklet
such as " Western European Union " prepared
on behalf of the Committee for Relations with
Parliaments was undoubtedly in the interest of
the whole organisation.
38. But is it possible to join the Assembly and
the ministerial organs in common action for
public relations as advocated in the document
entitled * WEU and public awareness " prepared
by the Permanent Council and endorsed by the
Ministers on 23rd April 1985?
39. First of all, it is gratifying that the Council
recognises the importance of an improved public
relations policy and that steps are being taken to
carry this policy into practice. In the above-
mentioned document, the r6le of the Assembly
is described as follows:
" IIL (ii) The Rome declaration and
document on institutional reform indicate
the importance Ministers attach to the
Assembly in the revitalisation of WEU
and to the role it might play in striving'to
consolidate the consensus among public
opinion'on the security and defence needs
of the member states. In this context,
Ministers at Rome express the hope that
the Assembly might play a part in achie-
ving greater public understanding of the
defence and security options open to the
Council which expresses the political will
of the individual governments in its policy
statements. To help in this, the Rome
institution document calls inter alia for
the development of informal contacts bet-
ween government representatives and
representatives of the Assembly, and for
better means of keeping the Assembly
informed of the work of the Council so
that the two bodies can operate together in
an even more complementary fashion. "
40. In her address to the Assembly on 2lst
May 1985, Baroness Young, Minister of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the Uni-
ted Kingdom, explained the r6le the Assembly
should play in this context, as follows:
"... the Assembly has a significant func-
tion, together with member governments,
in the process of improving public infor-
mation and generating what has been
called 'reassurance' about our defence
policies... As representatives of thepublic, and with obligations towards
them, parliamentarians have a most im-
portant part to play in this process. The
main aim of debate in the Assembly is to
develop ideas and proposals in defence
and security and to keep governments up
to the mark. In so far as is possible, how-
ever, we in the United Kingdom believe
that it should also be to create and expand
a consensus within our countries, cutting
across party political boundaries, about
the need for the alliance and the defensive
nature of its purpose and strategies as well
as those of its member states. We in the
Council are indebted to the Assembly for
its work in developing the thrust behind
the renewal process and for the critical
exchange of views which has such impor-
tance in our daily work as we govern-
ments account for ourselves in responding
to Assembly recommendations and ques-
tions. But let us also become indebtedfor the development of public under-
standing of the defence and security
option open to us as Council members. "
41. The Assembly of course is always pre-
pared to explain to the public its own views on
the whole spectrum of security and defence pro-
blems facing Europe. On the other hand, there
were some good reasons for the Assembly to cla-
rify its position in Recommendation 420 " wel-
coming the fact that the Council for its part has
decided to inform the public about its activities
but recalling that the Assembly alone is responsi-
ble for information about its own work " and
recommending that the Council " inform the
public and press about its own activities ".
42. There are mainly two reasons why the
Assembly and its members are not in a position
to carry out the task of explaining to the public
the defence and security options open to the
Council and/or member governments.
43. The first reason is a practical one. Parlia-
mentarians are never informed well enough
about all aspects of Council and government
concepts and planning in security and defencepolicy. The improvement of contacts between
the Council and the Assembly is still to be
implemented and effective parliamentary parti-
cipation in decisions will remain difficult-
44. The second reason is a political one. The
Assembly has an albeit limited control and
supervisory function vis-d-vis the Council. Its
position will therefore always be a critical one
even in the case of an enhanced dialogue bet-
ween the two main WEU institutions which are
the Assembly and the Council.
45. Consequently, the options open to the
Council have to be interpreted and explained inpublic by the Council itself and its member
governments. On the other hand, it is the task
of all WEU parliamentarians to explain the
Assembly's positions ori the Council's activities
and decisions.
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46. The better the information conveyed to
the public by the Council at European level and
by the governments at national level, the more
rewarding will be the public dialogue on these
rssues.
47. It emerges from the foregoing considera-
tions that the Assembly has to elaborate its own
public relations policy. One aspect of this
policy has been mentioned already in paragraphs
34 and 35. On the other hand, an exchange of
information between the Council and the
Assembly about efforts to improve public aware-
ness of WEU matters will be useful. It was
therefore most useful that the Council transmit-
ted the document on WEU and public awareness
to the Assembly. Undoubtedly it contains
useful suggestions which should be assessed for
the Assembly's public relations work. In addi-
tion, the Committee for Parliamentary and
Public Relations is very grateful that the new
Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. Cahen, has
agreed to address the committee on the subject
of improving WEU's public relations activities
and every opportunity ofdiscussing each other's
intentions should be seized.
48. For elaborating the substance of a public
relations policy for the Assembly, the themes
listed in the WEU and public awareness
document might provide a useful collection of
the main problems now facing Europeans.
49. The Assembly's positions on actual pro-
blems of western security and defence are set out
mainly in recommendations addressed to the
Council and according to Rule 42 bis, para-
graph 3 (a), it is particularly the duty of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions to " select from texts adopted by the
Assembly those which, in its opinion, should be
debated in national parliaments ".
50. It will be one of the new duties of the
committee to propose a procedure for bringing
Assembly recommendations to the attention of
the public and to examine to what extent criteria
for selecting texts for parliaments are valid for
the public too.
51. The committee should also examine
whether the Assembly should draw up more
general documents for use in public in which the
Assembly's function and position would be des-
cribed in a political context. Such considera-
tions should be co-ordinated with the General
Aflairs Committee and the Presidential
Committee.
52. After the necessary review of the general
function of the WEU Assembly with regard to
the public and after collecting some first ele-
ments of a future public relations policy in sub-
stance, it will be necessary to examine the practi-
cal means available to parliamentarians for
reaching the public in secufity and defence
matters.
IY. The means of reaching trublic opinion
in security and defence matters
( i) G ov ernmental act io n
53. Referring to the document on WEU and
public awareness according to which " the most
effective way of authoritatively reaching a wide
audience is through the public statements of
politicians and ministers in the national govern-
ments of member states ", it might be added that
successful joint political action by the govern-
ments and/or by the Council would be an even
more effective public relations policy than poli-
tical speeches and joint declarations.
54. The Assembly for its part will continue to
urge the Council and the gove[nments to take
such political action.
(ii) Parliameatary action
55. The intensification of parliamentary
action at European and national level also
attracts more public attention.
56. In this connection WEU parliamentarians
could and should do far more than heretofore.
The arrangements for follow-up action in
national parliaments on the activities of the
WEU Assembly still seem to be insuflicient.
Parliamentarians who are not members of the
WEU Assembly still know very little about what
goes on in WEU.
57. It therefore goes without saying that the
initiative taken by the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations for making the
consequences of the reactivation of WEU better
known in the parliaments of member countries
(information-action) has to be continued.
58. Nevertheless there are other aspects where
your Rapporteur believes an improvement could
be made in attracting the public's attention to
WEU matters. They are listed hereafter.
59. On 27th October 1975, ten years ago, in
Document 681 this committee suggested to the
Assembly and its Presidential Committee that
every two years a session be held away from the
permanent seat of the Assembly. This sugges-
tion is still valid, but additional financial means
will be necessary if it is to be implernented.
60. The chairmen of national delegations
should play a greater part in co-ordinating
follow-up action in national parliaments. It
could be suggested therefore that the committee
invite to its meetings once or twice a year, the
chairmen of national delegations.
l8l
DOCUMENT IO38
61. Procedure for transmitting texts selected
for debate in national parliaments and follow-up
action should be re-examined. At the moment,
these texts are transmitted by the President of
the Assembly to the presidents of member par-
liaments under cover of an oflicial letter express-
ing the wish that these texts be used as
material for speeches or questions to ministers.
62. It would be useful to send copies of these
letters also to the chairmen of delegations and
the rapporteurs for the selected recommenda-
tions in order to encourage them to promote
follow-up action in the national parliaments.
63. At present, the Chairman of the Commit-
tee for Parliamentary and Public Relations sends
a letter with suggested questions on the texts
selected to committee members. It would also
be useful for the chairmen of delegations to be
sent copies of these letters and also the rappor-
teurs for the recommendations in question. [f
possible, the rapporteurs should advise the
committee on how to proceed with follow-up
action in the parliaments.
64. A member should be appointed from each
parliament to report to the committee once or
twice a year on the follow-up action in his parlia-
ment. For this, he should ask for the assistance
ofthe secretariat ofthe relevant national delega-
tion. He should also remain in permanent
contact with the chairman of the delegation and
use his connections with committees concerned
and the political groups.
65. Some delegations meet briefly prior to
each Assembly session in order to co-ordinate
procedures during the session. Why not meet
after the session too in order to co-ordinate
follow-up action? Such meetings could be held
in the different member parliaments.
66. Apart from putting questions to the
government, it would be very useful if every
member made an eflort to mention Western
European Union in general, WEU Assembly
recommendations or other activities of the orga-
nisation in speeches made at plenary sessions of
the national parliaments.
67. It was requested in the previous report
that every national government be asked to
report regularly to parliament on its activities in
WEU matters. Such reports should contain not
only facts but also political assessments and
decisions and should be debated both in
committee and in plenary session.
68. Reverting to the activities of the Assem-
bly, all committees should endeavour to make
the recommendations the Assembly transmits to
the Council as concise and specific as possible in
order to strengthen their effectiveness. This
will improve the Assembly's position in reques-
ting a comprehensive reply without undue delay.
(iii) Action yis-d-vis the public and public opinion
69. For the means of reaching the public
directly, the problems are elren more delicate.
70. From the very outset the notions " pu-
blic " and " public opinion " have to be defined
clearly. The public is not identical with the
press and media although the latter play a pro-
minent role in shaping public opinion. The
public also includes the different private and
public institutions such as clubs, schools, univer-
sities, churches, pressure groups, political par-
ties, trade unions, etc.
71. But first, the public is composed of an
enormous number of individuals who are subjec-
ted to a wide variety of impressions and
influences.
72. Because of the complexity of the subject,
this report can outline only some aspects of the
problem of reaching public opinion on security
and defence matters.
73. In a further report this subject should be
examined in detail. At present only the main
questions to be solved can be listed without clai-
ming to be exhaustive.
74. Among the $eat number of individuals,
are there groups whose attitude in security and
defence matters should be considered as crucial?
75. What is the r6le and attitude of young
people? In the Federal Republic of Germany,
for instance, every third citizen is less than
twenty years old. The German Bundeswehr has
so-called " youth oflicers " whose duty is to seek
contacts with young people in order to inform
them about questions related to defence and
military service.
76. Who has the greatest influence on indivi-
duals and particularly on young people? Fami-
lies, schools, universities, churches, trade unions
and other pressure groups, all sorts of associa-
tions and clubs, political parties, or the mass
media such as television, radio and press?
77. Is the number of publications and the
wealth of information so enormous that many
people are saturated by all kinds of published
opinion?
78. What are the eflects of the so-called
" genius of the period " (Zeitgeist) which is often
marked by reflections of important contempo-
rary philosophers?
79. If an improvement is to be made in public
awareness and understanding of security and
defence matters, two different means might be
mentioned, i.e. approaching the population
directly, or approaching opinion leaders.
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(a) Approaching the population directly
80. There are various possibilities. A good
example was the participation of the President of
the Assembly, Mn Caro, in several political dis-
cussions organised by different organisations
such as the Europa Union in Hamburg in June
1985. Every member should seize the opportu-
nity of taking part in such conferences and dis-
cussions where a large audience may be found.
81. Provided the financial question can be
settled, $oups of young people could be invited
periodically to come to Paris in order to discuss
security questions with members of the Assem-
bly. Apparently, the Council of Europe and
national parliaments already receive many more
visiting groups than the Assembly of WEU.
82. A special problem is the question ofcreat-
ing a regular WEU publication. The financial
implications are evident. Nevertheless it should
be worth studying the activities of similar oryani-
sations in this respect.
83. The Eurogroup for instance recently made
an effort by publishing an illustrated booklet
entitled " Western defence, the European r6le in
NATO ". Several other publications are issued
by NATO, such as the NATO Review, now
published six times a year in several languages.
Every two months the North Atlantic Assem-
bly publishes a document entitled " News " with
a summary of its activities and a calendar of
events.
84. These are only a few examples. Is it not
worth studying the possibility of creating an
attractive information review dealing with WEU
questions? It could also provide a forum where
members and other prominent politicians would
have an opportunity of addressing the public.
Apart from the budgetary question it is obvious
that it should first be established whether such a
publication should be created under the aegis of
the Council or of the Assembly.
85. Would it be possible to find a film pro-
ducer to produce a film on the activities of the
Assembly and Western European Union as a
whole? Eurogroup was able to produce such a
film for public showing.
86. These are only first considerations which
have to be examined very carefully.
(b) Approaching opinion leaders
87. The possibility of establishing contacts
with non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
dealing with questions of defence and security,
research institutes, universities, etc., might be
studied. (It should be recalled that the Com-
mittee for Parliamentary and Public Relations of
the Council of Europe has even created a sub-
committee for relations with noh-governmental
organisations.) The purpose of such contacts
might be to ensure that these organisations take
due account of WEU and its Assembly in their
own work and particularly in their publications
which sometimes have an important influence in
forming the opinions of politicians.
88. The problem might be illustrated by one
example: every two weeks the German society
for foreign policy (Deutsche Gesellschaft filr Aus-
wtirtige Polilik) publishes a periodical entitled
Europa Archiv. In its documental part, this
review always takes account of important events
and documents relating to WEU. But this does
not seem to have a visible effect on authors of
articles which are published in the same perio-
dical. In a recent copy ofEuropa Archiv dated
25th August 1985, there was an article on
burden-sharing in the Atlantic Alliance 
- 
the
future of the American military presence in
Europe.
89. In a footnote, the author gave bibliogra-
phical data about the general problem ofburden-
sharing. No mention was made 0f Mr. Wilkin-
son's report adopted by the Assembly of Western
European Union on 29th November 1983 on
European security and burden-sfiaring in the
alliance which was the basis of the Assembly's
Recommendation 396. Nor was there any
substantial examination of the contents of
Mr. Wilkinson's report in the text of the article.
90. There are many reviews, newspapers and
periodicals at national and Ewopean level
interested in publishing articles on European
security questions. It would be a good oppoftu-
nity for the President of the Assemhly, the chair-
men of the committees, rapportsurs or other
members to use these channels for making the
Assembly's positions known to the public.
91. Turning to relations with the press andjournalists, it is first the Press Cotrnsellor who
should advise the committee on how to present
the activities of the Assembly in a rnore effective
way in the different countries.
92. But it is worth repeating that this commit-
tee has already examined the problems of rela-
tions with the press twice in recent years.
Indeed, Dame Jill Knight herself pfesented two
information reports on this matter: on 3rd
December 1980, Document 865 on relations
with parliaments with preliminary observations
on relations between parliaments and the press,
and, on 28th April 1981, Document 873 on rela-
tions between parliaments and the press - the
WEU Assembly and the press. At that time,
stress was laid on three main concerns: (i) the
WEU Assembly was not of sufficient interest for
the members themselves; (ii) an extremely small
sum was available in the Assembly's informa-
tion budget compared with that of the European
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Parliament and the Council of Europe; (iiil the
Council was inactive and failed to provide the
Assembly with adequate information.
93. WEU's new prospects following the reacti-
vation agreed by ministers in the Rome declara-
tion should provide an opportunity to improve
the interest of the press in the Assembly's work
too. Before considering new technical propo-
sals which, of course, have to be prepared, it
seems crucial to stimulate the interest of mem-
bers themselves in WEU matters.
Y. Activities of the Committeefor
Parliamentary and Public Relations
94. The committee met in Paris on 22nd May,in Rome on I lth June and in London on
5th November 1985. In accordance with Rule
42 bis of the Rules of Procedure, it selected from
texts adopted by the Assembly at the first part of
its thirty-first ordinary session the following
recommendations to be debated in the parlia-
ments, i.e.:
- 
417 on East-West relations ten years
after the Helsinki final act;
- 
420 on the new outlook for WEU 
-
reply to the thirtieth annual report of
the Council;
- 
421 on the application of the Brussels
Treaty 
- 
reply to the thirtieth annual
report of the Council;
- 
423 on the state of European security 
-
the central region.
95. These texts were transmitted with a letter
from the President of the Assembly to the presi-
dents of member parliaments expressing the
hope that they would be of interest and provide
subject matter for speeches or questions to
ministers.
96. In a letter addressed to committee mem-
bers on 9th September 1985, the Chairman of
the Committee for Parliamentary and Public
Relations enclosed draft questions relating to the
subjects covered in the relevant recommenda-
tions and invited members to inform the Oflice
of the Clerk of the questions they actually put.
97. Reactions so far have been practically nil.
Only Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges put a question
on Recommendation 420 in the Luxembourg
Chamber of Deputies on l lth July 1985.
98. It was also Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges who
asked her government about the future rdle of
WEU following the Rome declaration (4th June
1985) referring to Order 58 adopted by the
Assembly. On 2nd July 1985, she put a ques-
tion on Recommendation 413 on the military
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use of space and on Luxembourg's contribution
to the budget of Western European Union.
99. It emerges from this result that there are
active members but very few of them keep the
secretariat informed about their follow-up activi-
ties. Your Rapporteur therefore believes the
procedure should be improved as quickly as
possible. He made the relevant proposals in
paragraphs 60 to 66.
100. The committee has continued to organise
information meetings in member parliaments.
On llth June 1985 an information meeting
was held with members of the two chambers of
the Italian Parliament and the press at the lta-
lian Senate. The relevant summary record is
appended. There was a large attendance on the
Italian side, and the local press reported the
event. Briefings were given by members of the
committee as follows:
- 
the duties of the new WEU (by Mr.
Giust);
- 
the Assembly of WEU (by Mrs. Henni-
cot-Schoepges);
- 
relations between WEU, NATO and
other Western European organisations
and countries (by Mr. Eysink).
l0l. It is planned to hold the next information
meeting in the German Bundestag in February
1986. On 5th November 1985, the committee
had the pleasure of being addressed in London
by Mr. Cahen, the new Secretary-General of
Western European Union, on the subject of
improving WEU's public relations activities.
YI. Conclusions
102. (i) Both the Council and the Assembly
agree that efforts have to be made to improve
public awareness of defence matters in general
and of WEU matters in particular.
103. (ii) As for the Council and its member
governments, the best public relations policy
would be successful political action.
104. (iiil Member governments should be asked
to report regularly to parliament on their acti-
vities in WEU matters.
105. (iv) Parliamentarians in each member
country should urge their respective govern-
ments to implement the Council's reply to
Recommendation 4ll, according to which the
effort of informing European opinion is essen-
tially the responsibility of each member state.
\06. (v) Parliamentary action, and particularlyfollow-up action in national parliaments on the
Assembly's recommendations, has to be inten-
DOCUMENT IO38
sified with greater participation by the chairmen
of national delegations and rapporteurs.
107. (vi) A member should be appointed from
each parliament to report to the committee once
or twice a year on the follow-up action in that
member's parliament.
108. (viil In connection with actions vis-i-vis
the public and public opinion, the Assembly has
to work out its own public relations policy
taking into account that new ways of informing
the public about its activities must not involve
new expenditure.
109. (viii) In substance, a central point in the
Assembly's public relations should be to explain
the significance of WEU's democratic structure
and the fact that Western European security and
defence policy is democratically verified and
supervised at both national and European level.
On this basis, the Assembly should explain its
specific activities in public, using, in the first
place, the recommendations it adopts.
ll0. (ix) All reasonable means of approaching
opinion leaders and the population directly will
be helpful to stimulate public interest in WEU.
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APPENDIX I
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 3
to Recommendation 411
l. The Council has noted with great interest Recommendation 4l I on deterrence and the will of the
people. It shares the Assembly's concern to ensure that European opinion is informed as completely as
possible about the threats to our continent and about the security and defence policy adopted by the
member countries of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance to counter these threats.
2. This effort is essentially the responsibility of each member state which provides regular informa-
tion using the methods that it considers the most appropriate.
3. Parallel to this effort, in the context ofjoint reflection on this matter, the Council, which met at
ministerial level in Bonn on 22nd, and 23rd April, approved a document entitled 'WEU and public
awareness ". This document is annexed to the present reply.
4. As the Assembly is the only European parliamentary body empowered by treaty to discuss
security and defence questions, the Council attaches particular importance to the reflections on the
preoccupations of European public opinion which the Assembly can convey to the Council. The
enhanced dialogue between the Assembly and the Council should enable public opinion to be even
better informed of the basis of the defence policy of WEU member states. Whilst assuring the security
interests of the member states and maintaining-closer co-operation between them, this poiicy makes ii
possible to preseffe peace and to seek genuine dialogue with the countries of Eastern Europe. This
position has been approved by all the member states of the alliance and frequently reaffirmed, in
particular in the Washington declaration of 3lst May 1984 which demonstrates the full agreement and
unity of the WEU member states with their allies on the principles underlying their security.
5. Inspired directly by these principles, the members of the integrated military structure adopted the
dual-track decision of December 1979. It aimed at restoring a balance in Europe which had been
distorted by the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles.
At the same time the dual-track decision again demonstrated the alliance's readiness for dialogue
with the countries of the East. This decision advocated negotiations between the Soviet Union and
the United States aimed at achieving balance at the lowest possible level of forces and stressed that
western deployment could be reversed, halted or modified if the talks succeeded.
Hence the allies regretted the breaking-offof talks by the Soviet Union in November 1983 and
the WEU Council can but welcome the opening of a new round ogtalks between the United States and
the Soviet Union in Geneva on l2th March 1985.
6. The member states maintain regular in-depth consultations 
- 
multilaterally in the appropriate
fora, but also bilaterally 
- 
on all the problems relating to the various arms control questions. In this
connection, the member states of the integrated military structure hold regular consultations with the
United States on the negotiations in Geneva. Furthermore, the United States regularly inform the
NATO Council about these negotiations.
7. At its meeting in Bonn, the Council of Ministers requested the Permanent Council to implement
rapidly their decisions on restructuring the Paris agencies and to submit to the next meeting of the
Council of Ministers a report on the progress achieved by then and on the new tasks attributed io these
agencies, which include, inter alia, studies in the field of disarmament and arms control. The Council
takes the view that these studies should provide a useful contribution to its reflections in this field.
8. The continuation of the North-South dialogue clearly goes beyond the competence ofWEU. The Council wishes to point out, however, that the seven member states have already made
substantial efforts to expand their co-operation with the developing countries at both bilateial and
multilateral level and specifically at European level within the framework of the Lom6 Convention,
recently renewed for a second time.
3. Communicated to the Assembly on 20th May 1985.
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IYEU and public awareness
Introduction
l.(t) WEU Foreign and Defence Ministers at Rome agrged that a study should-be made of WEU
putitic relations aCtivities and a report submitted by the Permanent Council for the next ministerial
meeting. The Chairman-in-Office of WEU referred to this in his speech to the WEU Assembly on
29th October:
" The Ministers commissioned the Permanent Council to prepare reports that are to be
deliberated at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers. The Permanent Council will submit
proposals... on ways of improving WEU public relations activities. "
l. (ii) ln considering how best to develop WEU public relations activities, thought q4o{4 be given to
theihemes WEU wiihes to address in prCsenting its activities, and to the means by which this presenta-
tion is to be made. This paper aims to address these points.
Themes
II. (/ Ministers at Rome stressed the importance of the modified Brussels^Treaty and their attachment
to its goals of maintaining peace and security, of promoting unity, and of encouraging the progressive
integrition of Europe and closer co-operation both among its member states and with other European
organisations. They emphasised :
- 
the indivisibility of security within the North Atlantic Treaty area ;
- 
the vital and substantial contribution of all the European allies ;
- 
their conviction that a better utilisation of WEU would not only contribute to the security of
Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the
Atlantic Alliance and to greater solidarity among its members.
ll. (it)Ministers therefore decided to hold comprehensive,discussions and to seek to harmonise their
viewi on the specific conditions of security in Europe. They agreed on six main areas for discussion,
as indicated in paragraph 8 of the Rome declaration.
ll. (iii) Drawing on this mandate, the themes which the WEU mryIt address in its public relatiol-s, with
the aim of infolming public opinion on security and defence policies, became clearer. The following
could fulfil the expectations set at Rome :
(a) to explain the need to maintain adequate defences, that security has to be wofr, and that it
should never be taken for ganted ;
(b) to explain that the need for security and defence measures is greater than hitherto in view of
force imbalances and the present threat ;
(c) to reiterate that the members of WEU are determined to ensure their defence and solidarity
' ' 
whilst seeking more stable relationships with the countries of the East through constructive
dialogue and co-operation ;
(d) to demonstrate the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty as thgfogndgtion of our secullty,
' ' 
while underlining the defensive nature of its policies ; and to highlight the importance of the
European contribution to the alliance and to western security ;
(e) to draw attention to the proposals of western countries, including the-Europoans,_to_seek
' ' balanced and verifiable arms Control and disarmament agreements at the lowest possible level
offorces, explaining that allied unity increases the chances for progress ;
(fl to draw attention to the importance of developing European co-operation in the field of
armaments;
G) to draw attention to the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world ;
(h) ingeneral, to encourage a better-informed public debate about defence and security policy.
ll. (iv)ln view of the continuing quantitative and qualilative development of Soviet military
forcei, European governments should focus the attention of their qqblics on the central
importance of deterrence in maintaining peace and security. The WEU must also aim to
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develop public understanding of the transatlantic relationship as fundamental to the alliance,
and- of the irreplaceable nature of the United States commitment to Europe and the emericari
nuclear guarantee.
ll..(v) lt wi! be especially important for WEU to demonstrate the well-established commitment of the
alliance (cf. Harmel report) to work for constructive and stable East-West relations and a proAo.ti"idialogue- In-the coming months, it may also be important to explain the complexities of arms controi
negotiations in order to help increase public understanding of why early results cannot alwayi G
achieved.
Means
III. (y'There are three avenues through which WEU public relations activity could be channelled:
- 
WEU Assembly;
- 
WEU Council/Secretary-General/Agencies ;
- 
WEU member governments.
Assembly
\l!: .(it) The Rome declaration and document on institutional reform indicate the importanceMinisters attach to the Assembly in the revitalisation of WEU and to the r6le it might'play in
striving 
-" 
t_o consolidate the consensus among public opinion " on the security aid def6nce
needs of the membei states. In this context; Ministers at Rome express the hope that the
Assembly 4ight play a part in achieving greater public understanding of the defence and
security options open to the Council which expresses the political witt of the individualgovernments in its policy statements. To help in this, the Rome institution document callsinter alia for the development of informal contacts between government representatives and
representatives of the Assembly, and for better means of keeplng the Assembly informed of
the work of the Council so that the two bodies can operate together in an even more comple-
mentary fashion.
lq' (iii) _The Assembly is. the only European parliamentary body empowered by treaty todiscuss defence and security issues. It attracts considerable- publii attention duririg its 6ien-
nial sessions.
lll. (iv) Individual Assembly sessions are addressed by Ministers from various member states
on subjects of topical interest. This provides an oppoitunity to put across to a wider audience
the- commonly agreed themes. Other speeches which provide a platform for the discussion of
defence and security issues (see paragraph III. (x/ below) might also incbrporate these ideas.
lll. (v) It will be important 10 gi_ve__maximum.publicity to such speeches. This will to a large
extent be a national task; but WEU institutions can also play -a r6le by helping to spreidinformation from Assembly sessions and. disseminating the texts or extracts of ipeectrei UiMinisters of member states. Consideration- should be given to the arrangement of pres,'sbriefings, the production of broadsheets, information on Assembly debates, ind the distribu-tion.of reports suitable-for use by the press. It would be helpfui in this iespect if in futureMinisters making speeches at WEU Assembly sessions could- include a preis conference intheir itinerary. Between Assembly sessions, 
_ 
the press section should try to arrange gtreater
contact between members of parliament of member staies and the media.
C ounci I / S ec ret ary- G eneral /A g enc i es
lll. (vi) Ministerial sessions_ provide an opportunity to further develop good and comprehensive
relations with the press. Tfis 
-gs.k is primarily the responsibility of the-presidency and nationalgovernments. 
. 
Delegations should include_officials resporrsible soleiy for thijfunction. They should
aim also to assist in promoting the image of a revitalised WfU.
lll.:_(lii) There 
.may also be scope for using the office of the Secretary-General to promotewEU, to 
-explain its purpose and functions-within the framework of European r.c".ity,-;ato press Fq*tt agreed by the Council. The Council could also charge the Secretary-<ieniiJto. relay information to the press through independent briefings to j-ournalists or, if 6il;:priate, speeches. 
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Ill. (viii) There is probably a r6le for a public relations and information unit within the Secre-
tariat-General. This could take responsibility for developing contacts with the press and
disseminating information about WEU. It could arrange briefrng sessions for the press before
the major sessions of the Council and Assembly and as necessary in between thpm. It would
be for the Permanent Council to decide on the substance and nature of any material distri-
buted by the unit.
Agencies
lll. (ix) The Council may commission the Paris agencies of WEU to contribute to informa-
tion activity in the following ways:
(i) prepaing material specifically for public relations use; such material could be
distributed as directed by the Permanent Council through the secretariat unit in
London. If budgetary resources permitted, the Council might reques[ preparation
of small publications about the work of WEU in pamphlet or brochure form for
distribution;
(ii) preparing material of topical interest for publication and dissemination to the press. A list
of press contacts should be drawn up and kept with the new unit in the Secretariat-General in
l,ondon.
National governments
lll. (x) As previously indicated, the most effective way of authoritatively reaching a wiSe audience is
through the public statements of politicians and Ministers in the national governments of member
states. Considerable attention is regularly given to them by the media. Use should be made of the
major ministerial speeches, parliamentary debates, and media appearances of WEU Ministers to put
across the agreed themes.
lll. (xi) Government Ministers and officials in all WEU member countries regularly diFcuss defence
and security issues with members of parliament, journalists, church leaders, non-governrnental organi-
sations, research institutes, academic bodies, and others. These contacts should be used to explain the
agreed themes and the r6le of WEU in the context of European security.
lll. (xii) Other national information channels should also be used more effectively to generate greater
public awareness of policies which the alliance and WEU members follow. The Permanent Council
will be instructed to look at this problem periodicially during its regular sessions. When the
Permanent Council considers it appropriate, such national information activities could be co-ordinated
in order to enhance their effect. The overall aim of this work by the Permanent Council will be to
improve the image of the WEU member countries in the field of defence and security questions.
Conclusion
lY. (i) Success in achieving the objectives of the Rome declaration will depend on many factors, a
major one of which will be the stimulation of public interest in WEU and the generation of greater
public awareness of policies which WEU members follow. Maintenance of the higher political profile
of WEU will enable the organisation to play a part in helping the cause of European security and
transatlantic unity.
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APPENDIX II
Summary record
of the information meeting with members of the two chambers
of the ltalian Parliament and the press at the ltalian Senate,
Rome, on Tuesday, ||th June 1985, at 4.30 p.m.
The meeting was organised at the invit-
ation of the Italian Delegation and in the context
of the special action of the Committee for
Parliamentary and Public Relations in the WEU
member parliaments.
The following Italian parliamentarians
attended the meeting:
Mr. Bianco, Chairman of the Italian Dele-
gation to the WEU Assembly;
Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the
WEU Assembly;
Mr. Vecchietti, Vice-Chairman of the
Italian Delegation to the WEU Assembly.
Senate:
The following members were present :
MM. Accili, Frasca, Gianotti, Marchio,
Mezzapesa, Milani, Mitterdorfer, Palumbo,
Spitella (all members of the Italian Dele-
gation to the WEU Assembly).
Foreign Affairs C ommittee
Mr. Taviani, Chairman of the committee;
MM. Bernassola, Malagodi, Pierrelli,
Rumor.
Defence Committee
Mr. Ferrara, Vice-Chairman of the com-
mittee;
MM. Butini, Falluchi, Saporito.
Chamber of Deputies:
The following members were present:
MM. Foschi, Martino, Sinesio (all mem-
bers of the Italian Delegation to the WEU
Assembly).
Defence Committee
Mr. Ruffini, Chairman of the committee
Mr. Stegagnini, Vice-Chairman of the
committee;
MM. Di Re, Zanini.
At the beginning of the meeting briefings
were given by members of the committee as
follows:
- 
the duties of the new WEU (by Mr.
Giust);
- 
the Assembly of WEU (by Mrs. Henni-
cot-Schoepges);
- 
relations between WEU, NATO and
other Western European organisations
and countries (by Mr. Eysink).
The following discussion was launched by
questions put by members of the Committee for
Parliamentary and Public Relations to their
Italian colleagues.
Mr. Goerens asked whether Italian parlia-
mentarians felt they were suffrciently informed
about WEU matters and if they wished to
suggest improvements.
Mr. Eysink asked what was the attitude in
Italy towards the SDI and Eureka programmes.
On the SDI, Mn Bianco, Chairman of the
Italian Delegation to the WEU Assembly, said
there was a need of a specific European forum to
discuss these problems. There were still too
many bilateral talks and relations between
diflerent European countries and the United
States. The general feeling in Italy was that
WEU should play an important role in harmo-
nising the position of Western European coun-
tries in this matter.
This position was endorsed by Mr. Milani
who raised the question of the r6le the Assembly
could play within WEU.
Mr. Taviani, Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Aflairs Committee, said this was per-
haps the eve of a strategic revolution. In this
connection, WEU could have a new function in
voicing Europe's view. He was convinced Italy
wished to address these matters, but the main
question was whether the British, French and
Germans had the same intention. Another
question was the enlargement of the organisation
with the accession of Portugal and Spain. In
his view these countries could not be kept
outside. If European positions were not harmo-
nised, decisions would be taken elsewhere
without Europe.
Mn RulJini, Chairman of the Defence
Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, said as
a matter of fact there was little interest for WEU
in his committee. The problem was whether we
had the ability to define a joint European
defence policy. Unfortunately there was no
united Europe. The type of relationship
between the United States and Europe was not
clear. Membership of NATO was fundamental
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for Italy. A difficulty was that there was no
identity between NATO and WEU, so it was
impossible to reach a special European position
on security matters. WEU had the advantage
of including France.
Another difliculty came from the United
States which failed to understand European
needs. There was a danger of drifting away
from each other and this could damage the rela-
tionship. If the United States had contacted its
European allies on the problem of the neutron
bomb prior to reaching decisions many diffrcul-
ties would have been avoided.
In the SDI, it should be carefully conside-
red whether it might not lead to new unbalances.
He agreed with Mr. Taviani, recalling the
European Defence Community which had been
extremely important for Italy. It was important
for the creation of Europe which should not be
merely a Europe for trade. In the European
Community there were too many conflicts.
Had the defence community succeeded, the
history of Europe would have been quite
different.
WEU could have a future but it should
work for Europe's unity.
Mn Martino thought further meetings
were needed to be able to reach a decision in the
Assembly on the SDI.
Mr. Malagodi asked whether the relation-
ship between Eurogroup and WEU was taken
carefully into consideration. As for the United
States, it had to be noted that what the
Americans considered to be consultations meant
only information after decislons had been
reached. If there had been reatr consultations a
problem such as that of the neuffon bombwould
never have happened.
As for the SDI, he believed the Soviets
would double the number of their missiles.
There was adequate co-operation in
NATO between chiefs-of-staff, but there was a
need for a political forum. Sgcurity was notjust a question of money. He was very pleased
that this meeting was being held to discuss these
questions.
Mr. Stegagnini mentioned that the Italian
Chamber of Deputies had tried to put forward a
bill on the export of armaments. A question
was whether that bill correspondod to legislation
in other parliaments. There showld be a united
European position in this matter. Furthermore,
WEU should work for better co-ordination of
standardisation. There was still too much
competition within Europe.
Sir John Page asked what Italian parlia-
mentarians expected from the new Italian presi-
dency of the WEU Council.
Mr. Vecchietti said, future developments
depended mainly on three courttries: France,
Britain and Germany. If the three were in
agreement, the others would follow. Italy
wanted WEU to be extended to all other Western
European countries.
Mr* Knighl thanked all parliamentarians
for their contributions and closed the meeting at
6.30 p.m.
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Draft Resolution
on the revisioa of Articles III, IY, XI and XII of the Charter
The Assembly,
Drcnrs
1. To amend Article III of the Charter as follows:
Leave out the whole of paragraph (a) and insert:
" Each year the Assembly shall hold an ordinary session which may be divided into several parts.
The dates and duration of sessions or part-sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Committee
I and immediately brought to the attention of representatives. ";
2. To amend Article IV of the Charter as follows:
In paragraph (b),leave out " Bureau " and insert " Presidential Committee ".
3. To amend Article XI of the Charter as follows:
L,eave out Article XI and insert:
" (a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau
for a period offive years.
(b) ln the performance of his duties, the Clerk shall be responsible to the President. He
shall provide the Assembly and its committees with such secretariat and other assistance as they
may require.
) (c) The Clerk shall establish close co-operation with the Secretariat-General of Western European
,/ Union, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control ofI Armaments."
7 4. To amend the English text of Article XII of the Charter as follows:
In paragraph (a),leave out " Proposals " and insert " Motions ".
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Draft Resolution
oa the rqision olthe Rulcs ofPruedurc
The Assembly,
Decrpns
To amend the Rules of Procedure as follows:
l. Rule 2 S
I*ave out paragraphs I and 2 and insert:
" l. Each year the Assembly shall hold an ordinary session which may be divided into several
parts. " i
Renumber the other paragraphs accordingly.
2. Rule 3 S
At the end of the paragraph, leave out'or substitutes ".
3. Rule 4 S
In paragraph 2, leave out " Bureau " and insert " Presidential Committee ".
4. Rule 5 S
I-eave out paragraphs I and 2 and insert:
'1. At the beginning of each ordinary session, the oldest representative present shall take the ',
Chair until the election of the President has been announced. ,,
2. No discussion may take place while the Provisional President is in the Chair unless it is \
concerned with the examination of credentials or the election of the President of the Assembly. "
5. Rule 6 S
Leave out paragraph 3 and insert:
* 3. A committee of five representatives chosen by lot may be instructed to examine these
credentials and report to the Assembly without delay. "
6. Rule 7 S
kave out the title and insert:
* Representatives and substitutes, titular members and alternates'.
I*ave out paragraph 1.
I*ave out paragxaph 2 and insert:
" l. Llnless otherwise provided by the rules, the powers of a representative may be exercised by a
substitute. substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly. '
Renumber the other paragraphs accordingly.
7. Rule 8E
kave out paragraph 3.
8. RulelIE
At the beginning of paragraph 2, add: * When in the Chair ".
At the end ofparagraph 2, add:
* If the President speaks in a debate on a specific subject, he may not resume the Chair until the
debate on that subject is over. "
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9. Rule 158
In paragraph I ofthe English text, leave out " for any reason " and insert * without having been
invited by the President of the Assembly ".
Add a paragraph 4;
" 4. Duly accredited representatives of
purpose of photographic and/or sound :
dential Committee. "
Rule 22 S
At the end ofparagraph l, add:
" Speakers may submit corrections to the reports of their speeches not later than the day after
that on which the reports were communicated to them. "
Leave out paragraph 2 and insert:
* 2. A full transcription of speeches made in Dutch, German and Italian shall be made available
without delay to speakers on request. They may submit corrections to the transcription of their
speeches not later than the day after the speech was made. "
Rule 24 S
L,eave out " in accordance w"ith Rule 7 ".
Add a paragraph2:
" 2. IJnless otherwise provided by the rules, the powers of a representative who is prevented
from attending a sitting may be exercised by a substitute who has duly signed the register. "
Rule 27 S
In paragraph 4, leave out " may " and insert " shall be invited to ".
English text only: after * debate ", insert * may ".
Rule 28U
In paragraph 2, redraft the end of the first sentence to read: * and take the form of a recommen-
dation, opinion, resolution, order or decision ".
At the end ofparagraph 2, add:
" (a/ Recommendations or opinions shall be addressed to the Council.
(b/ Resolutions shall be addressed to international organisations, governments or national
parliaments.
(c/ Orders shall be addressed to the President of the Assembly or to a committee.
(d) Decisions concern the working of the Assembly and the status of its members. "
Rule 30 is therefore deleted.
Rule 29 S
Leave out paragraph 2 and insert:
" 2. Amendments tabled in writing and signed by their author shall be distributed without
delay. Unless otherwise decided by the President, no amendment shall be proposed and put to
the vote in the Assembly if it has not been tabled at the latest before the end of the sitting
preceding that at which it is considered. In the case of the first sitting, this time-limit shall end
with the opening of the sitting. "
Leave out paragraphs 8 and 9 and renumber paragraph l0 accordingly.
Rule 315
Leave out paragraph 2 and insert:
" 2. Except for the chairman of the committee and the rapporteur, representatives wishing to
speak in a general debate shall enter their names in a register provided for the purpose at the
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latest before the close of the sitting preceding the debate. In the case of the first sitting, their
request to speak shall be made in writing before the opening of the part-session. Unless the Pre-
sident decides otherwise, no other representative shall be called upon to speak. "
kave out paragraph 6 and insert:
" 6. The President shall decide when a representative may respond to a statement challenging
him on a personal basis. No debate may take place on this response. "
In paragraph 7, after " determining of ", insert * the order of business of the Assembly ".
16. Rule 32 S
At the end ofparagraph 4, add:
* The time-limit for points of order shall be one minute. If the right to raise points of order is
misused, the President may forbid the offending representative to speak for the remainder of the
debate. "
17. Rule 34 E
At the end ofparagraph l, add:
" Only aflirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast. "
At the end ofparagraph2(c), add: * or ifthe President so decides ".
In paragraph 4, after the first sentence, insert:
" Two tellers chosen by lot shall count the votes cast. "
At the end ofparagraph 4, add:
" The President shall announce the result. "
18. Rule 35 E
At the end of paragraph l(b), add: " (see Rule 34, paragraph l) ".
At the end ofparagraph l(c), add:
" [n the event ofa tie, the candidate senior in age shall be declared elected. Ifonly one candida-
ture is proposed to the Assembly and there is no opposition to it, the single candidate shall be
declared elected (see Rule 34,parugraph 4)."
kave out paragraph 2.
19. Rule 39E
At the end of paragraph 2, add former paragraph 3 of Rule 8:
" The Presidential Committee may, during the periods between sessions or part-sessions, provi-
sionally fill the seats which have fallen vacant in committees with representatives or substi-
tutes. These appointments must be ratified at the first session of the Assembly. "
In paragraph 5, leave out " resolution " and insert " decision ".
In paragraph 6, leave out " Rule 8, paragraph 3 ", and insert " paragraph 2 above ".
20. Rule 40E
In paragraph 5, leave out " Bureau of the Assembly " and insert " Presidential Committee ".
21. Rule 4l E
At the beginning of paragraph 2, insert: " In application of Rule 40, paragaph 5, ".
In paragraph 4, leave out " and methods of voting (Rule 34) " and insert " methods of voting
(Rule 34) and majorities required (Rule 35 (b) ard, (c)) ".
Leave out paragraph 4(b).
In paragraph 4(c), after " but " insert " elections or ".
Add a paragraph 4(d):
" (d/ Substitutes may be elected members of the bureau of a committee. "
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22. Rule 42E
kave out paragraph 3 and insert:
" 3. Only the substantive text is voted upon by the Assembly. It must be presented in the form
of a draft recommendation, opinion, resolution, order or decision as defined in Rule 28. "
Add a paragraph 4:
* 4. All reports on the agenda of a part-session shall be adopted by committees at least three
weeks before the opening of the relevant part-session. A report not adopted in time shall be
withdrawn from the agenda. However, the Assembly may decide, at the request of the
committee, to place the report on its agenda unless twenty representatives are opposed. Such a
decision shall be taken before the order of business is adopted (Rule l8). After adopting within
the prescribed time-limit a report placed before it, the committee may, after that time-limit, pre-
pare a supplementary report to take account of current events. "
23. Rule 47U
Leave out paragraphs l, 2 and 3 and insert:
" 1. The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau.
His term of oflice shall expire at the end of the fifth year following his appointrment and may
be renewed. If there has not been an appointment or reappointment before 30th June of the
year in which his term of oflice expires, his term of offrce shall be extended by one year.
2. Upon appointment, the Clerk shall make a solemn declaration before the Assembly that he
will perform his duties in complete independence and uninfluenced by national considerations,
that he will neither seek nor receive indications concerning the performance of his duties from
any government or authority other than the Assembly, and will refrain from any action incompa-
tible with his position as a European civil servant.
3. In the exercise of his duties, the Clerk shall be responsible to the President. He shall provide
the Assembly and its committees with such secretariat and other assistance as they may require.
4. The Presidential Committee shall, on the proposal of the Clerk, appoint members of the
Oflice of the Clerk who are recruited for a period of more than one year. It may delegate to the
Clerk the right to appoint permanent or temporary offrcials of a given level.
5. The Clerk shall establish close co-operation with the Secretary-General of Western European
Union, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of
Armaments. "
24. Rule 50U
In paragraph2,leave out * resolution " and insert " decision ".
25. Rule 51U
In paragmph I of the French text, leave out " r6solution " and insert " d6cision ".
26. Reference to substitutes S
Leave out reference to substitutes in the following rules: 2, 5, 13, 26, 27 (first sentence of
paragraph 6), 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36 (paragraph 2, line 4), 39,41 (except in paragraph 7), 43
(except in paragraph 6), 45 and 51.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submiued by MM. Eysinl6 Spies von Btillcshcim and Unland, Rapporteurs)
Rule 2
There is a contradiction in the concept of
an ordinary session in paragraphs I and 2. The
wording proposed makes a clear distinction
between the ordinary session which is annual
and part-sessions.
There is a contradiction between Rules 2
and 3. Since, according to Rule 2, paragraph l,
* The Assembly shall meet in ordinary session as
often as the fulfilment of its functions may
require ", Rule 3 on convening extraordinary
sessions seems pointless. The ordinary session
is all the part-sessions the Assembly holds during
the year since it meets " not less than once in the
course ofany calendar year".
The wording of the Rules of Procedure of
the Assembly of the Council of Europe is better
and should be taken as a model. The following
amendment is proposed:
Leave out paragraph I of Rule 2 and
insert:
" Each year the Assembly shall hold an
ordinary session which may be divided
into several parts. "
Leave out paragraph 2 of Rule 2 and
renumber paragraphs 3 and 4 accordingly.
Rule 3
These provisions should be brought into
line with those of Article III of the Charter and
the words * or substitutes " left out.
Rule 4
The following amendment is proposed:
Leave out * the Bureau of the Assembly "
and insert 'the Presidential Committee of the
Assembly ".
This amendment takes into account the
Presidential Committee's responsibilities under
Rule 2, paragraph 3, and Rule 14.
Rule 5
The following drafting amendment is pro-
posed to the French text only:
Leave out "jusqu'i la proclamation du
Pr6sident 6lu " and insert " jusqu'i la proclama-
tion de l'6lection du Pr6sident'.
Rule 6
In paragraph 3, leave out " may examine
these credentials and report at once to the
Assembly " and insert * may be instructed to
examine these credentials and report to the
Assembly without delay ".
In fact this committee has not been
convened for a very long time and it is respon-
sible only for examining the validity of the docu-
ments attesting credentials which have been
received from the appropriate authorities.
Rule 7
The committee considered it useful to set
out the general principle that unless otherwise
stipulated in the Rules of Procedure the powers
of a representative may be exercised by a substi-
tute. It is therefore possible to leave out the
reference to substitutes in many of the rules (see
paragraph 20 of the draft resolution). It is
evident that in all cases where they have the
same powers as representatives, substitutes have
the same obligations.
Rule 11
The provisions of this rule give the Presi-
dent wide enough powers to allow him to solve
any procedural problem and to settle any inci-
dent, if necessary in consultation with the
Assembly.
It should be noted in particular that
repeated points of order delay the Assembly's
work and that the President, responsible under
Rule I I for maintaining order, may stop them to
allow the Assembly to continue with the debates
on its agenda.
Comments in the present report on the
tabling of amendments (Rule 29) and the right to
speak (Rules 3l and 33) emphasise the extent of
the President's powers when in the Chair. It is
proposed, however, to stress that these powers
are linked with the fact that he is effectively in
the Chair. If he takes part in a debate, the
committee considers he should not resume the
Chair until the debate is over. It is therefori
proposed to add, at the beginning of paragraph
2, " When in the Chair " and, at the end of
paragraph 2, " When the President speaks in a
debate on a specific subject, he may not resume
the Chair until the debate on that subject is
over. "
These provisions are applicable to a
Vice-President replacing the President in accor-
dance with Rule 12.
\
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Rule 15
Paragraph I
After " Chamber ", add " without having
been invited by the President of the Assem-
bly..."
The purpose is to allow access to the
Chamber for persons who are not members of
governments of member countries but who have
been invited by the Presidential Committee to
attend and often to speak (representatives of
non-member governments, non-governmental
speakers, parliamentary observers, etc.).
Rule 22
Whereas the official report distributed
after each sitting gives the full text only of spee-
ches delivered in French and English, the pro-
ceedings issued after each session give the full
text in French and English ofall speeches, irres-
pective of the oflicial language in which they
were delivered.
Among the arrangements made for this
purpose, mention should be made of the possibi-
lity for speakers to ask the verbatim reporters to
give them the transcription of their speeches a
few minutes after they have been delivered. A
copy of this transcription may also be given to
a delegation secretary at his request.
It might be useful for this to be set out in
the Rules of Procedure. It is therefore proposed
to add a new paragraph 2 to Rule 22 as follows:
* 2. A full transcription of speeches made
in Dutch, German and Italian shall be
made available without delay to speakers
on request. They may submit corrections
to the transcription of their speeches not
later than the day after the speech was
made. "
The present paragraph 2, as amended,
would be added to paragraph I since it relates
solely to the summary report in English and
French (the word " stdnographie " in the French
text being left out and " compte rendu "
inserted).
Rule 24
The revised Rule 7 now covers all
the rights of substitutes independently of their
attendance at a given sitting in replacement of
representatives.
By making the links between the powers
of substitutes and signature of the attendance
register more flexible, the amendment to Rule 7
therefore clearly gives substitutes rights such as
that of convening an extraordinary session, ful-
filling the duties of Provisional President or
standing for election to a committee bureau.
Conversely, the rights and duties of
substitutes in the context of a given sitting
must be specified. For this purpose, Rule
24 should be revised by deleting the refe-
rence to Rule 7, which is now pointless,
and by inserting a new paragraph as follows:
" LJnless otherwise provided by the rules,
the powers of a representative who is pre-
vented from attending a sitting may be
exercised by a substitute who has duly
signed the register. "
It is proposed to retain the reference to
substitutes in rules indicating the area of applica-
tion of a general rule and to delete it in rules
defining the powers and obligations incumbent
upon members of the Assembly, the powers and
obligations of substitutes being, in accordance
with the principle laid down in Rule 7 revised,
identical to those of representatives.
Rule 26: Interpretation
Paragraph 2
The present rule authorising explanations
of vote only after the vote on the text as a whole
conforms to practice in the Council of Europe.
The purpose of this is to avoid another general
debate being started before the vote on the text
as a whole, since certain speakers might be
tempted to influence the decision of their collea-
gues at the last minute. It thus allows the
Assembly to vote on the text as a whole imme-
diately after the debate on the ameurdments.
Only those who wish to explain the
meaning of their votes speak. They are neces-
sarily limited in number, which is a considerable
advantage in view of the brevity of sessions.
Rule 27
Draft the beginning of paragraph 4 as
follows:
" The Chairman of the Council shall be
invited to present the report orally to the
Assembly... "
The purpose of this amendment is to
bring the drafting of the rule into line with the
corresponding paragraph of the Charter and to
make the English and French texts concord.
Rules 28 and 30
Rule 30 concerns motions for orders. In
the Assembly's vocabulary, a text emanating
from a committee is a draft and a t6xt emanating
from members of the Assembly is a motion.
After noting the difference ttetween draft
orders in reports and motions fbr orders as
referred to in Rule 30, it is therefore necessary to
stipulate to what extent the provisions appli-
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cable to motions for recommendations, opinions
or resolutions, covered by Rule 28, also concern
motions for orders.
The following differences should be noted:
(y' motions under Rule 28 must be sub-
mitted in writing and signed by at
least ten representatives, whereas a
single representative may lay a
motion for an order on the table of
the Assembly;
(if motions under Rule 28 are submitted
to the Assembly for inclusion in the
register of the Assembly, whereas
motions for orders may be put to the
vote without prior reference to com-
mittee and may in this case be
adopted directly;
(iii) where the debate is concerned, Rule
28 lays down that when the question
of including such a motion in the
register is put to the Assembly the
following only may be heard: one
speaker for the motion, one speaker
against and the chairman of any com-
mittee concerned. Rule 30 says
nothing in this respect but it is custo-
mary to treat a motion for an order in
the same way as a motion within the
meaning of Rule 28;
(iv) frnally, the notion of an order is not
defined but it is generally considered
that its purpose is to give a mandate
to the President or to an Assembly
committee.
In view of the facility with which a motion
for an order may be tabled and adopted, the
Assembly is liable to find itself bound by a text
adopted without debate by a chance majority.
To allow the Assembly to keep control of
its proceedings, three methods may be consi-
dered:
The first, to which the Assembly of the
Council of Europe seems to be turning, is to
introduce into the Rules of Procedure a precise
definition of the notion of an order laying down
in particular that an order may not relate to a
new subject but must relate to a question already
included in the register of the Assembly and
keep to matters of form, transmission, execution
or procedure, without tackling the substance of
thq question.
The second is to delete completely the
notion of an order which is possible since in fact
members of the Assembly generally resort to
points of order to raise matters which would be
the subject of a motion for an order if the
motion for an order were thus defined. Draft
orders submitted by committees for the purpose
of instructing an Assembly body to carry out a
specific task may also be termed draft resolu-
tions.
The third method has the advantage of
being clear and simple and should be given pre-
ference. It is to define an order as a mandate
given to an Assembly body and to deal with
motions for orders under Rule 28 like motions
for recommendations, opinions or resolutions.
Thus completed, Rule 28 would be the same
as paragraph 3 of Rule 42 which sets out the
form of the substantive text of reports and also
mentions draft orders.
The latter solution would imply redrafting
the end of the first sentence of paragraph 2 of
Rule 28 to read: " and take the form of a recom-
mendation, opinion, resolution, order or deci-
sion ".
Finally, a definition should be made of
motions tabled in the Assembly by ten of its
members and drafts included in committee
reports. It would be desirable to take this
opportunity of dispelling the ambiguity arising
from the plurality of meanings attributed to the
word * resolution ". It may in fact designate an
Assembly text addressed by its President to
international organisations, governments or
national parliaments or an Assembly decision
relating to its operation or the status of its mem-
bers: amendments to the Charter (Article XII)
or the Rules of Procedure (Rule 5 I ), the appoint-
ment of a committee of investigation (Rule 39,
paragraph 5), request for the waiver of immunity
(Rule 50, paragraph2).
Rule 28 might consequently set out the
following definitions:
" (a,) Recommendations or opinions shall
be addressed to the Council.
(b/ Resolutions shall be addressed to
international organisations, govern-
ments or national parliaments.
(c/ Orders shall be addressed to the Presi-
dent of the Assembly or to a com-
mittee.
(d/ Decisions concern the working of the
Assembly and the status of its mem-
bers.
The adoption of this amendment would
imply deletion of Rule 30.
Rule 29: Interpretation
The purpose of this amendment is to
ensure that the Assembly has time to see amend-
ments before they are debated, while leaving the
President the possibility of relaxing this rule if
necessary.
\
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Rule 3 I : Interpretation
This amendment is intended to allow the
President to ascertain the number of speakers
early enough before a debate to be able to foresee
the length of the debate and, if necessary, make
the appropriate arrangements to organise
it. This provision would moreover facilitate
the President's task as set out in Rule 31, para-
gaph 2: " As far as possible he shall endeavour
to call alternately upon speakers for and against
the matter under discussion. " Equally it allows
him to avoid a succession of speakers of the
same political group or the same nationality.
Paragraph 6
The committee considered the unduly
vague notion of a personal statement should be
defined. On the other hand, it wished to leave
the President greater freedom to choose when a
member of the Assembly may reply to a personal
affront.
Paragraph 7
After " determining of " add " the order of
business of the Assembly ".
Speaking time should be limited for
speeches on the adoption of the draft order of
business in the same way as for determining the
orders of the day of sittings and procedural
matters.
Rule 3 3 : Interpretation
The President may have included in the
draft order of business a proposal to hold a
debate on one or more reports. He may also
make such a proposal during the session should
this seem necessary.
In regard to speaking time for various
categories of speaker, proposals were made in
the memorandum by the President (Document
1016). This is a question of practice and not
one for the Rules of Procedure. In this connec-
tion, the Assembly must be able to adapt the
provisions it agrees upon according to circums-
tances.
Paragraph I
Just as the President regularly limits the
speaking time in general debates under Rule 33,
paragraph l, of the Rules of Procedure, there
should be no problem if he at the same time
limits speaking time on amendments.
Rule 34
Paragraph 1
Add at the end of the paragraph: " Only
aflirmative and negative votes shall count in cal-
culating the number of votes cast. "
The purpose of this arnendment is to
speciff that the rule applicable to roll-call votes
is also applicable to votes by sitting and
standing.
Paragraph 2
This amendment allows the President to
resort to roll-call votes when, for instance, he
considers it to be the only way to allow the
Assembly to vote clearly.
Paragraph 4
It is proposed to amend this paragraph by
adding the provisions in italics:
" 4. Voting on nominations shall take
place by secret ballot. Two tellers chosen
by lot shall count the votes cast. Only
those ballot papers bearing the names of
persons who have been duly entered as
candidates shall be taken into account for
the purpose of calculating the number of
votes cast. The Presidenl shall announce
the result. "
Inclusion of the provisions in italics
recalls the provisions of Rule l0 for nominations
other than those of members of the Bureau of
the Assembly.
Rule 35
Paragraph l(b)
Add: " (See Rule 34,paragraph l) ".
Paragraph 1(c)
Add at the end ofthis paragraph:
" ...In the event of a tie, the candidate
senior in age shall be declared elected. If
only one candidature is proposed to the
Assembly and there is no opposition to it,
the single candidate shall be declared
elected. (See Rule 34,parugraph 4). "
These provisions, applicable to the elec-
tion of members of the Bureau of the Assembly
under Rule 10, may be extended to cover all
elections.
Paragraph 2
Leave out this paragtaph whose provi-
sions are included in Rule 34, paragraph l.
Rule 36
The present rule that the quorum is calcu-
lated in accordance with the number of signa-
tures on the register of attendance and not the
number of representatives effectively present in
the Chamber has so far proved satisfactory. It
avoids a minority being able to prevent the
Assembly from voting by leaving the Chamber.It no doubt prevents a parliamentarian from
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insisting on the postponement of a vote by
invoking the insufficient number of representa-
tives present, but the President may always, at
the request of a member of the Assembly, and
with th-e agreement of the latter, postpone a vote
or suspend the sitting. Moreover, it is his task,
in the exercise of his responsibilities under Rule
I l, to avoid a surprise vote. Conversely, calcu-
lating the quorum on the basis of the number of
representatives present would result in the
Assembly and its President again becoming
powerless in face of certain maneuvres aimed at
preventing the majority from being able to
express its political wishes.
Rule 39
Paragraph 2
See the proposed amendment to Rule 8.
Paragraph 6
The reference should no longer be to Rule
8, paragraph 3, but to Rule 39, paragraph 2.
Rule 40
Paragraph 5
kave out " Bureau " and insert " Presi-
dential Committee ".
This is an overall responsibility of the Pre-
sidential Committee rather than the Bureau.
Rule 41
Paragraph 2
According to Rule 40, authorisation is
necessary for appointing one or more members
of a committee to carry out an information or
study visit. A fortiori, the authorisation of the
Presidential Committee would be necessary for
appointing a sub<ommittee in view of the finan-
cial implications of such a decision.
The following amendment is therefore
proposed:
Add at the beginning of Rule 41, para-
graph 2, * In application of Rule 40, para-
graph 5. ".
Paragraph 4(b)
This paragraph is not clear. It would be
better to leave out this paragraph and amend
paragraph 4 as follows to include a reference to
Rule 35 on majorities, which is clearer.
In the first paragraph ofparagraph 4, after
'(Rule 32\" rcad, 'methods of voting (Rule 34)
and majorities required (Rule 35 (b) and, (c))
shall apply...".
Paragraph 4(c)
An election is not simple deliberation but
a major decision. It should therefore be made
quite clear that the same quorum rules apply for
electing the bureau of a committee or its rappor-
teurs as for the vote on a report as a whole.
The following amendment is therefore
proposed:
* A committee may deliberate when one-
third of its members is present, but elec-
tions or the vote on a report as a whole... "
Paragraph a@): * Substitutes may be
elected members of the bureau of a committee. "
The addition of this new paragraph
is to avoid the ambiguity that might stem
from the fact that substitutes may not be
elected to the Bureau of the Assembly. It
mlght be conSidered that this rule was applicable
to the bureau of a committee. Rule 7, para-
graph 3, makes it clear that substitutes may be
elected to the bureau of a committee. Aflirma-
tion of this in Rule 4l adds to the clarity and
coherence of the rules.
Rule 42
The purpose of this amendment is to
allow the Assembly time to examine reports,
account being taken of the time required for pre-
paring texts, translating the last corrections,
printing and mailing.
It shall nevertheless still be possible for
the Assembly, in certain strict conditions, to
debate a report adopted after the required time-
limit.
Rule 47
At the meeting of the Committee on Rules
of Procedure and Privileges on 4th December
1984, the Chairman read out a letter from
Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, communi-
cating the following resolution by the Bureau
dated l2th November 1984:
* The Bureau of the Assembly,
Anxious to guarantee the Assembly's right
to exercise in full its supervision of all
matters within its purview;
Noting that in exercising this right the
Assembly is limited in respect of the man-
date it confers upon the Clerk and any
Clerk Assistant as long as the duration of
these mandates is not fixed;
Considering this shortcoming should be
overcome by the adoption of new provi-
sions guaranteeing that the Assembly can
exercise its right in this respect;
Feels it desirable to fix a five-year time-
limit on the mandate of the Clerk and anyClerk Assistant, this mandate being
renewable by decision of the Assembly,
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Asks the President to proceed to transmit
the present resolution to the Committee
on Rules of Procedure and Privileges so
that the latter may report to the Assembly
on this matter, if possible at the December
1984 session. "
Since lack of time did not allow a report to
be presented at the December 1984 session, the
President of the Assembly asked the committee
to report on this matter at the May 1985 session.
The Rapporteur first submitted an oral
report at the meeting of the committee in
Palermo on 22nd February I 985.
The matter was discussed at length and
general agreement on the principle of an amend-
ment was reached without a vote. Consequen-
tly, the Rapporteur drafted the proposed amen-
ded text of Rule 47 and presented it orally to the
Presidential Committee at its meeting on 15th
April 1985. In this presentation he underlined
the following points:
- 
the political basis and starting point for
the work of the committee was exclusi-
vely the resolution of the Bureau dated
l2th November 1984;
- 
the Committee
and Privileges
Rules of Procedure
a purely technical
organ. In this specific instance, its
tasks were merely to work out the tech-
nical and legal means of implementing a
political decision by the Bureau;
- as for the legal aspects, the present Clerk
was elected in December 1980 for an
unlimited period. An amendment of
Rule 47 could not have retroactive
effect. It could be applicable only in
future provided the post of Clerk
became vacant.
The Presidential Committee fully endorsed
these considerations and authorised the Com-
mittee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to
pursue its work on this basis.
An amendment to Artidle XI of the
Charter will be necessary. According to Article
XII of the Charter, proposals to atnend the Char-
ter are to be tabled in writing by at least ten
representatives.
Your Rapporteur proposes therefore to
submit to the Assembly the attached draft reso-
lution. The text corresponds to that of the pro-
posed amendment to Rule 47 but is shorter since
in the Charter only the basic principles should be
set out.
on
is
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APPENDIX
Comparison of presenl text and proposed amended text
of the Charter and Rules of Procedure
Charter
Present text
III. Sessions olthe Assembly
(a) The Assembly shall meet in ordinary
session as often as the fulfilment of its functions
may require, and not less than once in the course
ofany calendar year.
The dates and duration of sessions or part-
sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Com-
mittee and immediately brought to the attention
of representatives and substitutes.
(b) The Assembly may be convened in extra-
ordinary session by the President, either on his
own initiative or following a request by the
Council or by not less than a quarter of the
representatives.
IY. Seat of the Assembly
(a) The seat of the Assembly is at Paris.
(b) Sessions of the Assembly shall be held at
the seat of the Assembly unless the Bureau of the
Assembly decides otherwise.
XI. Olficc of the Clorh of the Asscmbly
(a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the
Assembly on the proposal of the Bureau. He
shall provide the Assembly and its committees
with such secretariat and other assistance as
they may require.
Upon appointment, the Clerk shall make
a solemn declaration before the Assembly that
he will perform his duties in complete indepen-
dence and uninfluenced by national considera-
tions; that he will neither seek nor receive indi-
cations concerning the performance of his duties
from any government or authority other than
the Assembly, and will refrain from any action
incompatible with his position as a European
civil servant.
(b) The Clerk shall, in consultation with the
Bureau, appoint officials on a perrnanent or tem-
porary basis as members of the Office of the
Clerk.
@ The Clerk shall establish close co-ope-
ration with the Secretary-General of Western
European Union, the secretariat of the Standing
Armaments Committee and the Agency for the
Control of Armaments.
Proposed amended text
III. Sessions of the Assembly
(a) Each year the Assembly shall hold an ordi-
nary session which may be divided into several
parts.
The dates and duration of sessions or part-
sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Com-
mittee and immediately brought to the attention
ofrepresentatives.
(b) The Assembly may be convened in extra-
ordinary session by the President, either on his
own initiative or following a request by the
Council or by not less than a quarter of the
representatives.
IY, Seat of the Assenbly
(a) The seat of the Assembly is at Paris.
(b) Sessions of the Assembly shall be held at
the seat of the Assembly unless the Presidential
Committee of the Assembly decides otherwise.
XL Olfrce of the Clcrh of thc Assembly
(a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presi-
dential Committee on the proposal of the
Bureau for a period offive years.
(b) In the performance of his duties, the Clerk
shall be responsible to the President. He shall
provide the Assembly and its committees with
such secretariat and other assistance as they may
require.
@ The Clerk shall establish close co-ope-
ration with the Secretary-General of Western
European Union, the secretariat of the Standing
Armaments Committee and the Agency for the
Control of Armaments.
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XII. Ameadment of the Char-ter and odoplion and
amendment of the Rulcs of Procedure olthe Assembly
(a) Proposals to amend the Charter of the
Assembly shall be tabled in writing by at least
ten representatives. After consideration of the
report thereon by the competent committee or
committees, such amendments require the
approval of a majority of the representatives of
the Assembly.
(b) The adoption of the Rules of Procedure of
the Assembly, and of any subsequent amend-
ments thereto, shall require an absolute majority
ofthe votes cast.
XIL Amcndment of the Charter and adoptioa and
amendment of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly
(a) Motions to amend the Charter of the
Assembly shall be tabled in writing by at least
ten representatives. After consideration of the
report thereon by the competent committee or
committees, such amendments require the
approval of a majority of the representatives of
the Assembly.
(b) The adoption of the Rules of Procedure of
the Assembly, and of any subsequent amend-
ments thereto, shall require an absolute majority
ofthe votes cast.
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Present text
Rule 2
Date and duration of sessions
l. The Assembly shall 
-eei in ordinary
session as often as the fulfilment of its functions
may require, and not less than once in the course
ofany calendar year.
2. An ordinary session may be divided into
two or more parts.
3. The dates and duration of sessions or part-
sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Com-
mittee and immediately brought to the attention
of representatives and substitutes.
4. The Presidential Committee shall inform
representatives and substitutes of the dates of
the opening or resumption of an ordinary ses-
sion not less than six weeks beforehand.
RuI-r 3
Extraordinary sessions
The Assembly may be convened in extra-
ordinary session by the President, either on his
own initiative or following a request by the
Council or by not less than a quarter of the
representatives or substitutes.
Ruu 4
Seat of the Assembly
l. The seat of the Assembly is at Paris.
2. Sessions of the Assembly shall be held at
the seat of the Assembly unless the Bureau of the
Assembly decides otherwise.
RurE 5
Provisional President
l. At the beginning of each ordinary session
the oldest representative or substitute present
shall discharge the duties of President until the
election ofthe President has been announced.
2. No discussion may take place while the
oldest representative or substitute is in the Chair
unless it is concerned with the election of the
President, or with the election or the report of
the Credentials Committee.
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Proposed amended text
Rulr 2
Date and duration of sessions
l. Each year the Assembly shall hold an
ordinary session which may be divided into
several parts.
2. The dates and duration of sessions or part-
sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Com-
mittee and immediately brought to rhe attention
of representatives.
3. The Presidential Committee shall inform
representatives of the dates of the opening or
resumption of an ordinary session not less than
six weeks beforehand.
Rum 3
Extraordinary sessions
The Assembly may be convened in extraor-
dinary session by the President, either on his
own initiative or following a request by the
Council or by not less than a quarter of the
representatives.
Rure 4
Seat of the Assembly
l. The seat of the Assembly is at Paris.
2. Sessions of the Assembly shall be held at
the seat of the Assembly unless the Presidential
Committee of the Assembly decides otherwise.
Rur,r 5
Provisional President
l. At the beginning of each ordinary session
the oldest representative present shall take the
Chair until the election of the President has been
announced.
2. No discussion may take place while the
Provisional President is in the Chair unless it is
concerned with the examination of credentials or
the election of the President of the Assembly.
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Rur-e 6
Rat ilicat ion of credent ials
l. The credentials of representatives and
substitutes shall be attested by the statement of
the ratification of credentials formally communi-
cated to the President of the Assembly by the
President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe.
2. If the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe has been unable to ratiff the
credentials, the WEU Assembly shall ratifu them
on the basis of the official documents supplied
either by the President of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe or by the
,, parliaments or governments of member states
'/ subject to conformity with the subsequent ratifi-
cation by the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council ofEurope.
3. A committee of five representatives or
substitutes chosen by lot may examine these cre-
dentials and report at once to the Assembly.
4. Any representative or substitute whose
credentials are contested may take his seat provi-
sionally with the same rights as other representa-
tives and substitutes until the Assembly has
made a decision on his case.
Rurs 7
Substitutes and alternates
l. Any representative prevented from atten-
ding a sitting of the Assembly may be replaced
by a substitute.
2. Substitutes duly registered in accordance
with Rule 24 have the same rights as representa-
tives in the Assembly.
Substitutes may not, however, be elected
to the Bureau of the Assembly.
3. A substitute who is a committee chairman
or rapporteur may speak in that capacity, even if
he is not sitting in place ofa representative. In
the latter case, however, he shall not be entitled
to vote.
4. Representatives and substitutes may sit on
committees either as titular members or as alter-
nates.
Any titular member who is prevented
from attending a meeting may appoint an alter-
nate from among the alternate members of the
committee of the same nationality as himself.
With the consent of the chairman of the
committee, he may also be replaced by any other
representative or substitute of the same natio-
nality as himself.
Rure 6
RatiJication of credentials
l. The credentials of representatives and
substitutes shall be attested by the statement of
the ratification of credentials formally communi-
cated to the President of the Assembly by the
President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council ofEurope.
2. If the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe has been unable to ratiry the
credentials, the WEU Assembly shall ratifu them
on the basis of the official documents supplied
either by the President of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe or by the
parliaments or governments of member states
subject to conformity with the subsequent ratifi-
cation by the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council ofEurope.
3. A committee of five representatives cho-
sen by lot may be instructed to examine these
credentials and report to the Assembly without
delay.
4. Any representative or substitute whose
credentials are contested may take his seat provi-
sionally with the same rights as other represen-
tatives and substitutes until the Assembly has
made a decision on his case.
RuLe 7
Representatives and substitutes,
titular members and alternates
l. Unless otherwise provided by the rules,
the powers of a representative may be exercised
by a substitute. Substitutes may not be elected
to the Bureau of the Assembly.
2. A substitute who is a committee chairman
or rapporteur may speak in that capacity, even if
he is not sitting in place ofa represontative. In
the latter case, however, he shall not be entitled
to vote.
3. Representatives and substitutes may sit on
committees either as titular members or as alter-
nates.
4. Any titular member who is prevented
from attending a meeting may appoint an alter-
nate from among the alternate members of the
committee of the same nationality as himself.
With the consent of the chairman of the com-
mittee, he may also be replaced by any other
representative or substitute of the same nationa-
lity as himself.
5. The alternate so appointed shall have the
same rights as the titular member. Alternates
may not however be elected to the bureau of a
committee.
207
DOCUMENT IO39 APPENDIX
The alternate so appointed shall have the
same rights as the titular member. Alternates
may not however be elected to the bureau of a
committee.
Rur-E 8
Duration of term of ffice of representatives
and substitutes
l. The term of office of representatives and
substitutes shall take effect from the date of the
communication of the statement of the ratifica-
tion of the credentials by the President of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe, or from the date of their appointment
by member states if the session of the Assembly
precedes that of the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe and subject to the ratifica-
tion of the credentials by the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe.
2. The term of office shall end in accordance
with the rules of the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe whether a seat is vacated
through parliamentary elections or through
death or resignation or through invalidation by
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe.
3. The Presidential Committee may, during
the periods between sessions or part-sessions,
provisionally fill the seats which have fallen
vacant in committees with representatives and
substitutes. These appointments must be rati-
fied at the first session of the Assembly.
Rurs I I
President
l. The duties of the President shall be: to
open, suspend and close sittings, to propose at
the end of each sitting the date, time and orders
ofthe day ofthe next sitting, to guide the debates
of the Assembly, to ensure the observance of the
rules, to maintain order, to call on speakers, to
close debates, to put questions to the vote and
announce the result of votes, and to refer com-
munications to the appropriate committees.
2. The President shall neither speak in
debate nor vote, his substitute may sit, speak
and vote in his place.
3. When so directed by the Assembly, the
President shall transmit resolutions to inter-
national organisations, governments and natio-
nal parliaments.
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Duration of term of ffice of representatives and
substitutes
l. The term of office of representatives and
substitutes shall take effect from the date of the
communication of the statement of the ratifica-
tion of the credentials by the President of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe, or from the date of their appointment
by member states if the session of the Assembly
precedes that of the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe and subject to the ratifica-
tion of the credentials by the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe.
2. The term of oflice shall end in accordance
with the rules of the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe whether a seat is vacated
through parliamentary elections or through
death or resignation or through invalidation by
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe.
Rulr I I
President
1. The duties of the President shall be: to
open, susp€nd and close sittings, to propose at
the end of each sitting the date, time and orders
of the day of the next sitting, to guide the
debates of the Assembly, to ensure the obser-
vance of the rules, to maintain order, to call on
speakers, to close debates, to put questions to the
vote and announce the result of votes, and to
refer communications to the appropriate com-
mittees.
2. When in the Chair the President shall
neither speak in debate nor vote; his substitute
may sit, speak and vote in his place. If the Pre-
sident speaks in a debate on a specific subject, he
may not resume the Chair until the debate on
that subject is over.
3. When so directed by the Assembly, the
President shall transmit resolutions to interna-
tional organisations, governments and national
parliaments.
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Rwr 13
Maintenance of order
l. The President shall call to order any repre-
sentative or substitute who departs from it.
2. If the offence is repeated, the President
shall again call the representative or substitute to
order and cause the fact to be recorded in the
minutes of proceedings.
3. In the event of a further o{fence (other
than an offence to which Rule 31 (4) applies) the
President may exclude the oflender from the
chamber for the remainder of the sitting.
4. In serious cases the President may pro-
pose that the representative or substitute who
committed the offence be censured and excluded
from the chamber for a period not exceeding
four days. The representative or substitute
upon whom a vote of censure is proposed shall
always have the right to be heard.
5. After the representative or substitute
concerned has been heard, ifhe has exercised his
right, the vote of censure shall be taken without
debate.
6. It shall be forbidden to make use of words
or expressions which are contrary to the good
conduct of debates. Without prejudice to his
other rights for the maintenance of order, the
President may cause such words to be deleted
from the offrcial report of debates. He shall
have similar power as regards any intervention
by a representative or substitute who has not
obtained prior permission to speak or who
exceeds the time that may have been allotted to
speakers.
Rurs 15
Public order in the chamber and galleries
l. No person shall enter the chamber for any
reason except representatives and substitutes,
ministers who are members of the Council of
Western European Union, other ministers of
member states and o{Iicials whose duties require
their presence there.
2. Only persons provided with a card grant-
ing right of access duly issued by the Clerk may
be admitted to the galleries.
3. Members of the public admitted to the
galleries shall remain seated and in silence.
Any person expressing approval or disapproval
shall be ejected at once by the ushers.
Rulr 13
Maintenance of order
l. The President shall call to order any repre-
sentative who departs from it.
2. If the offence is repeated, the President
shall again call the representative to order and
cause the fact to be recorded in the minutes of
proceedings.
3. In the event of a further offence (other
than an offence to which Rule 3l (4) applies) the
President may exclude the offender from the
chamber for the remainder of the sitting.
4. In serious cases the President may pro-
pose that the representative who committed the
offence be censured and excluded from the
chamber for a period not exceedlng four days.
The representative upon whom a vote of censure
is proposed shall always have the right to be
heard.
5. After the representative concerned has
been heard, ifhe has exercised his right, the vote
of censure shall be taken without debate.
6. It shall be forbidden to make use of words
or expressions which are contrary to the good
conduct of debates. Without prejudice to his
other rights for the maintenance of order, the
President may cause such words to be deleted
from the official report of debates. He shall
have similar power as regards any intervention
by a representative who has not obtained prior
permission to speak or who exceeds the time
that may have been allotted to speakers.
Rulr 15
Public order in the chamber and galleries
l. No person shall enter the chamber
without having been invited by the President of
the Assembly except representatives, ministers
who are members of the Council of Western
European Union, other ministers of member
states and oflicials whose duties require their
presence there.
2. Only persons provided with a card gran-
ting right of access duly issued by the Clerk may
be admitted to the galleries.
3. Members of the public admitted to the
galleries shall remain seated and in silence.
Any person expressing approval or disapproval
shall be ejected at once by the ushers.
4. Duly accredited representatives of the
media may be admitted to the chamber for the
purpose of photographic and/or sound recording
only under guidelines approved by the Presiden-
tial Committee.
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Ruw 22
Reports of debates
l. A report ofdebates at each sitting shall be
compiled in French and English and distributed
within as short a period as possible. A speech
delivered in French or English shall be repro-
duced verbatim in the report compiled in the
language in which the speech was delivered; a
summary report of the simultaneous interpreta-
tion of the speech shall be incorporated in the
report compiled in the other language. When a
speech is delivered in an oflicial language of a
member state other than French or English, a
summary report of its simultaneous interpre-
tation shall be incorporated in the reports
compiled in French and English.
2. Speakers are required to return the reports
of their speeches to the Office of the Clerk not
later than the day after that on which the reports
were communicated to them.
3. After each session or part-session the
reports of debates shall be published in full in
French and English.
Rul-r 24
Register of attendance
At each morning and afternoon sitting,
each representative or his substitute shall sign
the register of attendance in accordance with
Rule 7 before taking his place.
Rurr 26
Order of debates
l. A general debate and the examination of a
text shall take place on the report of the com-
mittee to which the matter has been referred and
not sooner than twenty-four hours after the dis-
tribution of the report unless the Assembly
decides to apply the provisions of Rule 43
below.
2. When examination of and voting on a text
as a whole have been concluded and the results
announced, representatives or substitutes may
present explanations of votes.
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Reports of debates
l. A report ofdebates at each sitting shall be
compiled in French and English and distributed
within as short a period as possible. A speech
delivered in French or English shall be repro-
duced verbatim in the report compiled in the
language in which the speech was delivered; a
summary report of the simultaneous interpreta-
tion of the speech shall be incorporated in the
report compiled in the other language. When a
speech is delivered in an oflicial language of a
member state other than French or English, a
summary report of its simultaneous interpreta-
tion shall be incorporated in the reports
compiled in French and English. Speakers may
submit corrections to the reports of their
speeches not later than the day after that on
which the reports were communicated to them.
2. A full transcription of speeches made in
Dutch, German and Italian shall be made avail-
able without delay to speakers on request.
They may submit corrections to the transcrip-
tion oftheir speeches not later than the day after
the speech was made.
3. After each session or part-session the
reports of debates shall be published in full in
French and English.
Rure 24
Register of attendance
l. At each morning and afternoon sitting,
each representative or his substitute shall sign
the register ofattendance before taking his place.
2. Unless otherwise provided by the rules,
the powers of a representative who is prevented
from attending a sitting may be exercised by a
substitute who has duly signed the register.
Rure 26
Order of debates
l. A general debate and the examination of
a text shall take place on the report of the com-
mittee to which the matter has been referred and
not sooner than twenty-four hours after the dis-
tribution of the report unless the Assembly
decides to apply the provisions of Rule 43
below.
2. When examination of and voting on a text
as a whole have been concluded and the results
announced, representatives may present expla-
nations of votes.
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RuI,e 27
Debate on the annual report
l. The Clerk shall send a copy of the annual
report of the Council of Western European
Union to each representative and substitute,
together with related documents.
2. The Presidential Committee shall refer to
the competent committees the relevant chapters
of the annual report of the Council of Western
European Union.
3. Meetings of the appropriate committees
shall be held before the opening or resumption
of the session.
These committees may formulate ques-
tions, which shall be transmitted by the Presi-
dent of the Assembly to the Council. The text
of the questions put to the Council and of the
replies thereto shall be included in reports ofthe
committees to the Assembly.
If a reply is postponed or omitted for
reasons ofEuropean public interest, the question
shall be published, with a statement of the rea-
sons given by the Council which deferred or
prevented the publication of a reply.
4. The Chairman of the Council may present
the report orally to the Assembly, and a general
debate take place on the annual report and on
the message of the Chairman of the Council.
5. An examination in detail of the texts sub-
mitted by the committees shall begin not earlier
than twenty-four hours after the distribution of
their reports.
6. A motion to disagree to the content of the
annual report, or any part of the report, must be
signed by at least ten representatives or substi-
tutes. The adoption of such a motion, which
shall not be put to the vote until at least twenty-
four hours after it has been tabled, shall require
support from a number of representatives or
substitutes equal to more than half the number
of the representatives to the Assembly.
Rum 28
Motions
1. Motions may be tabled by representatives
or substitutes on any matter within the aim and
scope of the Assembly as defined in Article I of
the Charter.
2. Motions must embody a concise summary
of the subject raised and take the form of a
recommendation, opinion or resolution. They
shall be submitted in writing and be signed by at
least ten representatives or substitutes.
3. The President shall decide whether such
motions are in order. He may, if he thinks fit,
RuI-e 27
Debate on the annual report
l. The Clerk shall send a copy of the annual
report of the Council of Western European
Union to each representative and substitute,
together with related documents.
2. The Presidential Committee shall refer to
the competent committees the relevant chapters
of the annual report of the Council of Western
European Union.
3. Meetings of the appropriate committees
shall be held before the opening or resumption
of the session. These committees may formu-
late questions, which shall be transmitted by the
President of the Assembly to the Council. The
text of the questions put to the Council and of
the replies thereto shall be included in reports of
the committees to the Assembly. If a reply is
postponed or omitted for reasons of European
public interest, the question shall be published,
with a statement of the reasons given by the
Council which deferred or prevented the publi-
cation of a reply.
4. The Chairman of the Cduncil shall be
invited to present the report orally to the Assem-
bly, and a general debate may take place on the
annual report and on the messagp of the Chair-
man of the Council.
5. An examination in detail of the texts sub-
mitted by the committees shall begin not earlier
than twenty-four hours after the distribution of
their reports.
6. A motion to disagree to the content of the
annual report, or any part of the r€port, must be
signed by at least ten represehtatives. The
adoption of such a motion, which shall not be
put to the vote until at least twenty-four hours
after it has been tabled, shall require support
from a number of representatives or substitutes
equal to more than half the number of the repre-
sentatives to the Assembly.
Rurs 28
Motions
l. Motions may be tabled by representatives
on any matter within the aim and scope of the
Assembly as defined in Article I of the Charter.
2. Motions must embody a concise summary
of the subject raised and take the form of a
recommendation, opinion, resolution, order or
decision. They shall be submittod in writing
and be signed by at least ten representatives.
(a/ Recommendations or opinions shall
be addressed to the Council.
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refer the matter to the Assembly or to the Presi-
dential Committee.
Motions which are in order shall be
printed and distributed immediately.
4. When the question of including such a
motion in the register is put to the Assembly, the
following only may be heard: one speaker for
the motion, one speaker against and the chair-
man of any committee concerned.
Rule 29
Amendments
1. Any representative or substitute may pro-
pose and speak to amendments. The President
shall decide whether they are in order.
2. Amendments must be signed by their
author. Amendments shall, if time permits, be
printed and distributed before their conside-
ration by the Assembly. The President shall
have the power not to select amendments for
consideration if, in his opinion, there has not
been adequate time for members of the Assem-
bly to study such amendments.
3. Amendments shall relate directly to the
text which it is sought to alter. Unless other-
wise decided by the President of the Assembly,
they shall relate to only one paragaph at a time.
4. Amendments shall be put to the vote
before the text to which they relate.
5. If two or more amendments relate to the
same paragraph, the amendment which differs
most from the original text shall be put to the
vote first.
6. When several contradictory amendments
are tabled, the President may rule that they be
debated together, their authors speaking in turn
before the amendments are put to the vote one
by one.
7. Amendments to amendments are in order
only if they do not contradict the amendment;
they may not be amended. They shall be
debated after and put to the vote before the
amendment to which they relate.
(b/ Resolutions shall be addressed to
international organisations, govern-
ments or national parliaments.
(c/ Orders shall be addressed to the Presi-
dent of the Assembly or to a com-
mittee.
(d/ Decisions concern the working of the
Assembly and the status of its mem-
bers.
3. The President shall decide whether such
motions are in order. He may, if he thinks fit,
refer the matter to the Assembly or to the Presi-
dential Committee. Motions which are in order
shall be printed and distributed immediately.
4. When the question of including such a
motion in the register is put to the Assembly, the
following only may be heard: one speaker for
the motion, one speaker against and the chair-
man of any committee concerned.
Rur-s 29
Amendments
1. Any representative may propose and
speak to amendments. The President shall
decide whether they are in order.
2. Amendments tabled in writing and signed
by their author shall be distributed without
delay. Unless otherwise decided by the Presi-
dent, no amendment shall be proposed and put
to the vote in the Assembly if it has not been
tabled at the latest before the end of the sitting
preceding that at which it is considered. In the
case of the first sitting, this timeJimit shall end
with the opening of the sitting.
3. Amendments shall relate directly to the
text which it is sought to alter. Unless other-
wise decided by the President of the Assembly,
they shall relate to only one paragraph at a time.
4. Amendments shall be put to the vote
before the text to which they relate.
5. If two or more amendments relate to the
same paragraph, the amendment which differs
most from the original text shall be put to the
vote first.
6. When several contradictory amendments
are tabled, the President may rule that they be
debated together, their authors speaking in turn
before the amendments are put to the vote one
by one.
7. Amendments to amendments are in order
only if they do not contradict the amendment;
they may not be amended. They shall be
debated after and put to the vote before the
amendment to which they relate.
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8. The reference back of an amendment to
committee may always be requested and shall be
obligatory if requested by the chairman or
rapporteur of the committee.
9. The reference back of an amendment to
committee shall not necessarily intemrpt the
debate. The Assembly may fix a timeJimit
within which the committee shall report its
conclusions on the amendments which have
been referred to it.
10. When amendments are being considered,
unless the President of the Assembly decides
otherwise, the only members who may speak
shall be the mover of the amendment, or ano-
ther member speaking in its favour, one member
opposed to the amendment and the rapporteur
or the committee chairman.
Rur_s 30
Orders of the Assembly
l. Any representative or substitute may lay
on the table of the Assembly a motion for an
order of the Assembly. The President shall
decide whether such motions are in order.
2. Such a motion may be put to the vote
without being referred to committee.
Rule 3l
Right to speak
L No representative or substitute may speak
unless called upon to do so by the President.
Representatives or substitutes shall speak from
their place and shall address the Chair; the Pre-
sident may invite them to come to the rostrum.
2. Representatives or substitutes wishing to
speak shall either enter their names before the
opening of the sitting in a register provided for
the purpose or ask for the right to speak in the
course of the sitting. The President may, in the
interests ofthe debate, depart from the order in
which representatives or substitutes have enter-
ed their names or have asked to speak. As far
as possible he shall endeavour to call alternately
upon speakers for and against the matter under
discussion. Once begun, a speech may not be
intemrpted and resumed at the following sitting.
3. A speaker may not be intemrpted except
on a point of order. He may, however, with the
permission of the President, give way during his
speech to allow another representative or substi-
tute to put to him a question on a particular
point in his speech.
4. If a speaker is irrelevant, the President
shall call him to order. Ifa speaker has already
8. When amendments are being considered,
unless the President of the Assembly decides
otherwise, the only members who may speak
shall be the mover of the amendment, or
another member speaking in its favour, one
member opposed to the amendrnent and the rap-
porteur or the committee chairman.
Rwe 30
Orders of the Assembly
Deleted.
Rurs 3l
Right to speak
l. No representative may speak unless called
upon to do so by the President. Representa-
tives shall speak from their place and shall
address the Chair; the President may invite
them to come to the rostrum.
2. Except for the chairman of the committee
and the rapporteur, representatives wishing to
speak in a general debate shall enter their names
in a register provided for the purpose at the
latest before the close ofthe sittint preceding the
debate. In the case of the first sitting, their
request to speak shall be made in writing before
the opening of the part-session. Unless the Pre-
sident decides otherwise, no other representative
shall be called upon to speak.
3. A speaker may not be intemrpted except
on a point of order. He may, however, with the
permission of the President, give way during his
speech to allow another representa,tive to put to
him a question on a particular point in his
speech.
4. If a speaker is irrelevant, the President
shall call him to order. Ifa speaker has already
been called to order twice in the same debate,
the President may, on the third occasion, forbid
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been called to order twice in the same debate,
the President may, on the third occasion, forbid
him to speak during the remainder of the debate
on the same subject.
5. Members of the Council and rapporteurs
on a question under discussion shall be allowed
to speak whenever they wish.
6. A representative or substitute who wishes
to make a personal statement shall be heard, but
only at the end of a sitting.
7. No representative or substitute may speak
for more than five minutes on any of the follow-
ing: explanations of vote, personal statements,
comments on the adoption of the minutes of
proceedings of tlre preceding sitting, determining
ofthe orders ofthe day ofa sitting and all ques-
tions ofprocedure.
Rurr 32
Procedural motions
l. A representative or substitute shall have
a prior right to speak ifhe asks leave:
(a) to move the previous question which,
if adopted, results in the subject of the
debate being removed from the agenda
and from the register of the Assembly;
(b) to move the suspension of the sitting
or the adjournment of the debate;
(c) to move the closure of the debate;
(d) to move reference back to committee.
Preyious questions shall be notified to the
President before the opening of the sitting and
put to the vote immediately after the presen-
tation of the relevant committee report.
None of these procedural motions may be
moved more than once during the course of a
debate.
2. The above matters shall take precedence
over the main question, the debate on which
shall be suspended while they are being con-
sidered.
3. In debate on the above matters, the
following only shall be heard: the proposer of
the motion, one speaker against the motion, and
the rapporteur or the chairman of any com-
mittee concerned..
4. In addition, a representative or substitute
shall have a prior right to speak if he asks leave
to raise a point of order. A point of order must
be confined to raising questions ofprocedure for
a ruling from the Chair.
him to speak during the remainder of the debate
on the same subject.
5. Members of the Council and rapporteurs
on a question under discussion shall be allowed
to speak whenever they wish.
6. The President shall decide when a repre-
sentative may respond to a statement challeng-
ing him on a personal basis. No debate may
take place on this response.
7. No representative may speak for more
than five minutes on any of the following:
explanations of vote, personal statements, com-
ments on the adoption of the minutes of procee-
dings of the preceding sitting, determining of the
order of business of the Assembly, the orders of
the day of a sitting and all questions of proce-
dure.
RuI.e 32
Procedural motions
l. A representative shall have a prior right to
speak ifhe asks leave :
(a) to move the previous question which,
ifadopted, results in the subject ofthe
debate being removed from the agenda
and from the register of the Assembly;
(b) to move the suspension of the sitting
or the adjournment of the debate;
(c/ to move the closure of the debate;
(d) to move reference back to committee.
Previous questions shall be notilied to the Presi-
dent before the opening of the sitting and put to
the vote immediately after the presentation of
the relevant committee report. None of these
procedural motions may be moved more than
once during the course ofa debate.
2. The above matters shall take precedence
over the main question, the debate on which
shall be suspended while they are being consi-
dered.
3. In debate on the above matters, the
following only shall be heard: the proposer of
the motion, one speaker against the motion, and
the rapporteur or the chairman of any com-
mittee concerned.
4. In addition, a representative shall have a
prior right to speak if he asks leave to raise a
point of order. A point of order must be con-
fined to raising questions of procedure for a
ruling from the Chair. The timeJimit for
points of order shall be one minute. If the right
to raise points of order is misused, the President
may forbid the offending representative to speak
for the remainder of the debate.
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Rurr 34
Methods of voting
l. The Assembly shall vote by sitting and
standing except in cases where a roll-call vote or
secret ballot is required.
2. The ,A,ssembly shall vote by roll-call:
(a) when an absolute majority is required,
in accordance with Rule 35, I (a), of
the Rules of Procedure;
(b) on the draft reply to the annual report
and on a draft recommendation or
opinion considered as a whole, when-
ever five or more representatives or
substitutes present in the chamber so
desire;
(c/ in other cases, whenever ten or more
representatives or substitutes present
in the chamber so desire.
3. The roll shall be called in alphabetical
order, beginning with the name of a represen-
tative drawn by lot. Voting shall be by word of
mouth and shall be expressed by " Yes ", " No ",
or " I abstain ". Only aflirmative and negative
votes shall count in calculating the number of
votes cast. The President shall be responsible
for the counting ofvotes and shall announce the
result. The votes shall be recorded in the
minutes of the proceedings of the sitting in the
alphabetical order of representatives' names.
4. Voting on nominations shall take place by
secret ballot. Only those ballot papers bearing
the names of persons who have been duly
entered as candidates shall be taken into account
for the purpose of calculating the number of
votes cast.
RuLe 35
Majorities
1. The majorities required are the following:
(a) for the adoption of,amendments to the
Charter, for the adoption of a motion
to disagree to the annual report or to
any part ofthe report or for the adop-
tion of a request for urgent procedure
without prior reference to committee:
a number of representatives or substi-
tutes equal to more than half the num-
ber of representatives to the Assem-
blv;
(b) for any other decision: a majority of
the votes cast;
Rure 34
Methods of voting
1. The Assembly shall vote by sitting and
standing except in cases where a roll-call vote or
secret ballot is required. Only dflirmative and
negative votes shall count in 0alculating the
number of votes cast.
2. The Assembly shall vote by roll-call:
(a) when an absolute majority is required,
in accordance with Rule 35 (a) of the
Rules of Procedure;
(b) on the draft reply to the annual report
and on a draft recommendation or
opinion considered as a whole, when-
ever five or more representatives pre-
sent in the chamber so desire;
. (c) in other cases, whenever ten or more
representatives present in the chamber
so desire or ifthe President so decides.
3. The roll shall be called in alphabetical
order, beginning with the name of a representa-
tive drawn by lot. Voting shall be by word of
mouth and shall be expressed by " Yes', " No ",
or " I abstain ". Only affirmative and negative
votes shall count in calculating the number of
votes cast. The President shall be responsible
for the counting of votes and shall announce the
result. The votes shall be recorded in the
minutes of the proceedings of the sitting in the
alphabetical order of representatives' names.
4. Voting on nominations shall take place by
secret ballot. Two tellers chosen by lot shall
count the votes cast. Only those ballot papers
bearing the names of persons whp have been
duly entered as candidates shall be taken into
account for the purpose of calpulating the
number of votes cast. The Prosident shall
announce the result.
Ruu 35
Majorities
The majorities required are the following:
(a) for the adoption of amendments to the
Charter, for the adoption of a motion
to disagree to the annual report or to
any part ofthe report or fbr the adop-
tion of a request for urgent procedure
without prior reference to committee:
a number of representatives or substi-
tutes equal to more than half the num-
ber of representatives to the Assem-
blv;
(b) for any other decision: a majority of
the votes cast (see Rule 34, paragraph
l);
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(c) for appointments other than those pro-
vided for in Rule l0 above: an abso-
lute majority of votes cast at the first
ballot and a relative majority at the
second ballot.
2. Only affirmative and negative votes shall
count in calculating the number of votes cast.
Rure 36
Quorum
l. The Assembly shall not take any decision
by roll-call unless more than half of the represen-
tatives to the Assembly or their substitutes have
signed the register ofattendance provided for in
Rule 24 above.
2. All votes other than votes by roll-call shall
be valid, whatever the number of representatives
or substitutes present, unless, at the request of a
representative or substitute before the voting has
begun, the President has ascertained that the
number of representatives or substitutes who
have signed the register of attendance is less
than a quorum.
3. In the absence of a quorum, the vote shall
be postponed. It may be taken at any time once
there is a quorum. Any matter on which it has
not been possible to vote before the end of
the part-session in the absence of a quorum shall
be referred to the Presidential Committee, which
shall decide whether the text should be put to the
vote at the next part-session of the Assembly or
referred back to committee.
Rws 39
Appointment of committees
l. At the beginning of each ordinary session
the Assembly shall set up the following perma-
nent committees:
(y' Committee on Defence Questions
and Armaments;
(ii) General Aflairs Committee;
(iii) Committee on Scientific, Technolo-
gical and Aerospace Questions;
(iv) Committee on Budgetary Aflairs and
Administration;
(v/ Committee on Rules of Procedure
and Privileges.
2. The first and second of the permanent
committees shall be composed of twenty-seven
members divided as follows: Belgium 3; France
(c) for appointments other than those pro-
vided for in Rule l0 above: an abso-
lute majority of votes cast at the first
ballot and a relative majority at the
second ballot. In the event of a tie,
the candidate senior in age shall be
declared elected. If only one candida-
ture is proposed to the Assembly and
there is no opposition to it, the single
candidate shall be declared elected (see
Rule 34, paragraph 4).
RuI-r 36
Quorum
l. The Assembly shall not take any decision
by roll-call unless more than half of the represen-
tatives to the Assembly or their substitutes have
signed the register ofattendance provided for in
Rule 24 above.
2. All votes other than votes by roll-call shall
be valid, whatever the number of representatives
or substitutes present, unless, at the request of a
representative before the voting has begun, the
President has ascertained that the number of
representatives or substitutes who have signed
the register of attendance is less than a quorum.
3. In the absence of a quorum, the vote shall
be postponed. [t may be taken at any time once
there is a quorum. Any matter on which it has
not been possible to vote before the end of the
part-session in the absence of a quorum shall be
referred to the Presidential Committee, which
shall decide whether the text should be put to the
vote at the next part-session of the Assembly or
referred back to committee.
Ruu 39
Appointment of committees
l. At the beginning of each ordinary session
the Assembly shall set up the following perma-
nent committees:
(y' Committee on Defence Questions
and Armaments;
(ii) General Affairs Committee;
(iii) Committee on Scientific, Technolo-
gical and Aerospace Questions;
(lvl Committee on Budgetary Affairs and
Administration;
(v,) Committee on Rules of Procedure
and Privileges.
2. The first and second of the permanent
committees shall be composed of twenty-seven
members divided as follows: Belgium 3, France
2r6
APPENDIX DOCUMENT 1039
5; the Federal Republic of Germany 5; Italy 5;
Luxembourg l; the Netherlands 3; the United
Kingdom 5.
The third, fourth and fifth permanent com-
mittees shall be composed of twenty-one mem-
bers divided as follows: Belgium 2', France 4;
the Federal Republic of Germany 4; ltaly 4;
Luxembourg l; the Netherlands 2; lhe United
Kingdom 4.
3. The Assembly may set up special com-
mittees during the session, which may be reap-
pointed at the beginning of subsequent ses-
sions. The Assembly shall fix the total number
of seats in such committees and the number of
seats to be allotted to each member state.
4. When setting up committees in accor-
dance with the provisions of the preceding para-
graph, the Assembly shall have regard to the
activities of other European organisations.
5. With the approval of the Council, the
Assembly may appoint committees of investiga-
tion as provided for in Article Yl 0 of the
Charter, the composition, terms of reference and
duration of which shall be defined in a reso-
lution.
6. Candidatures for membership of com-
mittees shall be addressed to the Bureau which
shall submit to the Assembly, or in the cases
provided for in Rule 8, paragraph 3, to the Presi-
dential Committee, proposals for their composi-
tion taking into account the representation of
political tendencies. The President of the
Assembly may invite the chairmen of political
groups to attend the appropriate meetings of the
Bureau. The Assembly, or the Presidential
Committee, shall decide by secret vote disputed
nominations for one or more seats in a com-
mittee.
7. The bureau of each committee shall be
composed of a chairman and two vice-chair-
men. Representatives or substitutes who are
members of governments shall not be members
of the bureau of a committee.
Rur-r 40
Powers of committees
L Committees shall examine questions and
documents which are referred to them by the
Assembly or by the Presidential Committee.
2. Committees shall also examine the action
taken on recommendations and resolutions
adopted by the Assembly on their reports.
3. Should a committee declare itself not
competent to consider a question, or should a
5, the Federal Republic of Gerrhany 5, Italy 5,
Luxembourg l, the Netherland$ 3, the United
Kingdom 5. The third, fourth 4nd fifth perma-
nent committees shall be composed of twenty-
one members divided as follows: Belgium 2,
France 4, the Federal Republic of Germany 4,
Itzly 4, Luxembourg l, the Netherlands 2, the
United Kingdom 4. The Presidential Commit-
tee may, during the periods between sessions or
part-sessions, provisionally fill the seats which
have fallen vacant in committees with represen-
tatives or substitutes. These appointments
must be ratified at the first session of the
Assembly.
3. The Assembly may set up special commit-
tees during the session, which may be reap-
pointed at the beginning ofsubsequent sessions.
The Assembly shall fix the total number of
seats in such committees and the number of
seats to be allotted to each member state.
4. When setting up committees in accor-
dance with the provisions of the preceding para-
graph, the Assembly shall have regard to the
activities of other European organisations.
5. With the approval of the Council, the
Assembly may appoint committeqs of investiga-
tion as provided for in Article yfi A of the
Charter, the composition, terms of reference and
duration of which shall be defined in a decision.
6. Candidatures for membership of commit-
tees shall be addressed to the Bureau which shall
submit to the Assembly, or in the cases provided
for in paragraph 2 above, to thre Presidential
Committee, proposals for their composition
taking into account the representation of politi-
cal tendencies. The President of the Assembly
may invite the chairmen of political groups to
attend the appropriate meetings of the Bureau.
The Assembly, or the Presidential Committee,
shall decide by secret vote disputed nominations
for one or more seats in a committee.
7. The bureau of each commiittee shall be
composed of a chairman and two vice-chairmen.
Representatives who dre membefs of govern-
mehts shall not be members of the bureau of a
committee.
Rur-r 40
Powers of committees
l. Committees shall examine questions and
documents which are referred to them by the
Assembly or by the Presidential Committee.
2. Committees shall also examine the action
taken on recommendations and resolutions
adopted by the Assembly on their reports.
3. Should a committee declare itself not
competent to consider a question, or should a
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conflict arise over the competence of two or
more committees, the question of competence
shall be submitted to the Presidential Com-
mittee or the Assembly.
4. Committees of the Assembly may request
the Council to communicate documents or
information nec€ssary for their enquiries.
5. A committee may, with the approval of
the Bureau of the Assembly, appoint one or
several of its members to undertake a mission
for purposes of information or study.
Rur.p 4l
Procedure in committees
l. A committee shall meet when convened
by its chairman or at the request of the President
of the Assembly, either during or between
sessrons.
2. A committee may, in the interest of its
work, appoint one or more subcommittees, of
which it shall at the same time determine the
composition and competence. However, the
number of members of a subcommittee may not
exceed a third of the membership of the full
committee.
3. Any two or more committees or subcom-
mittees may hold a joint meeting for the exami-
nation of subjects coming within their compe-
tence, but may not reach a joint decision.
4. The rules adopted for the Assembly
concerning the election of the President and
Vice-Presidents (Rules 5 and l0), the minutes of
proceedings (Rule 2l), amendments (Rule 29),
the right to speak (Rule 3l), procedural motions(Rule 32), and methods of voting (Rule 34), shall
apply to the proceedings of committees, subject
to the following provisions :
(a) A committee shall vote by show of
hands, unless any representative or
substitute requests a vote by roll-
call. The vote on any text which is to
be tabled in the Assembly shall be
taken by roll-call. The roll shall be
called alphabetically beginning with
the letter * A ". Election shall take
place by secret ballot. The formal
proposal of candidates is optional.
(b) Yoting in committee shall be by abso-
lute majority of the votes cast, pro-
vided that election shall be by relative
majority at the second ballot, if neces-
sary. In the event of a tie, the candi-
date senior in age shall be declared
elected.
(c) A committee may deliberate when
one-third of its members are present,
conflict arise over the competence of two or
more committees, the question of competence
shall be submitted to the Presidential Commit-
tee or the Assembly.
4. Committees of the Assembly may request
the Council to communicate documents or
information necessary for their enquiries.
5. A committee may, with the approval of
the Presidential Committee, appoint one or
several of its members to undertake a mission
for purposes of information or study.
Rwe 4l
Procedure in committees
l. A committee shall meet when convened
by its chairman or at the request of the President
of the Assembly, either during or between
sesslons.
2. In application of Rule 40, paragaph 5, a
committee may, in the interest of its work,
appoint one or more subcommittees, of which it
shall at the same time determine the composi-
tion and competence. However, the number of
members of a subcommittee may not exceed a
third of the membership of the full committbe.
3. Any two or more committees or subcom-
mittees may hold a joint meeting for the exami-
nation of subjects coming within their compe-
tence, but may not reach a joint decision.
4. The rules adopted for the Assembly
concerning the election of the President and
Vice-Presidents (Rules 5 and l0), the minutes of
proceedings (Rule 2l), amendments (Rule 29),
the right to speak (Rule 3l), procedural motions(Rule 32), methods of voting (Rule 34) and
majorities required (Rule 35 (b) and (c/), shall
apply to the proceedings of committees, subject
to the following provisions:
(a) A committee shall vote by show of
hands, unless any representative re-
quests a vote by roll-call. The vote
on any text which is to be tabled in the
Assembly shall be taken by roll-call.
The roll shall be called alphabetically
beginning with the letter * A ". Elec-
tion shall take place by secret ballot.
The formal proposal of candidates is
optional.
(b) A committee may deliberate when
one-third of its members are present,
but elections or the vote on a report as
a whole shall not be valid unless the
majority of the members of the bom-
mittee are present.
(c/ Substitutes may be elected members of
the bureau of a committee.
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but the vote on a report as a whole
shall not be valid unless the majority
of the members of the committee are
present.
5. The chairman of the committee may take
part in discussions and may vote, but without
having a casting vote.
6. Committee meetings shall be held in
private. Unless a committee decides otherwise,
representatives and substitutes may attend mee-
tings of that committee even though they are not
members, but they may not take part in its dis-
cussions.
A representative or substitute who has
moved a motion which has been referred to a
committee may, however, be invited by that
committee to take part in its discussions in an
advisory capacity.
7. The conditions in which any person who
is not a representative or substitute may be
heard by a committee shall be decided by that
committee. If the committee agrees, such a per-
son may take part in the discussions at the dis-
cretion of the chairman.
8. The conditions in which the offrcials of
Western European Union and experts are heard
by a committee shall be determined in each case
after agreement with the Council.
9. Minutes of proceedings shall be drawn up
for each committee meeting.
10. Unless a committee decides otherwise,
and subject to the confidential character ofinfor-
mation communicated by the Council, the only
texts which shall be made public shall be the
reports that have been agreed to, or statements
issued on the responsibility of the chairman.
Rwe 42
Reports of committees
l. The committees shall appoint a rappor-
teur for each subject, who shall be responsible
for the preparation of the report of the com-
mittee and for introducing it to the Assembly.
The final report of a committee shall comprise
an explanatory memorandum and a substantive
text.
2. The explanatory memorandum shall, in
particular, state the result of the vote taken in
committee on the report as a whole and, if the
committee's opinion is not unanimous, it must
also state the opinion of the minority.
3. Only the substantive text is voted upon by
the Assembly. It must be presented in the form
of a draft recommendation or opinion addressed
to the Council, a draft resolution or a draft
order.
5. The chairman of the comniittee may take
part in discussions and may vote, but without
having a casting vote.
6. Committee meetings shall be held in pri-
vate. Unless a committee decides otherwise,
representatives may attend meetings of that
committee even though they are not members,
but they may not take part in its discussions. A
representative who has moved a motion which
has been referred to a committee may, however,
be invited by that committee to take part in its
discussions in an advisory capacity.
7. The conditions in which any person who
is not a representative or substitute may be
heard by a committee shall be docided by that
committee. If the committee agrees, such a per-
son may take part in the discussions at the dis-
cretion of the chairman.
8. The conditions in which the offrcials of
Western European Union and experts are heard
by a committee shall be determined in each case
after agreement with the Council.
9. Minutes of proceedings shall be drawn up
for each committee meeting.
10. Unless a committee decidos otherwise,
and subject to the confidential charpcter ofinfor-
mation communicated by the Couhcil, the only
texts which shall be made public shall be the
reports that have been agreed to, Qr statements
issued on the responsibility of the chairman.
Rulr 42
Reports of committees
l. The committees shall appoint a rappor-
teur for each subject, who shall be responsible
for the preparation of the report of the commit-
tee and for introducing it to the Assembly. The
final report of a committee shall qomprise an
explanatory memorandum and a substantive
text.
2. The explanatory memorandum shall, in
particular, state the result of the vote taken in
iommittee on the report as a whole and, if the
committee's opinion is not unanimous, it must
also state the opinion of the minority.
3. Only the substantive text is voted upon by
the Assembly. It must be presented in the form
of a draft recommendation, opinion, resolution,
order or decision as defined in Rule 28.
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Rur.r 43
Urgent procedure
l. At the request of the Council, of the com-
mittee concerned, or of ten or more representa-
tives or substitutes, a debate may be held on an
item which has not been placed on the agenda.
2. As soon as a request for urgent procedure
is received, the President shall communicate it
orally to the Assembly. The request shall then
be posted up and the relevant text circulated.
The Assembly shall decide on the request for
urgent procedure at the earliest after the first
vote included in the orders of the day of the
sitting at which the request for urgent procedure
was communicated to the Assembly and at the
latest at the beginning ofthe next sitting.
3. The debate on a request for urgent proce-
dure shall not enter into the substance of the
question other than to justifr the request or to
reject the urgent procedure. [n connection with
a request for urgent procedure, the following
only may be heard: one speaker for the request,
one speaker against, the chairman of the com-
mittee concerned and one representative of the
Bureau speaking in its name.
4. If the Assembly decides against urgent
procedure, another request concerning the same
question may not be placed before it during the
same part-session.
5. If urgent procedure is adopted, the Assem-
bly may, notwithstanding the provisions of Rule
26, decide that the debate on the substance of
the text shall be held on an oral report of the
appropriate committee, either at the beginning
ofthe orders ofthe day ofthe next sitting or at a
later date during the current part-session.
6. Any request for urgent procedure without
prior reference to committee shall be put to the
vote by roll-call. Its adoption shall require a
favourable vote by a number of represen-tatives
or substitutes equal to more than half the
number of representatives to the Assembly.
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4. All reports on the agenda of a part-session
shall be adopted by committees at least three
weeks before the opening of the relevant part-
session. A report not adopted in time shall be
withdrawn from the agenda. However, if that
report has been adopted unanimously, the
Assembly may decide at the request of the com-
mittee to keep it on its agend4 unless twenty repre-
sentatives are opposed. Such a decision shall
be taken before the order ofbusiness is adopted(Rule l8). After adopting within the prescribed
timeJimit a report placed before it, the commit-
tee may, after that time-limit, prepare a supple-
mentary report to take account of current events.
Ruu 43
Urgent procedure
l. At the request of the Council, of the com-
mittee concerned, or of ten or more representati-
ves, a debate may be held on an item which has
not been placed on the agenda.
2. As soon as a request for urgent procedure
is received, the President shall communicate it
orally to the Assembly. The request shall then
be posted up and the relevant text circulated.
The Assembly shall decide on the request for
urgent procedure at the earliest after the first
vote included in the orders of the day of the sit-
ting at which the request for urgent procedure
was communicated to the Assembly and at the
latest at the beginning ofthe next sitting.
3. The debate on a request for urgent proce-
dure shall not enter into the substance of the
question other than to justify the request or to
reject the urgent procedure. In connection with
a request for urgent procedure, the following
only may be heard: one speaker for the request,
one speaker against, the chairman of the com-
mittee concerned and one representative of the
Bureau speaking in its name.
4. If the Assembly decides against urgent
procedure, another request concerning the same
question may not be placed before it during the
same part-session.
5. If urgent procedure is adopted, the Assem-
bly may, notwithstanding the provisions of Rule
26, decide that the debate on the substance of
the text shall be held on an oral report of the
appropriate committee, either at the beginning
ofthe orders ofthe day ofthe next sittingor at a
later date during the current part-session.
6. Any request for urgent procedure without
prior reference to committee shall be put to the
vote by roll-call. Its adoption shall require a
favourable vote by a number of representatives
or substitutes equal to more than half the num-
ber of representatives to the Assembly.
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Rure 45
Written questions
1. Any representative or substitute may put
written questions to the Council in accordance
with Article v (i) of the Charter. The text of
such questions shall be transmitted by the Presi-
dent to the Chairman of the Council. Ques-
tions and answers shall be published by the
Clerk of the Assembly.
2. All questions governed by this rule to
which an answer has not been given within a
period of one month shall be published, together
with a statement that no reply has been received.
Rum 47
Office of the Clerk of the Assembly
l. The Clerk shall be appointed by the
Assembly, on the proposal of the Bureau. He
shall provide the Assembly and its committees
with such secretariat and other assistance as they
may require.
Upon appointment, the Clerk shall make a
solemn declaration before the Assembly that he
will perform his duties in complete indepen-
dence and uninfluenced by national considera-
tions, that he will neither seek nor receive indi-
cations concerning the performance of his duties
from any government or authority other than
the Assembly, and will refrain from any action
incompatible with his position as a European
civil servant.
2. The Clerk shall, in consultation with the
Bureau, appoint oflicials on a permanent or tem-
porary basis as members of the Oflice of the
Clerk.
3. The Clerk shall establish close co-ope-
ration with the Secretary-General of Western
European Union, the secretariat of the Standing
Armaments Committee and the Agency for the
Control of Armaments.
Rure 45
Written questions
l. Any representative may put written ques-
tions to the Council in accordance with Article V(/ of the Charter. The text of such questions
shall be transmitted by the President to the
Chairman of the Council. Questions and ans-
wers shall be published by the Clerk of the
Assembly.
2. All questions governed by this rule to
which an answer has not been given within a
period of one month shall be published, together
with a statement that no reply has been received.
Ruu 47
Office of the Clerk of the Assembly
l. The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presi-
dential Committee on the proposal of the
Bureau. His term of oflice shall expire at the end
of the fifth year following his appointment and
may be renewed. If there has not been an
appointment or reappointment before 30th June
of the year in which his term of oflice expires,
his term ofoflice shall be extended by one year.
2. Upon appointment, the Clerk shall make
a solemn declaration before the Assembly that
he will perform his duties in complete indepen-
dence and uninfluenced by national considera-
tions, that he will neither seek nor receive indi-
cations concerning the performance of his duties
from any government or authority other than
the Assembly, and will refrain frorn any action
incompatible with his position as a European
civil servant.
3. In the exercise of his duties, the Clerk
shall be responsible to the President. He shall
provide the Assembly and its comrhittees with
such secretariat and other assistance as they may
require.
4. The Presidential Committee shall, on the
proposal of the Clerk, appoint members of the
bffice of the Clerk who are recruited for a period
of more than one year. It may delegate to the
Clerk the right to appoint permanent or tempo-
rary ollicials of a given level.
5. The Clerk shall establish close co-ope-
ration with the Secretary-General of Western
European Union, the secretariat of the Standing
Armaments Committee and the Agency for the
Control of Armaments.
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Rur-e 50
Waiver of the immunity of representatives
and substitutes
l. Any request addressed to the President by
the competent authority of a member state for
the waiver of the immunity of a representative
or substitute shall be transmitted to the Assem-
bly and then referred without prior discussion to
the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges.
2. The committee shall immediately consi-
der the request, but shall not make any examina-
tion of the merits of the case in question. The
representative or substitute concerned may, if he
so wishes, be heard by the committee. The
report of the committee shall conclude with a
draft resolution for the retention or the waiver of
the immunity.
3. The report of the committee shall automa-
tically be included as the first item ofthe orders
of the day for the first day on which the Assem-
bly sits after the report has been laid upon the
table of the Assembly.
4. The debate on the report shall be confin-
ed to arguments for or against the waiver
of the immunity.
5. The President shall immediately inform
the authority which submitted the request
of the decision of the Assembly.
Rurr 5l
Revision of the Rules of Procedure
l. Motions to amend the Rules of Procedure
must be supported by ten or more representa-
tives or substitutes. They shall be referred
without debate to the Committee on Rules of
Procedure and Privileges, which shall report on
them, as provided by Rule 42 above.
2. The examination of the report of the com-
mittee shall be included in the orders of the day
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 17
above.
3. The debate shall be concerned only with
the relevant texts.
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Rure 50
Waiver of the immunity of representatives and
substitutes
l. Any request addressed to the President by
the competent authority of a member state for
the waiver of the immunity of a representative
or substitute shall be transmitted to the Assem-
bly and then referred without prior discussion to
the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges.
2. The committee shall immediately consi-
der the request, but shall not make any examina-
tion of the merits of the case in question. The
representative or substitute concerned may, if he
so wishes, be heard by the committee. The
report of the committee shall conclude with a
draft decision for the retention or the waiver of
the immunity.
3. The report of the committee shall automa-
tically be included as the first item of the orders
of the day for the first day on which the Assem-
bly sits after the report has been laid upon the
table of the Assembly.
4. The debate on the report shall be confin-
ed to arguments for or against the waiver
of the immunity.
5. The President shall immediately inform
the authority which submitted the request of
the decision of the Assembly.
Rum 5l
Revision of the Rules of Procedure
l. Motions to amend the Rules of Procedure
must be supported by ten or more representati-
ves. They shall be referred without debate to
the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges, which shall report on them, as provided by
Rule 42 above.
2. The examination of the report of the com-
mittee shall be included in the orders of the day
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 17
above.
3. The debate shall be concerned only with
the relevant texts.
Document 1039
Amendments I and 2
2ndlDecember 1985
Revision aad iaterpretation of the
Chaner and of the Rulas of Procedure
AMENDMENTSIand2'
tabled by Mn Bianco and others
1_. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the
Charter.
2. I*ave out paragraph 23 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure(Rule 47).
Signed: Bianco, Amadei, Antoni, Mezzapesa, Foschi, Rauti, Masciadri, Giust, Sinesio, Martino,
Sarti, Milterdorfer, Francese
L See l2th sitting, 5th December 1985 (report referred back to comminee).
223
Document 1039
Amendments 3 to 9
3rd December 1985
Revision and interpretation of the
Charter and of the Rules of Procedure
AMENDMENTS 3 to 9t
tabled by Lord Hughes and others
3. In paragraph 3 of the draft resolution on the revision of Articles II[, IV, XI and XII of the
Charter, leave out " (a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presidential Committee on the proposal of
the Bureau for a period of five years. " and insert " (a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Assembly on
the proposal of the Presidential Committee for a period of five years. ".
4. After paragraph 8 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, insert the
following new paragraph :
" 9. Rule 14
In paragraph l, line 5, leave out'and'.
In paragraph 1, line 6, after'committees' insert 'and one member appointed by each political
group'.
In paragraph l, line 10, leave out'The President may invite the Chairmen of the political groups
to attend meetings of the Presidential Committee'. "
5. In paragraph 14, last line, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure,
leave out " Irave out paragraphs 8 and 9 and renumber paragraph l0 accordingly. ".
6. In paragraph 18, line 4, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure,
leave out " and there is no opposition to it ".
7. In paragraph 21, line 4, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure,
leave out " Irave out paragraph 4(b). ".
8. In paragraph 23, line 2, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure,
leave out " Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau " and insert " Assembly on the
proposal of the Presidential Committee ".
9. In paragraph 23 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, in the
proposed new paragraph 4, line l, leave out " shall " and insert " may'.
Signed: Hughes, Tummers, Hardy, Buchner, StoJfelen, Blaauw, van Tets, Jung, Cifarelli,
Staels-Dompas
l. See l2th sitting, 5th December 1985 (report referred back to committee).
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Amendment l0
4th December 1985
Revision and interpretation of the
Charter and of the Rulu of Procedure
AMENDMENT 10 
'
tabled by Mn Schalte and others
10. In paragraph 3, line 9, of the draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the
Charter, in the proposed new paragraph (c), leave out " , the secretariat of the Standing Armaments
Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments. " and insert " and the thr9e agencies for
security questions. "
Signed: Schulte, Eysink, Spies von Blillesheim, Unland, Lenzer, Berger, Enders, Ahrens, Stolfelen,
Schmidt, Gansel, Staels-Dompas
l. See l2th sitting, 5th December 1985 (report referred back to committee).
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Amendment 1l
4th December 1985
Revision and interpretation of the
Charter and of the Rules of Procedure
AMENDMENT 11 
'
tabled by Mr. Schulte and others
I l. In paragraph 23, line 17, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, in the
proposed new paragraph 5, leave out * , the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the
Agency for the Control of Armaments. " and insert * and the three agencies for security questions. ".
Signed: Schulte, Eysink, Spies von Bullesheim, Unland
l. See l2th sitting 5th December 1985 (report referred back to committee).
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Infioductory Note
In preparing this information report, the Rapporteurhad interviews as follows:
Non-proliferation treaty review conference, Geneva, 12th and 13th September 1985
H.E. Dr. Ian Cromartie, Ambassador, Deputy Representative of the United Kingdom;
Mr. Richard Edis, Counsellor;
Mr. Ian Kenyan, Expert;
H.E. Mr. Duncan Campbell, Ambassador, Leader of the Delegation of Australia;
Mr. Thomas Barthelemy, United States Delegation;
H.E. Mr. Milos Vejvoda, Ambassador, [rader of the Delegation of Czechoslovakia;
H.E. Mr. Ryukichi Imai, Ambassador, Representative of Japan;
H.E. Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala, Ambassador, Leader of the Delegation of Sri Lanka;
H.E. Mr. F.J.A. Terwisscha van Scheltinga, Ambassador, Leader of the Netherlands Delegation;
Mr. A.J. Meerburg, Adviser;
H.E. Mr. Saad Alfararyi, Ambassador, Representative of Egypt;
H.E. Mr. Victor Issraelyan, Ambassador, Deputy Leader of the Delegation of the Soviet Union.
NATO Headquarters, Brussels, l1th October 1985
Mr. Steven kdogar, Minister-Counsellor, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United
States;
H.E. Mr. Eric Da Rin, Ambassador, Deputy Secretary-General;
H.E. Mr. J.G.N. de Hoop Scheffer, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands;
Mr. Bots, Deputy Permanent Representative;
General Cornelius de Jager, Netherlands Army, Chairman of the Military Committee;
Brigadier General Ilenio Sanotto, Italian Army, Deputy Assistant Director (Arrns Control and
Disarmament), Plans and Policy Division of the International Military Staff;
Colonel H. Hoerner, German Army;
Colonel P. Schmitz, German Air Force;
Mr. A. Bonfanti, Mr. Salmon, Disarmament and Arms Control Section, Political Aflairs
Division, International Staff.
The committee as a whole met in Geneva on 24th July 1985 and was addressed by the following
representatives to the Conference on Disarmament:
- 
H.E. Mr. Mario Alessi, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Italy;
- 
H.E. Mr. Alfonso Garcia Robles, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Mexico and
Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament;
- 
H.E. Mr. Stanislaw Turbanski, Ambassador, Head of the Polish Delegation and Chairman of
the ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons;
- 
H.E. Mr. Saad Alfarargi, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Egypt and Chairman of
the ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space;
- 
H.E. Mr. Richard Butler, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of Australia and Chairman of
the ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons;
- 
H.E. Mr. Donald Lowitz, Ambassador, Representative of the United States;
- 
H.E.Mr. Victor Issraelyan, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the Soviet Union.
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The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the officials who met the Rapporteur
or committee and replied to questions. In particular, the Rapporteur thanks those members of the
staff of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, which was authorised by the Council to assist in the
preparation of the committee's report on disarmament.
This information report is intended to be a factual document prepared by the Rapporteur at the
request of the committee; it has not been approved by the committee.
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Information Report
(submitted by Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l.l. The committee has regularly reported on
disarmament and arms control problems, most
recently in both May and December 1984', the
reports usually concentrating on one or two par-
ticular sets of negotiations. In view of the
slightly improved prospects for movement in
some at least of the various forums where arms
control is discussed, the committee decided at its
rneeting on 2lst May 1985 to produce a com-
prehensive report on " all current arms control
and disarmament negotiating forums, both bila-
teral and multilateral; those dealing with nuclear
weapons and those dealing with other aspects of
arms control ".
1.2. At its meeting on 4th November, the com-
mittee had before it the first draft of such a
report, but realised that because of the broad
scope of the report and the committee's own
busy programme, there was insufficient time to
study it. The committee also decided to
postpone adoption of the report until after the
summit meeting between President Reagan and
General Secretary Gorbachev to be held on l9th
and 20th November, so that the Assembly at its
session beginning on 2nd December might have
before it a report which took account of the
summit meeting. However, in view of the tech-
nical problems involved in preparing and circu-
lating a large report to all representatives, the
committee requested the Rapporteur to produce
the present factual information report, based on
the explanatory memorandum to his first draft
report, for advance distribution.
1.3. This information report therefore summa-
rises the situation concerning five forums of
arms control negotiations: bilateral negotiations
between the United States and the Soviet Union
on nuclear and space weapons; and the multila-
teral forums on mutual and balanced force
reductions (Vienna); the Conference on Disar-
mament in Europe (Stockholm); the Conference
on Disarmament (Geneva); and finally the non-
proliferation treaty review conference held in
Geneva in September.
IL lnternational developments
2.1. Reporting last year the committee had to
note that " the general atmosphere of East-West
relations had deteriorated since the active period
l. Control of armaments and disarmament, Document
972, lsth May 1984, Rapporteur: Mr. de Vries; Control of
armaments and disarmament, Document 998, 3rd December
1984, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw.
of d6tente in the 1970s ... This is an unpropi-
tious background for current negotiations. The
situation is further complicated by the two
successive changes at short interval in the
leadership of the Soviet Union, and the presi-
dential election year in the United States.
Indeed, in retrospect it appears that the mini-
mum mutual confidence between the United
States and Soviet leadership that is needed for
any far-reaching agreements has not been
re-established since the period of Presidents
Nixon and Brezhnev ... ". While multilateral
negotiations were then continuing in the other
forums noted above, there had been no bilateral
negotiations between the two superpowers since
the Soviet walkout at the end of 1983.
2.2. The committee felt that " at the present
time, the European members of the alliance
must bear a far greater share of responsibility for
maintaining and developing relations with the
Soviet Union and its allies, and if necessary in
taking the initiative with specific proposals in
certain fields at the Conference on Disarmamentin Geneva which could open the way to
mutually advantageous agreements in the arms
control field "2.
2.3. Since then the general atmosphere of
East-West relations has improved slightly. In
some respects the united States administration
appears to be taking a slightly more positive atti-
tude to arms control, and the urgings of the
European countries, through quiet diplomacy
and bilateral conversations quite as much as
within formal structures such as the North
Atlantic Council, can take credit for this. Euro-
pean attitudes have undoubtedly significantly
strengthened the hand of the united states
Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, who seeks to
approach the bilateral negotiations realistically,
in his permanent struggle with the more hawkish
elements of the Reagan administration led by
the Secretary of Defence, Mr. Weinberger, and
the Assistant Secretary, Richard Perle, who has
been on record on a number of occasions as
advocating a breakout from the existing cons-
traints of the ABM treaty and SALT II.
2.4. The European allies themselves are in a
stronger position both to approach arms control
negotiations in the multilateral forums in which
they participate and to press their own view on
the United States. The five-year debate on the
deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles has
largely subsided, over 150 are already deployed
in four of the countries that agreed to accept
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them, parliamentary confirmation of the Nether-
lands decision is now confidently expected.
2.5. In the Soviet Union, Mr. Gorbachev has
shown himself to be a self-confident leader in
firm control. Although his chief experience and
future concerns are and will be with the reinvi-
goration of the Soviet economy, he has already
demonstrated a thorough grasp of arms control
issues, most recently in the speech made at a
reception in the National Assembly in Paris on
3rd October in the course of which he appeared
to break with past Soviet policy on a number of
points. His proposals for the complete prohibi-
tion of " cosmic attack weapons " and for a
reduction of 50% in nuclear weapons " capable
of reaching the territory of the other ", and his
statement of willingness to accept a separate
agreement on medium-range nuclear weapons in
Europe are commented on in Chapter IV below
as is his statement of readiness to begin direct
discussions with France and the United King-
dom on the nuclear forces of those countries.
Mr. Gorbachev continued however to make a
number of other points which appear to be new.
Recalling the proposal of the Eastern European
countries' Council of Mutual Economic Assis-
tance (COMECON) to establish direct links
with the European Economic Community, Mr.
Gorbachev then appeared to refer to European
political co-operation when he said " to the
extent that the EEC countries act as a'political
entity', we are ready to seek common language
with them also on concrete international pro-
blems. That could take various forms including
parliamentary links, in particular with those who
represent the European Parliament ... we do not
think for example that there should be an eternal
taboo on the possibility of establishing, in some
form, contacts between the Warsaw Pact Treaty
and the North Atlantic Alliance as organisa-
tions ". In the past, when for instance NATO
initiated its proposal for the opening of MBFR
negotiations, the Soviet Union had resolutely
refused to deal with the Secretary-General of
NATO.
2.6. The most important concrete sign of the
improved prospects for progress was of course
the January agreed statement by the United
States and the Soviet Union agreeing to reopen
direct bilateral negotiations, this time con-
currently in the three fields of strategic nuclear
weapons, intermediate-range nuclear weapons,
and space weapons, and the subsequent opening
of these negotiations in Geneva on 12th March
1985.
2.7. The forthcoming summit meeting between
President Reagan and General Secretary Gorba-
chev in Geneva on l9th and 20th November is
not expected to solve detailed problems of the
various arms control negotiations discussed in
this report, but it could contribute to re-estab-
lishing some of the mutual understanding bet-
ween two leaders, both firmly in the saddle, that
in retrospect can be seen to have characterised
the Nixon-Brezhnev era.
III. Negotiating forums for disarmament
and arms control
3.1. This report discusses the current status of
negotiations in five separate forums dealing with
arms control and disarmament. In the absence
of any recent concrete agreement in this field it
is often forgotten that so many sets of negotia-
tions are currently in progress. For complete-
ness they are described here.
3.2. The bilateral negotiations between the
United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear
and space weapons are dealt with in the follow-
ing chapter. They dominate public attention,
newspaper headlines about * Geneva arms
talks " generally refer to them, completely ignor-
ing the other multilateral arms control talks
which have been continuing for many years in
the same city.
3.3. In Vienna the only strictly bloc-to-bloc
talks between twelve NATO and seven Warsaw
Pact countries on what NATO usually refers to
as mutual and balanced force reductions have
continued without any agreement since
1973. They are entirely closed to the public;
documents tabled by each side are not released;
public information concerning them comes from
briefings given by spokesmen for either side.
3.4. In Stockholm since the beginning of 1984
the Conference on Disarmament in Europe has
been in progress with the participation of 35
countries from Europe, the United States and
Canada 
- 
the same countries as the parties to the
Helsinki final act of the conference on security
and co-operation in Europe. While the confe-
rence itself does not meet in public session the
speeches and proposals of various participants
have usually been made public. The conference
is convened to secure agreement on more far-
reaching confidence-building measures than
those included in the Helsinki final act, and
there are prospects that it will succeed in doing
so before the end of 1986.
3.5. In Geneva, the Conference on Disarma-
ment and its various predecessors has been mee-
ting twice a yeat since the 1960s. It represents
the principal worldwide multilateral negotiating
forum for arms control treaties, including in the
past the partial test-ban treaty, the treaty on the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the
biological weapons convention. Today there
are forty participating countries from all parts of
the world. Its plenary sessions are in public.
Lastly in this report there is an account of
review conference of the non-proliferation
3.6.
the
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treaty held this year in September in Geneva.
That treaty like the biological weapons conven-
tion, provides that a review conference of the
parties shall be held five years after its entry into
force, and these review conferences have become
self-perpetuating at five-yearly intervals.
3.7. For convenience a summary of countries
participating in the foregoing sets of negotiations
is given at Appendix I.
Alliance consultation
3.8. Arrangements for allied consultation in
these various sets of arms control negotiations
vary with the nature of negotiations themselves;
it is most intense and structured in the case of
the MBFR negotiations which are strictly
NATO-Warsaw Pact bloc-to-bloc, with no neu-
tral or non-aligned countries present. A special
MBFR working group with subgroups, meets in
NATO headquarters from time to time and both
the Council, the Military Committee and their
respective staffs are involved in studying and
preparing the western position in the negotia-
tions. This consultation process appears to be
watertight, no proposal is tabled by the West in
Vienna without its having been approved by the
North Atlantic Council as representing the
policy of the alliance as a whole. Consultationin Brussels is supplemented by on-the-spot
consultation within the ad hoc group where the
western delegations in Vienna meet among
themselves together with representatives from
SHAPE and the international military staff. It
appears that in the last two years the Military
Committee, and international military staff have
played a more active r6le in studying and pre-
paring western positions both in the MBFR posi-
tions, including the question of associated
measures, and in discussing confidence- and
security-building measures for presentation in
Stockholm. On the other hand, as far as the
Vienna negotiations are concerned the western
position does not appear to be discussed in other
allied bodies such as the WEU Council or within
European political co-operation.
3.9. As far as the Conference on Disarmament
in Europe in Stockholm is concerned, in view of
the essentially military nature of the confidence-
and security-building measures being proposed
by the West in those talks, NATO and its Mili-
tary Committee again play a prominent part in
preparing the agreed western position, and there
is further consultation within the western caucus
of delegations from the NATO countries which
meet together in Stockholm. There was of
course considerable economic and political
content in the CSCE negotiations leading up to
the Helsinki final act, and the machinery of
European political co-operation played a promi-
nent r6le. In Stockholm it appears that the
delegations from the European Community
countries meet only occasiona,lly as a caucus,
essentially to keep Ireland informed of pro-
gress 
- 
Ireland has chosen not to join the neutral
group of countries in their caucus meetings in
Stockholm. Nevertheless delegates of the
NATO countries speaking at the Stockholm
conference reflect individual policies of their
own countries in addition to the agreed allied
position.
3.10. As far as the forty-nation Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva is conoerned, consulta-
tion in NATO is a more sporadic affair with
occasional meetings in Brussels of experts from
national capitals. Delegations of the NATO
countries in Geneva give general support to pro-
posals from other allied countries, but proposals
they introduce into the confbrence do not
necessarily represent an agreed NATO view. A
particular case is the United States draft treaty
for the banning of chemical weapons introduced
in Geneva in July 1984, which apparently was
discussed in NATO only a few days beforehand;
the terms of the treaty have been generally sup
ported by allied speakers in Geneva, but specific
aspects of that draft treaty 
- 
as mentioned
below 
- 
do not represent the collective position
of the NATO countries. European political
co-operation is also known to review the posi-
tion of the Community countries in Geneva
negotiations, as well as in the United Nations
General Assembly debate on disarmament.
Prior to United Kingdom accession to the Euro-
pean Community in 1973 this task was always
carried out within the WEU Council.
3.11. As far as the bilateral negotiations on
nuclear and space weapons between the United
States and the Soviet Union are concerned, the
United States consults the allies within the
North Atlantic Council on a regular basis.
There are times when this consultation appears
to the European governments to amount to little
more than prior notification, often at short
notice, but given the permanent state of tension
between the White House, State Department,
and Department of Defence which characterises
the American policy-making frocess, allied
influence on Washington policy, through bila-
teral contacts as much as through formal collec-
tive consultation in Brussels, is probably gpeater
than may at times appear. During most of the
Reagan administration it has operated to streng-
then the hand of the State Department in the
internal Washington debate. Since 1979 a Spe-
cial Consultative Group has met periodically in
the NATO headquarters to consult on the bila-
teral negotiations concerning intermediate-range
nuclear forces (INF). It has been pointed out
that the United States chairmatship of this
Broup, held until his appointmertt as Ambas-
sador to Bonn by Mr. Richard Burt, is an
anomaly. Comparable NATO bodies are chair-
ed by senior members of the NATO interna-
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tional staff, reflecting the status of the Secretary-
General as Chairman of the North Atlantic
Council in both ministerial and ambassadorial
session. Statements made by the Chairman of
the SCG are felt to escape the checks of the
NATO machinery, and may not always accura-
tely reflect the views of the group as a whole.
3.12. Despite the recent reactivation, the WEU
Council in all this has not so far played a signifi-
cant r6le, except in the attempt to prepare an
agreed reply to Mr. Weinberger's invitation for
European allied participation in the strategic
defence initiative. The tentative meeting of
disarmament experts from Ministries for
Foreign Affairs, held under the chairmanship of
Ambassador Ruth in Bonn in February 1985,
appears from all accounts to have been a timid
affair and to have encountered some opposition
from the United States. There has however
been a meeting of the Permanent Council with
experts from national capitals to assess the
recent Soviet proposals in the bilateral
negotiations.
3.13. Allied consultation in preparation for the
forthcoming summit meeting between President
Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to be
held in Geneva on l9th and 20th November is a
classic case history of how not to consult allies.A casual White House initiative, obviously
unco-ordinated with the State Department, led
President Reagan to invite other leaders of the
seven-nation economic summit $oup - Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United
Kingdom 
- 
to a meeting in New York on 24th
October to consult in preparation for the summit
meeting. The White House announced the
invitations on 30th September, without the cus-
tomary prior consultation with the intended
guests through diplomatic channels, and in some
cases before the invitations had been received.
The opportunity was no doubt being taken
because of the scheduled presence in New York
of some of the heads of governments at that time
for the United Nations General Assembly. The
initiative in practice offended both some of the
intended guests, to whom the abrupt invitation
appeared as a summons, and the remaining nine
excluded NATO countries. President Mitter-
rand of France declined the invitation. Mr.
Tindemans, the Belgian Foreign Minister, in a
co-ordinated move with Mr. van den Broek, the
Dutch Foreign Minister, let it be known that he
had written to Mr. Shultz, the United States
Secretary of Defence, pointing out that NATO
remained the proper forum for allied consulta-
tion. Mr. Shultz offered to go to Brussels
himself to meet other NATO Foreign Ministers
who might be available at a special meeting of
the North Atlantic Council on l5th October. In
the event some nine ministers were able to
attend that meeting, but as the Foreign Ministers
of France, Germany and the United Kingdom
already had other commitments that could not
be rearranged at such short notice, the NATO
meeting inevitably took on some of the appea-
rances of a second-best arrangement for those
excluded from the New York meeting. In prac-
tice it provided Mr. Shultz with a useful plat-
form on which to reaflirm that the United States
would stick to a narrow interpretation of the
ABM treaty concerning the extent of SDI
research that it permitted.
IY. Bilateral negotiations
4.1. Since the Soviet Union walked out of the
two sets of bilateral negotiations on interme-
diate-range nuclear weapons (INF) and the stra-
tegic arms reductions talks (START) at the end
of 1983, following the initial NATO deployment
of cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe, the
bilateral talks were in abeyance throughout 1984.
4.2. After the meeting between the United
States Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, and the
then Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, in
Geneva on 8th January 1985 an agreed state-
ment on their resumption was issued:
" The sides agee that the subject of the
negotiations will be a complex of ques-
tions concerning space and nuclear arms
both strategic and intermediate-range with
all the questions considered and resolved
in their interrelationship. The objective
of the negotiations will be to work out
effective agreements aimed at preventing
an arms race in space and terminating it
on earth ... "
4.3. Bilateral negotiations were resumed in
Geneva in 1985 in a first session from l2th
March to l6th July, and a second from l9th Sep-
tember to 7th November. Delegations from the
two sides comprise three principals, one of
which represents their country in the three spe-
cialised goups which now meet on space wea-
pons; strategic weapons; and intermediate-range
weapons. The committee examines the ques-
tion of space weapons, the ABM treaty and the
strategic defence initiative in a separate report3.
The primary concern of the European allies
here will be to urge the United States to agree on
a mutually satisfactory definition of " permitted
research " for SDI, to ensure that the ABM
treaty is not eroded through the " broad " defini-
tion that the Department of Defence, unsuccess-
fully so far, has been pressing for. Not a great
deal has emerged in public concerning the
detailed negotiating positions of the two sides in
the other two sets of negotiations on strategic
and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. This
is usually to be taken as a good sign that the dis-
3. WEU and the strategic defence initiative 
- the strategic
defence initiative (Defence aspects), Document 1033, 4th
November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. van den Bergh.
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cussions are in earnest, but little progress can be
expected before the November summit meeting.
Strategic nuclear weapons
4.4. The United States has recalled what is
publicly known about its negotiating position on
strategic nuclear weapons most recently in
Mr. Shultz's address to the North Atlantic
Assembly in San Francisco on l4th October
where he said that the United States had pro-
posed a reduction of nuclear warheads on ballis-
tic missiles to 5,000 on each side, a considerable
reduction in the numbers and yield of ballistic
missiles, and substantial reductions in the num-
bers of strategic bombers and airJaunched cruise
missiles carried by them.
4.5. Mr. Gorbachev in his speech at the recep-
tion given in the National Assembly in Paris on
3rd October gave a partial explanation of the
latest Soviet proposals which at first sight appea-
red attractive :
" A few days ago we proposed to the
Government of the united States to come
to terrns on the total prohibition of space
strike arms for both sides and to reduce
really radically, by 50%, the nuclear arms
capable of reaching each other's terri-
tory."o
4.6. Mr. Nitze, the United States co-ordinator
of arms control policy, subsequently briefed the
North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 9th Octo-
ber concerning the detailed proposals which the
Soviet Union had finally tabled in the bilateral
negotiations in Geneva on 30th September. It
is clear from subsequent press reports that the
Soviet o{fer was one of 50% reduction in strate-
gic missile launchers and aircraft (not warheads)
and was not limited to intercontinental weapons
but extended to all United States forward-based
weapons in Europe including the recently
deployed cruise and Pershing missiles, as well as
carrier-based and land-based tactical aircraft in
Europe and Asia that are within range of Soviet
territory. At the same time, this definition
would of course exclude Soviet SS-20 and SS-4
missiles in range of Western Europe, China and
Japan. It is understood that the Soviet Union
proposed that nuclear charges, which is assumed
to include warheads of all missiles including
cruise missiles, as well as aircraft bombs, should
be limited to 6,000 on each side with not more
than 60% in any leg of the triad comprising
ICBM; SLBM;weapons carried in aircraft. The
Soviet Union also implied concessions to limit
missile throw-weight in which it has superiority.
4.7. In proffering this definition of strategic
nuclear weapons the Soviet Union was reverting
to its negotiating position on SALT at the
beginning ofthe 1970s. To be acceptable to the
United States, and to alliance irtterests in gene-
ral, any separate agxeement on strategic weapon
systems will almost certainly have to be limited
to the same categories of system$ as those inclu-
ded in the two existing SALT agreements, i.e.,
weapons ofintercontinental range, based on the
territory of one of the superpowers or in subma-
rines, and capable ofreaching the territory ofthe
other.
4.8. The United States put forward new
detailed proposals in Geneva on lst November
which President Reagan the previous day said
called for " deep cuts, no first-strike advantage,
defensive research ... and no cheating ". Details
have not been made public. Although des-
cribed in Moscow as " old proposals ", it is clear
that the latest proposals from both sides repre-
sent the start ofserious negotiations.
4.9. Meanwhile, the United States and the
Soviet Union (with the ambiguity concerning
the SS-25 missiles referred to in paragraphs 4.25
et. seq.) continue to respect the still unratified
SALT II agreement signed by President Carter
and General Secretary Brezhnev in 1979. On
lTth September 1985, the United States Depart-
ment of Defence announced that President Rea-
gan had ordered the dismantling of the Poseidon
nuclear missile submarine Sam Rayburn with
sixteen missiles as the seventh Ohio class sub-
marine Alaska with twenty-four rnissiles beganits sea trials. The United States has also
announced that subject to reciprocity it will
continue to respect the SALT II limits after
3lst December 1985. The treaty would have
expired then, but its Article XIV also states " the
objective of the parties to conclude well in
advance of 1985 an agreement limiting strategic
offensive arms to replace this treaty on its expi-
ration ". Present levels of strategig nuclear wea-
pons covered by the treaty are shown in Appen-
dix V.
Intermediate-range nuclear weapon$
4.10. With the steady deployment since the end
of 1983 of cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe,
NATO is today in a stronger positlon regarding
this category of weapons system than in the
past. The public debate about the validity of
NATO's 1979 dual decision to deploy 572 INF
systems, while negotiating reductirons in such
systems with the Soviet Union, ha$ largely sub-
sided. Since the end of 1983 when the deploy-
ment of the first Pershing and cruise missiles in
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom was
publicly announced, the policy followed by the
countries having accepted deployment of these
weapons on their territory appears to be not to
comment on actual numbers deployed at any
one time. From such public statements as have
been made from time to time, and from various4. Soviet News, 9th October 1985.
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press reports, it appears that the status of the NATO deployment schedule is approximately as
shown in the following table:
NATO INF deploymcnt schedulo
Country Base
Maximum levels
agreed in 1979
Probable sratus
October 1985
NotesPershing II Cruise Pershing II Cruise
Belgium
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
United
Kingdom
Florennes
Mutlangen
Heilbronn
Neu Ulm
Bitburg
Comiso
Woensdrecht
Greenham
Common
Molesworth
to
36
,_,
i'
96
tt2
48
96
64
36
9
9
l6
48
48
Due in 1986
Due in 1988
Due in 1988
Totals 108 464 54 tt2
4.11. The total numbers of Pershing and cruise
missiles deployed probably exceeds 150, although
Mr. Allen Holmes, speaking as the United
States Chairman of the NATO Special Consulta-
tive Group, said on lTth September that the
number was ll8 
- 
a lower number than that
referred to by Lord Carrington at the meeting of
the Nuclear Planning Group in Luxembourg in
March.
4.12. Under the terms of the Netherlands
Government decision of lst June 1984, a final
decision on deployment of the 48 cruise missiles
in the Netherlands scheduled for 1988 was to be
dependent on the number of Soviet SS-20
missiles deployed on lst November 1985 being
greater than the number on lst June 1984 when
it was reported to be 378. In the light of the
NATO NPG assessment that 441 were deployeds,
the Netherlands Government duly took the
decision to deploy on lst November 1985, and
on 4th November signed an agreement to this
effect with the United States.
4.13. A letter from Mr. Lubbers, the Prime
Minister, to parliament explaining the decision,
referred to the government's attempt to * do
something of its own to promote arms control
while remaining within the framework of the
alliance's defence policy ". However, an
exchange of letters with Mr. Gorbachev had
shown * that the Soviet Union is not prepared to
match our efforts to achieve arms control and
arms reductions "6. The Netherlands is now
5. Paragraph4.lT.
6. Quoted from Atlantic News, 6th November 1985.
consulting with a view to abolishing the nuclear
strike r6le of its dual-capable F-16 aircraft and
the nuclear r6le of its Orion maritime patrol
aircraft, so that in addition to the cruise missiles
it will retain a nuclear r6le only for the lance
tactical missile and 8-inch howitzer 
- 
all of
course relying on United States warheads. In
the event of a bilateral INF agreement being
concluded, the number of cruise missiles to be
deployed in the Netherlands could be adjusted
accordingly. Parliamentary approval of the
government decision is now expectedT.
4.14. During 1984 the number of SS-20 missiles
actually deployed by the Soviet Union appears
to have remained frozen at the level of 378
reported in the Nuclear Planning Group com-
munique of 7th April 1984. Of these 243 were
reported to be within range of Europe, although
that figure is not oflicially given in the NPG
communiquE. The subsequent NPG communi-
qu6 on l2th October 1984 did not state the num-
ber of SS-20 missiles deployed, and the diffe-
rence of interpretation on the issue between the
United States and its European allies became
apparent after the meeting. The communiqu6
stated that: 'New SS-20 bases, east and west of
the Ural mountains, are under construction
which, when operational, u/ill significantly
increase the number of deployed SS-20 laun-
chers. " Mr. Weinberger after the meeting
informed journalists that * to my knowledge ...
there are additional SS-20 missiles since the
January count that are ready and able to be
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shot ". The difference of opinion appeared to
reside in the state of readiness of certain SS-20
missiles. The NPG communiqu6 of 29th
March 1985 stated unambiguously however
that: " the current SS-20 force is composed of
414 SS-20 launchers with 1,242 warheads ".
4.15. Following the meeting of the NATO Spe-
cial Consultative Group - the group of national
experts that consults on progress of the interme-
diate-range part of the bilateral negotiations on
nuclear space weapons - on lTth September
1985, the new United States Chairman, Mr.
Allen Holmes, in a press statement said: " the
group reviewed in detail recent developments in
the Soviet SS-20 force. They noted that despite
the moratorium on LRINF deployments declar-
ed by General Secretary Gorbachev on 7th April
the Soviet Union has continued to deploy new
SS-20s and that the current Soviet SS-20 force
has grown to 441 launchers. " The status of
declarations made by the chairman of a NATO
group is of course different from that of a com-
muniqu6 formally issued by a meeting, the latter
having to be approved unanimously by the parti-
cipants. It has also been pointed out to your
Rapporteur that, as mentioned in paragraph
3.11, there is a anomaly in having a United
States chairman of a NATO committee such as
the Special Consultative Group.
4.16. The issue of numbers of SS-20 deployed
has become more complex with other remarks
made by Mr. Gorbachev in his speech in
the National Assembly reception in Paris on
3rd October 1985 already quoted in another
context:
" You know that we have announced a
moratorium on the dePloyment of
medium-range missiles in Europe. The
number of SS-20 missiles that the Soviet
Union has on stand-by alert in the Euro-
pean zone is now 243. This means that it
precisely accords with the level of June
1984, when the additional deployment of
our missiles was started in response to the
deployment of American medium-range
missiles in Europe. The SS-20 missiles
that were additionally deployed in the pro-
cess have been withdrawn from standby
alert and the stationary installations for
housing these missiles will be dismantled
within the next two months. This is veri-
fiable. As to our reply measures in
respect of the territory of the United
States itself they continue to remain in
force.
I also wish to explain the meaning with
which we invest the term 'European zone'
in this case. This is the zone in which
medium-range missiles capable of striking
targets on the territory of Western Europe
are deployed.
It should be added to this that we have
already totally phased out the old, and
very powerful, SS-5 missiles and are conti-
nuing to phase out SS-el missiles. This
means that taken as a whole the numbers
of medium-range carrier missiles in the
European zone of the USSR is now much
smaller than ten or even fifteen years
ago.'
4.17. NPG communiques have never made a
clear distinction between Soviet SS-20 missiles
in the Far East, targeted on China and Japan,
and those in the European and central areas of
the Soviet Union which can reach targets in
Europe. But the famous July 1982 " walk in the
woods " abortive compromise discussed by the
United States and Soviet negotiators, Mr. Nitze
and Mr. Kvitsinsky, was reported to have
suggested a limit of 75 land-based missile laun-
chers for each side in Europe, but with a funher
90 SS-20 missile launchers permitted to the
Soviet Union in the area east of 80' East longi-
tude agreed to be out of range of European
targets. While the SS-20 is a lnobile missile,
cruise and Pershing II are at least as mobile. In
some circumstances stocks in the United States
could be held to offset SS-20 mis iles east of 80'
East longitude.
4.18. The communiqu6 of the ministerial mee-
ting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group on
29th and 30th November states unambiguously
that " the total SS-20 force his further increased
to 441 launchers with 1,323 warheads ". As
before no breakdown is given concerning mis-
siles in range ofEurop€an targets (those in Euro-
pean and central parts of the Soviet Union, west
of 80' East longitude) and those in the east tar-
geted on China and Japan. Another respected-
estimateE for July 1985 shows a total of
423 SS-20 and 120 SS-4 among $oviet IRBMS,
of which all the SS-4 and 216 SS.20 would be in
the European part of the Soviet Union, 45 SS-20
in the central part, and the remainder (162) in
the Far East. These figures show 261 SS-20 in
range of European targets, compared with 243
claimed by Mr. Gorbachev (paragraph 4.15).
4.19. The INF negotiations are of course consi-
derably complicated by the issue of other wea-
pons systems, including the Soviet shorter-range
SS-21 and SS-22 nuclear missiles now deployed
in the Democratic Republic of Germany and
Czechoslovakia. The SS-22 in particular is
reported to have a range of 900 kilometres pro-
bably bringing it well within range of targets in
Germany and the Benelux countrios. The ques-
tion of which nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe
should be included in an INF agroement is also
very complex. In his 3rd October speech in
8. The Military Balance
l 985.
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Paris quoted above, Mr. Gorbachev however
stated categorically:
* Concerning medium-range nuclear wea-
pons in Europe. With the aim of making
agreement easier on their speediest mutual
reduction, we consider it possible to
conclude a corresponding agreement sepa-
rately, outside of direct connection with
the problem of space and strategic arms. "
British and French nuclearforces
4.20. Mr. Gorbachev's surprise offer of direct
discussions 
- 
not negotiations 
- 
with Britain and
France was made in the same Paris speech in the
sentence following his offer of a separate agrce-
ment on INF forces:
" In this connection I consider it impor-
tant to explain our position on such a
question as the place ofthe nuclear poten-
tial of France and Britain in the European
balance of forces. This potential is grow-
ing rapidly and we can no longer ignoreit. It was said from the French side that
the nuclear forces of France are not sub-ject to discussion without her participa-
tion. This stands to reason. It follows
from this that it is time to start between us
a direct dialogue on this theme and try to
find an acceptable way out through joint
effort. The Soviet Union is prepared for
such a direct dialogue with France just as
with Britain, of course.
Here I want to stress that we will take into
account the security interests of France in
the most attentive manner. And today,
as it appears to us, the question ofa reduc-
tion of her armaments is not on the
agenda."
4.21. President Mitterrand was quick to decline
the Soviet invitation. According to the press
the invitation to the United Kingdom was subse-
quently confirmed in a three-page letter from
Mr. Gorbachev to Mrs. Thatchere. The Foreign
Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, has stated since
Mr. Gorbachev's Paris speech that Britain would
be prepared to look at its own position if the
superpowers agreed very substantial reductions
in their strategic nuclear weapons, and if there
was no improvement in the Soviet strategic
defence capabilities. The French position in
the past has been to insist also that imbalance of
conventional forces in Europe should be redu-
ced, and chemical weapons eliminated, before
consideration could be given to negotiating on
French nuclear forces.
4.22. Throaghout the SALT negotiations in the
1970s the western powers were at pains to
exclude any discussion of French and British
nuclear forces in purely bilateral talks and agxee-
ments between the United States and the Soviet
Union. However, in the SALT I interim agree-
ment on strategic offensive arms signed on 26th
May 1972 the Soviet Union was careful to pre-
serve its own position in a unilateral statement
which is reprinted in the official United States
text of the treaty and related statements and
understandings:
" On lTth May 1972 Minister Semenov
made the following unilateral statement of
the Soviet side:
'Taking into account that modern ballistic
missile submarines are presently in the
possession of not only the United States,
but also of its NATO allies, the Soviet
Union agrees that for the period of effecti-
veness of the interim freeze agreement the
United States and its NATO allies have
up to 50 such submarines with a total of
up to 800 ballistic missile launchers there-
on (including 4l US submarines with
656 ballistic missile launchers). However
ifduring the period ofeffectiveness ofthe
agreement United States allies in NATO
should increase the number of their
modern submarines to exceed the num-
bers of submarines they would have ope-
rational or under construction on the date
of signature of the agreement, the Soviet
Union will have the right to a correspon-
ding increase in the number of its subma-
rines...'. "
There follows in the offrcial United States text
the statement made subsequently on 24th May
to the elfect that * the United States does not
accept the validity of the considerations in that
statement ".
4.23. The committee in previous reports has
always taken the view that while United States
and Soviet nuclear weapons remain at their pre-
sent very high levels there can be no case for
negotiating reductions in the relatively small
levels of nuclear weapons controlled by the two
European governments. It is obvious at the
same time that the Soviet Union must take
account of the levels of these forces in its own
assessment of the threat, and indeed a recent
British defence white paper makes precisely that
claim which Soviet spokesmen have been deligh-
ted to quote. The introduction of MIRVs to
French and British forces in the future will signi-
ficantly increase their capability. The Trident
D-5 missile scheduled to be fitted to British sub-
marines in the 1990s can carry up to ten MIRVs,
although the United Kingdom has stated that ir
does not intend to deploy this number. This
aspect will certainly complicate the arms control
situation. The Soviet Union may again insist
on appending a unilateral statement to the sepa-9. Daily Telegraph, l Trh October t 985.
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rate agreement on INF systems that Mr. Gorba-
chev has specifically offered, since the Soviet
systems to be counted in such an agreement
threaten the territory of only the European allies.
4.24. The committee in the past has pointed out
that any concept of nuclear balance can be dis-
cussed only in terms of all nuclear weapons sys-
tems 
- there cannot be a European theatre
balance separate from a United States-soviet
Union strategic balance 
- 
in part because many
of the intercontinental Soviet systems are
designed and deployed to be able to strike targets
in Europe as well as in the United States. For
the purpose of arms control agreements however
it will be easier to agree on a separate package of
reductions affecting only INF forces. The
forward-based United States systems including
cruise and Pershing missiles must be kept firmly
within any such package in order to secure
reductions in SS-20 missiles in particular.
" Cheating "
4.25. United States allegations of breaches of
existing arms control agreements by the Soviet
Union have been described in previous reports.
The chief allegations have concerned the cons-
truction of a phased array radar at Abalokova
near Krasnoyarsk, said to breach the ABM
treatf the conduct of some nuclear tests in
excess of 150 KT in breach of the (unratified)
threshold test-ban treaty, and the deployment of
two new ICBMs including an SS-25 in breach of
the (unratified) SALT II treaty. European
governments have not found all United States
allegations proven, and press reportsro have spo-
ken of strong disagreements on this issue with
Mr. Weinberger who was said to be demanding
a tough NATO statement condemning Soviet
violations.
4.26. The NPG communiqu6 of 30th October
1985 reported that "we received a detailed
briefing from the United States Secretary of
Defence on the evidence of Soviet treaty viola-
tions. We take the most serious view of this
and call on the new Soviet leadership to take the
steps necessary to assure full compliance with its
commitments ". The communique expressed
concern at the " testing and deployment of new
strategic systems, including the SS-X-24 and the
recently deployed SS-25, ... " (thus accepting the
SS-25 as a new system rather than an improved
SS-13 as claimed by the Soviet Union), but
made no other specific endorsement of the
United States allegations.
4.27. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is said to
have offered to suspend work on the Abalokova
radar if the United States would suspend the
conversion of its early warning radars at Thule,
Greenland, and Fylingdales, United Kingdom,
to phased array as now planned.
Y. Mutual and balanced forw redactions
History
5.1. The communiqu6 of the ministerial ses-
sion of the North Atlantic Courrcil in Luxem-
bourg on l4th June 1967 first irrdicated NATO
interest in force reductions: " if conditions
permit, a balanced reduction of forces by the
East and West could be a significant step
towards security in Europe. A oontribution on
the part of the Soviet Union and the Eastern
European countries towards a reduction of
forces would be welcomed as a ggsture of peace-
ful intent. " Following the adoption by the North
Atlantic Council on 14th December that year of
the Harmel report on the future tasks of the
alliance pledging the NATO countries to seek
d6tente in parallel with defence, the North
Atlantic Council issued the so-called Reykjavik
signal at their meeting in that city on 25th June
1968. An annex to the communiqu6 contained
a declaration on mutual and balanced force
reductions which was spelt out in more detail in
the declaration attached to the North Atlantic
Council ministerial communiqu6 issued in
Rome on27th May 1970 which read as follows:
* 3. Ministers invite interested states to
hold exploratory talks on mutual and
balanced force reductions irr Europe, with
special reference to the oentral region.
They agree that in such talks the allies
would put forward the following conside-
rations:
(a) mutual force reductiorls should be
compatible with the vital security
interests of the alliance and should not
operate to the military disadvantage of
either side having regard for the diffe-
rences arising from geographical and
other considerations;
(D/ reductions should be on a basis of reci-
procity, and phased and balanced as to
their scope and timing;
(c/ reductions should include stationed
and indigenous forces and their wea-
pons systems in the areas concerned;
(d) there must be adequate verification
and controls to ensure the observance
of agreements on mutual and balanced
force reductions. "
5.2. From the NATO standpoint, these propo-
sals to some extent were a counter to the calls
made by the Warsaw Pact countries for a confe-
rence on security in Europe. The two processes
led frnally to the opening of the Helsinki confe-10. Sunday Times, 27th October 1985.
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rence on security and co-operation in Europe,
and the convening in Vienna on 31st January
1973 of exploratory talks between twelve NATO
and seven Warsaw Pact countries on mutual
force reductions which on 28th June produced
an agreement providing for the formal opening
of negotiations in Vienna on 30th October that
year.
5.3. The preparatory talks agreed that negotia-
tions would be on * mutual reduction of forces
and armaments and associated measures in Cen-
tral Europe ". The decision-making or direct
participants were to be: Belgium, Canada, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the
United States on the NATO side and Czechoslo-
vakia, the German Democratic Republic,
Poland and the Soviet Union on the Warsaw
Pact side. Special status countries allowed to
speak but not participate were to be: Denmark,
Greece, Italy, Norway and Turkey on the one
hand, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania on the
other. Reductions were to be discussed of all
forces within the area comprising the territory of
the decision-making countries other than the
United States, Canada and the Soviet Union.
The NATO countries would be negotiating
under the handicap that United States reduc-
tions would be withdrawn 6,000 km across the
Atlantic, Soviet reductions only 600 km over-
land. But NATO had an advantage in the
depth and area of reductions of 600 km and
549 sq. km on the Warsaw Pact side, compared
with 300 km and 317 sq. km on the NATO side.
Proposals in 1982
5.4. The committee having reported from time
to timetr on the progress of the MBFR
negotiations, the full history of proposal and
counter-proposal is not repeated here. To
describe the present situation it is most
convenient to start with the two draft treaties
proposed in 1982.
5.5. On l8[h February of that year Poland on
behalf of the Warsaw Pact introduced a draft
treaty for a phase I agreement with the following
provrslons:
(y' reductions of 13,000 United States
troops and 20,000 Soviet troops, each
to include a complete division and
subunits equivalent to an armoured
brigade, together with all their arma-
ments and combat equipment. The
reductions were to be completed
within one year and the troops with-
drawn to their own countries located
so as not to threaten the security of
the other (indirect) participants;
I l. Document 972, cited above, and Disarmament, Docu-
ment 909, 2fth April 1982, Rapporteur: Mr. Vohrer.
(ii) a freeze on all other forces in the
reduction area for the duration of
phase l;
(iii) phase I to last for three years;
(iv) in the subsequent phase 2 agreement
would be reached on proportionate
reductions offorces ofall direct parti-
cipants to common collective ceilings
of 90,000, reductions of each country
to be proportionate to the country's
proportionate contribution to the
total forces in the area at the outset;
the forces of no participant ever to
exceed 50% ofthe 900,000 ceiling;
(v,/ associated measures to be commensu-
rate with the volume of the reduc-
tions, monitoring posts to be estab-
lished at exit points during the
period. reductions were taking place,
comprising one representatiye from
each of the United States, the Soviet
Union, and the country from which
the forces were being withdrawn.
There would then be notification of
troop movements and exercises and
prohibition of exercises in excess of
50,000 men;
(vi) the ceiling of 900,000 never to be
exceeded even during exercises or
rotation of troops.
5.6. The NATO side replied on 8th July 1982
with a more comprehensive draft treaty covering
four stages ofreductions over seven years:
(y' reductions to achieve common collec-
tive ceilings on each side of 900,000
men including not more than 700,000
ground troops;
(if reductions to be achieved in four
stages within seven years, each stage
to be fully verifiable;
(iil,) levels of forces agreed to be within
the reductions area at the outset to be
specified in the treaty;
(iu/ first-stage withdrawals of 13,000 Uni-
ted States ground forces and 30,000
Soviet ground forces to be achieved
within twelve months;
(v) in the second phase lasting two years
a further reduction of 31,000 NATO
forces and of 93,000 Warsaw Pact
forces, to include 33,000 Soviet for-
ces;
(vf stages'3 and 4 over a total of four
years, to bring levels down to the
agreed collective ceilings.
5.7. The NATO countries then on lSth No-
vember 1982 tabled details of associated mea-
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sures to be linked to the proposed treaty which
would provide for:
(y' pre-notification of out-of-garrison
activities by one or more divisions;
(iy' observers to 
. 
be invited to out-of-
gamson actrvrtres;
(iii) pior notification of major troop
movements within the reductions
area;
(iv) an annual quota of-eighteen ground
or air inspections or both;
(v) permatent exit/entry points with per-
manent observers through which all
forces entering or leaving the reduc-
tions area would be required to pass;
(vi) exchange of information on forces
to be withdrawn and continuing
exchange of information on strength
and organisation of remaining forces;
(vii) no interference with national means
of verification.
Warsaw Pact counter-proposals in 1983
5.8. In response to the western proposal, on
lTth February 1983 the Warsasw Pact made a
series of proposals leading up to a draft treaty
tabled on 23rd June 1983 relating in particular
to the third stage.
5.9. The final version of the Warsaw Pact pro-
posals made provision for a three-stage reduc-
tion:. (i) withdrawal within a period of one year
of 13,000 American troops and 20,000 Soviet
troops to be effected by mutual example outside
the framework of an agreement; (ii) a declared
collective freeze on all troop levels and arma-
ments in the reductions area pending the conclu-
sion of the final agreement; (iii) a witten agree-
ment reducing troop levels within three years to
a common collective ceiling of 900,000 men
with sub.ceilings of 200,000 for air forces and
700,000 for land forces, each side fixing and
declaring the volume of national reductions and
sub-ceilings.
5.10. For verification purposes, the new propo-
sal still insisted on the use of national technical
means, but dealt with the general control pro-
blem less restrictively than in the past. On the
one hand, it accepted an exchange of informa-
tion on residual forces after the withdrawals.
On the other hand, it accepted three control
measures, the first two of which were subject to
the prior agreement of the party to be inspected:
(i) veifrcation by observers of the with-
drawal of forces;
(ii) veifrcation of the common ceiling by
on-the-spot inspections following the
withdrawal of forces;
(iiy' establishment of four or five desig-
nated permanent entry and exit
points, with observers.
Agreement and points of disagreement 
- 
end
1983
5.11. After twelve years of negotiations, no
agreement had been signed in Vienna. At least
four points nevertheless emerged from the
various proposals exchanged which were accept-
ed by both sides :
(y' reductions were to lead to common
collective ceilings limiting to 900,000
the number of troops stationed in the
reductions ateat2, of which land
forces were not to exceed 700,000
(the rest consisting ofair forces);
(if reductions were to be effected in
stages: during stage l, only American
and Soviet forces were to be with-
drawn;
(iii) in principle, reductions were to relate
both to armaments and to troop
levels;
(iv) associated measures (including means
of verification) were to be listed at
appendix to an agreement on force
reductions. Permanent entry and
exit points with observers were to be
designated.
5.12. The principal points of disagreement
remaining at the end of 1983 may be summed
up as follows:
- 
Ceilings: The Warsaw Pact asked for
separate sub-ceilings for each country's
troop levels or at least a guarantee that
no state would account for more than
50% of common collective ceilings and
for a sub-ceiling of 200,000 for levels of
air forces. The Warsaw Pact above all
feared a situation in which, even theore-
tically, Germany could ono day provide
the major part of western forces in the
area; NATO for its part refused to allow
the Warsaw Pact to have any say in
national forces making up the common
ceiling.
- 
Armamenls: The Warsaw Pact sought
specific agreements on the withdrawal
of armaments outside the area at the
same time as the troops they
equipped. NATO, anxious to retain
the possibility of reinforcements from
12. Territory of Belgium, the Federal Rqpublic of Ger-
many, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in the West and of
Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and
Poland in the East.
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across the Atlantic (and Channel) in the
event of crisis, would endeavour to
maintain within the area stocks of
annaments, particularly heavy arrna-
ments, earmarked for reinforcements
brought in by air.
- 
VeriJication: NATO asked for the right
to effect, on request, a specific number
of inspections (eighteen) each year on
land or from the air, and the right to
send observers to manceuvres or troop
movements 
- even outside the reduc-
tions area 
- 
the latter having to be
notified beforehand. The Warsaw Pact
accepted the principle of observation
and inspection only with the agreement
of the party inspected, but in 1983 for
the first time it accepted the principle of
designated permanent entry and exit
points, with permanent observers.
- 
Data: NATO asked that prior to any
reduction in forces there should be prior
agreement on data, i.e. levels of troops
in the reductions area whose presence
was recognised by both blocs. While
the Warsaw Pact did not dispute the
figures given by NATO for allied troop
levels in the area, NATO estimates of
Warsaw Pact troop levels in the area
were higher by 145,000 than the figure
put forward by the Warsaw Pact itself.
Since details of this discussion about
figures have not been published, the
following table, based on various sour-
ces, gives an approximate summary of
the situation.
Prc.scnt lctels olforces ia MBFR redactions area
NATO Warsaw Pact Warsaw Pact
superiority
Ground
defence
Air
force Total
Ground
defence
Air
force Total
Ground
defence
Air
force Total
NATO
estimate 790,000 203,000 993,000 980,000 240,000 1,220,00c 190,000 37,000 227,000
Warsaw
Pact
estimate
not disputed by
Warsaw Pact 815,000 182,000 997,00c 25,000 -21,000 4,000
Among sourges consulted are:
- 
Report for United States House Sub-Committee on International Security and Scientifrc AIIairs by the Foreign Affairs and
National Defence Division, Congressional Research Service, Library ofCongress, 2lst April 1983.
- 
Keesings, Volume XXIX, page 31990.
- 
Previous report of the committee, Document 909, op. cit. 5-48.
- 
International Herald Tribune, 2fth and 23rd April 1984.
The western initiative of April 1984
5.13. On l9th April 1984, NATO put forward
another proposal, relaxing its position with
regard to the data problem, while stating that it
expected as a counterpart that associated mea-
sures would be improved as compared with
those proposed in July 1983 but not yet speci-
fied. NATO proposed that forces should no
longer be classified by military formation but
according to the type of mission, which would
allow the number of combat, combat support
and logistic elements to be counted. Only the
first two categories were to be taken into account
in the prior exchange of data which were no lon-
ger expected to be so accurate, figures not too
different from western estimates being con-
sidered acceptable (according to a spokesman,
up to 5 or l0%). In this renewed, relaxed fra-
mework, reductions were to be effected in three
stages:
(i) the withdrawal of 13,000 and 30,000
combat and combat support troops
by the United States and the Soviet
Union respectively, and a freeze on
the ceiling thus attained as regards
United States and Soviet forces.
These withdrawals would be effected
essentially by complete unit, but up
to l0% by the withdrawal of indivi-
duals. This first stage was to be
immediately followed by a verifiable
undertaking not to bring in reinforce-
ments applying to the overall level of
land forces ofall direct participants;
(ii) the following year a second stage
would consist of the exchange and
verification of information relating to
the forces of all participants so as to
determine the volume of collective
reductions to be accepted by each
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alliance in order to reach ceilings of
700,000 for land forces and 900,000
for land and air forces as a whole;
(iii) in the third stage, from the third to
the fifth year after conclusion of the
agreement, direct participants, with
the exception of the United States
and the Soviet Union, would effect
agreed reductions.
5.14. In the minds of the western negotiators,
NATO concessions over data and the duration
of reductions were to be offset by stricter asso-
ciated measures than those proposed in 1982,
but in the eighteen months which have elapsed
since the April 1984 proposals were made the
NATO countries do not appear to have managed
to reach agreement on the stricter associated
measures which they had announced. It seems
in effect that in the last three or four years the
western countries have been finding it increa-
singly diffrcult to work out joint positions, so
that it takes longer to prepare each proposal
made by the NATO countries in Vienna.
- 
Both sides were to undertake to conti-
nue to negotiate cor4mon collective
ceilings of 900,000 rlren, of which
700,000 for land forces.
Present situation
5.17. From information avail4ble it appears
that compared with their 1983 proposals, the
Warsaw Pact countries have proposed a written
agxeement for the phase I Withdrawals by
United States and Soviet forcesl have accepted
the principle of withdrawals to be by complete
units as NATO proposed in 1984; and have
maintained their concession of agreeing to per-
manent designated entrance and exit points to
be manned by observers both during and after
the initial withdrawals. Important differences
between the two sides remain however 
- 
the
Warsaw Pact text insists on units being with-
drawn complete with their equipment, admits in
the initial phase the withdrawal of only 20,000
Soviet forces compared with 30,000 demanded
by NATO, and does not accept on-site inspec-
tion except with the prior consent of the country
to be inspected. Otherwise the points of agree-
ment and disagreement between the two sides
remain as described in paragraphs 5.1 I et seq.
5.18. As pointed out above, for the last four
years, the NATO countries have found it much
more difficult to agree among themselves on
proposals to be tabled in Vienna. For the last
eighteen months they have ostensibly been dis-
cussing certain more far-reaching associated
measures to be tabled following their 1984 pro-
posals. Your Rapporteur understands however
that in practice a more fundamerttal reappraisal
of the western position is under way.
Conclusions
5.19. The opening of MBFR negotiations repre-
sented the price that the Soviet Urtion was ready
to pay for the convening of the conference on
se.cy{rty. and co-operation in Europe the object of
which, in Soviet eyes, was to secLlre recognition
of the de facto boundaries in Europe which had
resulted from the end of the war in 1945. Once
this result had been obtained, albeit at the price
of further concessions from the Sdviet Union in
the Helsinki final act, the MBFR problem lost
some of its interest for the Soviet Union 
- 
hence
the long-drawn-out discussions on data and
associated measures, and the still limited scope
of the points so far agreed in Vienna.
5.20. One western interest in the MBFR debate
originally had been to offset the risk ofeven par-
tial unilateral withdrawals by United States
forces stationed in Europe, while fostering
d6tente and providing the basis for possible
future co-operation between the two blocs.
Moscow on the other hand, a secretive state
since the days of the csars, has not so far been
The Warsaw Pact counter-proposal of 14th
February 1985
5.15. The western proposal was not accepted by
the eastern countries. They criticised the fact
that the data problem was still intact, the inequa-
lity in restrictions affecting half the Warsaw Pact
forces in the area, i.e. those of the Soviet Union,
and claimed that the non-reinforcement com-
mitment was fragile and the verification measu-
res unrealistic.
5.16. The Warsaw Pact countries submitted a
further proposal on l4th February 1985 which
included a certain number of concessions as
compared with their 1983 proposals.
- They submitted the basic provisions of a
limited agreement on an initial withdra-
wal, still 13,000 troops from American
land forces and 20,000 from those of the
Soviet Union, the reductions to be
effected by combat units with their own
equipment, but allowing l0% of the
troops to be withdrawn as individuals.
As in the case of the 1983 proposal,
the agrcement was to be accompanied
by an undertaking on a collective, natio-
nal basis not to increase troop levels
and armaments on either side.
- 
The United States and the Soviet Union
were to exchange lists of units to be
withdrawn and notifu the beginning and
end of their withdrawals.
- 
Withdrawals were to be verified by
observers at designated exit points and
by national technical means.
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prepared to accept adequate inspection in terri-
tory under its influence, and continues to see the
Central European glacis and the present balance
of forces as the best means of protecting its wes-
tern frontiers. The Soviet Union also will be
reluctant to reduce its forces stationed in the
other Warsaw Pact countries lest the Polish syn-
drome should spread to its other satellite allies.
Simultaneously, however, the Soviet Union is
interested through the MBFR negotiations in
securing some control over the forces of the
Federal Republic of Germany.
5.21. As the committee has pointed out in pre-
vious reports, although the Vienna negotiations
have been in the doldrums for several years, cer-
tain progress has been made in addition to the
points noted in paragraph 5. I l.
YI. Conference on Disarmament
in Europe (Stockholm)
A. Background
6.1. The committee last reported on the confe-
rence on confidence- and security-building mea-
sures and disarmament in Europe, as the Stock-
holm conference is oflicially styled, in May
1984'3. It will be recalled that the conference is
a development of the Helsinki conference on
security and co-operation in Europe, which
resulted in the signing of the final act by the
foreign ministers of the 45 participating states on
lst August 1975, and the proposal by the French
President in the United Nations General Assem-
bly Special Session on Disarmament in May
t978.
6.2. The Helsinki final act of some 60 pages
comprises three chapters or baskets, the first
containing, inter alia, reference to development
and co-operation between states to foster under-
standing, mutual confidence and security. The
signatories " recognising that this measure deriv-
ing from political decisions rests on a voluntary
basis " agreedla:
(i) that they will notifr their major
man@uvres exceeding 25,000 troops
in the area of application: the terri-
tory in Europe of participating coun-
tries or, in the case of Turkey and the
Soviet lJnion, within 250 km of a
common frontier with another parti-
cipating state. The area includes the
airspace, ocean areas adjoining and
associated airspace;
13. Control of armaments and disarmament, Document
972, lsth May 1984, Rapporteur: Mr. de Vries.
14. Emphasisadded. FulltextatAppendixll.
(ii) that they may also notify smaller
military man@uvres if they so wish.
As a gesture of good will, participa-
ting states on a voluntary and bilate-
ral basis may also invite observers to
attend military maneuvres;
(iii) the participating states recognise that
at their own discretion and with a
view to contributing to confidence-
building, they may notit/ their major
military moYements;
(iv) that, with regard to other measures,
they may promote exchange of mili-
tary personnel, including visits by
military delegations.
The participating states also agreed that they
recognised the need to lessen military
confrontation and to promote disarmament, and
that they respected the security interests of
participating states.
6.3. The French proposal of 1978 was for a
conference on disarmament in Europe, from the
Atlantic to the Urals, to proceed in two phases
- 
first confidence-building measures, second
actual disarmament measures. It was agreed
subsequently to seek a mandate for such a confe-
rence at the Madrid CSCE review conference
which opened on 22nd November 1980 but
concluded only on 6th September 1983, with
agreement inter alia on a mandate for a first
phase of a conference on confidence- and
security-building measures and disarmament in
Europer5.
6.4. The mandate stated specifically that confi-
dence- and security-building measures " will
cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoin-
ing sea area " (which includes ocean areas
" adjoining Europe ") * and airspace. They will
be of military significance and politically bind-
ing and will be provided with adequate forms of
verification which correspond to their con-
tent ". It further provided that " the next
follow-up meeting of the participating states of
the CSCE to be held in Vienna, commencing on
4th November 1986, will assess the progress
made during the first stage of the conference ".
The period of nearly three years thus allowed
for the Stockholm CDE conference virtually
ensured that negligible progress would be made
in the first two years, as participants are rarely
inclined to make major concessions until the
deadline approaches.
B. Opeaing positiorrs at Stockholm 1984
6.5. The opening session at Stockholm, which
commenced on lTth January 1984, saw the
collective submission of a paper on confidence-
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and security-building measures by the sixteen
NATO nations on 24th January. Their propo-
sals contained six concrete information mea-
sures, in the conviction that openness on mili-
tary matters should be extended well beyond
those provided for by the Helsinki measures :
- 
measure l: the exchange of military
information;
- 
measure 2: the exchange of forecasts of
activities notifiable in ad-
rance;
- 
measure ,' 
lir[T",ron of military acti-
- 
measure 4: observation of certain mili-
tary activities;
- 
measure 5: conformity and verifica-
tion;
- 
measure 6: the development of means
of communication.
6.6. The initial Soviet position was made clear
by a speech by Ambassador Grinevsky on 3lst
January 1984. However, apart from a paper
submitted by Romania on 25th January, the
Warsaw Pact countries submitted no documents
until one tabled by the Soviet Union on 8th May
1984. As outlined in the Grinevsky speech the
Soviet and Warsaw Pact proposals were essen-
tially declaratory, including (i) a no-first-use of
nuclear weapons undertaking; and (ii) a treaty on
the non-use of force, but included some more
concrete measures; (iii) redttctions in military
budgets; (iv) banning of weapons of mass des-
truction and the non-stationing of such weapons
where they are not at present stationed; (v)
nuclear-free zones in various parts of Europe;
and lastly, oflering hope of eventual compromise
with the NATO position; (vy' significant confi-
dence- and security-building measures including
limits on the scale of military manceuvres; notifi-
cation of major land and air force maneuvres;
notification of major troop movements 
- 
to
cover the whole of Europe including adjoining
sea and ocean area and airspace.
6.7. The eight neutral non-aligned nations(Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Malta, San Marino,
Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia) tabled
their own paper on 9th March which included
nine concrete proposals for CSBMs reflecting
many of the NATO proposals, but adding cons-
traints on the deployment of military equip-
ment. They were joined by Liechtenstein on
l0th May. On 8th November, Malta proposed
measures related to the Mediterranean Sea area.
The representatives of Ireland, the Vatican
and Monaco have not associated themselves
with any proposals submitted so far.
C, Developments in 1!N5
(i) The NATO position
6.8. Between 27th January anQ.27th February
1985 the NATO countries circulated six papers
which elaborated, clarified and defined in some
detail the measures proposed in the paper circu-
lated in the previous year. In outline the pro-
posals are as follows:
6.9. Measure /, the exchange of military infor-
mation, would require each participating state to
exchange information concerning its military
command organisation in the area of application
in writing and not later than lqt January each
year. The information would include the orga-
nogram of the command structure of the land
and land-based air forces in the zone, including
their normal locations, with details of the major
grou.nd forces, and combat units of both armed
servlces.
6.10. Measure 2, the exchange of forecasts of
activities in advance, would require the partici-
pating states to exchange annual forecasts of
military activities in the zone of application for
each notification required by measure 3 which
follows. These forecasts should be issued not
later than l5th November for the followingyear.
6.11. Measure 3, the notification of military
activities, would require warning to be given
45 days in advance of out-of-garrison land acti-
vities, when one or more ground force divisions
or equivalent formations of 60000 or more
ground troops or forces having a certain number
of combat vehicles (yet to be specified) are ope-
rating under a single command. Mobilisation
activity would be notified when 25,000 troops or
the major combat elements of three or more
divisions are involved. Amphibious activity
involving three or more battalions or 3,000
amphibious troops is likewise to be reported.
Short-term out-of-garrison land activity mount-
ed as an alert measure is to be hotified at the
time of commencement.
6.12. Participating states would report any acti-
vity taking place on their territoFy even if the
forces of that state are not taking part. This,
however, would not limit the obligation of the
state participating in the out-of-garrison activity
on the territory of another participating state
from notifying the activity also. The notifica-
tion would include, if applicable, the name and
objectives of the exercise and the name of
the headquarters conducting the activity. The
timetable of the exercises and itq geographical
boundaries are to be given along with the names
of the participating states. The dates on which
those taking part are due to return to their nor-
mal peacetime locations are to be notified. The
number of participating troops, directing staff
and umpires for each participating state are to be
supplied. Amphibious and airborne troops, as
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well as ground-based tactical air force units
and ship-shore gunnery personnel, are to be
included.
6.13. The activity would be related to forecasts
made under measure 2. If the information had
been changed or not previously forecast, a state-
ment to that effect would be made.
6.14. Measure 4 covers observation of certain
military activities to which participating states
would invite observers from all other participat-
ing states to observe all forces engaged, including
forces other than those of the host state. Cer-
tain safeguards are contained in the measure; for
instance, the host state is not required to invite
observers from another participating state with
which it does not enjoy diplomatic relations.
Observers need not be invited to " Alert Acti-
vity " unless such an activity exceeds 48 hours,
and then only after 36 hours have elapsed. The
observers would normally be the military atta-
ch6s accredited to the host state. Invitations
would be dispatched via normal diplomatic
channels.
6.15. The host state is to supply observers with
accommodation and transport in the zone of
activity; however, observers would be able to use
their own vehicles to reach a transfer point near
the zone of activity. Observers are to be per-
mitted to remain in telecommunication contact
with their nearest national authorities during the
activity. The measure includes details of the
host state responsibilities in providing observers
with suflicient scenario details to follow the evo-
lution of the activities in the zone.
6.16. Measure 5 covers compliance and verifi-
cation, and provides that national technical
means can be employed without interference.
In addition, each participating state would be
allowed to demand up to two inspections each
year, but must state its reasons for making such
a demand. Inspections may take place on the
ground or take the form ofan aerial inspection.
The inspections are only to be carried out in
areas where there is normal unrestricted public
access; military establishments, armament facto-
ries, etc., will not be entered. The proposed
measure gives details of timeJimits for acceding
to requests for challenge inspections and for the
logistic and communications rights of these ins-
pection teams.
6.17. Measure 6 covers the means of communi-
cation for achieving confidence-building for
which it is proposed that participating states
would have dedicated communication links for
contacting each other for the expeditious hand-
ling of CSBMs.
(ii) Soviet proposals
6.18. The proposals tabled by the Soviet Union
on 8th May 1984 are prefaced, inter alia, by
remarks on attempts to upset the existing mili-
tary and strategic balance and the assertion that
Europe and the entire world requires a radical
turn in the policy of states away from confronta-
tion to peaceful co-operation. The document
proposes:
(a) participating states of the conference
possessing nuclear weapons should
assume an obligation through multila-
teral agreement or unilateral declara-
tion not to be the first to use them;
(b) the conclusion of a treaty on the non-
use of military force and the mainte-
nance of peaceful relations would be a
major confidence-building measure,
which would include neutral and non-
aligned states as well as the Warsaw
Pact and North Atlantic Alliance
states;
(c/ states represented at the Stockholm
conference could participate in the
efforts to halt the further grofih of
military spending and reallocate the
released resources for assistance to
developing countries;
(d) the banning of weapons of mass des-
truction, in particular chemical wea-
pons, and the non-stationing of such
weapons in areas where they are not at
present stationed. Such steps would
also facilitate agreement to ban chemi-
cal weapons and destroy stockpiles
ofsuch weapons on a global scale;
(e) a positive view is taken of the creation
of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans
and in Northern Europe and on both
sides of a contact line between the
Warsaw Pact and NATO forces;
(l) manetvres should be limited to a cer-
tain maximum level to facilitate diffe-
rentiation between large-scale maneu-
vres and preparation for hostilities.
Prior notification of major man@uvres
and movements and transfers above a
certain level should be notified. A
system of invitation for observers
should be developed.
6.19. From 20th May 1985 three papers were
presented by Warsaw Pact countries covering
proposals for the notification of land, sea and
air man@uvres respectively. Czechoslovakia,
Poland and the Soviet Union tabled the docu-
ments on prior notification of major maneuvres
of land forces as well as parallel activity in the
adjoining sea or airspace conducted indepen-
dently or jointly with participating states. It
defines a major manceuvre as one where the
numbers, to include land forces and any other
air, naval, amphibious and airborne components
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participating in the mancuvre, exceed 20,000
troops. It would require notification to be
given by each state taking part in the maneuvre
to all other participating states via normal diplo-
matic channels 30 days in advance of its start or
at the first possible opportunity if it is arranged
at short notice. Notice of multinational
man@uwes will be given by the state on whose
territory the manceuvre is to take place even if
the troops of that state are not to take part.
Other states involved in the manceuvre are to
give notification in accordance with the require-
ment of the measure.
6.20. Prior warning of the move or the transfer
of the troops to the maneuvre area from another
area is to be given in accordance with the mea-
sure for notification of military movements(transfers). Notification of major maneuvres is
to include:
- 
the designation of the maneuvre;
- 
the purpose of the activity with a des-
cription of the activity of the troops
engaged;
- 
the states participating;
- the strength and components of the
force;
- the area of conduct of the manceuvre;
- the time-frame of the maneuvre and
the time the participants will be away
from their permanent locations. Besi-
des this, the participating states will,
whenever possible, supply information
with regard to the composition of their
forces, the military hardware involved
and other military information.
6.21. Bulgaria, Poland and the Soviet Union
tabled the parallel proposal for prior notiJication
of major maneuvres of naval forces. The propo-
sal defines a major maneuvre of naval forces as
one involving 30 combat ships and 100 military
aircraft, whether carrier- or land-based, but
excluding nuclear-powered ballistic missile sub-
marines. The notification requirements and
the information to be supplied correspond
closely to those proposed for the land forces.
6.22. The German Democratic Republic, Hun-
gary and the Soviet Union tabled the document
on prior notilication of major maneuvres of air
forces. It defines such a manceuvre as one
either independent or in combination with land
and naval forces, in the course of which it is
foreseen that more than 200 military aircraft will
be in the airspace over the notified area at the
same time. The rest of the proposal concerning
notification and the nature of the information to
be supplied largely follows that proposed for the
other two armed services.
6.23. Following the three foregoing proposals,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union
on 2lst June 1985 tabled a proposal on prior
notification of major military movements and
transfers. The document calls for an explana-
tion of major movements (transfers) of land and
air forces in Europe and in the adjoining seas
and associated airspace within the area of appli-
cation, as well as movements into or out of this
area, covered by the confidence-building mea-
sure. A major movement is defined as the
change in location of more than 20,000 troops or
100 aircraft, and notification is to be given
30 days in advance of the start of the movement,
or at the earliest opportunity if the decision is
taken at shorter notice. Should movements by
the forces of several states takp place on the
same territory under a commol plan and the
total number exceed the level of notification
then the state on or into whose territory the
movements are effected would give notification.
6.24. The notification is to provide the general
purpose of the movement or transfer and the
states involved. The types and numerical
strength of the land and air force personnel are
to be supplied, together with the time-frame of
the movement. The starting and terminal
points of the transfer are to be given. The units
of troops and air forces involved, the mode of
movement and the route to be taken are to be
provided whenever possible.
6.25. Romania, the idiosyncratic member of the
Warsaw Pact, had tabled its own proposals for
confidence- and security-building measures on
25thJanuary 1984:
- 
at least 30 days' warning with full
details should be given of military
man@uvres exceeding 18,000 to 20,000
land troops, or 5,000 special forces such
as paratroops or amphibious troops, or
more than l0 or 12 warsfrips displacing
a total of 50,000 to 60,000 tons, or by
air forces involving more than 40 to 50
fighter aircraft;
- 30-day notification of military move-
ments involving two or rqore divisions,
or movement of heavy equipment for
these or equivalent formations;
- 
observation to be provided for;
- 
prior notification of emergencies invol-
ving a state of alert for national or
foreign forces;
- 
maximum ceilings to be imposed on
man@uvres of 40,000 to 50,000 land
forces or numbers to be specified of
warships and fighter aircraft;
- 
prohibition of military manceuvres near
state borders as a step towards demilita-
rised zones;
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- 
nuclear-free zones much as proposed by
the Soviet Union on 8th May 1984;
- 
a freeze on the establishment of military
bases or stationing oftroops on the ter-
ritory ofother states;
- 
establishment of a system of communi-
cations between states and measures to
prevent conflict by error or accident;
- 
a freeze on military expenditure at 1984
levels.
(iiil The neutral and non-aligned (NNA) pro-
posals
6.26. The NNA countries have added nothing
to their proposals circulated on 9th March
1984. It will be recalled that the list of concrete
measures they put forward was closer in philoso-
phy to the NATO approach than to that of the
Warsaw Pact in advocating in a preamble
concrete measures in order to give effect to the
duty ofstates to refrain from the threat or use of
force. The measures proposed included:
(a) major military manceuvres to be noti-
fied earlier and in more detail than in
the Helsinki final act;
(b) pior notification of small-scale mili-
tary man@uvres, which are conducted
close to each other, in time and space,
if the total numbers involved exceed
the level to be definedfor (a);
(c) pior notification 
- 
of major military
man@uYres involving amphibious,
sea-transported, airborne, or air-trans-
ported troops or a combination thereot
(d) pior notification of major military
movements giving their organisation
level, the number of troops involved
and their transport, etc.;
(e) pior notification of major military
activity in the adjoining sea area and
airspace which affect security in
Europe when they constitute part of
other notifiable activities;
(fl invitation to send observers to
maneuvres and movements subject to
notification, with observers enjoying
improved conditions for observation;
k) pior notification of redeployments of
major military units and rotation of
personnel;
(h) annual exchange of information on
major military activities planned in
advance;
(r) upper ceiling on major military
manceuvres and separate lower cei-
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lings for amphibious or airborne
man@uvres;
(l) constraints on the redeployment of
units and/or equipment for sustained
offensive operations in certain areas;
(k) the foregoing would include adequate
verification provisions which colres-
pond to their content;
(l) t}rre standard reporting system on mili-
tary expenditure elaborated by the
United Nations should be applied by
member states.
D. Procedure
6.27. The conference was unable to agree on the
establishment of working groups 
- 
essential for
detailed negotiation 
- 
until towards the end of
1984 when proposals based on those by Sweden
and Finland were accepted for the creation of
two working groups: (a) to deal with notification
and observation of military activities; afi (b)
other questions. The two goups also meet
together as a combined working group.
6.28. The establishment of the working groups
and the January 1985 announcement of the
resumption of bilateral negotiations on nuclear
and space weapons between the United States
and the Soviet Union in Geneva have resulted
in a business-like negotiating atmosphere at the
sessions ofthe conference so far this year.
E. Comparisoa of positions and conclusioas
6.29. A comparison of the proposals so far
put forward by the NATO, Warsaw Pact and
neutral countries is given in summary form in
the following table.
6.30. The prospects for some eventual agree-
ment in the Stockholm conference remain good;
although the starting positions of the NATO and
Warsaw Pact countries were far apart, neither,
when the small print is examined, excludes the
possibility of concessions to take account of
some of the major demands of the other.
6.31. Thus, the NATO countries will be prima-
rily concerned to secure mandatory invitations
to observers, with the best possible facilities for
observation, to all significant out-of-garrison
activities, and also if possible the right to a
limited number of challenge inspections each
year. The Helsinki final act, it will be recalled,
makes the invitation of observers to exercises
purely discretionary, and does not require them
to be provided with reasonable observation faci-
lities. The full exchange of information called
for in the NATO proposals is also highly desi-
rable to provide the sort of picture of the
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Comparison of proposals to luly 19ti in summary
Item NATO Wrsaw Psct Neutral andnon-aligned
A. Conftdence- and secur ity-bui lding measures
Exchange of in-
formation
Participating states to exchange in-
formation each year on their mili-
tary command organisation, with
details of land forces and land-
based air forces in the zones and
their normal locations.
No proposal. Annual exchange of information
on military activities planned in
advance.
Advance notice
of military acti-
vities.
/y' annual forecast of notiliable
military activities;
(ii) 45 days'notice, with specified
details, of each notifiable activity;
(lir,) short-term alert activities to
be notilied on commencement;
(iv) noticr-, to be given both by
countries on whose territory acti-
vity occurs, and by country whose
forces are involved.
No corresponding proposal;
(ii) 30 days'notice with specilied
details of notifiable manoeuvres,
or notiliable troop movements;
(iii) notice at first opportunity for
activities arranged at short notice;
(iv) notice to be given both by
countries on whose territory acti-
vity occurs and by country whose
forces are involved.
No corresponding proposal;
(ii) earlier and igr more detail than
Helsinki final act.
Zone covered. * The zone " as defined in man-
date of conference (see Appendix
IIr).
Notification of manceuvres to co-
ver parallel activity in the adjoin-
ing sea or airspace conducted
independently or jointly with par-
ticipating states.
Adjoining sea atrea and airspace
which alfect seourity of Europe
when part of other notifiable acti
vities (language of mandate of
conference).
Notifrable activi-
ties.
(y' out-of-garrison activity by one
or more divisions or 6,000 men
under single command;
/iy' mobilisation of 25,000 men or
three divisions;
(iiy' amphibious activity by 3,000
amphibious troops.
(i) land man@uvres by more than
20,000 men including air, naval
and amphibious components;
(ii) naval maneuvres by 30 com-
bat ships excluding nuclear-power-
ed ballistic missile submarines and
100 military aircraft, carrier- or
land-based;
Giil an man@uvres, whether in-
dependent or in combination with
land and naval forces with 200 mi-
litary aircraft in notified airspace;
(ir,) movements or transfer of a
total of 20,000 troops or 100 air-
craft. To be notified by state
on whose territory the activiry
occurs if total of movements of
troops of different nationality ex-
ceeds level of notification;
(v,) movements to areas of man-
cBuvres to be notified as troop
movements.
(y' to include several small man-
euvres in proximity if totals
would be notifiaule;
/ir) amphibious airborne and sea-
borne manoeuvres;
(iiy' redeployments of major mili-
tary units and rotation of person-
nel.
Limitations
manoeuvres
movements.
on
and
No proposal. Ceiling (to be specified) on size of
man@uvres.
(i) upper ceilings on major mili-
tary man@uvres, separate lower
ceilings for amphibious and air-
borne manceuvres.
Constraints on rcdeployment of
units and equipment for sustained
operations in certain areas.
Observers. Invitations to all participating sta-
tes (with whom diplomatic rela-
tions exist) to send observers, nor-
mally the accredited military atta-
ch6s, to certain military activities,
including activity by foreign troops
on territory ofthe inviting state.
Observers to be invited to
" Abert " activities exceeding 48
hours, after first 36 hours.
Specified facilities for observers.
A system of invitations to be wor-
ked out.
Invitations to send observers to
notifiable manoeuyres and move-
ments, with improved conditions
for observation.
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Irrm NATO Wart3w Prcl Ncutrsl lndnoa-di8lcd
Compliance and
verification.
No interference with national tech-
nical means. Each participating
state may request, with reasons, up
to two inspections each year. May
be ground or air inspections, but
limited to ar€as of normal unres-
tricted public access (not military
establishment, arms factories, etc).
No proposal. Adequate verification measures
corresponding to content.
Communica-
tions.
Dedicated communications links
between participating states to
handle CSBMs.
Military
expenditure.
No proposal. States to participate in eforts to
halt increase in military spending.
Standard United Nations reporting
system on military expenditure to
be adopted.
B. Other proposals
Itcm NATO Warraw Pac{ Ncuml andnoo-.li8Dcd
No first use of
nuclear weapons.
No proposal. Multilateral agreement or unilate-
ral declaration on no first use of
nuclear weapons.
Nuclear-free
zones.
No proposal. Favoured in Northern Europe,
Balkans, and both sides ofcontact
line between NATO and Warsaw
Pact forces.
Non-use of mili-
tary force.
No proposal. Treaty on the non-use of military
force.
Preambular reference in CSBM
proposals recalls duty of states to
refrain from the threat or use of
force.
Non-statiouing
of chemical wea-
pons.
No proposal. Ban weapons of mass destruction,in particular chemical weapons.
Non-stationing of such weapons in
areas where not at present station-
ed.
Warsaw Pact military structure that is already
available in the case of the military structures of
NATO countries, through the more open nature
of the western societies.
6.32. The Warsaw Pact countries have been pri-
marily concerned with their declaratory propo-
sals on the non-use of force and the non-first use
of nuclear weapons, although Mr. Gromyko
indicated in his opening speech in 1984 that they
would be satisfied if one of those two demands
was met. They are then concerned to secure
notification of manceuvres not only in the whole
of Europe as provided for in the mandate agxeed
in Madrid, but also of independent man@uvres
in adjoining sea areas and airspace. In the
Madrid mandate the NATO countries conceded
only that such man@uvres would be notifiable
" whenever these activities affect security in
Europe as well as constitute a part of activities
taking place within the whole of Europe... ".
The Warsaw Pact anxiety to set ceilings on the
size of man@uvres reflects the fact that Warsaw
Pact maneuvres, even before the Helsinki final
act, have tended to be on a smaller scale than
those of NATO, and usually to involve the
troops of fewer countries at any one time.
6.33. Prospects of a compromise remain.
While the NATO military posture would not
permit a declaration on the non-first use of
nuclear weapons, and while NATO countries
insist that a specific treaty on the non-use of
military force would merely undermine the long-
established undertakings to this effect in many
binding international agreements including the
Charter of the United Nations, the NATO coun-
tries might well accept in a document containing
mandatory concrete confidence- and security-
building measures some preambular reference
recalling the duty of states to refrain from the
threat or use of force. The fact that the Warsaw
Pact proposals for notification of naval man@u-
vres specifically exclude nuclear-powered ballis-
tic missile submarines would seem to be a ges-
ture to make it easier for NATO countries to
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accept notification of maneuvres in the adjoin-
ing sea areas to Europe in certain circums-
tances.
6.34. But as the committee pointed out in its
previous report the fact that the Stockholm
conference is scheduled to report to the Vienna
CSCE review conference only in November 1986
makes it unlikely that significant progress will be
made at the current seventh session in Stock-
holm which opened on lOth September.
6.35. A table showing implementation of confi-
dence-building measures under the Helsinki
final act is at Appendix IV. Warsaw Pact coun-
tries have invited observers from NATO coun-
tries to maneuvres only once since 1979.
YII. Conference on Disarmanent
(a) Geaual
7.1. On 24th July 1985 the committee for the
first time met in Geneva for briefings on the
work of the Conference on Disarmament, and
was privileged to be addressed by the representa-
tives of Italy, Mexico (Chairman of the ad hoc
committee on a comprehensive programme of
disarmament), Poland (Chairman of the ad hoc
committee on chemical weapons), Egypt (Chair-
man of the ad hoc committee on the prevention
of an arms race in outer space), Australia (Chair-
man of the ad hoc committee on radiological
weapons), the United States and the Soviet
Union. The committee as a whole is thus in a
better position than before to report on the work
of the conference, although rapporteurs of the
committee have regularly called on representa-
tives to the conference and its predecessors at
various times over the past twenty years.
7.2. The Conference on Disarmament, which
meets in the United Nations building in Geneva,
is intended to be the principal multilateral nego-
tiating body for concluding actual agreements on
arms control or disarmament. It reports to the
United Nations General Assembly and receives
remits from it. Composed of 40 countries at
present, including all WEU' countries except
Luxembourg, (membership at Appendix I), it
has evolved from the Eighteen-Nation Com-
mittee on Disarmament of the 1960s which
negotiated the non-proliferation treaty and was
previously known as the " Committee on Disar-
mament ".
7.3. The conference is under constant pressure
for more countries to join it; its mandate
already provides for non-member countries to
participate in its work. At the same time, it is
recognised that the greater the number of partici-
pating countries, the less effective it can be as a
negotiating forum. Privately agreement has
been reached on the enlargement of the confe-
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rence by four countries to be ono western group,
one socialist, and two non-aligned. These will
be Norway (western), Bangladesh and Senegal
(neutral and non-aligned) but formal agreement
is blocked because Vietnam, proposed by the
socialist group, is vetoed by China.
7.4. The multilateral agreements negotiated in
the conference or its various predecessors are:
the partial test-ban treaty (1963); non-prolife-
ration treaty (1968); seabed treaty (1971); biolo-
gical weapons convention (1972\ and the envi-
ronmental modification treaty ( I 978).
7.5. The conference normally holds two ses-
sions a year from February to April inclusive
and from June to the end of Arlgust when the
conference agrees its report to the United
Nations General Assembly which sits in the
autumn.
7.6. Quite apart from the East'West conflict
over arms control issues, there is a fundamental
conflict within the Conference on Disarmament
between the 2l non-aligned countries (a majority
of whom are pressing for nuclear disarmament
by the superpowers, guarantees ag4inst the use of
nuclear weapons, and general and controlled
disarmament) on the one hand, and the NATO
and Warsaw Pact countries on thd other (which
are prepared to concentrate on certain limited
measures 
- 
principally, at the present time, a
chemical weapons ban 
- on which agreement
mryht be reached while leaving nu0lear disarma-
ment to possible bilateral negotiations).
(b) Programmc of worh of the coaferunce
7.7. The agenda agreed on 7th February for the
1985 session, the same as the previous year, was
as follows, with the time subsequbntly allotted
for discussion in brackets:
l. Nuclear test ban (four weefts)
2. Cessation of the nucleatr arms race
(four weeks)
3. Prevention of nuclear war (two weeks)
4. Chemical weapons (four weeks)
5. Prevention of an arrns race in outer
space (three weeks)
6. Negative security guarantees (two
weeks combined with item 8)
7. Radiological weapons (two weeks)
8. Comprehensive programme on disar-
mament (two weeks combined with
item 6)
9. Annual report, etc. (three weeks)
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From the standpoint of the western countries,
and of East-West relations in general, items l, 4,
5, and 7 are significant, and are discussed in
some detail below.
(c) Ad hoc committees
7.8. Since the negotiating body reached its pre-
sent size the substantive drafting of treaties has
been undertaken in ad hoc committees of the
conference, when consensus is reached on terms
of reference for a committee to draft a treaty.
In 1985 as in 1984 such committees have been
established on chemical weapons (chairman:
Poland) and on radiological weapons (chairman:
Australia). In both years there has been an ad
hoc committee on a comprehensive programme
of disarmament (chairrnan: Mexico) but the
1984 committee on negative security assurances
is replaced this year by an ad hoc committee on
the prevention of an arrns race in outer space(chairman: Egypt) but with terms of reference
permitting it only to * examine ... issues rele-
vant to the prevention of an arrns race in outer
space ".
7.9. There is considerable pressure from the
group of2l and from the group ofsocialist states
for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to
negotiate a treaty on a complete nuclear test ban,
but the western group has been prepared to sup-
port terms of reference which would permit such
a committee to examine only problems of verifi-
cation; consequently no agreement has been
reached, but an ad hoc group of scientific
experts to consider international co-operative
measures to detect and identify seismic events
has been meeting for some four years.
(d) Chemical woapons
7.10. A treaty to ban the possession or produc-
tion of chemical weapons has been actively dis-
cussed in the Conference on Disarmament and
its predecessors since 1980 when the correspon-
ding United States-Soviet Union bilateral nego-
tiations were broken off. An ad hoc working
group by the end of 1983 had reached consensus
on many general provisions of a treaty including
some lists of chemicals to be permitted for
industrial purposes, or prohibited as not having
industrial applications, and general concepts of
verification including inspection of the destruc-
tion of stocks; routine inspection of specified
chemical plants, and provision for some sort of
inspection by challenge of disputed activities.
The Soviet Union had conceded the right of
continuous inspection of the process of destruc-
tion of stocks of chemical weapons.
7.11. At the 1984 session of the conference the
working group was converted into the ad hoc
committee now responsible for drafting a treaty.
On l5th April 1984 the United States Vice-
President, Mr. Bush, introduced in person a
draft convention on the prohibition of chemical
weapons which in part embodied in treaty lan-
guage many points on which consensus appeared
to have been reached. The United States draft
contained however the disputed Article X provi-
ding for special on-site inspection which would
give a major party the right to demand inspec-
tion of any installations or locations owned or
controlled by a government within 24 hours.
7.12. Allied countries have given general sup-
port to the United States draft, but it has not
been endorsed by NATO countries which were
shown the draft in Brussels only six days before
it was tabled in Geneva. The Soviet Union and
its allies have described Arricle X as unaccep-
tably intrusive, but have not offered any alterna-
tive draft convention of their own. Privately
several European allies have let it be known that
the provisions would be too intrusive for their
own chemical industries.
7.13. Apart from the fundamental disagreement
on Article X, a number of other points require
detailed negotiation before a convention could
be concluded. These include more precise defi-
nition of chemical production to be permitted
for industrial purposes, the possible use of non-
lethal chemicals for military purposes (tear
gases, etc., and herbicides); as well as the ques-
tion of prohibitions to be included in a conven-
tion 
- 
the 1925 Geneva Convention already
prohibits the use of chemical weapons in war,
but not the manufacture or stockpiling of chemi-
cal weapons. It is not yet clear whether a new
convention should duplicate the 1925 Protocol
by banning use, as well as production and stock-
piling.
7.14. Particular urgency attaches to the negotia-
tion of a comprehensive chemical weapons ban,
on the one hand because of continued Soviet
production of these weapons, and the decision of
the United States administration to begin cons-
truction of production facilities for binary che-
mical weapons, and on the other because of the
verified use of chemical weapons by Iraq against
Iran in 1984, which the committee detailed in its
last report.
7.15. However there is a lack of hard evidence
concerning the level of Soviet chemical weapon
stocks. United States public estimates have
varied with administration policy, being low
when the United States 1969 decision to cease
production of chemical weapons was being justi-
fied, to as much as 700,000 tons, but a figure
commonly quoted by allied ministers is 300,000
tonsr6 of weapons. United States statements
16. E.g. Mr. Luce, United Kingdom Minister of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, in answer to a question
in the WEU Assembly,4th December 1984.
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concerning Soviet chemical and biological wea-
pons capabilities and use continue to be alar-
ming, but assessments of stocks are mostly
unquantified and allegations of use non-specific
since past United States allegations failed to find
independent substantiation; more emphasis is
placed on the potential danger from third coun-
tries:
" The Soviet Union maintains a massive
chemical and expanding biological and
toxic capability and has repeatedly used or
sponsored the use of such weapons in vio-
lation of their treaty obligations. In addi-
tion, chemical weapons have proliferated
throughout the world with potentially
grave consequences for us and our
allies... "t7.
7.16. The United States assessment of Soviet
intentions however has been toned down in
r 985:
" Although we no longer believe the
Soviets intend to use chemical weapons
on a massive scale, the selective use
against special targets cannot be ruled
out. Responding to this threat of chemi-
cal warfare has been a particularly difficult
issue for our nation to face. The question
we must address is how to ensure these
weapons are not used against either civi-
lians or the men and women of our armed
forces... "18.
In the third week of October 1985, the United
States House Appropriations Committee voted
against the administration request for $164 mil-
lion for the resumption of the manufacture of
chemical weapons. On 28th October, the
Department of Defence then released an updated
version of an October 1983 report by the
Defence Intelligence Agency, which claimed
inter alia: " storage depots for chemical warfare
agents within the USSR have undergone a signi-
ficant increase in storage capacity since the late
1960s we believe chemical weapons are
coJocated with conventional weapons in for-
ward areas facing NATO ". A map included in
the reporrt showed 32 chemical warfare storage
sites in Warsaw Pact nations including many in
East Germany and Czechoslovakia, close to the
West,German border. The text of the report
ma(es clear however that defensive equipment
.sdch as respirators and protective clothing is also
stored in " chemical weapons depots ". The DIA
report gives no figure for the present levels of
Soviet chemical weapons stocks.
7.17. Despite earlier reports of deteriorating
stockpiles, United States stocks of serviceable
chemical weapons remain large. A recent aca-
17. United States Secretary of Defence annual report to
Congress, FY 1986, page28l.
18. Idem.
demic study is reproduced in the table here-
after re. As the same study point$ out, President
Reagan's Chemical Warfare Review Commission
reported in June 1985 that claims that these
stocks had deteriorated were " exaggerated and
inaccurate ". The problem the United States
forces have is that some weapons for which
these stocks are designed are obsolete - this
is true in particular of the 105 mm howitzer
no longer in service. But the large numbers
of 155 mm rounds for example will remain
serviceable for a long time.
7.18. Towards the end of the session of the
conference in late August some progress was
made on ostensibly technical details such as how
binary- or multiple-component chemical wea-
pons should be covered by a treaty, and what
toxicity criteria should be employed. It was
also tacitly agreed that consultation should
continue in Geneva before the resumption of the
conference in February 1986 
- 
it is understood
there were informal consultations in Geneva in
October on specific issues such as permitted acti
vities, declaration of stocks, and compliance and
verification, and that there will be an informal
session ofthe working group in January 1986.
7.19. A very constructive invitation was also
extended by the Netherlands Delegation to a
workshop on verification of the prohibition of
the production of nuclear weapons to be held in
the Netherlands in early June 1986 where repre-
sentatives of the chemical industry would be
able to explain to the diplomatic representatives
the practical problems of veriffing the absence
of prohibited activities by the chemical industry.
7.20. There are signs of desire for progress on
the part of most delegations. Against them has
to be set: first the refusal of the Soviet Union so
far to make any concrete counter-proposal to the
United States 1984 draft treaty with its unaccep-
table Article X, and other signs that the Soviet
Union is no longer seeking progresb on a chemi-
cal weapons ban in Geneva, either because the
Soviet forces intend after all to retain their
considerable chemical weapons dapability, or
because they believe the present United States
administration cannot be deterred from resum-
ing production of chemical weapons. The other
signs of declining Soviet interest in a total com-
prehensive ban are the Warsaw Pact proposals
put forward both bilaterally and in the CDE
conference in Stockholm for a chemical wea-
pons-free zone in Europe, and the $oviet propo-
sals for a treaty on the non-proliferation of che-
mical weapons.
7.21. Secondly, against the positive signs of pro-
gress has to be set the refusal of the United
19. Julian Perry Robinson in
report; September-October I 985.
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American chemical weqons: atimola from open sowca
Item Numberheld
Tons of
agent fill
GB neme-gas munitions for in-service weapons
105 mm howitzer rounds
155 mm and 8 in howitzer rounds
500 lb and 70 lb aircraft bombs
VX nerve-gas munitions for in-service weapons
155 mm and 8 in howitzer rounds
2,000 lb aircraft spraytanks
Mustard gas munitions for in-service weapons
4.2 in mortar rounds
105 mm howitzer rounds
155 mm howitzer rounds
Munitions deteriorated beyond repair, obsolaed, orfor weapons no lon-
ger in service
I l5 mm rockets
Leakers,land-mines and 155 mm gun rounds
Unweaponised agent held in bulk storage
I ton drums of GB nerve gas
I ton drums of VX nerve gas
I ton drums of mustard gas
Planned binary-munition acquisition quantities
155 mm howitzer rounds, binary GB
500Ib aircraft spraybombs, binary VX
227 mm MLRS rocket warheads, binary GD (?)
900,000
200,000
13,000
300,000
900
470,000
480,000
300,000
480,000
320,000
5,700
2,300
14,000
410,000
44,000
?
750
8s0
1,300
950
630
1,400
700
1,700
2,500
1,400
4,300
1,900
12,600
1,700
4,100
?
Note: Of the total tonnage held of mustard and nerve gases,
93.3% is in the United States, 1.4% in West Germany, and
5.3% on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. The hotdings in Ger-
many constitute some l7% by agent weight of all of the avai-
lable nerve-gas howitzer ammunition.
States to modiff the particular verification arti-
cle in its 1984 draft treaty that is known publicly
to be unacceptable to the Soviet Union, and pri-
vately is known to be unacceptable to those of its
allies that have substantial chemical industries.
7.22. The Military Appropriations Bill for FY
1986, approved by the House of Representatives
on 30th October 1985, did not authorise the pro-
duction of chemical Oinary) weapons as request-
ed by the administration.
(e) Comprehensiye tes, baa
7.23. For several years the conclusion of a com-
prehensive test ban to prohibit nuclear weapon
tests in all environments, including under-
ground, has been the single most discussed disar-
mament issue in the United Nations General
Assembly. In autumn 1984 three main rosolu-
tions were adopted on the subject. The first
two, 39/52 and, 39/60, were adopted by 123
votes with two against (United Kingdom-United
States)2o and 24 abstentions (China, the remain-
ing NATO countries less Greece). Resolution
39152 reiterated the General Assembly's
condemnation of all nuclear tests; called upon
the three depositary governments of the partial
test-ban treaty (Soviet Union-United Kingdom-
United States) to abide by their undertaking to
achieve the early discontinuance ofall tests, and
meanwhile to accept a moratorium; and appeal-
ed to the Conference on Disarmament to initiate
immediately multilateral negotiations on a treaty
to halt all tests. Resolution 39/60 urged the
Conference on Disarmament to proceed promp-
20. France was recorded as voting against the first ofthese
two resolutions, but informed the secretariat that it had
intended to abstain.
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tly to negotiate a multilateral treaty on the prohi-
bition of nuclear weapons and tests by all states
as a matter of the highest priority.
7.24. A third resolution 39153 adopted by 124
votes to 0 with 24 abstentions (all five nuclear
weapon powers; the allies of the Soviet Union)
specifically urged the Conference on Disarma-
ment to establish an ad hoc committee on a
nuclear test ban at the beginning ofthe 1985 ses-
sion; to resume immediately substantive work
on a comprehensive test ban with a view to the
negotiation ofa treaty; to take steps to establish
an international seismic monitoring network to
monitor nuclear explosions and determine the
capabilities of such network; to investigate a pos-
sible international network to monitor atmos-
pheric radioactivity.
7.25. A nuclear test ban therefore formed the
first item on the agenda of the Conference on
Disarmament in 1985 as in previous years. But
as noted above agreement has not been reached
on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to
draft treaty language on a nuclear test ban
because the western group of countries on
United States insistence was prepared for an ad
hoc committee only to discuss verification.
China which hitherto had said it would not par-
ticipate in such an ad hoc committee has
reversed its position in 1985.
7.26. An ad hoc group of scientific experts to
consider international co-operative measures to
detect and identiff some seismic event has been
working within the framework of the conference
on the possibility of verifying nuclear explosions
through an international seismic network, and
has continued to work in 1985.
7.27. From 1977 to July 1980 there were tripar-
tite negotiations in Geneva on a comprehensive
test ban between the Soviet Union, the United
Kingdom and the United States which in the
words of the tripartite report to the conference
dated 30th July 1980 * made considerable pro-
gtress in negotiating the treaty ". There have not
since been substantive negotiations on drafting a
treaty. The threshold test-ban treaty limiting
underground nuclear test explosions to 150 KT,
and the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty,
signed by the Soviet Union and the United
States on 3rd July 1974 and 28th May 1976 res-
pectively, have remained unratified.
7.28. The attitude of the United States to a
comprehensive test ban has been reversed since
its participation in the trilateral negotiations
mentioned above. In his opening remarks
to the non-proliferation review conference which
opened in Geneva on 27th August, Mr. Ken-
neth Adelman, Director of the United States
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, stated
unequivocally:
* For our part we remain committed to a
complete ban on nuclear tosting as a long-
term goal. But we do not agree it should
be the next step in our efforts to reduce
the nuclear threat. A nuclear test ban
would not reduce the nuruber of nuclear
weapons... "
7.29. The United Kingdom, in opposing nego-
tiations on a comprehensive test ban at the pre-
sent time, has advanced different reasons. The
British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Richard Luce, addressing the sarire non-prolife-
ration conference in Geneva on 29th August,
referred to a comprehensive test ban in these
terms:
" ... the verification problems continue,to
be a major obstacle... Until solutions to
them become available, we believe any
resumption of formal negotiations would
be premature ... We believe that a com-
prehensive test ban which allowed any
militarily significant cheating by its signa-
tories would not be in the interests
of international stability or security. But
it remains the British Government's view
that a properly verified treaty which met
the security interests of all parties would
be a significant contribution to containing
the proliferation of nuclear arms. "
7.30. The United States is knortn to have a
substantial nuclear test programmre ahead of it,
although reports differ as to whether more tests
are required on warheads for the MX and Mid-
getman missiles which are under development.
United States tests continue to be conducted on
the Nevada test site in its metropolitan territory,
and United Kingdom tests, about one a year, are
conducted there also. All these tests have been
conducted underground since thle conclusion
of the partial test-ban treaty in 1963. France,
although not a party to that trehty, has also
declared that future tests will be underground,
and has not conducted atmospheric tests since
1974. Continued French testing in Mururoa in
the Pacifrc has encountered considerable poli-
tical opposition from South Pacific countries.
Although inspectors from one country visiting
the test site at French invitation found no
evidence of radioactive contamination, spokes-
men have claimed that French tests could be
conducted on French metropolitan territory,
possibly in the Massif Central where suitable
geological conditions prevail, if the French
authorities believed that there was no risk of
contamination.
7.31. There remains little doubt that the main
obstacle to negotiation of a comprehensive test
ban remains the United States requirement to
continue testing. The Soviet Union, immedia-
tely after having conducted five nuolear tests of
its own, announced a moratorium on further
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Soviet tests from 6th August 1985 
- 
the anniver-
sary of the Hiroshima bomb 
- 
until lst January
1986, and thereafter if the United States
also suspended testing. The United Kingdom
would be unlikely to continue testing if the
United States stopped, and indeed would be
deprived of its present test site in Nevada. As
far as improvement in nuclear weapon design
is concerned it is unlikely that United States
designs are behind those of the Soviet Union;
the question of which country has conducted
most tests is complex, and cannot be directly
related to the advance of weapon design. From
1945 to the end of 1984 the United States
conducted a total of 745 nuclear tests; the Soviet
Union 554. Since l97l however the United
States in most years has conducted significantly
fewer nuclear explosions than the Soviet Union,
the figures being 183 and 305 respectively.
However, about one-third of those Soviet explo-
sions have been conducted outside the Soviet
weapon-test areas, and are believed to have been
for peaceful purposes such as the exploitation of
oil-fields. The United States has not recently
conducted peaceful nuclear explosions, having
completed its earlier ploughshare project in the
early 1970s. On this basis the two superpowers
would seem to have conducted approxima-
tely equal numbers of nuclear weapon-test explo-
sions during the last fifteen years 2r.
7.32. President Reagan on 6th July 1985 elabo-
rating on a proposal he had made in the United
Nations General Assembly on 24th December
1984, invited the Soviet Union to send observers
with technical measuring equipment to the
United States Nevada test site, to monitor
United States test explosions. It is a feature of
the technical argument concerning the ability to
monitor nuclear test explosions by distant seis-
mic networks that initial calibration tests are
desirable in order to establish at points close to
the test site the relationship between the yield of
nuclear weapon tests in the geological strata
concerned, and the magnitude of the seismic
waves produced. Regrettably the Soviet Union
has declined this invitation. In conversation
with journalists on 5th August, President Reagan
also appeared to offer from an unspecified date a
moratorium on United States nuclear testing
once tests scheduled for the MX and Midgetman
missiles had been completed, but this interpreta-
tion of an impromptu suggestion was subsequen-
tly denied by oflicial spokesmen.
7.33. Certainly the technical claim by the
United Kingdom that existing seismo[ogical
verification efforts might not detect even subs-
tantial nuclear explosions no longer appears
21. Data concerning numbers of nuclear explosions
quoted in this paragraph are drawn from the SIPRI Year-
book 1985, Chapter 2, and from the paper on nuclear explo-
sions, CD/430, submitted to the Conference on Disarma-
ment by the Swedish Delegation on 7th February 1984.
very credible in the light of expert evidence from
other countries. Even the United Kingdom
appears to have reduced its technical claims in
this connection. A technical paper submitted
to the Conference on Disarmament by that
country in 1984 claimed that by decoupling
(exploding a nuclear device in a large under-
ground cavern) an explosion as large as 300 kilo-
tons might go undetected by seismic means.
The more comprehensive paper submitted by
the United Kingdom in 198522 does not repeat
that claim, saying only:
" The size of cavity required to achieve
full decoupling increases with the yield of
the explosion and there is debate about
the maximum size of cavity which would
remain sulliciently stable for a decoupled
test. It is therefore not possible to esti-
mate precisely how large an explosion
could be effectively decoupled but the
decoupling ofseveral tens ofkilotons can-
not be ruled out. "
That is a significant reduction on the 3OO-kiloton
claim of 1984. Other experts have estimated
that in order to decouple an explosion of only
eight kilotons a cavern the size ofthe gtreat pyra-
mid would be required at a depth of two kilo-
metres. That would be equivalent in volume to
a spherical cavity 170 metres in diameter.
7.34. Other allied governments in the Confe-
rence on Disarmament have not supported the
position taken by the United States and the Uni-
ted Kingdom in their approach to a comprehen-
sive test-ban treaty. The representative of the
Netherlands for example speaking on l3th
August 1985 said: " The early conclusion of a
comprehensive test-ban treaty remains a major
objective of the Netherlands Government. We
regret that for the second year in a row it has
been impossible to resume our work " 
- 
a clear
reference to the failure to establish an ad hoc
committee with a mandate to negotiate a treaty.
The representatiye continued with a number
of constructive proposals including suggestions
for the provision of regional seismic networks
within the territory of nuclear weapon powers, to
supplement a worldwide international network
with which the ad hoc group of scienti-
fic experts had been experimenting. He recall-
ed that such arrangements had been discussed in
the trilateral negotiations between the United
States, the Soviet Union and the United King-
dom in 1980. He quoted the report from the
United States Lawrence Livermore laboratory in
May 1983 to the effect " that a network that
includes fifteen high-quality array stations in the
Soviet Union ... would have a 90% degree of
confidence of detecting decoupled explosions
with yields as small as 3 to l0 kilotons. "
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7.35. Dr. David Owen, a former Foreign Secre-
tary of the United Kingdom, speaking in Geneva
at the time of the opening of the non-prolifera-
tion treaty review conferenpe at the end of
August 1985 was particularly scathing of the
technical argument that tests would be undetec-
table. He claimed that goverments " bend the
scientific evidence to fit the political judgments
of leaders who are not prepared to state
openly their true wish, namely to continue to
test "23. Dr. Owen in an earlier article2a proposed
that three calibration tests should be carried out
on United Stateq and Soviet test sites in the pre-
sence of observers with technical equipment
from the other party, and that thereafter there
should be a three-year moratorium on all other
nuclear tests by the two superpowers while a
comprehensive test ban was being negotiated.
7.36. The committee notes that, with the excep-
tion of two or three of the nuclear weapon
powers, world opinion is now almost unanimous
in believing that negotiations on a comprehen-
sive test-ban treaty should begin forthwith. On
l2th September 1985 the European Parliament
adopted by 128 votes to 18, with 13 abstentions,
Resolution B2-845185 on the importance of the
non-proliferation treaty review conference whe-
reby the parliament:
" (i) considers it necessary that talks on a
comprehensiye test ban treaty should
begin as soon as possible;
(ii) calls urgently on all the countries that
possess nuclear weapons to embark
forthwith upon consultation to this
end;
(iii) welcomes the United States Senate's
vote in summer 1984 calling on Presi-
dent Reagan to resume negotiations
for a CTBT;
(iv/ supports the forthcoming House of
Representatives' amendment to the
defence bill to cut off funding for
explosive nuclear testing, subject to a
reciprocal halt by the Soviet Union;
(u/ welcomes the Soviets putting on
record their willingness to be invol-
ved in a testing moratorium starting
this Hiroshima day, August 6th;
(vi) calls in particular on the two member
states that possess nuclear weapons to
lead the way in submitting proposals
to the other nuclear states ... "
At the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty
review conference referred to in the next section
the final declaration adopted by consensus
Observer, lst September 1985.
Sussex University ADIU report, March-April 1985.
without objection contained three paragraphs(on which the United States reserved its posi-
tion) calling in the strongest terms for a test ban
and concluding:
" The conference deeply regretted that a
comprehensive multilateral nuclear test-
ban treaty banning all nu0lear tests by all
states in all environments for all time had
not been concluded so far and, therefore,
called on the nuclear weapon states party
to the treaty (i.e. non-proliferation treaty)
to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985
and called on all the nuclear weapon
states to participate in the urgent negotia-
tion and conclusion of such a treaty as a
matter of the highest priority in the Confe-
rence on Disarmament. "
7.37. On 24th October, the Prime Minist,;rs of
Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and
Tanzania addressed a proposal to the United
States and the Soviet Union calling for a twelve-
month moratorium on all nuclear weapon tests,
and offering to contribute to adoquate verifica-
tion through the installation of seismic detection
systems on their own territories.
(J) Space
7.38. The question of the prevention of an arms
race in outer space left the United States more
isolated than on any other disarnlament issue at
the United Nations General Assembly debate in
autumn 1984. Resolution 39/59 was adopted
on l2th December 1984 with nq votes against
and only one abstention 
- 
that of the United
States.
7.39. The resolution reiterated that the Confe-
rence on Disarmament was the single multilate-
ral disarmament negotiating forum with a pri-
mary r6le of negotiating an agreement or agree-
ments " on the prevention of an arms race in
all its aspects in outer space " and requested the
conference to establish an ad hoc committee
" with a view to undertaking negotiations for the
conclusion of an agreement ... ". As noted
above, because of western objectiens, the terms
of reference of the ad hoc committee established
by the conference instructed it merely to " exa-
mine ... issues relevant to the prevention of an
arms race in outer space ", which the non-
aligned and socialist countries finally accepted
in the absence of consensus on a mandate for the
ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty.
7.40. Speaking in the ad hoc committee on 5th
August 1985 the French representative stressed
the close relationship between anti.ballistic mis-
sile (ABM) systems and anti-satellite (ASAT)
systems. Recognising the importance of the
bilateral negotiations in Geneva between the
United States and the Soviet Union, which were
23.
24.
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dealing with some aspects of space weapons, he
called for a distinction to be made between
topics properly the subject ofthe bilateral nego-
tiations, and those which should be discussed
multilaterally in the Conference on Disarma-
ment. Stressing the importance of preserving
the existing ABM treaty he repeated a French
proposal of 1984 for the negotiation ofa ban on
high-altitude ASAT systems, the development of
which would be verifiable because such systems
had not yet been tested by any country.
7.41. ln the Conference on Disarmament on
20th March 1984, the Soviet Union tabled a
draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force
in outer space, and from space, against the earth
which would ban the placing of weapons in orbit
or on celestial bodies designed to destroy objects
on earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space.
The treaty would also prohibit any interference
with space objects belonging to other states, and
would prohibit the testing, production or posses-
sion of any anti-satellite systems. It would also
prohibit the use of manned spacecraft for any
military purpose. The draft treaty makes no
reference to anti-ballistic missile systems as
such, or to directed-energy systems.
7.42. The committee deals in another report
with the SDI and the aspects of the bilateral
negotiations which concern it.
(g) Rodiological waapons
7.43. Radiological weapons are hypothetical
weapons which would consist of highly radio-
active material and a bursting charge of conven-
tional explosive; they would be designed to pro-
duce extensive radioactive contamination of the
ground on bursting. There is some doubt as to
whether such weapons could be constructed in
practice, because they would be highly radio-
active even before firing, which might make it
impossible to handle them.
7.44. ln 1979 the United States and the Soviet
Union nevertheless tabled an " agreed joint pro-
posal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting
the development, production, stockpiling and
use of radiological weapons ". They no doubt
saw it as a cosmetic device on which it would be
easy to reach agreement, designed partly to offset
criticism by non-aligned countries about lack of
progress on disarmament by the superpowers.
7.45. In 1984 the Conference on Disarmament
established an ad hoc committee to negotiate a
treaty and has re-established the committee in
1985. Sweden and some non-aligned countries,
fundamentally critical of the superpowers'
attempt at a purely cosmetic exercise, have
introduced another theme into the discussion
- 
suggesting that a treaty should also ban
conventional attacks on civilian nuclear installa-
tions, on the grounds that such attacks could
release radioactive contamination creating the
same effect as that which the hypothetical radio-
logical weapons are purported to produce. The
debate has been largely bogged down since with
arguments about whether such a prohibition
should be included in the same or a separate
convention, and how such civilian nuclear ins-
tallations should be defined. The ad hoc
committee established two working subgroups
on the two issues. To its report on22ndAugust
1985 it attached a compilation of draft provi-
sions of a treaty, prepared by the Chairman, and
will continue its work in 1986.
(h) (hher topics
7 .46. The remaining topics on the agenda of the
Conference on Disarmament may appear less
realistic to western allied countries; nevertheless
several are important to delegations of other
countries represented in the conference or the
United Nations General Assembly, particularly
to those of certain non-aligned countries.
7.47. Forr resolutions on the prevention of
nuclear war or assurances for non-nuclear states
against nuclear weapons and similar topics were
adopted at the 1984 United Nations General
Assembly session, the western allies voted
against three. A proposal to set up an ad hoc
committee in the conference on the prevention
of nuclear war was opposed chiefly by the
United States. Although an ad hoc committee
on assurances for non-nuclear weapon countries
was set up at the 1984 session it was not recons-
titutedin 1985.
7.48. Instead an ad hoc committee on a com-
prehensive programme of disarmament was esla-
blished in 1985. Among the proposals of the
second special session on disarmament of the
United Nations General Assembly was one for
such a programme to be drawn up by 1986. It
is a variant of proposals for general and com-
plete disarmament discussed in the United
Nations framework for more than 30 years.
7.49. The topic cessation of the nuclear arms
race has been discussed in the conference in
conjunction with a nuclear test ban, and assumes
importance in the context of Article VI of the
non-proliferation treaty, and the review confe-
rence on that treaty discussed in the next
chapter.
YI I I. Non-proliferation teaty review conference
8.1. A conference of all parties to the non-
proliferation treaty to review its application
convenes every five years; such a conference met
in Geneva from 27th August to 2lst September
1985 
- 
fifteen years after the treaty entered into
force.
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Summary of provisions
8.2. The non-proliferation treaty is to some
extent unique as a treaty in classiffing parties
under the two heads, nuclear weapon parties,
and non-nuclear weapon parties; the former are
defined as states who manufactured and explod-
ed a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive
device prior to lst January 1967 
- 
a definition
which embraces the five present nuclear weapon
powers, although France and China have not
acceded to the treaty. Under Article I, nuclear
weapon states undertake not to transfer nuclear
weapons to any other state, and not to provide
assistance in the construction of nuclear wea-
pons to non-nuclear weapon states. Under
Article II non-nuclear weapon states undertake
not to acquire nuclear weapons. Under Article
m non-nuclear weapon states undertake to
accept safeguards on civilian nuclear installa-
tions through a safeguards agxeement negotiated
with the International Atomic Energy Agency,
and all states undertake not to provide nuclear
material or equipment unless subject to the safe-
guards provided for in the article.
8.3. It is recalled however that the treaty
embodies a number of other significant obliga-
tions. Article IV provides for the right of all
parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes and to be assisted by other parties in so
doing. Article V provides that potential bene-
fits from any peaceful applications of nuclear
explosions shall be made available to non-
nuclear weapon states - although no circums-
tances have arisen under which this article has
been applied. Most importantly under Article
VI each party undertakes " to pursue negotia-
tions in good faith on eflective measures relating
to cessation ofthe nuclear arrns race at an early
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a
treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control ".
8.4. While the review conference was able to
note that Articles I and II had been applied, the
greater part of the debate turned on Article VI,
and the failure of the nuclear weapon powers in
particular to make detectable progress on nego-
tiations to limit nuclear weapons. The over-
whelming consensus of the conference was to
call for the early conclusion of a comprehensive
test-ban treaty, referred to above.
Parties
8.5. The number of parties to the treaty has
risen from 115 at the last review conference in
1980 to 130 in 1985. Apart from the nuclear
weapon powers, China and France, there remain
significant non-parties to the treaty including in
particular India, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, South Africa, Israel, Saudia Arabia and
Spain. From the beginning of 1986 Spain will
be in an anomalous position as the only member
of the European Community apart from France
which is not a party to the non-proliferation
treaty. This will affect the way in which safe-
guards are applied to nuclear installations in
Spain. France has declared that it will behave
in the same way as parties to the treaty.
8.6. The report of the IAEA to the review
conference states that at the end of 1984 safe-
guards agreements under Article III of the treaty
were in force with 78 of the 121 non-nuclear
weapon powers 
- 
these covered ttre great bulk of
significant nuclear installations ooncerned. Safe-
guards have also been accepted with respect
to civilian nuclear installations, in dilferent
ways, by the nuclear weapon powers, France,
United Kingdom, the United States and, with
eflect from lOth June 1985, the Soviet Union.
China, after the conclusion of thp review confe-
rence, surprised the IAEA annual congress in
Vienna on24th September by announcing that it
also would place " some of its civilian nuclear
installations under IAEA safeguards ".
The non-proliferation r4gime
8.7. The position of the significant parties
listed above continues to cause anxiety. Indiain particular conducted a nuclear explosion
which it claimed to be peaceful in 1974. Such
an explosion would have been prohibited by the
treaty had India been a party to it which refers
throughout to " nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices ", it having been
argued throughout the negotiation of the treaty
that no meaningful distinction cpuld be made
between the two. India has consistently refused
to accept safeguards on much of its nuclear
activities. There are consistent reports of the
preparation of fissionable material for nuclear
weapons in Pakistan. Although Libya is a party
to the NPT, and its nuclear installations safe-
guarded by the IAEA, there are fur,ther reports of
Libyan assistance to Pakistan for the manufac-
ture of an 'lslamic bomb ". Speaking in New
York on 2lst October, President Zia of Pakistan
reiterated an earlier pledge to accede to the non-
proliferation treaty and accept international safe-
guards if India did the same; he denied that
Pakistan was about to conduct a nuclear test,
and said that the uranium enrichment plant at
Kahuta was * a very modest research pro-
gramme " to make the country self-sufficient for
its energy requirements; he denied that Pakistan
had built a plutonium reprocessing plant25.
Other reports in the past have referred to the
capability of the production of, or even possible
possession of, nuclear weapons by Israel and
South Africa. Nevertheless the non-prolifera-
tion r6gime has been strengthened irn the interval
between the two review conferences. Egypt in
particular acceded to the treaty in 1982.
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8.8. As an authoritative and thoughtful
report26 the non-proliferation r6gime is a broader
concept than mere accession to the non-prolife-
ration treaty. There are still relatively few
countries in a position to supply significant
assistance to a civilian nuclear industry; their
export policy is a significant factor in the non-
proliferation r6gime, because civilian nuclear
installations, if they comprise nuclear fuel
reprocessing facilities, or uranium enrichment
facilities, can be misapplied to the production of
nuclear weapons. A second support for the
non-proliferation regime comes from the
creation of nuclear weapon-free zones by states
in certain areas of the world. The Tlatelolco
treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in
Latin America was signed on l4th February
1967 ar,d entered into force on 22nd April
1968. There are 23 parties to the treaty. The
South Pacific nuclear-free zone treaty has just
been signed on 6th August 1985 at Rarotonga, in
the Cook Islands, by eight members of the South
Pacific forum 
- 
Australia, Cook lslands, Fiji,
Kiribati, New Zealand, Niue, Tuvalu and
Western Samoa.
8.9. Signifrcant backup to IAEA safeguards has
been the adoption by the nuclear suppliers
group, originally known as the London Club, of
guidelines for nuclear transfers, originally nego-
tiated from 1975 to 1977 by seven significant
suppliers of nuclear facilities: Canada, the Fede-
ral Republic of Germany, France, Japan, the
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United
States. These founder countries were joined in
1978 by Belgium, Czechoslovakia, the German
Democratic Republic, Italy, the Netherlands,
Poland, Sweden and Switzerland. The guide-
lines for nuclear transfers agreed on 21st
September 1977 have formed an important basis
for regulating international supplies of nuclear
materials and installations. Since January 1978
seven more countries have informed the IAEA
that they would apply the guidelines: Australia,
Finland, Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, Ire-
land and Bulgaria, and South Africa announced
unilaterally in 1984 that it would follow the
guidelines in its export policy.
8.10. Consideration was given to updating the
guidelines at a meeting of western members of
the original London Club held in Luxembourg in
February 1985, and from which, apparently at
United States instigation, the Eastern European
26. New approaches
approach, Centre for
April 1985.
to non-proliferation: a European
European Policy Studies, Brussels,
members, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the
Soviet Union, were excluded. The latter there-
upon organised their own meeting in Bratis-
lava on l4th and 15th February and issued their
own communiqu6 calling for a further strength-
ening of the international non-proliferation
r6gime. It is now understood however that a
broader meeting of all parties to the original
London agreement is being arranged in Vienna
on the initiative of the United Kingdom in
November 1985. Despite the relative success of
the London agreements international competi-
tion in the supply of nuclear facilities leaves
some weaknesses in the non-proliferation
r6gime. Not all WEU countries have insisted
on the full application of IAEA safeguards to all
nuclear material and facilities on the territory of
recipient states.
Proceedings of the review conference
8.11. Compared with the 1980 review confer-
ence, the onejust concluded was conducted in a
constructive atmosphere despite the sustained
criticism of the nuclear weapon powers for their
failure to make progress on nuclear disarmament
under the terms of Article VI of the non-
proliferation treaty. There was general support
for the non-proliferation treaty, but ofcourse the
principal critics of the treaty such as India
excluded themselves as they are not parties.
8.12. In the final declaration adopted by
consensus on 2lst September 1985 the parties
solemnly declared * their conviction that the
treaty is essential to international peace and
security; their continued support for the objec-
tives of the treaty ... ". Among other points
made in the recommendation are a concern
about the nuclear capability of South Africa and
Israel and a call for the total and complete prohi-
bition of the transfer of nuclear facilities or
resources to those countries. In supporting the
non-proliferation regime the declaration urged
non-nuclear weapon states not parties to the
treaty to undertake a commitment not to acquire
nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA safeguards,
and urged exporting states to take effective steps
towards achieving such a commitment to non-
proliferation and acceptance of safeguards. It
expressed the view that accession to the non-
proliferation treaty was the best way to achieve
that objective, without however making it a
precondition.
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APPENDIX I
Countries participating in arms contol
and disarmament negotiations by bloc
Coutry StockholmCDE
Geneva
CD
Vrcnm
ITaBFR I
Number of
rnvolvements
ll/esten group
NATO nations
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
France
Federal Republic
of Germany
Greece
Iceland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Other western
allies
Australia
Japan
Socialist group
Warsaw Pact
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
DDR (East Germany)
Hungary
Poland
Romania2
USSR
Other Warsaw Pact
ally
Mongolia
Neatral and non-aliped
Austria
Cyprus
Sweden
Yugoslavia
Finland
Liechtenstein
Malta
San Marino
Switzerland
Algeria
Argentina
Burma
Brazil
Cuba3
Egypt
Ethiopia3
India
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
I
x
I
I
x
x
I
I
x
x
I
x
x
U
x
I
x
3
3
2
2
3
2
I
3
2
3
2
I
1
2
3
3
I
I
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
I
I
I
2
2
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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Country SrockholECDE
Gcncva
CD
Vienm
MBFR I
Nubcrof
iDvolvcmcnB
Iudonesia
Kenya
Morocco
Mexico
Nigeria
Pakistan
Peru
Iran
Sri Lanka
Venezuela
Taire
Memben of no
gtoap
China
Ireland
Monaco
Vatican
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Total: 58 35 40 l9
l. Notr on MBFR particifilx I - indinct pnicipaag U - thc rtatu of Hulgary hrs not bccn drtcrmincd
2. In thc Confcrcacc on Di!.msEm! Romia aho ottcnds mcctiags of rhc NNA.
3. In thc Confqucc on Diramancnl' Cuba strd Ethiopia ako attcnd Ecctitr8r of thc socialirr group.
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The participating states,
Desirous of eliminating the causes of tension
that may exist among them and thus of contribu-
ting to the strengthening ofpeace and security in
the world;
Determined to strengthen confidence among
them and thus to contribute to increasing stabi-
lity and security in Europe;
Determined further to refrain in their
mutual relations, as well as in their international
relations in general, from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other man-
ner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations and with the declaration on principles
guiding relations between participating states as
adopted in this final act;
Recognising the need to contribute to reduc-
ing the dangers of armed conflict and of misun-
derstanding or miscalculation of military activi-
ties which could give rise to apprehension, parti-
cularly in a situation where the participating
states lack clear and timely information about
the nature of such activities;
Taking into accoun consideration relevant
to efforts aimed at lessening tension and promo-
ting disarmament;
Recognising that the exchange of observers
by invitation at military manceuvres will help to
promote contacts and mutual understanding;
Having studied the question of prior notifi-
cation of major military movements in the
context of confidence-building;
Recognising that there are other ways in
which individual states can contribute further to
their common objectives;
Convinced of the political importance of
prior notification of major military maneuvres
for the promotion of mutual understanding and
the strengthening of confidence, stability and
security;
Accepting the responsibility ofeach ofthem
to promote these objectives and to implement
this measure, in accordance with the accepted
criteria and modalities, as essentials for the reali-
sation of these objectives;
APPENDIX II
Docament on confidence-building measares
and certain aspects of security and disarmament
from the final oct of the conference on security
and co-operation in Europe, Helsinki
lst August 1975
Recognising that this measure deriving from
political decision rests upon a voluntary basis;
H ave adopted the following:
I
Prior notifrcatiot of major military manauvrus
They will notiff their major military
maneuvres to all other participating states
througb usual diplomatic channels in accordance
with the following provisions:
Notification will be given of major military
maneuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops,
independently or combined with any possible air
or naval components (in this c0ntext the word
" troops " includes amphibious and airborne
troops). In the case of independent manceuvres
of amphibious or airborne troops, or of combin-
ed maneuvres involving them, these troops will
be included in this total. Furthermore, in the
case of combined manceuvres which do not
reach the above total but which involve land
forces together with significant numbers of either
amphibious or airborne troops, or both, notifica-
tion can also be given.
Notification will be given of major military
manceuvres which take place on lthe territory, in
Europe, of any participating state as well as, if
applicable, in the adjoining sea area and
airspace.
In the case of a participating state whose ter-
ritory extends beyond Europe, prior notification
need be given only of manceuvhes which take
place in an area within 250 kilometres from its
frontier facing or shared with any other Euro-
pean participating state, the participating state
need not, however, give notification in cases in
which that area is also contiguous to the partici-
pating state's frontier facing or shared with a
non-European non-participating state.
Notification will be given twenty-one days
or more in advance of the start of,the maneuvre
or in the case of a man@uvre arranged at shorter
notice at the earliest possible opportunity prior
to its starting date.
Notification will contain information of the
designation, if any, the general purpose of and
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the states involved in the maneuyre, the type or
types and numerical strength of the forces enga-
ged, the area and estimated time-frame of its
conduct. The participating states will also, if
possible, provide additional relevant informa-
tion, particularly that related to the components
ofthe forces engaged and the period ofinvolve-
ment of these forces.
Prior notification olother military maneayrcs
The participating states recognise that they
can contribute further to strengthening confi-
dence and increasing security and stability, and
to this end may also notifu smaller-scale military
man@uvres to other participating states, with
special regard for those near the area of such
manGuvres.
To the same end, the participating states
also recognise that they may notify other mili-
tary mancuvres conducted by them.
Exchange ofobsenen
The participating states will invite other
participating states, voluntarily and on a bilate-
ral basis, in a spirit of reciprocity and good will
towards all participating states, to send observers
to attend military manceuvres.
The inviting state will determine in each
case the number of observers, the procedures
and conditions of their participation, and give
other information which it may consider useful.
It will provide appropriate facilities and hospi-
tality.
The invitation will be given as far ahead as
is conveniently possible through usual diploma-
tic channels.
Prior notification of major military mauDaytes
In accordance with the final recommenda-
tions of the Helsinki consultations the participa-
ting states studied the question of prior notifica-
tion of major military movements as a measure
to strengthen confidence.
Accordingly, the participating states recog-
nise that they may, at their own discretion and
with a view to contributing to confidence-
building, notit/ their major military movements.
In the same spirit, further consideration will
be given by the states participating in the confe-
rence on security and co-operation in Europe to
the question of prior notification of major mili-
tary movements, bearing in mind, in particular,
the experience gained by the implementation of
the measures which are set forth in this docu-
ment.
Other confidence-building measures
The participating states recognise that there
are other means by which their common objec-
tives can be promoted.
In particular, they will, with due regard to
reciprocity and with a view to better mutual
understanding, promote exchanges by invitation
among their military personnel, including visits
by military delegations.
***
In order to make a fuller contribution to
their common objective of confidence-building,
the participating states, when conducting their
military activities in the area covered by the pro-
visions for the prior notification of major mili-
tary man@uvres, will duly take into account and
respect this objective.
They also recognise that the experience
gained by the implementation of the provisions
set forth above, together with further efforts,
could lead to developing and enlarying measures
aimed at strengthening confidence.
II
Questions rebting to disarmament
The participating states recognise the inte-
rest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening
military confrontation and promoting disarma-
ment which are designed to complement politi-
cal d6tente in Europe and to strengthen their
security. They are convinced ofthe necessity to
take effective measures in these fields which by
their scope and by their nature constitute steps
towards the ultimate achievement of general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control, and which should result in
strengthening peace and security throughout the
world.
ilI
G eneral cons iderat ions
Having considered the views expressed on
various subjects related to the strengthening of
security in Europe through joint efforts aimed at
promoting d6tente and disarmament, the partici-
pating states, when engaged in such efforts, will,
in this context, proceed, in particular, from the
following essential considerations:
- 
the complementary nature of the political
and military aspects of security;
- 
the interrelation between the security of
each participating state and security in
Europe as a whole and the relationship
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which exists, in the broader context of
world security, between security in
Europe and security in the Mediterranean
area;
- 
respect for the security interests of all
states participating in the conference on
security and co-operation in Europe inhe-
rent in their sovereign equality;
- 
the importance that participants in nego-
tiating forums see to it that information
about relevant developments, progress
and results is provided on an appropriate
basis to other states participating in the
conference on security and co-operationin Europe and, in retum, the justified
interest of any of those states in having
their views considered.
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APPENDIX III
Mandate approved in Madrid on 6th September 198i
for the conference on confidence- and security-building
meutures and disarmament in Europe
The participating states,
Recalling the provisions of the final act
according to which they recognise the interest of
all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military
confrontation and promoting disarmament,
Have agreed to convene a conference on
confidence- and security-building measures and
disarmament in Europe.
The aim of the conference is, as a substan-
tial and integral part of the multilateral process
initiated by the conference on security and co-
operation in Europe, with the participation of all
the states signatories of the final act, to under-
take, in stages, new, effective, and concrete
actions designed to make progress in strengthen-
ing confidence and security and in achieving
disarmament, so as to give effect and expression
to the duty ofstates to refrain from the threat or
use of force in their mutual relations.
Thus the conference will begin a process of
which the first stage will be devoted to the nego-
tiation and adoption of a set of mutually com-
plementary confidence- and security-building
measures designed to reduce the risk of military
confrontation in Europe.
The first stage of the conference will be heldin Stockholm commencing on lTth January
1984.
On the basis of equality of rights, balance
and reciprocity, equal respect for the security
interests of all CSCE participating states, and of
their respective obligations concerning confi-
dence- and security-building measures and disar-
mament in Europe, these confidence- and secu-
rity-building measures will cover the whole of
Europe as well as the adjoining sea arear and
airspace. They will be of military significance
and politically binding and will be provided with
adequate forms of verification which correspond
to their content.
As far as the adjoining sea arear and
airspace is concerned, the measures will be appli-
cable to the military activities of all the partici-
pating states taking place there whenever these
activities affect security in Europe as well as
constitute apaft of activities taking place within
the whole of Europe as referred to above, which
they will agree to notit/. Necessary specifica-
tions will be made through the negotiations on
the confidence- and security-building measures
at the conference.
Nothing in the definition of the zone given
above will diminish obligations already under-
taken under the final act. The confidence- and
security-building measures to be agreed upon at
the conference will also be applicable in all areas
covered by any ofthe provisions in the final act
relating to confidence-building measures and
certain aspects of security and disarmament.
The provisions established by the negotia-
tors will come into force in the forms and
according to the procedure to be agreed upon by
the conference.
Taking into account the abovementioned
aim of the conference, the next follow-up meet-
ing of the participating states of the CSCE, to be
held in Vienna, commencing on 4th November
1986, will assess the progress achieved during
the first stage ofthe conference.
Taking into account the relevant provisions
of the final act, and having reviewed the results
achieved by the first stage ofthe conference, and
also in the light of other relevant negotiations on
security and disarmament affecting Europe, a
future CSCE follow-up meeting will consider
ways and appropriate means for the participat-
ing states to continue their efforts for security
and disarmament in Europe, including the ques-
tion of supplementing the present mandate for
the next stage of the conference on confidence-
and security-building measures and disarma-
ment in Europe.
A preparatory meeting, charged with estab-
lishing the agenda, timetable and other organi-
sational modalities for the first stage of the
conference, will be held in Helsinki, commen-
cing on 25th October 1983. Its duration shall
not exceed three weeks.
The rules of procedure, the working
methods and the scale of distribution for the
expenses valid for the CSCE will, mutatis
mutandis, be applied to the conference and to
the preparatory meeting referred to in the prece-
ding parag;raph. The services of a technical
secretariat will be provided by the host country.
(Madrid, 6th September 1983)l. In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area isunderstood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe.
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APPENDIX IV
Implementation of confidence-building measares
1. Notification olmilitary morroarrcs under the CSCE rdgine by NATO countrics
Ehte Sponroriagcoutry
Namc of
Eto(luw
Sizc of
EAtr(lUVIC
(ao. ofrrcn)
Noti6cation
givcn (no. of
days)
Obccrvsn
invilcd
1975
September
October
Oct['{ov
September
October
OctA.Iov
t976
September
September
September
Feb/Mar
September
October
November
1977
September
September
May
September
September
Sep/Oct
October
1978
September
September
September
September
March
September
1979
Jau/Feb
September
September
March
Sep/Oct
October
October
r980
September
September
September
FRG
USA
USA
Turkey
Norway
Netherlands
FRG
USA
USA
Norway
Norway
Denmark/FRG
Britain
USA
FRG
USA
Denmark
Belgium
Netherlands
Turkey
FRG
USA
Netherlands
FRG
Norway
Norway
USA
USA
FRG
Norway
Turkey
France
Britain
FRG
USA
Britain
Grosse
Rochade
Certain Trek
Reforger 75
Deep Express
Batten Bolt
Pantsersprong
Grosser Bir
Gordian Shield
Iares Team
Atlas Express
Teamwork
Bonded ltem
Spearpoint
Cardon Edge
Standhafte
Schatten
Ceruin
Fighter
Arrow Express
Blue Fox
Interaction
Tayfun 77
Blaue Donau
Certain Shield
Saxon Drive
Bold Guard
Arctic Express
Black Bear
Certain
Sentinal
Constant
Enforcer
Harte Faust
Cold Winter 79
Display Determina-
tion 79
Saone 79
Keystone
St. Georg
Certain Rampart
Spearpoint
68 000
57 000
53 000
l8 000
8 000
r0 000
50 000
30 000
44 000
l7 000
t3 500
ll 000
l8 000
58 700
38 000
24 000
l6 000
24 500
l2 000
r5 000
46 000
56 000
32 500
65 000
l5 300
8 200
66 000
29 000
60 000
l0 000
l8 000
l6 000
l8 000
44 000
40 000
90 000
23
34
2l
2t
24
t4
2t
2t
2t
2t
2r
2t
23
2t
2t
23
2l
2t
2t
30
25
2t
2t
30
32
2t
2t
24
2t
24
24
24
24
24
30
30
":'
Yes
Yes
V.,
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
"j'
Yes
Yes
Yes
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Ehrc Sponsoringcountry
Namc of
mlEcuEl
Siz of
maocuuc
(no. ofmco)
Notification
givcn (no. of
days)
Obscrvcrs
itrvilcd
March
September
October
I98I
September
September
October
March
September
Sep/Oct
October
October
1982
March
Sep/Oct
September
September
September
t983
September
Seprcmber
1984
A. Major
mQncuvres
March
September
September
September
B. Smaller-scale
mancuvfes
September
September
Norway
Nonrray
France
USA/FRG
FRG
Britain
Norway
Norway
Denmark
Belgium/FRG
France
Norway
Denmark/FRG
USA/FRG
FRG
France
Norway
USA/FRG
FRG
FRGA.Ieth.
Britain
Denmark
France
Norway
Britain
FRG
FRG
USA/FRG
France
Denmark
Anorak Express 80
Teamwork 80
Marne 80
Certain
Encounter
Scharfe Klinge
Red Claymore
Cold Winter
Barfrost
Amber Express
Cross Fire
Farfadet
Alloy Express
Bold Guard 82
Carbine Fortress
82
Starke Wehr
Langres 82
Cold Winter 83
Confident Express
Wehrhafte Loewen
Atlantic Lion
Eternal Triangle
Ample Express
Moselle 83
Avalanche
Express
Lion Heart
84 (Full FIow)
plus
Spear
Point 84
Flinker
Igel
Crrtain Fury
Doubs 84
Bold
Gannet 84
18 200
l6 800
r7 000
45 600
48 000
23 000
11 000
9 000
l5 000
21 000
4 000*
t42W
47 2@
73 000
35 000
l7 000
r0 000
> 25 000
> 25 000
> 25 000
> 25 000
> 25 000
25 000
132 000
55 000
50 000
20 000
21 000
3l
28
10
24
2r
2l
2t
2t
2l
2t
t4
30
24
24
2t
4
29
24
22
2l
32
22
:'
Yes
'!,
V.,
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
r To Mcditcrrancan CSCE ountrica only.
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2, Notifwation olmilitary maneuyres uader the CSCE rdgime by Wanaw Put coaatrics
Dat€ Sponsoring
coutrry
Namc of
man(luut
Sizc of
mgn(luul
(no. ofmcn)
Nori6cation
given (no. of
days)
Obscrvcrs
invircd
1975
None
1976
JanlFeb
June
April
October
September
1977
Mar/Apr
July
r978
February
July
September
1979
February
April
July
mid-May
1980
July
September
August
I98I
September
t982
January
September
r983
January
June
July
July
September
1984
A. Major
maruEuvrd
June/July
September
USSR
USSR
Hungary
Hungary
Poland
USSR
USSR
USSR
USSR
USSR
USSR/CSSR
USSR
USSR
Hungary
USSR
GDR
Hungary
USSR
ussR/cssR
Bulgaria
Hungary
Hungary
USSR
USSR
USSR
USSR
cssR
Kavkaz
Sever
TarczaT6
f"rputi.
Berezhina
Tarcza7S
Kavkaz II
Druzhba
Neman
Shield 79
Brotherhood in Arms
Dyna 80
7-apad 8l
Druzhba 82
Shield 82
Danube 83
Kunsag 83
ir,.,o ro
25 000
25 000
l0 000
l5 000
35 0@
25 000
27 000
25 000
30 000
25 000
26 000
25 000
25 000
25 000
30 000
40 000
l8 000
100 000**
25 000
60 000
over
20 000
14 000
50 000
26 000
23 000
60 000
60 000
2l
2t
I
0
2l
2t
2t
2t
2l
2t
2l
2t
2t
*
2t
2t
I
2t
2t
2l
few days
6
2t
2t
2t
22
2t
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yesr*.
Yes
No
No
' 
Vsrtsl notifcations on 3rd M8y 1979.o Accoding io TASS on 5th Scprlmbcr 1981.E Only from Warsaw Paa countrics.
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Dalc Sponcoring
counEy
Namc of
EtneuvTc
Siz€ of
mricuvrc
(no. ofmcn)
Notifcation
giwn (no. of
dryB)
Obacrucn
itrvirrd
r975
October
November
1976
October
November
1977
March
October
November
1978
November
1979
March
October
November
1980
None
I98I
OctA'Iov
October
1982
March
Seprcmber
r983
B. Smaller-scale
morutuvfes
September
Sept/Oct
1984
Yugoslavia
Switzerland
Yugoslavia
Sweden
Sweden
Sparn
Austria
Austria
Switzerland
Switzerland
Austria
Spatn
Switzerland
Sweden
Sweden
Yugoslavia
Sweden
Golilja
Poseidon
V6nn 77
Podenco
Herbstubung
(Command Post
Exercise)
Nussknacker
Forte
Area Defence
Exercise 79
Crisex 8l
Cresta
Norrsken
Sydfront
Unity 83
Ostkust
l8 000
40 000
24 000
r2 000
l0 000
8 000
l2 000
5 000
34 000
27 000
27 500
322W
25 000
23 000
25 000
2200o
20 000
None
25
3l
24
30
2t
53
37
20
28
33
45
25
33
30
30
35
3l
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
3. Notifuatioa olmilitary narcuwxs undcr the CSCE rAgirne by neutal and non-alignod countrics
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Levels of United States and Soviet strategic nuclear woopons (covered by SALT II), July 1985
Type
Unitcd Stalc. Sovia Unioa
Maximum nagc(lm) No. ofwsrtcads cach fr[s. 6f 
niuil6
caimfr Toul rnrtads Toral whads
No. of miuila
or eircraft
No. of
wartcad! cach
Mlrinun rargp(kn) TlDc
ICBMs
Titan II
Minuteman II
Miauteman III
15,000
I 1,300
13,000
I
I
3
26
4501
550
26
450
1,650
520
60
600
3,080
2,160
?
520
60
150
308
360
?
lor3
I
4
l0
6
I
9,60G
13,000
10,000
10,000
16,700
10,000
8,500?
ICBMs
ss-l l
ss-13
s$I7
ss-18
ss-19
s$25
Sub.total 1,026 2,t26 6,420 r,398 Sub-total
SLBMs
Poseidon C3
Trident C4
4,600
7,4N
lGl4
8
304
3t2
3,040
2,496
39
336
292
t2
1,568
540
?
39
336
292
t2
224
60
l6
I
t-2
I
I
t-7
9
?
1,400
3,000
7,800
9,100
3,900
6,50G,
8,000
8,300
?
SLBMs
s$N5
SS.N6
SS.N8
S$NI7
ss-Nl8
ss-N20
ss-N23
Subtotal 6t6 5,536 2,787 979 Sub-'total
Total BM t,642 7,662 9,207 2,377 Total BM
Aircrafi
852G
B52}t
r2,000
16.000
12 ALCM + 8
8 ';l'l 2,520 s00180 r2545 244 12,800l 1,200
Aircrafi
Bear Tu-95
Bison Mya-4
Subtotal l4l 2,520 680 170 SubtoEl
Total r 0,1 82 9,987 Total
tJ{
Sourcc: IISS Milirrry B.lincc l9ttt6.
l. IDcludi[S 8 Minurcnm for connuaicationc Durporcr.
2. hcluding 6l i! no!-nuclc.r r$lc.rEcd with HarDooL
ts
'Uln
zU
X
UIc
tnz
-l
55o
Document 1041 14th November 1985
Replies of the Council to Recommendations 417 to 424
RECOMMENDATION 417 
'
on Eost - jlest relations
ten years alter the Helsinki final act 2
The Assembly,
O Considering that close co-operation between the American and European members of the
Atlantic Alliance is the basis of Western European security and the maintenance of peace;
(iil Considering that Western Europe's security means protecting it against local or global attacks;
(iiil Considering that in many cases in Eastern Europe human rights have not been respected and that
this has not facilitated efforts for peace;
(iv) Welcoming the meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union with a view to reaching
agreements to terminate the armaments race;
(v) Considering that the development of exchanges between East and West is likely to contribute to
the reduction of tension;
(vil Considering that the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, signed in
Helsinki on lst August 1975, is the essential charter for the reduction of tension in Europe, but that the
principles it defines are still far from being applied everywhere, particularly where human rights are
concerned;
(viil Considering that the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki final act provides an opportunity to
review its efrectiveness as a contribution to peaceful coexistence in Europe;
(viii) Considering that WEU's rdle is to take the necessary steps to make the voice of the European
pillar of the alliance heard on matters relating to security, as specified in the Rome Declaration;
(ix) Considering that WEU's action should allow the CSCE process to be strengthened and in particu-
lar the views of the European pillar of the alliance to be heard at the Stockholm conference on disarma-
ment in Europe;
(x) Considering that a dialogue with members of the United States Congpess is essential for the infor-
mation and deliberations of members of the WEU Assembly on matters of this kind,
RrcoutrreNos rnnr rnr Corngcn
l. Regularly examine the state of all negotiations on disarmament and the limitation of armaments
with a view inter alia to achieving through joint action:
(a) agreement udth the eastern countries to speciff the implications of the principles set out in
the final act of the Helsinki conference;
(b) more confidence-building measures, particularly through the presence of observers at military
man@uwes, in the context of the negotiations now being held in Stockholm;
(c) the definition of a joint position on matters discussed by the United States and the Soviet
Union at the Geneva conference with a view to agxeement on the conditions for limiting the
armaments race;
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 2lst May 1985 during the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session (3rd sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Haase on behalf of the General Alfairs Committee (Document
l0l3).
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2. Make use of the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki conference to obtain confirmation by all the
signatory powers of their determination to apply eflectively all the principles contained in the final act,
particularly those relating to:
(a) respect for human rights;
(b) the inviolability of frontiers;
(c) the territorial integrity of states;
(d) non-interference in the internal affairs of another state with immediate application to Afgha-
nistan;
(e) equality of treatment between nations and their right to self-determination;
(fl co-operation between states;
G) the establishment of confidence-building measures;
3. In the appropriate forums, actively promote:
(a) the development of trade between eastern and western countries;
(b) the adaptation of Cocom practice and lists to an increase in trade which does not jeopardise
the West's security;
(c) in agreement with the United
tific nature;
States, the participation ofEurope in space research ofa scien-
(d) agreement between Western and Eastern European countries on improving protection of the
envrronment;
4. On the occasion of the renewal of the Warsaw Pact, seek agreement between the Atlantic Alliance
and WEU countries on the one hand and the Warsaw Pact couniries on the other in order to define theprinciple of non-recourse to the threat or use of force as set out in the Helsinki final act, while preparing
and implementilg- specific mutual measures of confidence and bearing in mind that any realhrmatioi
of the non-use of force should be accompanied by an agreed confirmation of the need to respect human
rights.
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'
to Recommendation 417
The Council notes with interest the Assembly's recommendations concerning East-West relations
ten years after the Helsinki final act.
l. The countries of WEU attach great importance to the full implementation by all the participating
states in the conference on security and co-operation in Europe of all the principles and provisions laid
down in the final act.
They deplore the delays and breaches on the part of the Warsaw Pact countries in fulfilling the
solemn intentions and commitments expressed in Helsinki ten years ago, such as those concerned with
the seventh principle of the final act 
- 
the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The continued occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet forces for more than five years is a flagtrant
violation of several fundamental principles enunciated in the final act.
The unhelpful attitude of the countries of the Warsaw Pact towards the comprehensive package
of concrete confidence-building and security measures presented to the Stockholm conference by the
member countries of WEU and their allies in the Atlantic Alliance, has so far hindered the progress of
negotiations leading to an agreement satisfactory to all the thirty-five participants.
These examples demonstrate that the provisions of the final act are far from being fully imple-
mented, but this is clearly not a reason to reject the process as being inappropriate to the aims being
pursued. The member governments of WEU had this concern in mind on the occasion of the celebra-
tion of the tenth anniversary of the signing of the final act.
2. The Council emphasises that the development of the CSCE process must be balanced.
Compliance with the provisions of the final act as a whole is vital to the achievement of lasting peace,
security, justice and well-being in Europe. It is not possible to isolate one aspect or one principle and
to ignore the others. Real progress in the field of human rights, as in other fields, must be made to
enable the CSCE process to make a genuine contribution to the improvement of East-West relations.
In this connection, the Council regrets the outcome of the recent meeting of human rights experts in
Ottawa which highlighted the gap that continues to exist between commitments freely entered into by
participating states and concrete results at the individual level.
3. As to the Stockholm conference, which is an integral part of the CSCE process, the member states
of WEU are in favour of an agreement on concrete confidence-building and security measures.
These measures, covering the whole of Europe, must be militarily significant, politically binding
and properly verifiable. They will thus be able to give new and concrete effect and expression to the
existing duty ofall the participating states to refrain from the threat or use offorce.
The member countries of WEU have actively co-operated within the Atlantic Alliance in drawing
up a coherent set ofconcrete confidence-building and security measures.
These measures, which would lead to greater mutual transparency, contain specific commitments
relating in particular to the exchange of military information, the prior notification of military
mancuvres, the invitation to send observers and verification measures.
In this context, the Council draws attention to the undertaking by the member countries of WEU
and their allies in the Atlantic Alliance never to use their weapons except in response to attack.
4. With regard to the Geneva arms control talks between the United States and the Soviet Union,
the member states of WEU are kept informed by the American allies within the framework of the
North Atlantic Council and bilaterally and, for those states concerned, within the special consultative
group set up to formulate positions on INF.
With regard to the United States strategic defence initiative, the Council of WEU is continuing
its collective consideration in order to achieve, as far as possible, a co-ordinated reaction to the United
States invitation to participate in the research programme.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd October 19E5.
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In the context of the revitalisation of WEU, it is clear that the Seven intend to pay special
attention to examining the abovementioned questions concerning the security interests of the European
countries.
5. Member countries of WEU act both bilaterally and within the appropriate forums to promote the
development of trade between the countries of the East and of the West and also to promote
co-operation in the field of environmental protection.
Furthermore, they have always demonstrated their concern to develop trade with the countries of
the East in a way which does not jeopardise their own security.
As regards co-operation in the field of environmental protection, the Council notes with satisfac-
tion the results of the conference of environment ministers which took place in Munich ftom24th-27th
June 1984 under the aegis of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.
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'
on Cypras and Earopeon securiy2
The Assembly,
O Considering that the situation in Cyprus is a serious threat to the maintenance of the cohesion of
the Atlantic Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean;
(iil Considering that the association of the Republic of Cyprus with the European Community, its
participation in the Council of Europe and that of Greece and Turkey in the Atlantic Alliance give the
member countries of WEU the right and duty to do their utmost to promote the establishment of
lasting peace on the island;
(iiil Considering that the conclusions drawn by the Secretary-General of the United Nations from the
inter-community negotiations held between 1977 and 1984 are the best possible basis for the resto-
ration of peace in Cyprus;
(iv) Welcoming the decision taken by the two Cypriot communities to pursue their negotiations in
spite of the initial setback,
Rrcouuruos rHer rHe CouNCrL
Express its support for the proposals by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and use all
the influence it may have with the Greek, Turkish and both Cypriot authorities to promote the
conclusion of a final agreement on this basis.
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2lst May 1985 during the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session (3rd sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Alfairs Committee(Document 1008).
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The governments of the member states of WEU share the concerns of the Assembly in this
matter.
The member governments have for some time been acting within appropriate international fora,
with the aim of contributing to an eventual agreement for the reconciliation of the differences between
the parties to the dispute.
The member governments very much hope that a fair and permanent solution may be found
through the good oflices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The member governments
wish to confirm their full support for the current initiative of the United Nations Secretary-General
whose efforts they have encouraged in this matter from the beginning.
Recently the problem was studied within the framework of European political co-operation and
the Ten once again launched an appeal to the parties concerned in the hope that they would co-operate
with the Secretary-General's initiative and that they would avoid any action which might hinder
progless.
1. Communicated to the Assembly on l lth Ocrober 1985.
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'
on the military use of comPuters -
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council2
The Assembly,
O Aware of the preponderant importance of computers for the defence of the western world,
whether they are incorporated in weapons systems or used for command, control, communications and
intelligence;
(iil Considering the importance of military computers which have been prime movers for the
development of civil computer industries for the last twenty years;
(iiil Considering also that, since the failure of Unidata - Philips, Siemens and CII - Western Europe
has had no common co-ordinated policy and is only now starting the Esprit programme which covers
no military use;
(iv) Considering the United States and Japanese challenge in the world computer market and
Western Europe's backwardness that involves serious drawbacks owing to excessive dependency on the
United States and Japan and which, on the one hand, requires a common European policy and, on the
other hand, co-operative action with American and eventually Japanese firms;
(v) Considering the extremely fast development of computer technology;
(vil Considering the need to face up to this phenomenon and, to this end, instructing its Committee
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to prepare a supplementary report on this
important question in order to keep the Assembly informed of the evolution of the situation in the eco-
nomic, technological and military sectors,
RecoruruENDs rner rge CouNcrL
l. Urge the membergovernments to stimulate and co-ordinate research and development of basic
technologies for manufacturing very-high-speed integrated circuits and provide the funds necessary to
encourage the industries concerned;
2. Draw up a common policy in a Western European framework based on a co-ordinated strategy to
be worked out by the Agency for the development of co-operation in thp field of armaments for the mi-
litary applications of computer systems;
3. Prepare the ground for the next generation of military computers in weapon systems which will
be interchangeable and interoperational between units of European forces assigned for the common
defence;
4. Promote a single European market for military computers, and particularly supercomputers,
which will stimulate the civil market;
5. Advocate a common computer language to facilitate the interoperability of all systems used by
the armed forces of Western Europe;
6. Call for the standardisation of computer components such as very-high-speed integrated circuits.
7. Reflect on the impact on European computer industries due to the research and development to
be undertaken in connection with the American strategic defence initiative and European-American co-
operation on the space station.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 22nd May 1985 during the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session (4th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Fourre on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and
Aerospace Questions (Document I 007).
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l. The Council welcomes the Assembly's initiative and shares its assessment that phe military use of
advanced computer technology is of outstanding significance and that great impoftance attaches to
close co-operation among all allies for the sake of the alliance's cohesiotr and collective
defence. European computer technology has reached a high level. The Council is aware, however,
that efforts to preserve and enhance the competitiveness of European industry merit special attention.
2. The Council also realises that the military use of computers is but one aspect of the wide-ranging
applications of advanced computer technology and that thus the market for military computers is much
smaller than that for civilian ones. Considerations on the military use of computers cannot, therefore,
be detached from the civilian applications sector. Yet it should not be overlooked that military
demand for computers can trigger offimportant innovation serving civilian purposes, too.
3. In view of the growing significance of advanced technology, the Foreign and Defence Ministers
reaflirmed at their meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985 the determirtation of member
countries to take the necessary steps in the European Communities to strengthen Euriope's own techno-
logical capacity and thus achieve the creation of a technological community.
4. European efforts in the field of information technology are already being madO at various levels;
mention should be made of Eureka, the Esprit programme and 
- 
with regard to t[re military use of
computer technology 
- 
the considerations for joint European projects within the scope of the
Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), as initiated by the relevant ministfrs.
5. The Council welcomes these efforts. WEU should afford them its political sudport and encoura-
gement, but without causing unnecessary and wasteful duplication of effort.
6. As regards co-operation among armed forces, the Council considers it necessari, for the computer
systems used to be interoperable in line with military requirements. WEU member fountries therefore
support all endeavours to achieve this goal. The prerequisite for this is the early hafmonisation of the
national operational requirements in the relevant bodies. Only in this way will it bo possible to deter-
mine which type of systems is suitable for meeting those requirements.
7. Some WEU member countries have decided to facilitate the interoperability of their computer
systems used in the armed forces by adopting the common ADA computer language selected in the
alliance.
8. Interoperability can also be fostered by standardising important components. The Council thus
shares the Assembly's view that the development of components deserves particular attention and
should be supported as a suitable means serving this end. The Council welcornes the initiatives
already taken by some member countries in this respect.
9. As stated in the communique issued by the Foreign and Defence Ministers aftqr their meeting on
22nd and 23rd April 1985, the governments are continuing their collective consideration in order to
achieve as far as possible a co-ordinated reaction of their governments to the invita,tion of the United
States to participate in the research programme.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd October 1985.
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on the new outlookfor WEU -
reply to the thirtieth annual rupofi of the Council2
The Assembly,
(i) Taking cognisance of the thirtieth annual report of the Council, the Rome Declaration of
27th October 1984 and the Bonn communiqu6 of 23rd April 1985;
(iil Noting that the information the Council has thus given to the Assembly regarding its activities is
incomplete and inadequate;
(iiil Noting that the activities organised by the presidency of the Council have been developed signifi-
cantly, that the treaty makes it incumbent on the Council to inform the Assembly but that present pro-
cedure is inadequate;
(iv) Noting that the United States invitation to the European states to take part in the research pro-
gramme relating to the strategic defence initiative is raising many questions in Europe;
(v) Underlining that the Assembly's activities make a major contribution to the cohesion of the
European peoples for their joint security and therefore help to deter destabilising operations against the
western defence system;
(vi) Recalling that the Assembly can play the r6le assigned to it in the Rome Declaration only if it has
precise information and satisfactory co-operation from the Council, the material means it needs for its
work and if it remains totally independent from the Council, particularly when involving public
opinion;
(viil Welcoming the initiative taken by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments for making the
consequences of the reactivation of WEU better known in the parliaments of member countries;
(viii) Recalling that only the national delegations are in a position to give this work the necessary
continuity;
(ix) Welcoming the fact that the Council for its part has decided to inform the public about its activi-
ties but recalling that the Assembly alone is responsible for information about its own work;
(x) Welcoming the endeavours to reactivate WEU because they promise to provide a forum for
European countries to discuss among themselves matters affecting their own security and defence;
(xil Welcoming the decisions taken by the Council to support the efforts of the United States to reach
agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of armaments, to pursue its own efforts to give the
United States a co-ordinated answer from the seven governments on the strategic defence initiative and
to stress the importance it attaches to respect for commitments set out in the treaties in force;
(xiil Recalling that Portugal's application for membership of WEU is in complete conformity with thejoint interest of the Western European countries and the guidelines decided by WEU in the Rome
Declaration,
RrcouueNos rrnr rne CoLJNCIL
l. Continue its work until it obtains a collective answer from the seven governments to the
American invitation to take part in the United States research programme relating to the strategic
defence initiative;
2. Ensure the full participation of the Chairman-in-Oflice of the Council throughout the parliamen-
tary debate on the Assembly's reply to the annual report of the Council so that he may, in particular,
make known his opinion on the report of the General Affairs Committee examined by the Assembly;
l. Adopted by rhe Assembly on 22nd May 1985 during the first pan of the thirty-firsr ordinary session (5th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Committee(Document l0l2).
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3. Submit to the Assembly a report by the Chairman-in-Oflice of the Council on the activities of the
presidency at the same time as the report on the organisation adopted by the Permanent Council;
4. Ensure that the Assembly is effectively informed of all joint activities by thp Seven, including
meetings of Ministers of Defence and meetings organised by the presidency of the Council;
5. Inform the public and press about its own activities;
6. Define without delay the attributions of the three agencies which it has decided to set up, particu-
larly so as to allow the Assembly to act accordingly;
7. Take a favourable decision as soon as possible on Portugal's application for mombership of WEU
in application of Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty.
281
DOCUMENT IO4I
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL I
to Recommendation 420
The Council has examined with particular attention the Assembly's report on the new outlook
for WEU as well as the recommendations adopted following this report.
1. With respect to questions associated with the United States strategic defence initiative, the
Council can state the following: At their meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April, the Ministers
decided to continue their collective consideration in order to achieve as far as possible a co-ordinated
reaction of their governments to the invitation of the United States to participate in the research
programme. Work in this connection has already been started by the Permanent Council and these
questions are being examined on a continuing basis.
2. The Council wishes to assure the Assembly of the importance that the member states as a whole
attach to its reply to the Council's annual report in view of the fact that the questions dealt with in these
documents directly affect the organisation's activity and its subsequent development. The Council,
moreover, has on several occasions acknowledged the important contribution that the Assembly's
deliberations have made to the revival of WEU. The Assembly also knows that the reforms adopied
at the ministerial meeting in Rome stem to a large extent from-its own work. It was in the spirit of
maintaining and extending the dialogue with the Assembly that, at its last session in Miy, the
Chairman-in-Office, representing the Council, spoke at length on the problems dealt with in the ieport
of the General Affairs Committee and endeavoured to reply to all the questions put by the parliamenta-
rians present.
3. In view of the intensification of the Council's activities, the Rome declaration stipulated that the
presidency should be given a leading r6le in preparing replies to Assembly recommendations and
written questions. It also recommended the improvement of the contacts that traditionally take place
after the ministerial meetings of the Council and, more generally, the improvement of the procedures
under which the Assembly is kept informed by the presidency, whose representatives could 
- 
between
the Assembly sessions 
- 
keep the various committees up to date with the work of the Council, as notedin the document on the institutional reform of WEU. In addition, the presidency naturally
contributes actively to the preparation of and follow-up to ministerial meetings.
However, the presidency as such is not an autonomous institution, and its actions and declara-
tions cannot be separated from those of the Council as a whole. Under these circumstances there is no
qeed f91the presidency to present an activity report separate from the one regularly submitted by the
Council to the Assembly.
4. In the light of the foregoing, one cannot properly speak about " meetings organised by the presi-
dency " since any initiative of this type stems from a collective decision of the member states. As
menlioned earliel, the Council endeavours to keep the Assembly informed, as completely as possible,
of all the activities of the Seven by the use of existing procedures and in particular aft6r ministeriai
mc-etings, ls lvas the case with the three ministerial meetings that have taken place since the spring of1984. It is then the rOle of the presidency of the Council, in co-ordination with the presidency oflhe
Assembly, to inform the latter and to direct the discussions at the same time as taking not6 of the
Assembly's wishes vis-i-vis the Council.
5. As indicated in the communiqu6 released after the ministerial meeting in Bonn, the Ministers
have studied the possibility of improving WEU's public relations and information activities. In this
context, consideration is being grven to how the Council could develop 
- 
without involving new
expenditure 
- 
means of informing the public and press about its own aitivities. The Ministlrs in
Ponn approved the rqnort on'WEU and public awareness " containing concrete suggestions of how to
improve WEU's public relations activities.
6. The Assemblyis awarelhat the r€organisation of WEU's technical organs, linked with the ending
of control activities in accordance with the Assembly's wishes, has been a very important part of th6
work carried out on the revitalisation of the institutions of WEU. The Counci[ decided to set up three
new agencies arranged on the basis of the threefold tasks defined in the Rome document bn the
institutional reform of WEU. This decision taken in Bonn means that the fundamental conditions are
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l8th September 19E5.
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now fulfilled for these agencies to be set up rapidly and for specific assignments to be given to them,
even though it is obvioris that, for practical reasons, they can only reach full working capacity after a
certain period of time.
7. The Ministerial Council at its meeting in Bonn has considered the various problems that may be
raised by the accession of non-member stites to the modified Brussels lreaty. Jhe interest already
shown iir tnis by certain states is welcomed as a sign of encouragement by the Sev_en who intend to
continue consideration of this question in parallel with the ongoing reactivation of WEU.
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'
on the application of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the CouncilT
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming the recent steps taken by the Council to implement the Assembly's demand that
WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s;
(ii) Expressing its appreciation of the successfully completed work of the Agency for the Control of
Armaments over the last thirty years, which has contributed to the present solidarity of Europe;
(iii) Welcoming in particular the Rome Declaration of 27th October 1984 providing for all aspects of
European security to be discussed in the WEU Council and for the ministerial organs of WEU to be
reorganised to provide institutions, available to the Council and to the Assembly, to study these
questions;
(iv) Welcoming the references in the communiqu6 of the Bonn ministerial meeting of the Council on
22nd and,23rd April which show that Ministers discussed questions of European security, disarma-
ment, armaments co-operation and research and the creation of a technological community within the
European Communities;
(v) Welcoming in particular the emphasis placed in the communiqu6 on the need for " agreements
aimed at ending the arms race on earth and preventing an anns race in space " and the importance
attached " to respect for existing treaty obligations ";
(vi) Welcoming the establishment of the three agencies for security questions as evidence of the
Council's determination to continue active study of all the foregoing questions;
(vii) Calling for the provisions of the Rome Declaration to be fully and continuously implemented,
RrcouuBrros rnnr rnr CouNcn
l. Keep under continuous study at permanent and ministerial level all major problems affecting
European security;
2. !, particular continue to keep under continuous review all outstanding East-West arms control
and disarmament questions, attaching equal importance to those negotiated in a multilateral and in a
bilateral framework, with a view to reaching a common position on:
(a/ Presid-ent Rea_gan's ltrateglc dgfence initiative and a reply to Secretary Weinberger's invita-tion for allied participation, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space -and ensure
respect for existing treaty obligations;
(b) the treaty to ban chemical weapons being negotiated in the forty-nation Conference on Disar-
mament in Geneva;
(c) General Secretary Gorbachev's declaration of a six-month unilateral freeze on the
deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Europe;
(d) a comprehensive nuclear test ban and the reported Soviet offer to accept a moratorium on all
nuclear testing from the fortieth anniversary of the Hiroshima bomb;
3. Entrust the new WEU agrencies for security questions with the tasks identified in the report of theCommittee on Defence Questions and Armam6nti, including an urgent study of the cost of the joiltproduction by Western European Union of observation satellites to provide independent intellig'ence
relevant to arms control and security;
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 22nd May 1985 during the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session (5th sitting).
2. Explanatory memoraldum; see the report tabled by Mr. Scheer on behalf of the Committee on Defence euestions andAmaments (Document l0l9).
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4. Subject to reciprocity by Warsaw Pact countries, declare the levels of forces, and in the future
the levels of nuclear weapons, stationed on the territory of all WEU countries, as a contribution to
confi dence-building measures;
5. Make material provision to ensure that the new agencies for security questions will be able to
provide more fully effective assistance to Assembly committees than the international secretariat of the
Standing Armaments Committee has been in a position to provide in the past;
6. Make adequate budgetary provision to enable all WEU organs to carry out their respective tasks.
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l. In the framework of the reactivation of WEU, the Council has, at both ministerial and
permanent level, intensified its discussions of problems concerning European security, including arms
control and disarmament questions. Pursuant to the decisions taken at the last ministerial meeiing in
Bonn, the Permanent Council is currently examining the strategic and technological aspects involved in
the United States invitation to participate in the research programme on SDI, in order to work out as
far as possible a co-ordinated reaction to this invitation.
2. The Council takes due note of the interesting suggestion by the Assembly to entrust one of the
new WEU agencies with the task of preparing a study on the costs of the joint production by WEU
countries of observation satellites. The new agencies, however, are still in the process of being set
up. Once this process has been completed, specific studies may be assigned to them.
3. The Council is very much in favour of greater mutual transparency as a means of building confi-
dence between the countries of East and West. To this end, the western participants to the Conference
on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe have proposed a series of
measures, including provision for the exchange of information on military forces. In the MBFR
negotiations in Vienna, western participants have tabled figures on their forces in the reduction area but
a dispute has arisen about the eastern figures which has not yet been resolved.
4. The Council is prepared, as in the past, to consider the possibility of assistance in the preparation
of Assembly reports by staff members of the future agencies, along the lines defined when previous
requests were made. The Council has indicated that such requests would be considered on a
case-by-case basis and that the assistance provided would be with the handling of the data gathered by
the Assembly committee concerned, it being understood that such a procedure would have no
budgetary implications.
5. The Council will ensure that the reorganisation of WEU will remain within the present limits in
terms of staffand the organisation's budget without weakening WEU's ability to play iti rOle.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on Eth October 1985.
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'
on the situation in l*banonz
The Assembly,
Greatly disturbed by the situation in Lebanon, which is disrupted by internal warfare accompa-
nied by killing, bloodshed and genocide,
Rrcorrauruos rser rne CouNcIL
l. Call upon its Chairman-in-Office and all member governments to use all the means at their dis-
posal to help to restore peace by acting directly, as well as in the framework of intgrnational organisa-
tions likely to exert an influence in favour of peace;
. 2. Instruct its Chairman-in-Oflice to make a solemn appeal to the Government bf Irbanon and all
I tne internal parties concerned and to the governments of neighbouring countries to respect human7 rights for all kbanese, whatever their race or creed;
3. Urge the United Nations to undertake immediately an examination of the situation in Lebanon
with a view to promoting a transitional solution guaranteeing the population agairlst a resumption of
the massacres;
4. Ask all member countries of western European Union to associate themselvbs with these steps'
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 22nd May 1985 during the first part of the thirty-Iirst ordinary session (5th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Martino on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document
1025).
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to Recommendation 422
The recommendations made by the Assembly correspond to appraisals and preoccupations una-
nimously shared by the governments of the member states of the organisation.
On several occasions, both in a national capacity and in the international contexts of which they
are part, they have expressed themselves in favour of a solution to the Lebanese crisis based on the
overcoming of conflicts and the cessation of acts of indiscriminate violence between the various com-
munities. Such a solution would safeguard Lebanon's unity, territorial sovereignty and independence.
It is with deep concern that the member states of WEU look upon the grave consequences of the
kbanese crisis in the humanitarian field. They are dismayed by the tragic spiral of violence which
has regrettably only been halted for short and ephemeral periods of truce.
In such circumstances it is essential that the communities in the Lebanon should find again the
path to dialogue and negotiation, in order to achieve internal stability and preserve the unity of that
country.
The Italian Foreign Minister, when he was also President-in-OfIice of the EC Council of
Ministers, visited Beirut and Damascus to assess the prospects for a settlement of the present conflict,
including the possibility of holding a kbanese national conference of reconciliation, and to communi-
cate the Ten's preoccupations as stated in their Brussels declaration on 20th May 1985 in this respect.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th July 19E5.
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'
oil the state of Earopean secarity - the central regionz
The Assembly,
(i) Noting that the long-standing Warsaw Pact superiority in numbers of men, tanks, guns and
aircraft in the central region has not diminished;
(it) Aware however that with the improved defence effort made by most NATO countries in the last
five years more modern equipment is now reaching NATO forces which still enjoy some qualitative
advantages in training and equipment;
(iiil Stressing that the European countries provide some 80 to 90% of the ready forces and equipment
in place in Europe;
(iv) Welcoming the important contribution to allied defence made by the French conventional forces
stationed in Germany and in France which in the event of hostilities, should the French President so
decide, could be placed under the operational control of NATO commanders;
(v) Noting that a referendum on continued Spanish membership of NATO is expected to be held in
March 1986;
Qi) Recognising that the stationing of over 400,000 allied troops on the territory of the Federal
Republic of Germany represents a considerable social burden borne by that country in the interests of
allied defence;
(viil Recalling that considerable further improvement in the effectiveness of the alliFd defence effort
can be made at no additional cost through standardisation and interoperability of equfpment, and that
logistic arrangements are still in need of improvement,
RecouurNos rHAT THE CouNcn
Urge in the North Atlantic Council:
l. That a renewed effort be made to establish a genuine European defence industry with a view to
improving standardisation and interoperability;
2. That advantage be taken of any opportunities to reposition forces stationed in Germany to alle-
viate the present unsatisfactory deployment;
3. That published NATO force comparisons take account of.French and Spanish forces;
4. That Spain be requested to assign to SACEUR a modern mobile force of at leastt one division as
an early reserve for the central region, and that Spain be asked to respond to the NATO annual review
questionnaire as is the custom of all other NATO countries.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 23rd May 1985 during the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session (6rh sitting),
2. Explanatory memorandlm: see the repon tabled by Dr. Miller on behalf of the Committee on Defence euestions andArmaments (Document l0l8).
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 42i
1. The Council has noted with great interest the Assembly's report on the state of European security
in the central region and the recommendation adopted on this subject. However, the Council
considers that it is not its r6le, as such, to make recommendations to another body, of which the
member states of WEU are members and where they are able to express themselves individually.
With respect to the problems referred to by the Assembly, the Council wishes to reaffirm the
importance that it attaches, within the framework of WEU's competence, to the security interests of
Europe and in particular to promoting European armaments co-operation. On this point they recall
the r6le of the SAC and, generally, the political impetus that WEU intends to give by supporting all
co-operative efforts within Europe, including those of the CNAD and the IEPG.
In this connection, the Council has noted with satisfaction the efforts made by the Defence
Ministers of IEPG member states to achieve this by agreeing to seek an improvement in the efficient
use ofresources in the European defence industrial base through:
(a) greater discipline in not launching a national development project where one already exists
elsewhere, nationally or collaboratively in Europe;
(b) greater readiness to adopt equipment already in production in Europe;
(c) greater readiness to apply competition in managing European collaborative projects;
(d) encowagement in the formation of industrial relationships, both for specific projects and,
preferably, on a more permanent base.
IEPG Defence Ministers have also directed that a study be entrusted to an independent group of
" wise men " with findings to be presented by mid-1986 on enhancing the competitiveness of the
European armaments industry.
The Council believes that this high level of activity demonstrates the effort which is being made
to establish the European defence industry on a firmer basis, which will enhance the European
contribution to the common defence effort of the alliance.
2. With regard to points 2,3 and 4 of the Assembly recommendation, the Council takes note of the
views expressed, but considers that it is not its r6le to give its opinion on these questions which, as
regards the first, falls within the competence of the Atlantic Alliance and which, as regards the other
two, come within the sovereignty of the states concerned.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l2th November 1985.
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RECOMMENDATION 424 
'
on the disaster in Mexico
The Assembly,
Deeply moved by the disaster which has struck Mexico;
Anxious to demonstrate the actiye sympathy of Europeans towards the Mexican people,
Recouunr.ros rnAr rns CouNcrr
. 
-U.g. member governments to express their solidarity through action to help victims by affordingthem humanitarian, material and financial assistance, using the most appropriate framework for thii
purpose.
l. Adopted on behalf of the Assembly by the Presidential Committee at its meeting on Tuesday, 24th September 1985(Document 1032).
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 424
The Council shares the Assembly's feelings regarding the disaster in Mexico.
As soon as the extent and the effects of the earthquake were known, the WEU member countries
participated in the massive movement of international solidarity to assist the victims. They
immediately sent out equipment to hasten the release of those who were trapped, the most advanced
instruments available to locate survivors still buried beneath the rubble, teams of first-aid workers and
specialised medical teams. Both financial and material assistance in the form of medical supplies,
blankets, etc., has also been provided for the Mexican authorities.
The member governments of WEU also join their partners in the larger organisations to which
they belong, in particular the European Community, the lnternational Monetary Fund and the World
Bank in order that measures be taken to help Mexico overcome the effects of this disaster.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on I lth October 1985.
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Written Questions 253 and 256 to 261 and replies of the Councll
QUESTTON 2s3
put by Mn Goerens
on 6th December 1984
Many estimates in the defence budgets of
the various WEU and NATO countries do not
always have a direct connection with military
expenditure proper.
The question which I have the honour to
put therefore refers to sums earmarked for
technological research in the defence budgets of
the various WEU countries and the United
States.
What percentage of the military budgets of
the WEU countries and the United States res-
pectively is earmarked for technological
research?
What percentage of defence budgets of the
WEU countries and the United States is
earmarked for advanced technology?
REPLY BY THE COUNCIL
commanicated to the Assembly
on 4th July 1985
According to the economic study prepared
by the Standing Armaments Committee on the
armaments sector of industry in the member
countries of WEU, the declassified version of
which for the period 1975-83 was communicated
to the Assembly in November 1984, the expen-
diture on research and development is consi-
dered as military expenditure proper.
The percentage of the budgets assigned to
research out of the total expenditure and arma-
ments expenditure of each of the member coun-
tries of WEU is shown in tables I (c) to 7 (c)
inclusive (line 5) of Annex II to the above-
mentioned document.
Concerning the United States, the Council
is not in a position to answer the question as it
does not have the respective data at its disposal.
QUESTTON 2s6
put by Mr. Masciadri
on 14th March 19E5
What measures does the Council intend to
take to ensure that the A-129 helicopter (Man-
gusta) produced by the Italian group Agusta is
adopted by the armed forcQs of the WEU coun-
tries in view of the fact th[t a Franco-German
consortium is at present pl[nning to produce a
new combat helicopter with specifications simi-
lar to those of the one being produced by
Agusta? Does the Council not think it would
be more logical to choose the Italian helicopter,
and what possibilities are there for industrial co-
production between the cotrntries concerned so
that economic forces are not dispersed?
Production will start on Agusta's multi-
purpose light combat helicopter at the end of
this year and prototype tests have given excep-
tional results; moreover, the Franco-German
project is still at the simple prefeasibility study
stage.
Production of two similar helicopters
would be contrary to the goal of standardising
the armaments of Western fluropean countries.
REPLY BY THE COUNCIL
communicated to tfte Assembly
on 26th Novettfrer 1985
Letter from the Seuetary-General
I have the honour to refer to Written
Question 256 put to the Council by Mr. Mas-
ciadri.
After a detailed study of this question at
its meeting on 25th Noverhber the Council ins-
tructed me to inform yorl that it very much
regrets that it is not able to give a collective
answer to the matter conceined.
(signed) A. C;;
QUESTION 257
put bY Mr* KellY
on 26th luly 19ES
How high are the salaries for the penna-
nent staffof WEU in Paris and London (for each
level and category, including the Clerk of the
Assembly)?
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
commanicoted to the Assembly
on 27th September 1985
In reply, reference is made to the attached
current salary scales. (This document has been
distributed to members of the Assembly as an
appendix to the letter from the Clerk dated
3rd October 1985.)
QUESTTON 2s8
put by Mr* KeAy
on 26th July 1985
Does the Council of Ministers of WEU
support a future merger of the European Parlia-
ment and the parliamentary Assembly of WEU?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 27th September 1985
The question of a merger of the two par-
liamentary institutions does not arise at pre-
sent. The foreign and defence ministers, how-
ever, in the document on the institutional reform
of WEU, have stressed the value of developing a
dialogue between the Assembly and other parlia-
ments and parliamentary institutions.
QUESTTON 2s9
put by Mrs. Kelly
on 26th July 1985
Is the Council of Ministers convinced that
the realisation of the strategic defence initiative(SDI) does not in any way weaken or injure the
non-proliferation treaty (NPT)?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on [|th October 1985
The United States have repeatedly stated
that the strategic research programme is being
carried out in conformity with existing treaty
obligations.
QUESTTON 260
pat by Mrs. KeAy
on 26th July 19ES
Have there been any consultations or are
there any future consultations planned in the fra-
mework of the debate concerning the European
union with the Government of the neutral Repu-
blic of Ireland concerning future WEU mem-
bership?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on l|th October 1985
There have been no such consultations,
nor are any planned.
QUESTTON 26r
put by Mn. Kelly
on 26th July 1985
Does the Council of Ministers of WEU
desire to see all EEC members join WEU?
RBPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 18th October 1985
Whilst bearing in mind the question of a
possible enlargement of WEU, the Council's
efforts at the moment, however, are directed
towards setting up the new structures of the
organisation, in accordance with the decisions
reached in Rome and then Bonn.
Moreover, discussion among the Twelve
about co-operation in the security field 
- 
which
might have an impact on the issue raised by the
honourable member 
- 
is under way in the
context of the negotiations about a treaty on
political co-operation.
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Disarmament
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments2
by Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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on disarmament
ExpmNetonv MruouNoutvt
submitted by Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. International developments
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IV. Bilateral negotiations
V. Mutual and balanced force reductions
VI. Conference on Disarmament in Europe (Stocktolm)
VII. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva)
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APPENDIx
Statements issued by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev,
Geneva, 2lst November 1985
1. Adopted in committee by I 3 votes to 0 with I abstention.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Pignion (Chairman); MM. Blaauw, Kittelmann (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alberini, Amadei,
van den Bergh,Bonnel, Bourges, Brown, Cox, Dejardin, Ertl, Galley, Gerstl, Giust, Sir Anthony Grant, MlvL Huyghues des Etages
(Alternate: Baumel), Konen (Alternate:, Henge[), de Kwaadsteniet (Alternate: van der Sanden), Lrmmrich_(Alternate: Berger),
Natiez, Pecchioli (Alternate: Antont), Sarti, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, MI[.f.. Steverlynck, Stokes (Alternate: Atkinson).
N.B. Ilre names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Introductory Note
In preparing this report and the separate information report (Document 1040), the Rapporteur
had interviews as follows :
Non-proliferation treaty review conference, Geneva, 12th and 13th September 1985
H.E. Dr. Ian Cromartie, Ambassador, Deputy Representative of the United Kingdom;
Mr. Richard Edis, Counsellor;
Mr.Ian Kenyan, Expert;
H.E. Mr. Duncan Campbell, Ambassador, I-eader of the Delegation of Australia;
Mr. Thomas Barthelemy, United States Delegation;
H.E. Mr. Milos Vejvoda, Ambassador, Leader of the Delegation of Czechoslovakia;
H.E. Mr. Ryukichi Imai, Ambassador, Representative of Japan;
H.E. Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala, Ambassador, kader of the Delegation of Sri Lanka;
H.E. Mr. F.J.A. Terwisscha van Scheltinga, Ambassador, Leader of the Netherlands Delegation;
Mr. A.J. Meerburg, Adviser;
H.E. Mr. Saad Alfararyi, Ambassador, Representative of Egypt;
H.E. Mr. Victor Issraelyan, Ambassador, Deputy Leader of the Delegation of the Soviet Union.
NATO Headquarters, Brussels, l0th October 1985
Mr. Steven Ledogar, Minister-Counsellor, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United
States;
H.E. Mr. Eric Da Rin, Ambassador, Deputy Secretary-General;
H.E. Mr. J.G.N. de Hoop Scheffer, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands;
Mr. Bots, Deputy Permanent Representative
General Cornelius de Jager, Netherlands Army, Chairman of the Military Committee;
Brigadier General Ilenio Sanotto, Italian Army, Deputy Assistant Director (Arms Control and
Disarmament), Plans and Policy Division of the International Military Staff;
Colonel H. Hoerner, German Army;
Colonel P. Schmitz, German Air Force;
Mr. A. Bonfanti, Mr. Salmon, Disarmament and Arms Control Section, Political Affairs
Division, International Staff.
The committee as a whole met in Geneva on 24th July 1985 and was addressed by the following
representatives to the Conference on Disarmament:
H.E. Mr. Mario Alessi, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Italy;
H.E. Mr. Alfonso Garcia Robles, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Mexico and
Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on a Comprehensive Programme of Dlsarmament;
H.E. Mr. Stanislaw Turbanski, Ambassador, Head of the Polish Delegation and Chairman of the
ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons;
H.E. Mr. Saad Alfararyi, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Egypt and Chairman of the
ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space;
H.E. Mr. Richard Butler, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of Australia and Chairman of the
ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons;
H.E. Mr. Donald Lowitz, Ambassador, Representative of the United States;
H.E. Mr. Victor Issraelyan, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the Soviet Union.
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The committee met subsequently at the seat of WEU, London, on 4th November to discuss the
first draft of a comprehensive repet on disarmament. It met again at the seat of the Assembly, Paris,
on 22llld November when it discussed and adopted the present report.
The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the oflicials whq met the Rapporteur
or committee and replied to questions. In particular, the Rapporteur thanks those members of the
staff of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, which was authorised by the Council to assist in the
preparation of the committee's report on disarmament.
The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.
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Draft Recommendation
on disarmameat
The Assembly,
(il Welcoming the positive fresh start to bilateral relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union that has resulted from the summit meeting in Geneva from l9th to 2lst November 1985, the
agreement to hold further summit meetings as well as meetings of ministers and experts on various
issues, and the constructive references to most arms control issues in the agreed statement including the
principle of a 50% reduction in nuclear arms, the general and complete prohibition of chemical
weapons, and the idea of an interim INF agreement, while noting the absence of specific agreements;
(ii) Considering the present status of negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in
Vienna, in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm, in the Conference on Dis-
armament in Geneva, and of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union on
nuclear and space weapons in Geneva;
(iii) Considering the conclusions of the third review conference on the non-proliferation treaty held in
Geneva;
(iv) Stressing the importance of a concerted European position on all issues discussed in these forums
in order to ensure that proper weight is attached to the requirements of European security,
RecouueNos rHAT THE CouNcrr
l. Ensure that the machinery and practice of consultation in NATO attaches full weight to the
views of the European allies on all disarmament and arms control issues;
2. Hold preliminary discussions itself on disarmament and arms control issues whenever a member
government feels that proper weight is not being given to the European position in NATO or that
European political co-operation has been unable to discuss an issue;
3. Request the United States to examine with the utmost attention the recent proposals of the
Soviet Union in the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, and to seek an early interim
agxeement on INF systems providing for the lowest levels compatible with the interests of allied
security of United States systems based in Europe and comparable Soviet systems;
4. Request countries participating in the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations to press
for an early first phase agreement in which full verification of withdrawals could obviate the need for
prior agreement on data, as outlined in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and
Armaments;
5. (a) Pendrng agreement in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe on improved compulsory
confidence-building measures, urge the Warsaw Pact to extend regular invitations to mancuvres to
observers from NATO countries under the terms of the Helsinki final act;
(b) Instruct the Agency for the Study of Arms Control and Disarmament Questions to study the
verification and observer r6gime which should be agreed in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe,
and to co-ordinate the activities of observers from WEU countries invited to Warsaw Pact maneuvres;
6. (a) Urge member countries in the Conference on Disarmament to give priority to the urgent
negotiation of treaties to ban chemical weapons and all nuclear tests;
(b) Urge the Soviet Union to accept the United States invitation to observe United States nuclear
test explosions with a view to establishing reliable seismic calibration data and urge the Soviet Union
and the United States to ratifo the threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties;
7. (a) Rleqttest nuclear countries, and in the first place the two most powerful, to make arrangements as
soon as possible to make significant and substantial reductions in their nuclear weapons as mentioned
in the Reagan-Gorbachev summit statement, which would facilitate the desirable accession to the
non-proliferation treaty of many countries which have not signed it;
(b) Urge all members of IAEA to further improve its safeguards and to establish arrangements for
international plutonium storage and spent fuel management;
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(c) Urge all parties to the London nuclear suppliers' group guidelines for nuclear transfers to
continue co-operation and improve the application of the guidelines;
(d) Urge member governments to insist on the full application of IAEA safeguards on all nuclear
material and installations in recipient countries before authorising the export of civilian nuclear
material or facilities.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Blatuw, Rapporteur)
L lntroduction
l.l. The committee has regularly reported on
disarmament and arms control problems, most
recently in both May and December 1984r, the
reports usually concentrating on one or two par-
ticular sets of negotiations. In view of the
slightly improved prospects for movement in
some at least of the various forums where arms
control is discussed, the committee decided at its
meeting on 2lst May 1985 to produce a com-
prehensive report on " all current arms control
and disarmament negotiating forums, both bila-
teral and multilateral; those dealing with nuclear
weapons and those dealing with other aspects of
arms control ".
1.2. At its meeting on 4th November, the
committee had before it the first draft of such a
report, but realised that because of the broad
scope of the report and the committee's own
busy programme, there was insuffrcient time to
study it. The committee also decided to post-
pone adoption of the report until after the
summit meeting between President Reagan and
General Secretary Gorbachev held from l9th to
2lst November, so that the Assembly at its
session beginning on 2nd December might have
before it an up-to-date report. However, in
view of the technical problems involved in
preparing and circulating a large report to all
representatives, the committee requested the
Rapporteur to produce a separate factual infor-
mation report, based on the explanatory memo-
randum to his first draft report, for advance
distribution2.
1.3. This report therefore attaches only a short
explanatory memorandum to the draft recom-
mendation. Reference should be made to the
corresponding headings of the information
report for the factual information which the
committee had before it in making its recom-
mendations. Afterexaminingrecentinternatio-
nal developments affecting arms control negotia-
tions, the information report recalls the present
negotiating forums for disarmament and arms
control and discusses arrangements for alliance
consultation with respect to them. The report
then describes the status of each of the five
forums concerned: bilateral negotiations bet-
ween the United States and the Soviet Union on
nuclear and space weapons; the multilateral
l. Control of armaments and disarmament, Document
972, lsth May 1984, Rapporteur: Mr. de Vries; Control of
armaments and disarmament, Document 998, 3rd December
1984, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw.
2. Document 1040.
forums on mutual and balanced force reductions
(Vienna); the Conference on Disarmament in
Europe (Stockholm); the Conference on Disar-
mament (Geneva); and finally the non-proli-
feration treaty review conference held in Geneva
in September.
I I. International developments
2.1. The committee obviously welcomes the
establishment of direct contact between Presi-
dent Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev
at the Geneva summit from l9th to 2lst
November. While no concrete agreement on
details concerning any set of arms control nego-
tiations was to be expected, the committee hopes
that the meeting and the decision to hold further
regular meetings will establish a degree of
mutual understanding between the two leaders
that will make possible some agreement on
different aspects of arms control in the future.
2.2. The agreed statement issued after the
meeting3 contains hopeful cosmetic language
including agreement * that a nuclear war cannot
be won and must never be fought " and " the
importance of preventing any war between
them, whether nuclear or conventional "; it
makes constructive reference to all arms control
topics discussed in this report with the notable
exception of a comprehensive test ban, although
the statement contains no specific agreement on
any of these issues. Indeed it notes that
" serious differences remain on a number of
critical issues ".
2.3. Chief among these is obviously President
Reagan's strategic defence initiative or " star
wars " about which General Secretary Gorba-
chev at the concluding press conference which
he alone gave in Geneva is reported as saying
that " the door to an arms race in outer space
must be firmly slammed shut ". Saying that
President Reagan considered star wars a shield,
Mr. Gorbachev continued * but we, I hope,
convincingly proved that no, it is a space
weapon which could be used against rockets,
could be used against satellites, and ... against
installations on earth ... it is a new type of
weaponry "a. In contrast, President Reagan in
his statement at the closing ceremony said
"... we know the questions that must be
answered: will we join together in sharply
reducing olfensive nuclear arms and moving to
3. Appndix, (a).
4. AP.
300
DOCUMENT 1043
non-nuclear defensive (arms)s or systems to
make this a safer world? ". The committee
reports elsewhere on the strategic defence ini-
tiative6. Preambular paragraph (y' of the draft
recommendation comments on the summit.
III. Negotiating forams and alliance
consultation
3.1. The committee particularly welcomes the
fact that President Reagan went in person to
NATO in Brussels on 21st November to brief a
special meeting of the North Atlantic Council on
the results of the summit. Weaknesses in
earlier arrangements for consultation are des-
cribed in paragraph 3.13 of the information
report. In paragraph 3.11 ofthat report, atten-
tion is drawn to an anomaly in NATO consulta-
tion arrangements concerning the Special
Consultative Group on the INF negotiations.
Now that the person of the SCG chairman has
changed, the committee feels there is a case for
changing the system.
3.2. As far as the role of the WEU Council is
concerned, the committee welcomes the discus-
sion of prospects for the summit meeting to
which most of the Rome ministerial meeting on
14th November was devoted. The information
report in paragraph 3.12 points out the otherwise
modest r6le of the WEU Council. The commit-
tee recognises that provided the views of the
European allies can be co-ordinated in European
political co-operation, and carry suflicient
weight in the North Atlantic Council, there is no
particular virtue in duplicating such discussion
in the WEU Council on a systematic basis. The
machinery must however exist to permit the
WEU countries to consult and adopt collective
positions on important disarmament and arms
control issues whenever their military nature
precludes proper discussion in European poli-
tical co-operation and consultation in NATO
fails to attach full weight to European views.
Paragraphs I and 2 of the draft recommendation
are worded accordingly.
IY. Bilateral negotiations
4.1. In the days before the summit, further de-
tails emerged in the press (see table hereafter) of
the proposals put forward in the Geneva bila-
teral negotiations aimed at " preventing an arms
race in space and terminating it on earth " in the
words of the agreement of 8th January 1985,
which are repeated in the summit statement.
Unintelligible word.
Document 1033.
4.2. The statement agreed at the summit 7
notes that the leaders " agreed to accelerate the
work at these (nuclear and spacE arms) negotia-
tions " and " called for early prqgress ... includ-
ing the principle of 50% reductions in the
nuclear arms of the United Statss and the USSR
appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an
interim INF agreement ". " Eflective measures
of verification " are to be agreed. A new
concept introduced in the statement calls for
study of " centres to reduce nuplear risk taking
into account the issues and dev$lopments of the
Geneva negotiators ". The nrlodernisation of
the hot line is recalled.
4.3. The committee's views on any concept of
nuclear balance as expressed in previous reports
is recalled in paragraph 4.24 of the information
report. The committee recomrnends that the
United States be urged to bear these considera-
tions in mind in the bilateral negotiations. The
information report describes what is publicly
known of the present status of the bilateral
negotiations and notes (paraEaph 4.8) that
serious negotiations have stafted. The com-
mittee hopes that each party to the bilateral
negotiations will examine with tftre utmost atten-
tion the latest proposals of tl|e other. Para-
graph 3 of the draft recommendhtion is address-
ed to the United States as the party negotiating
in the interests of the alliance.
Y. Mutual and balanced forpe reductions
5.1. On MBFR the statement agreed at the
summit says simply:
" The two sides emphasiised the impor-
tance they attach to the Vienna (MBFR)
negotiations and expresspd their willing-
ness to work for positive results. "
5.2. After reviewing the status of these negotia-
tions described in Chapter V of the information
report, the committee believes there is scope for
a major political initiative from the western side,
following the Reagan-Gorbacfrev meeting in
November, to secure at least the desired initial
agreement on the withdrawal (f certain United
States and Soviet forces. On this particular
point the positions of the two sides are not too
far apart. A possible first phase agreement
could be based on the following points:
- initial withdrawals.'agreement exists on
the initial withdrawal Of 13,000 United
States forces; a compromise should be
found between the figures of 30,000 or
20,000 Soviet troops which the two
sides have proposed for withdrawal in
the first phase;
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The arms proposals: a balaace slwaS
Figures compiled by the House Committee on Foreign AJfairs
Cumr Balane Soviet hoposalOctobtr 1985
US Proposal
Novcnbcr 1985
Intercontinental
ballistic missiles
(ICBMS) and
submarine-
launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs)
US Soviet1,630 2,352
(1,030 ICBMs) (1,398 ICBMs)( 600 SLBMs) ( 954 SLBMs)
US Soviet815 1,176
Applies 50% cut across the
board using US figures. Soviet
Union counts all US strategic
and medium-range systems at
3,360 and Soviet ones at 2,5@(not including SS-20s). Using
Soviet figures, 50% cut would
result in 1,680 systems for US
and 1,250 for Soviet Union.
Soviet
r,250-1,450 1,250-1,450
Freedom to mix between
ICBM and SLBM launchers.
US
E
e
o
o
ICBM and SLBM
warheads
7,506 8,830
(2,130 ICBMs) (6,420 ICBMs)
(5,376 SLBMs) (2,410 SLBMs)
6,000 6,000
Only 3,600 of any one type;
6,000 limit also applies to
gravity bombs and short-range
attack missiles. (US rejects
this inclusion.)
4,500 4,500
No more than 3,000 on
ICBMs.
Heavy bombers 263 480
includes 300
Backlires
Soviet Union
says this is not
a strategic
bomber.
l3l 90
Backlires not
included
350 350
includes 30(
Backlires
AirJaunched cruise
missiles
t,t76 200 00
Part of larger
total ban on
long-range
cruise missiles.
1,500 1,500
Missile tfuow
weight *
4.4 mitlion I1.9 millionpounds pounds Not included Not included Not to exceed Not to exceed6 million 6 million
pounds. pounds.
New systems Ban on new types of ICBMs,
SLBMs and heavy bombers.
Soviet Union has not defined
what it considers to be new
types.
Ban on all new heavy ICBMs
and mobile missiles, including
Soviet SS-18 modernisation
and replacement plans. So-
viet SS-24 and SS-25 mobile
missiles, and US Midgetman
mobile missiles.
e
o
c
q
E
a
E
Medium-range
launchers
l34Pershing2s 270 SS-20s in
andground- Europe plus
launched 171 in Asia
cruise for total of 441
missiles (one (3 warheads
warheadeach) each)
No Penhing 2s;' 243 SS-20s in
100 ground- Europe plus alaunched freeze on
cruise SS-20s in Asia,
missiles. currently
at l7l.
140 ceiling on 140 SS-20s
Pershing 2s in Europe and
and gound- 89 in Asia,
launched crui- totalling 229.
se missiles.
Medium-range
bombers
254 553
(198 F-llls (includes
and 58 Backlires)
FB-llls)
127 276
Derived from applying 50%
cut to US flgures.
Willingness to discuss res-
traints.
I Weight that can be lifted offand carried onto target.
- 
equipmenl.'the western allies have so far
made insuflicient proposals concerning
the withdrawal of equipment although it
was agreed at the outset that the oflicial
designation of the talks was " mutual
reduction of forces and armaments and
associated measures in central Eu-
rope ". The geogaphical imbalance
makes it impossible for NATO to
accept the withdrawal of all United
States equipment 6,000 kilometres
across the Atlantic to the United States,
while Soviet equipment would be with-
drawn only 600 kilometres overland to
the Soviet Union. NATO could how-
ever accept the withdrawal to a depot in
some rear area in Europe to be desig-
nated, of the equipment of American
units to be withdrawn from the zone;8. lnternational Herald Tribune, l8th November 1985.
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- 
inspections: NATO could afford to offer
the Soviet Union permanent observers
on rear area depots containing with-
drawn equipment, in exchange for the
right to a specified number of annual
inspections in the Warsaw Pact part of
the zone;
- 
data: if the number of United States
and Soviet forces to be withdrawn
under an initial agxeement is acceptable
to both sides, and if their effective with-
drawal and non-return is verified
through pennanent exit/entrance points
with observers, as now appears to have
been conceded by the Warsaw Pact,
then the problem of reaching agreement
on estimates of numbers of forces
remaining within the zone after the
initial withdrawals can be postponed to
a second stage agr6ement involving
reductions by the forces ofall countries
down to the agreed 900,000 ceiling;
- 
subceilings on national components:
NATO will accept only common col-
lective ceilings for the forces of the two
sides, whereas the Warsaw Pact in a
second stage continues to insist on some
form ofsubceiling for the forces ofeach
country. NATO could afford in this
context to allow the Warsaw Pact to
take account oflevels ofnational forces
which NATO countries make public in
any case through the annual publication
of their defence budgets and in many
other forms. Such figures would not of
course form part of any initial agree-
ment, but the Soviet Union might well
wish to make some unilateral declara-
tion in accepting an initial agreement,
such as it has made in the past on differ-
ent issues in other arms control agree-
ments.
5.3. A limited initial agreement in Vienna
would have both a concrete advantage in
reducing, even if only slightly, the levels of
forces on both sides and a psychological advant-
age in providing an incentive to pursue the talks
to their second phase. Parallel progress in
Stockholm on confidence-building measures can
also have a direct impact on the associated
measures called for in Vienna. Paragraph 4 of
the draft recommendation is formulated accord-
ingly.
YI. Conference on Disarmament in Europe
(Stockholm)
6.1. On the Conference on Disarmament in
Europe the statement agreed at the summit
makes constructive comment:
"... they reaflirmed the need for a docu-
ment which would include mutually-
acceptable confidencer and security-buil-
ding measures and gi[e concrete expres-
sion and effect to the lrinciple of non-use
offorce. "
This reflects the terms of likely agreement
already foreshadowed in paragraph 6.33 of the
committee's information report.
6.2. Chapter VI of the information report
describes progress ofthe confierence so far. The
committee again calls for a sense of urgency to
be injected into the negotiations. It proposes
specifically (paragraph 5(b) of the draft recom-
mendation) that the new WEU agency for the
study of arms control and disarmament ques-
tions should begin a study oflthe verification and
observation rOgime that shoqld desirably emerge
from agreement in StoclCholm and should
prepare to plan and co-ordiilate the activities of
observers from the WEU countries 
- 
normally
the military attaches of those countries en poste
in the various Warsaw Pact capitals who will be
enabled to observe manceuvres in those coun-
tries. Co-ordinated arrangdments could ensure
for example that with one o$server from each of
the seven WEU countries bpecialists could be
available in different fieldB such as arrnour,
artillery, ground-support aircraft, etc. A co-
ordinated debriefing after exercises would ensure
that a maximum amount of information was
derived from the operation.
6.3. As the information rSport nol.r, Warsaw
Pact countries have invitbd observers from
NATO countries to manceuvres only once since
1979. Pending agreement on more binding
measures in Stockholm they should be urged to
resume invitations (paragraph 5(a) of the draft
recommendation).
YIL Conference on Disatmament (Geneva)
7.1. The information repoft describes the work
of this forty-nation conference, pointing out that
the two most urgent topics, ripe for agreement,
are a comprehensive test han and a chemical
weapons ban. The committee concludes that
negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty
should be given the highest priority in multi-
lateral negotiations. [t reqommends that the
Council call on the United $tates and the Soviet
Union to ratifu the bilatefal peaceful nuclear
explosions and threshold tqst ban treaties, urge
the Soviet Union to accept the United States'
invitation to observe weapon tests for calibra-
tion purposes, and call for the negotiation of a
comprehensive test ban treaty to be initiated in
the Conference on Disarmatnent in Geneva as a
matter of urgency at the beginning of 1986.
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7.2. The committee, as last year, concludes in
the light of available evidence that at present
stocks of chemical weapons available to the
alliance are effective and sufficient to deter the
use of such weapons by an adversary. It there-
fore recommends that the United States be urged
not to resume production of chemical weapons
at present, that every effort be made to achieve
substantial progress in 1986 on the negotiation
of a treaty to ban chemical weapons, with parti-
cular emphasis on realistic verification mea-
sures, and that the situation be again reviewed at
the end of 1986. Paragraphs 6(a) and 6(b) of
the draft recommendation embody these conclu-
sions.
7.3. The agreed summit statemente again has
constructive comments on a chemical weapons
ban:
" The two sides reaffirmed that they are in
favour of a general and complete prohibi-
tion of chemical weapons and the destruc-
tion of existing stockpiles of such wea-
pons. They agreed to accelerate efforts to
conclude an effective and verifiable inter-
national convention on this matter.
The two sides agreed to intensi$ bilateral
discussions on the level of experts on all
aspects of such a chemical weapons ban,
including the question of verification.
They agreed to initiate a dialogue on
preventing the proliferation of chemical
weapons. "
This foreshadows progress in the Conference on
Disarmament, prepared through bilateral discus-
sions, and the new concept of measures to
prevent proliferation of chemical weapons. In
contrast there is no summit reference to a
comprehensive test ban, reflecting United States
opposition noted in the information report.
7.4. The committee deals in another reportro
urith the SDI and the aspects of the bilateral
negotiations which concern it. It endorses here
9. At appendix.
10. Document 1033.
the French proposal and recommends that a
mandate be given to the ad hoc committee in the
Conference on Disarmament for the urgent
negotiation of a treaty to ban anti-satellite
systems, in particular hlgh altitude ASAT.
Y I I I. Non-proliferation treaty rev iew conference
8.1. The information report describes the
working of the treaty on the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons and the review conference of
parties to the treaty held in Geneva in Septem-
ber 1985. The committee recommends that all
nuclear weapon countries, and in the first place
the two most powerful, should be requested to
make significant and substantial reductions in
their nuclear weapons as soon as possible, which
would facilitate the desirable accession to the
non-proliferation treaty of many countries which
have not signed it. It recommends that every
effort should be made to improve funher
existing IAEA safeguards, in particular through
provision for international plutonium storage and
management of spent fuel. It further recom-
mends that all parties to the London guidelines
for nuclear transfers should meet to consider
their updating, and should be urged to continue
to co-operate in their application. It considers
it important that the acceptance of full IAEA
safeguards on all nuclear material and facilities
on the territory of a recipient non-nuclear
weapon country should be a precondition for the
export of any such material or facilities by any
country. Paragraphs 7(a) to (d) of the draft
recommendation are formulated accordingly.
8.2. The committee particula'rly welcomes the
very favourable references to nuclear non-proli-
feration in the agreed summit statementrr, in
particular " enlarging its membership " with
reference to the non-proliferation treaty, the
" strengthening of the IAEA " and its safeguards
and the intent to continue regular bilateral
consultations on non-proliferation.
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APPENDIX
Statemerrts issued by President Rmgan and General Secretary Gorbacliev,
Geneva, 2 Ist November 19ES
(a) Joint stotement issued by
President Reagan and
General Secretary Gorbachev
(Extracts)
...These comprehensive discussions cov-
ered the basic questions of United States-Soviet
relations and the current international situation.
The meetings were frank and useful. Serious
differences remain on a number of critical issues.
While acknowledging the differences in
their systems and approaches to international
issues, some greater understanding of each side's
view was achieved by the two leaders. They
agreed about the need to improve United States-
Soviet relations and the international situation
as a whole.
In this connection the two sides have
confirmed the importance of an ongoing dia-
logue, reflecting their strong desire to seek
common ground on existing problems.
They agreed to meet again in the nearest
future. The General Secretary accepted an invi-
tation by the President of the United States to
visit the United States of America and the Presi-
dent of the United States accepted an invitation
by the General Secretary of the Central Commit-
tee of the CPSU to visit the Soviet Union.
Arrangements for and time of the visits will be
agreed upon through diplomatic channels.
In their meetings, agxeement was reached
on a number of specific issues. Areas of agree-
ment are registered on the following pages.
Security
The sides, having discussed key security
issues, and conscious ofthe special responsibility
of the USSR and the United States for maintain-
ing peace, have agreed that a nuclear war cannot
be won and must never be fought. Recognising
that any conflict between the USSR and the
United States could have catastrophic conse-
quences, they emphasised the importance of
preventing any war between them, whether
nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to
achieve military superiority.
Nuclear and space tall<s
The President and the General Secretary
discussed the negotiations on nuclear and space
anns.
They agreed to accelerate the work at
these negotiations with a view to accomplishing
the tasks set down in the joint United States-
Soviet agreement of 8th January 1985, namely,
to prevent an arms race in space and to termin-
ate it on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms
and enhance strategic stability.
Noting the proposals recently tabled by
the United States and the Soviet Union, they
called for early progress, in particular in areas
where there is common ground, including the
principle of 50% reductions in the nuclear arms
of the United States and the USSR appropriately
applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF
agreement.
During the negotiatio4 of these agree-
ments effective measures fdr verification of
compliance with obligations assumed will be
agreed upon.
Risk reduction centres
The sides agreed to study the question at
the expert level ofcentres to roduce nuclear risk,
taking into account the issues End developments
in the Geneva negotiations. They took satisfac-
tion in such recent steps in this direction as the
modernisation of the Soviet-United States hot-
line.
Nuclear non-prolderatio n
General Secretary GorQachev and Presi-
dent Reagan reaffirmed the cdmmitment of the
USSR and the United States to the treaty on the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their
interest in strengthening, together with other
countries, the non-proliferation r6gime and in
further enhancing the eflectiveness ofthe treaty,
inter alia by enlarging its memfership.
They note with satisfdction the overall
positive results of the recent review conference
of the treaty on the non-proliftration of nuclear
weapons.
The USSR and the United States reaffrrm
their commitment, assumed by them under the
treaty on the non-proliferdtion of nuclear
weapons, to pursue negotiatioris in good faith on
matters of nuclear arms limitation and dis-
armament in accordance with Article VI of the
treaty.
The two sides plan to continue to promote
the strengthening of the Intornational Atomic
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Energy Agency and to support the activities of
the agency in implementing safeguards as well as
in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
They view positively the practice of
regular Soviet-United States consultations on
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which
have been businesslike and constructive and
express their intent to continue this practice in
the future.
Chemical weapons
In the context of discussing security
problems, the two sides reaflirmed that they are
in favour of a general and complete prohibition
of chemical weapons and the destruction of
existing stockpiles of such weapons. They
agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effect-
ive and verifiable international convention on
this matter.
The two sides agreed to intensiry bilateral
discussions on the level ofexperts on all aspects
of such a chemical weapons ban, including the
question of verification. They agreed to initiate
a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of
chemical weapons.
MBFR
The two sides emphasised the importance
they attach to the Vienna (MBFR) negotiations
and expressed their willingness to work for posi-
tive results.
CDE
Attaching great importance to the Stock-
holm conference on confidence- and security-
building measures and disarmament in Europe
and noting the progress made there, the two
sides stated their intention to facilitate, together
with the other participating states, an early and
successful completion of the work of the confer-
ence. To this end, they reaffirmed the need for
a document which would include mutually-
acceptable confidence- and security-building
measures and give concrete expression and effect
to the principle of non-use of force.
Process of dialogue
President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev agreed on the need to place on a
regular basis and intensify dialogue at various
levels. Along with meetings between the
leaders of the two countries, this envisages
regular meetings between the USSR Minister for
Foreign Affairs and the United States Secretary
of State, as well as between the heads of other
ministries and agencies. They agree that the
recent visits of the heads of ministries and
departments in such fields as agriculture,
housing and protection of the environment have
been useful.
Recognising that exchanges of views on
regional issues on the expert level have proven
useful, they agreed to continue such exchanges
on a regular basis...
(b) Statement by General Secretary Gorbochev
(Extracts)
...The President and I have done a huge
amount of work, gone into great detail, we have
really done it in depth. And we have done it
totally openly and frankly. We have discussed
several most important issues: the relations
between our two countries and the situation in
the world today.
These are issues and problems the solving
of which in the most concrete way is of concern
both to our countries and to the peoples ofother
countries in the world. We have discussed
these issues, basing our discussions on both
sides' determination to improve relations
between the Soviet Union and the United States
of America.
We have decided that we must help to
decrease the threat of nuclear war. We must
not allow the arms race to move off on into
space. And we must cut it down on earth.
It goes without saying that discussions of
this sort we consider to be very useful. And in
its results you find a clear reflection of what the
two sides have agreed together.
We have to be realistic and straight-
forward. And therefore, the solving of the most
important problems concerning the arms race
and increasing hopes of peace, we did not
succeed in reaching at this meeting.
So of course there are important dis-
agreements on matters of principle that remain
between us. However, the President and I have
agreed that this work of seeking mutually-
acceptable decisions for these questions will be
continued here in Geneva by our represent-
atives.
We are also going to seek new kinds of
developing bilateral Soviet-American relations.
And also, we are going to have further consul-
tations on several important questions where for
the most part our positions again are completely
different.
All this (sic) we consider these forth-
coming talks to be very, very useful. But the
significance of everything which we have agreed
with the President can only of course be reflected
if we carry it on into concrete measures. If we
really want to succeed in something, then both
sides are going to have to do an awful lot of
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work in the spirit of the joint commission which
we, the joint statement which we have put out.
And in this connection I would like to
announce that the Soviet Union for its part will
do all it can in this co-operation with the United
States of America in order to achieve practical
results, to cut down the anns race, to cut down
the arsenals which we have piled up and give,
produce the conditions which will be necessary
for peace on earth and in space.
We make this announcement perfectly
aware of our responsibility both to our own
people and other peoples of the earth. And we
would very much hope that we could have the
same approach from the administration of the
United States.
(c) Statement by President Reagan
(Extract)
We have packed a lot into the last two
days. I came to Geneva to seek a fresh start in
relations between the United States and the
Soviet Union and we have done this.
General Secretary Gorbachev and I have
held comprehensive discussions covering all
elements of our relationship. I am convinced
we are heading in the right direction.
We have reached some useful interim
results which are described in the joint statement
that is being issued this morning. In agreeing to
accelerate the work of our nuclear arms negotia-
tors, Mr. Gorbachev and I have addressed our
common responsibility to strengthen peace.
I believe that we have established a
process for more intensive contacts between the
United States and the Soviet Union. These two
days of talks should inject a certain momentum
into our work on the issue between us, a
momentum we can continue at the meeting that
we have agreed on for next yoar.
Before coming to Geneva I spoke often of
the need to build confidence [n our dealings with
each other. Frank and forthright conversations
at the summit are part of this process. But I am
certain General Secretary Gorbachev would
agfee that real confidence in each other must be
built on deeds, not simply wqrds.
This is the thought that ties together all of
the proposals the United States has put on the
table in the past and this is the criteria by which
our meetings will be judged in the future.
The real report card en Geneva will not
come in for months or even years. But we
know the questions that mubt be answered: will
we join together in sharply reducing offensive
nuclear arms and moving to non-nuclear defen-
sive (unintelligible word) or systems to make
this a safer world?
Will we join together to help bring about a
peaceful resolution of conflicts in Asia, Africa
and Central America, so thdt the peoples there
can freely determine their orwn destiny without
outside interference? Will the cause of liberty
be advanced? And will the treaties and agree-
ments signed past and future be fulfrlled? The
people of America, the $oviet Union and
throughout the world are reafly to answer yes.
I leave Geneva today and our fireside
summit determined to pursure every opportunity
to build a safer world of peace and freedom.
There is hard work ahead. We are ready for it.
General Secretary Gorbachev, we ask you
to join us in getting the job done, as I am sure
you will. Thank you.
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Amendment I
2nd December 1985
Disarmament
AMENDMENT 1 
'
tabled by Mr. Antoni and others
l. At the end of paragraph I of the draft recommendation proper, add:
*, prevent the sovereignty of each member country being violated and ensure that in any event
the standards oftreaties and ofinternational law are respected; ".
Signed: Antoni, Masciadri, Pecchioli, Vecchietti, Rubbi, Francese
l. See 7th sitting, 2nd December 1985 (amendment negatived).
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Amendments 2 and 3
2nd December 1985
Disarmament
AMENDMENTS 2 and 3t
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere
2. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " the Unitqd States to examine
with the utmost attention the recent proposals " and insert " the United States and the Soviet Union to
examine with the utmost attention the reciprocal proposals ".
3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " in which full verification of
withdrawals could obviate the need for prior agreement on data, as outlined in the report of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments " and insert " providing for the full verification of
withdrawals ".
Signed: Cavaliere
l. See 7th sitting, 2nd December 1985 (amendments negatived).
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Amendments 4 and 5
2nd December 1985
Disarmament
AMENDMENTS4and5'
tabW by Mr. Antoni and others
4. I*ave out paragraph 6(b) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
" IJrge the nuclear countries to apply Resolution 4911952 of the United Nations and the
resolution of the European Parliament of l2th September 1985 on the urgency of promoting
negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty totally banning nuclear tests, urge the United States
itself to apply the moratorium decided by the Soviet Union and urge the Soviet Union and the
United States to ratiff the threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties ; ".
5. l*ave out paragraphT(d) of the draft recommendation and insert:
'Urge member governments to ensure that as far as possible Cocom restrictions no longer
concern nuclear material and installations, while respecting defence guarantees. "
Signed: Antoni, Rubbi, Vecchietti, Pecchioli, Francese
l. See 7th sitting, 2nd December 1985 (amendment 4 withdrawn; amendment 5 negatived).
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l. The Presidential Committee expressed the
wish that the Assembly's three political commit-
tees each submit a report on WEU and the stra-
tegic defence initiative in the area for which it is
responsible. As these three reports are to be the
subject ofa joint debate in plenary sitting on 3rd
and 4th December 1985, it was agreed that only
the report of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments would include a draft
recommendation on the strategic defence initia-
tive, the other two committees being asked to
give an opinion on the draft recommendation
adopted by the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments.
2. Accordingly, the report on WEU and the
strategic defence initiative 
- 
the European pillar
of the Atlantic Alliance (Document 1034), sub-
mitted by Mr. Berrier on behalf of the General
Affairs Committee and adopted by the latter on
5th November 1985, contains a chapter on the
strategic defence initiative which is the true
explanatory memorandum of the opinion of the
General Aflairs Committee on the report sub-
mitted by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments and adopted by that committee on 4th
November 1985.
3. Your Rapporteur was appointed on 5th
November so as to be able to table the General
Affairs Committee's proposed amendments to
the draft recommendation of the Committee on
Defence Questions and Armaments. This is the
subject of the present document. For the subs-
tance, he refers to Chapter III of Mr. Berrier's
report.
22nd November 19t5
The strategic defence initiative
OPINION 
'
on the draft recommendation adopted by
the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments
on 4th November 1985
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee2
by Mr. Hill" Rapporteur
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur)
Amendments
lo the dmft rccommelfutioa
odopted by the Committee on Dclence Quations
aad Armamanls
Preamble
After paragraph (i), add a new paragraph
as follows (which would become patrytaph (ii)):
" (il,) Considering that the development of
space defence technology means that
the European allies of the United States
have to make every effort to master the
new technologies which might one day
take their place in an effective defence
system; "
Paragraph (iy' (which would become paragraph(iii)):
Amend this paragraph to read:
" (iii) Believing that Europe collectively
must pursue the development of inde-
pendent space technolqgy both for civilian
applications and for defence applications
which will enhance itC security and assist
in verification of arms control agreements
and confidence-building measures; "
Paragraph (ii, (which would become para-
saph (iv)):
l*ave out from " will not undermine " to
the end ofthe paragraph and insert:
1. Adopted in committee by 12 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.
2. Members of the committee:Mr. Michel (Chairman); MM. Hardy (Alternate: Lord Hughes), van der Werlf (Vice-Chairmen);
Mr. Ahrens, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berrier(Alternate: Baumet), Bianco (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Bogaerts, Burger, Hill,Sir
Russell Johnston (Alternate: Atkinson), Mrs. Kelly, MM. Koehl, Lagneau, lagorce, Martino, Masciadri, M0ller, Prouvost, Iord
Reay,MM. Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf, van der Sanden, Spitella, Vecchiati, de Vries.
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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" and foster research on new defence sys-
tems without jeopardising existing arrns
control agreements or compromising the
negotiation of future agreements, "
Paragraph (iv)
Leave out this paragraph.
Paragraph (v)
Amend this paragraph to read:
" (v/ Believing that a strategic defence sys-
tem might play a complementary r6le
in the policy ofnuclear deterrence; "
Paragraph (vi)
l. kave out from " according to which " to
the end ofthe paragraph and insert:
" considering that the American authori-
ties have not yet explained in sufli-
cient detail the proposals for the United
States' European allies to take part in the
SDI programme, "
2. Add a footnote as follows (paragraph 3 of
the reply of the Council to Recommendation
413):
" 3. The Council welcomes the fact that
the United States and the Soviet Union
have begun global negotiations, i.e. deal-
ing with strategic weapons, INF missiles
and defence and space weapons. It hopes
that these negotiations will achieve secu-
rity at the lowest p'ossible level of forces
through substantial, balanced and veri-
fiable reductions of nuclear weapons.
The Council notes that the strategic
defence initiative (SDI) announced by the
United States is no more than a scientific
research programme and hence does not
contravene the provisions of the 1972
ABM treaty. The Council also takes the
view that laboratory research does not
lend itself to arms control measures.
On the other hand, relevant tests or
deployments will have to be a matter for
negotiation, under the terms of the ABM
treaty. In view of the contribution of this
treaty to stability, the Council stresses the
importance of preventing its erosion. "
Operative text
Paragraph I
In the first sentence, after " defence initia-
tive " insert:
" or, if that seems impossible, specifu
Europe's own interests in this area by har-
monising as far as possible the answers of
the seven WEU member countries "
Paragraph I (c)
Leave out from " on mutually " to the end
ofthe paragraph and insert:
" in all areas of SDI research on terms pro-
viding a genuine exchange of techno-
logy "
After paragraph I (c), add a new paragraph
as follows (which would become paragraph (d)):
" (d) ensure that the answers of members
of WEU to the American invitation
do not jeopardise the development
of Europe's technological capability
and encourage the development of
this capability, in particular through
the early implementation of the
Eureka programme; "
Paragraph 3
Amend this paragraph to read:
" Request all countries concerned to en-
sure that no obstacles will be placed in the
way of balanced and verifiable agreements
limiting strategic and intermediate-range
nuclear weapons and encourage the pur-
suit and success of the Soviet-American
negotiations in Geneva on the limitation
of armaments in the three areas covered; "
After paragrcph 5, add a new paragraph as
follows (which would become paragraph 6):
" 6. Ensure maintenance of the nuclear
deterrent capability of the Atlantic
Alliance as long as Europe's security is not
effectively guaranteed by other means and
consider the question of the case for ade-
quacy in conventional defence capacity,
both in the present situation and in regard
to the development of the strategic
defence initiative. "
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1. The Presidential Committee is authorised
by the Rules of Procedure, and encouraged by
the requirements of political life, to take the
necessary measures to ensure the continuity of
the Assembly's action.
2. The Assembly meets only a few days each
year in two part-sessions. But it does not consi-
der that its tasks are limited to a critical exami-
nation of the annual report which the Council is
invited, in the modified Brussels Treaty, to
submit to it each year. Its supervisory duties
and also its duties as instigator require an unin-
temrpted dialogue with the Council. The reac-
tivation of WEU, or at least the increase in the
Council's activities, makes the continuity of this
dialogue even more necessary and the responsi-
bility of the Presidential Committee in this
connection even more important.
3. The Presidential Committee is in a posi-
tion to assume this responsibility. It is not only
the Assembly's steering body, responsible inter
alia for fixing the date and place of sessions,
determining its agenda and organising its deba-
tes, it is also a political body. Apart from the
chairmen of committees, it includes the chair-
men of political groups, who are regularly asked
to attend its meetings, and a representative of
each national delegation, since it includes the
Bureau.
4. Unlike the Assembly and its other com-
mittees, the Presidential Committee is probably
not weighted de jure from the standpoint of the
national delegations nor de facto from the stand-
point of the political groups. It therefore seeks
a consensus. But it is able to act because all
points of view are represented in it, even if not
necessarily in a balanced manner.
5. Since the last session, the Presidential
Committee has therefore continued its work in
the three areas which traditionally require its
attention. It has continued its efforts to im-
prove conditions for the dialogue with the
Council. It has studied the programme of work
of the Assembly and the financial conditions for
carrying it out. It has taken the steps necessary
in the light ofcurrent events and in this context
thought fit to adopt a draft recommendation on
behalf of the Assembly to promote the expres-
sion of the solidarity of the WEU member coun-
tries with the Mexican people so sorely tried by
the earthquake which caused many victims and
serious damage in the country's capital.
Action by the Presidential Committee
REPORT
submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee
by Mr. Reddemann, Yice-President of the Assembly
28th November 1985
6. In this connection, the Council informed
the Assembly of measures taken by its members
in a bilateral or international framework to assist
the victims by immediately sending equipment
to hasten the release of those who were trapped
and providing financial and material assistance
for the Mexican authorities.
7. But neither the Council's replies to recom-
mendations nor its replies to written questions
(some of which reach parliamentarians very late)
suflice to ensure the continuity of the dialogue
with the Council. In the spirit of the 1984
Rome declaration, the Assembly therefore ins-
tructed the Presidential Comrnittee, in Order 58,
" to establish permanent liaison arrangements
with the Council or its presiddncy and to see that
the Assembly is enabled to bfing to a successful
conclusion its mission in worfting out a new and
more important r6le for WEU ".
8. Since the Assembly is finding it diflicult,
for financial reasons, to accofnplish its mission,
it also instructed the Presidedtial Committee, in
Order 59, " to invite the Counpil... to give favour-
able consideration " to the budgetary proposals
the Assembly was soon to make for improving
its conditions of work.
9. The Presidential Courmittee therefore
informed the Council of its wish to organise the
dialogue between the Council and the Assembly
on the basis of these two orders, speciffing that
" the first refers mainly to arranging the political
dialogue between the Assembly and the Council
so that the Assembly may be informed and
heard in due time, whereas the second seeks to
establish a consensus with the Council for the
Assembly to be provided with the budgetary
means of fulfilling its mission ".
10. In this spirit, it was proposed to organise a
meeting between the Presi{ential Committee
and the Permanent Council]. This suggestion
was agreed to in principle, buf it proved difficult
to apply and the meeting wds postponed until
the next session. The purpose was to establish
new procedure allowing the Presidential Com-
mittee to keep the Permanent Council informed
of its concerns, the Permanent Council being
composed of the ambassadors to the Court of
St. James and a senior official from the Foreign
Office. It meets regularly in London under tle
chairmanship of the Secretary-General. It
would thus be possible for the Permanent Coun-
cil to inform the Presidential Committee of the
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progress of the Council's work, for the Presiden-
tial Committee to inform the Permanent Coun-
cil of certain difficulties encountered by the
Assembly and for both bodies to smooth out
obstacles standing in the way of relations
between the Council and the Assembly.
11. It was impossible to hold this meeting for
reasons which were apparently minor but which
were in fact important, since it was a matter of
ensuring that members of the Presidential Com-
mittee could take part in a real working
meeting. An Assembly committee can in fact
meet usefully only if it has simultaneous inter-
pretation. The Council, which is accustomed to
its own methods of work, had not realised the
importance of this point for the representatives
of national parliaments. This misunderstan-
ding has now been cleared up and thanks to the
action of the Chairman-in-Offrce of the Council,
Mr. Andreotti, to whom the Assembly should
express its gratitude, the Presidential Committee
will meet during the session with both the
Chairman-in-Oflice of the Council and the
Permanent Council. It is to be hoped that on
that occasion it will be possible to agree to
arrange for the Presidential Committee to meet
the Permanent Council, whenever necessary, in
between ministerial meetings which, it is to be
hoped, will allow certain outstanding problems
between the governmental and parliamentary
bodies of the organisation to be settled by
flexible procedure.
12. Another meeting could not be held
because of circumstances over which the part-
ners had no control, i.e. the meeting between
the Committee for Relations with the Council
and the Chairman-in-Office of the Council
which had to be postponed because of the minis-
terial crisis in ltaly. The Assembly was there-
fore unable to inform the Council of its views
before the ministerial meeting in Rome.
13. In spite of these mishaps, the dialogue
between the Council and the Assembly has deve-
loped thanks to the meetings between the Presi-
dent of the Assembly and the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council, i.e. with the German and
Italian Ministers for Foreign Affairs succes-
sively. These meetings have borne fnrit and in
particular allowed preparations to be made for
the traditional meeting between the Presidential
Committee and the Council at ministerial level.
The most recent meeting was held in Rome on
14th November.
14. Members of the Presidential Committee
who were present were thus able to be informed
before the press of the results of the meeting
which had just been held. However, in the very
brief time assigned to this meeting (forty-five
minutes) the Presidential Committee was unable
to start a real dialogue which would have been
an exchange of views on the matters raised
rather than information being conveyed to
parliamentarians. Moreover, the information
given was then communicated to the press.I will leave the task of analysing it to
others. It is not for the Rapporteur of the Presi-
dential Committee to draw his own conclusions
from the results of the ministerial meeting. He
must underline, however, that while the results
obtained by the Presidential Committee were
meagre in building up relations with the
Council, they were even more disappointing in
budgetary matters since no answer has been
given to the proposals and requests made on
behalf of the Assembly.
15. The Presidential Committee saw that to
implement the Assembly committees' full pro-
gramme of work would mean slight overspen-
ding under two sub-heads of the budget relating
to the travelling expenses of members of the
OfEce of the Clerk and the cost of interpreta-
tion. Since the Council imposed large reduc-
tions in estimates under the 1985 budget, it
seemed very diflicult to offset this overspending
by savings under other sub-heads. In spite of
many letters, each of which gave further details,
the Permanent Council has not answered the
wishes expressed by the Assembly.
16. The same is true for the draft budget for
the financial year 1986 which was drawn up by
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admi-
nistration, as provided for in the Charter, in
consultation with the Presidential Commit-
tee. It is paradoxical to note that the Perma-
nent Council has not followed the procedure to
which it visibly attached such great importance
last year since it failed to make its opinion
known before the Assembly studied the draft
budget thus prepared. Admittedly, we were
aware of the negative reactions of many budget
experts but as of now no offrcial opinion has
been brought to our attention by a responsible
Council body.
17. Hopes placed this time last year in the
effects of the decisions taken in Rome on the
occasion of the celebration of the thirtieth anni-
versary of WEU have thus been disappoin-
ted. It is certainly not the fault of the
Chairman-in-Office of the Council who has, on
the contrary, made praiseworthy efforts to allow
the Assembly to benefit from the political and
financial conditions it needs for the accom-
plishment of its mission. I propose that the
Assembly convey its warrrest thanks to him
when he addresses it next Wednesday. Our
disappointment is in fact due to the absence of
agreement in the Council on giving Western
Europe the means of making its voice heard in
areas which concern its own security. The diffi-
culty which the Presidential Committee has had
in making itself heard is therefore but the sig;n of
a languishing European will.
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Document 1046 2nd December 1985
Druft budget of the administrative erpenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 19E6
PREVIOUS QUESTTON '
moyed by Sir Dudley Smith
on behalf of the Committee on Badgetary Alfairs and Administation
under Rale 32 of the Rules of Procedure
The Assembly,
(i) Considering the procedure for approving Assembly budgets as set out in the attached note;(iil Considering that the opinion of the Council has not yet been communicated to the Assembly;(ii, Considering that the Assembly is therefore unable to vote in full knowledge of the facts on a
budget which provides for various options and sets priorities,
DscroEs
That the draft budget is withdrawn from the agenda of the session.
Sigtaed: Dudley Smith
Note
Procedure in force for approving Assembly budgets is as follows:
(i) the Assembly's Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration produces a draft
budget;
(ii) this draft, accompanied by an explanatory memorandum, is sent to the Council for an
oprnron;
(iii) the Council gives its opinion, indicating either preparedness to accept the draft or proposing
amendments;
(iv) in the latter case, if the Council's amendments are not acceptable and tha matter cannot be
settled by correspondance, they are discussed at a joint meeting;
(v) the draft budget, as eventually agreed, then continues through the Assembly's normal
procedure;
(vil the budget, as then approved by the Assembly (during the second part of t[re annual session),
goes back to the Council and, if it has not been further amended by the Assembly, the
Council can formally approve it without further discussion.
l. Se€ l0th sitting, 4th December 1985 (previous question agreed to).
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Document 1047 4th December 1985
Iran-Iro4 war
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
'
tabled by Mr. Bianco and others
The Assembly,
(i) Considering the serious human and financial losses caused by the war between Iran and lraq;
(ii) Considering the present r6gime's insistence on continuing the war between Iran and lraq, which
is a serious threat to peace and tranquillity in the area and throughout the world;
(iit) Considering the will of the lranian people to bring the war to a peaceful conclusion, which finds a
positive point of reference in the peace plan of the National Resistance Council;
(iv) Considering further the resolutions submitted to and adopted by the Council of Europe,
CoNoeuNs the policy of the Iranian r6gime, which continues to be based on recourse to war and
the violation of human rights, as dramatically demonstrated by the list of 12,028 victims in the
Mujaheddin publication.
Signed: Bianco, Palumbo, Martino, Sinesio, Amadei, Milterdorfer, Sarti, Rauti, Cifarelli, Giust
l. See l lth sitting, 4th December l9E5 (motion referred to the Presidential Committee).
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Document l04t 3rd December 1985
Drafi budga of the administative *penditure of the Assembly
for thefinancial year 19E6
MOTION FOR AN ORDER 
'
tabled by Sir Dudley Smith
under Rule i0 of the Rules of Procedure
The Assembly,
(il Having decided not to vote on its draft budget at the present session;
(ii) Noting that:
(a) most of the Council's budget experts were in favour of strict application of the principle of
zero growth to the budget of the Assembly;
(b) they did not take account of the fact that the reactivation of WEU has further aggravated the
difficulties which the Assembly has already encountered in fulfilling its tasks, whereas they
have demonstrated their intention to take into consideration the effects of roactivation on the
Secretariat-General in London;
(c) the Council has not adopted a position on the draft budget of the Assembly;
(d) thrs draft budget provides for different options depending on the opinion of the Council and
specific priorities,
INsrnucrs rnr PneslnrNrlq,L Coururrer
l. To negotiate with the Council for the Assembly to be granted adequate financilal means to allow
it to play its r6le in a reactivated WEU;
2. In application of Rule 14, parugraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure, to take the necessary measures
to finalise the Assembly's draft budget in acceptable conditions.
Signed: DudleY Smith
L See lOth sitting, 4th December 1985 (motion agreed to).
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